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THE TRAUMA OF BIRTH
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THE TRAUMA OF BIRTH

by Otto Rank

*Das Trauma der Geburt*, 1924;

English translation 1929
INTRODUCTION TO THE DOVER EDITION (1993, out of print)

by E. James Lieberman

One of the most remarkable books in the history of psychology, The Trauma of Birth marked the beginning of the end of the relationship between Sigmund Freud and his favorite disciple, Otto Rank. Rank dedicated the work to his mentor, "the explorer of the unconscious, creator of psychoanalysis." Freud, grateful and gracious, praised it as the greatest advance since the discovery of psychoanalysis. But he had only read the first part. (1)

Das Trauma der Geburt was published in 1924, the year Otto Rank turned forty and made his first visit to the United States. Thus Rank brought his new ideas to America, in English, as soon as the book appeared in German. In New York, Rank was hailed as Freud's emissary, a brilliant man who--unlike Alfred Adler and Carl Jung--could express original ideas while remaining faithful to his mentor. Rank became an honorary member of the American Psychoanalytic Association; professionals and laypersons sought him out for brief therapy. Of course there were some, like the influential psychiatrist A. A. Brill, who were jealous or suspicious. When he and Rank's rivals in Europe aroused Freud's anxiety about Rank's deviation from the narrow path of psychoanalytic orthodoxy, Freud withdrew his support of the new ideas.

Rank, 28 years younger than Freud, had come to his mentor in 1905, just in time to help start up the psychoanalytic movement as Secretary of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. A modest stipend enabled him to complete his PhD. at the University of Vienna in 1912. By then Alfred Adler had been expelled from the movement and Carl Jung was about to go. Rank's career was entirely different: clearly Freud's favorite, he became the mainstay of Freud's inner circle—the Committee, or "Ring."

Then came this book, just a year after The Development of Psychoanalysis, co-authored by Sandor Ferenczi and Rank: both dealt with a more active approach to therapy, and both had Freud's imprimatur until controversy surrounded them. The two books caused a rift in the Committee which Freud could not heal. Pressured by Rank's rivals, he challenged his protégé in letters to New York. Rank, dismayed and furious, counterattacked forcefully, but on his return to Vienna he was reconciled with Freud and the Ring long enough to prepare a move to Paris. From there, beginning in 1926, Rank visited the United States almost every year until finally settling there in 1934. Five years later he died, at 55, a month after Freud passed away in London.

The Trauma of Birth was praised, criticized, misunderstood and, finally, ignored after Rank's break with orthodox analysis. Rich with ideas whose time had not yet come, the book brought a rebuttal by Freud in Inhibition, Symptom, and Anxiety (1926), which included a major
revision of Freud's theory of anxiety. Unfortunately, other writers took parts of Rank's thesis and oversimplified or distorted it. A recent reprint of the original German version includes a modern introduction which virtually ignores the text but enthusiastically links Rank to natural childbirth (F. Leboyer), primal scream therapy (Arthur Janov), mind-altering drugs (S. Grof) and intrauterine experience. (2)

Misinterpretations of the birth trauma theory began soon after its appearance. In 1928, the respected psychiatrist Marion Kenworthy, extending Rank's theory into obstetrics, said the child born by Caesarian section "is prone to be less sensitized--he cries less, is markedly less irritated by the contacts of handling, etc.,--than the child delivered through the birth canal." She warned of "profound nervous and emotional shock, a concomitant of every hard birth experience," urging obstetricians to keep pregnant women on diets to produce smaller babies who would be able to get through the birth canal with less trauma! (3) A recent writer asserts, scornfully (but inaccurately), "Rankians proposed that all children be born by Caesarian section to eliminate birth trauma." (4)

Rank bears responsibility for some of the confusion, since he does speak of more and less severe birth traumas. He was too eager to make a strong biological argument, perhaps because he lacked a medical degree with which to bolster his authority. But his basic point is psychological: expulsion from the blissful intrauterine state--separation from the mother—is inevitably traumatic. Caesarian section cannot prevent that. Furthermore, that trauma is the prototype for all anxiety crises: weaning, walking, the Oedipal conflict, willing and choosing anything important--i.e., living creatively--and, finally, dying.

The Trauma of Birth sets forth a number of interrelated ideas which are crucial to all of Rank's subsequent work in theory and therapy: the pre-Oedipal phase of development; the importance of the mother; end-setting in therapy (whether brief or long-term); separation; the notion of will; and self-creation or psychological rebirth. The book sparkles with gems of insight set in solid historical, philosophical, anthropological, artistic and literary foundations. Lay readers who feel dazzled or bewildered by some of the theoretical acrobatics should take solace in the fact that Freud had similar feelings.

Rank gives Freud credit for various ideas in the book, notably that birth is the primal anxiety, and that setting termination time in analysis can be useful. Rank wrote this book to praise Freud, not to defy him. Rank's hope and need for Freud's approval kept him from seeing the hazards of leaping forward, farther than Freud was willing to let him go. Perhaps such faith in a mentor is essential for a disciple to take the big creative risk. The alternative--not to care--is unthinkable in the case of these two remarkable men.

Nowadays we forget the degree to which Freud's psychology was father-centered prior to The Trauma of Birth. Rank was quite aware of this pervasive ideology in science and society: "It has been noticed, especially in recent times, that our whole mental outlook has given
predominance to the man's point of view and has almost entirely neglected the woman's" (p. 36). This sets Rank apart as the first feminist in Freud's inner circle. Today, of course, we take for granted that the mother-child relationship is crucial in the earliest formative phase of development, but then psychoanalytic theory presented a strong father threatening castration, and a mother whose importance was more erotic than nurturing.

The birth trauma is followed by two normal developmental separations: weaning and walking. Only later does the Oedipal drama become central--and then modified somewhat. (5) The debate over Rank's theory raged around this point, since the Oedipus complex had become synonymous with Freudian theory and clinical practice. To Rank, separation from the analyst at the end of treatment recreated the birth trauma. Analysts and patients confirmed Rank's observation that the ending of treatment brought forth dreams and strong emotions replete with birth symbolism. And Rank brings in Socrates as midwife to the birth of the self through insight (p. 181): the perfect example of knowledge aiding experience. Rank felt that analysis was often too intellectually ritualized, blocking rather than facilitating change, which depends upon experience as much as insight.

As the table of contents indicates, this book ranges through art, anthropology, religion, philosophy and psychology, with an anchor in biology: Rank chose “anchor” to describe the biologically rooted anxiety which is the crux of his thesis (p. 187). To sum up: we are violently expelled from uterine bliss, threatened with asphyxia along the way. Our lives are dedicated to finding that bliss again, by adapting the world-as-mother to ourselves or vice versa. We repress the birth trauma and the prenatal memory of bliss, but play out the representations of both in every aspect of living and dying. We are anchored to life in large part by (literally) breathtaking anxiety that prevents regression to a state of fetal mindlessness, on the one hand, or suicide, on the other. Life is hard, and the periods before and afterwards are infinitely better (not the Nietzschean epigraph) but we are trapped in our human status, half animal, half divine.

We are trapped, and anxiety keeps us from simply exiting. Having said this, Rank takes us in big leaps from era to era and culture to culture, cradle to coffin, Sphinx to Eden to Golgotha. He is a virtuoso interpreter of “the whole development of mankind, even of the actual fact of becoming human” (p. xxvii).

Rank cites many authors, including some Freud would view askance, like Stekel, Jung, Adler and Tausk. Rank does find fault with Jung and Adler, and always praises Freud, yet with the praise comes some audacious analysis. Rank credits Josef Breuer with the discovery of psychoanalysis as did Freud (p. 183); Rank commends Freud's diligence on the difficult path and faults those who defected, but then also criticizes those Freudians who “interpreted the master's teachings all too literally” (p. 184): this must have galled his conservative rivals on the Committee, and shows how confident he was of his mentor's favor. Rank then takes up the separation of Freud and Breuer, “the severance of the pupil from his master” (p. 186), a brilliant
piece of analysis, unintentionally prophetic of what was about to happen in his own life. Freud's break with Breuer occurred when the younger man was 40! (6)

Could Rank have failed to see the parallel in the present situation? Just as a virtuoso musician may miss notes in an otherwise brilliant performance, so Otto Rank overreaches now and then, or misses something apparent to the outsider. Rank lived through Freud's breaks with Adler, Stekel, Jung and Tausk and he knew about Breuer and Fliess. But Rank also knew he was unique in Freud's checkered history of collegial relationships; he expected to be able to spread his wings and still return to the nest. He was wrong, and both men were hurt deeply by the break.

Rank probably could have remained under Freud's wing by yielding, but would not or could not. As for Trauma of Birth, Rank admitted “some of the criticism is just,” but defended his general position and rebutted Freud's arguments forcefully. (7)

Freud believed that the analysand presents a baby to the analyst at the end of therapy. This book, a birthday present to Freud, was Rank's baby. Freud did not like it any more than Laius liked Jocasta's baby. I find an ironic Oedipal metaphor here: The baby could not live in Freud's house; Rank would not kill it, so he had to leave.

Did the baby, like Oedipus, kill the father? Hardly: Freudian analysis flourished, especially in the United States, Rank's adopted home. The book was not translated into English until 1929, without the original dedication. In 1930 A. A. Brill denounced Rank as mentally ill, and ousted him from the American Psychoanalytic Association. Worse yet, Rank's analysands who wanted to be members of the American or the International Psychoanalytic Association had to be reanalyzed by an orthodox Freudian!

This reprint appears in the midst of a Rankian renaissance and at a time when brief therapy has become part of the mainstream. Otto Rank is the founding father of brief therapy, and even orthodox psychoanalysts are belatedly discovering this man's indispensable contributions to the Freudian enterprise. After over half a century, I hope this book will join the works of Freud and Ferenczi again in their timeless search for understanding of the human psyche and society.

--E. JAMES LIEBERMAN


There is an old story that King Midas had hunted for the wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus, for a long time in the woods without catching him. But when he finally fell into his hands, the King asked: “What is the very best and the most preferable thing for Man?” The demon remained silent, stubborn, and motionless; until he was finally compelled by the King, and then broke out into shrill laughter, uttering these words: “Miserable, ephemeral species, children of chance and of hardship, why do you compel me to tell you what is most profitable for you not to hear? The very best is quite unattainable for you: it is, not to be born, not to exist, to be Nothing. But the next best for you is—to die soon.”

Nietzsche: *The Birth of Tragedy.*
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The following arguments indicate a first attempt to apply the psychoanalytic way of thinking, as such, to the comprehension of the whole development of mankind, even of the actual fact of becoming human. It would be more correct not to use the word “apply,” for it is not a question of one of the usual works on the “Application of Psychoanalysis to the Mental Sciences”; rather it is a matter of making psychoanalytic thought productive for our entire conception of mankind and history. This finally represents the history of mind, that is, the history of the development of the human mind and of the things created by it.

This particular viewpoint, still too new to be quite clearly grasped, is made accessible to us through Psychoanalysis by reason of the prodigious extension of our consciousness, which at the present time enables us to recognize part of the deepest Unconscious as such, and to understand its mode of operation. As scientific knowledge itself is no more than a conscious comprehension of previously latent facts, it is only logical that every particle of the extension of our consciousness, gained by analysis, should be converted into understanding. It is now shown at a quite definite point of psychoanalytic knowledge, which we shall soon characterize more definitely, that there is also a considerable part of organic or biological development which can be understood only from the psychical side; that is, from the side which, together with all the residue of development, includes also our own instrument of knowledge, which has suddenly become definitely more efficient through our progressive knowledge of the Unconscious.

We have taken certain new individual psychoanalytic experiences solely as a starting-point for a more comprehensive view and for general knowledge; but we believe that in so doing we have opened up the way to something essentially different from the hitherto prevailing “application” of Psychoanalysis. Thus we also lay stress on the fact that we want to keep ourselves free from an overestimation of the psychoanalytic doctrine of the Unconscious as applied to therapy, without thereby departing from the psychoanalytic way of thinking. But at the same time we extend this line of thought in both directions. It is, then, no accident that Psychoanalysis, as soon as it began to develop from a therapeutic procedure into a doctrine of the Unconscious, almost simultaneously deviating from its original medical field, invaded and enriched well-nigh every mental science, and finally itself became one of the most important of mental movements of the present day. The psychic patient, from whose material and by whose help Psychoanalysis was discovered and developed, will always remain the native source for further investigation and extension of the doctrine. Yet this origin is of no more importance today than, for instance, the
country from which Columbus set forth, and which furnished the bold explorer with practical means for his voyage.

We have attempted in the first place to sketch in the following pages a part of the further development of psychoanalysis itself, as it has proceeded from the consistent application of the method created by Freud, and from the doctrine based on the method. Then, starting from this basis, we have tried to gain a general and a wider knowledge through a direct comprehension of the Unconscious. Whoever is familiar with the particular course of psychoanalytic investigation will not be astonished to find that starting both generally and in individual cases from the upper layers of consciousness, and penetrating ever further into its hidden depths, this method ultimately reaches a point at which it finds its natural limitation, but likewise also its foundation. After a thorough examination of the Unconscious, its psychical content and complicated mechanism of conversion into the conscious, by the analysis both of abnormal and of normal people, we have come up against the final origin of the psychical unconscious in the psycho-physical, which we can now make biologically comprehensible as well. In attempting to reconstruct for the first time from analytic experiences the to all appearances purely physical birth trauma with its prodigious psychical consequences for the whole development of mankind, we are led to recognize in the birth trauma the ultimate biological basis of the psychical. In this way we gain a fundamental insight into the nucleus of the Unconscious on which Freud has constructed which may claim to be comprehensive and scientific. In this sense, the following arguments are only possible and intelligible on the basis of the whole body of knowledge gained psychoanalytically, about the construction and the functioning of our own psychical instrument.

If it has thus become possible to give a biological basis to the Unconscious, that is, to the psychical proper, discovered and investigated by Freud, then a second purpose of this work is to arrange synthetically, in its wide connection with the mechanics of the Unconscious thus founded, the whole psychical development of man as shown from the analytically recognized importance of the birth trauma and in the continually recurring attempts to overcome it. We notice, moreover, with astonishment how, without compulsion, we succeed in linking the deepest biological layer of the Unconscious to the highest manifest content of the mental productions of mankind. In this way the foundation and the principle correspond with, and harmoniously supplement one another, or as Freud himself expresses it in his latest work: “What has belonged to the depths in the individual psychical life, becomes the highest in the human psyche in the sense of our valuation, through the formation of an ideal.”1
Whilst attempting in the following pages to trace the mechanism of this “ideal-formation” in the development of man right to its biological basis, we recognize through all the complicated transformations of the Unconscious— which Psychoanalysis first taught us to understand—how the deepest biological content ultimately almost unchanged, though indiscernible only through our own inner repression, yet remains tangible as manifest form even in the highest intellectual accomplishments. There is apparent in this a normal and universally valid psycho-biological law, the full significance of which is neither to be estimated nor exhausted within the compass of the arguments we have outlined here. But the chief purpose of this work is to draw attention to this biologically based law of the form which determines the content, and here and there to suggest to the imagination rather than to wish to solve, the wider problems which loom up from behind. But to be able to set forth the whole problem at all, and to risk at least the first steps towards its solution, this we owe to the instrument of investigation and to the way of thinking which Freud has given us in Psychoanalysis.
As a preliminary to my task of pursuing a little further the investigation of the Unconscious from my psychoanalytic experiences and observations, I should like to refer to a fundamental principle which has hitherto guided psychoanalytic investigation. Freud has occasionally remarked that Psychoanalysis was really invented by the first patient whom Breuer treated in the year 1881, and whose case (Anna O-) was published many years later (1895) in the *Studien über Hysterie*. The young girl, who understood only English in her nervous states, called the soothing hypnotic speeches to her doctor the *talking cure*, or jokingly referred to them as *chimney sweeping*. And in later years, when hostility was shown to psychoanalytic experiences and results on account of their astonishing novelty, and they were criticized as being productions of the author’s perverted imagination, Freud used to hold up against these stupid objections the argument that no human brain would have been able to invent such facts and connections, if they had not been persistently forced on it by a series of similar observations. In this sense, therefore, one may say that not only the basic idea of Psychoanalysis but also its further development is largely due to the patients whose valuable efforts supplied an accumulation of material which, though fragmentary in character and unequal in worth, was eventually condensed by means of Freud’s power of observation into general notions, principles, and laws.

Only in this path of investigation, along which Psychoanalysis has gone step by step, striving against all kinds of resistances, can Freud’s statement, that the patient somehow is really always right although he himself does not know how and why, be fully estimated. But the analyst has to show him this by revealing connections which were repressed, by filling in memories previously forgotten, and by disclosing the “meaning” of the illness and of its symptoms. Psychologically too the patient is right, because the Unconscious — although by means of pathologic distortion—speaks through him as it has spoken formerly through the mouths of geniuses, prophets, founders of religions, artists, philosophers, and discoverers. For not only is the psychological knowledge which is based on intuition a step towards the grasping and understanding of the Unconscious, but the capability of recognition itself presupposes to a certain extent a removal and overcoming of repression, behind which we can “reveal” the things sought for. The scientific value of
psychoanalyses applied to others lies in the fact that they enable us, often by great effort, to remove the repressions in others which we cannot detect in ourselves; and thus we gain insight into new fields of the Unconscious. If I now refer to the objective method of investigation by Psychoanalysis, it is because, under the abundance of astonishing impressions of the same kind, I was forced to the conclusion that the Unconscious is once more right at the very point where hitherto we dared to follow it only hesitatingly and incredulously.

In a number of analyses, most of which were successfully accomplished, I noticed that in the end-phase of the analysis the healing process was quite regularly represented by the Unconscious in the typical birth symbolism, which to a large extent is already known to us. I have also attempted, in a hitherto unpublished work (written in the winter of 1921-22), entitled Zum Verständnis der Libidoentwicklung im Heilungsvorgang (“Concerning the Understanding of the Libido Development in the Healing Process”),1 to show the theoretical importance of these astonishing facts in connection with other characteristic features of the healing process (for instance, the identification with the analyst, etc.). I mentioned there that it is obviously a matter of the well-known rebirth-phantasy, in which the patient’s desire for recovery expresses its accomplishment. In the same way patients frequently speak, in their convalescence, of feeling “new born.” I emphasize also the unmistakable part of the work of sublimation, which lies in the fact that the patient is now able to renounce the infantile libido fixation, expressed in the Ædipus complex, in favour of the analysis. He does this finally by renouncing the phantasy of the infant child, which he—as the mother—wishes to present to the father, and by considering himself the new-born (spiritual) child (of the analyst).

In spite of this conception, regularly emerging from the analytic material which I there briefly mentioned, and which without doubt seems justified within the limits of the healing process, I was struck on the one hand by the infantile character of the “rebirth-phantasy,” and on the other hand by its “anagogic” character, which has been valued to excess by Jung to the neglect of its libidinal tendencies, and hence has been misleading theoretically.

The existence of such ideas has never been denied; what puzzled me was that the real basis of thoughts of this kind was missing.

So I left the matter, till one day, in a specially obvious case, it became clear to me that the strongest resistance to the severance of the libido transference at the end of the analysis is expressed in the form of the earliest infantile fixation on the mother. In numerous dreams belonging to this end-phase, the finally undeniable fact forced itself upon us again and again that the fixation on the mother, which seems to be at the bottom of the analytic fixation (transference), includes the earliest physiological relation to the mother’s womb. This rendered the regularity of the rebirth-phantasy intelligible and its underlying reality analytically comprehensible. The patient’s “rebirth-phantasy” is simply a repetition in the analysis of his own birth. The freeing of the libido from its object, the analyst, seems to correspond to an exact reproduction of the first separation from the first libido object, namely of the newborn child from the mother.

Since patients, irrespective of sex, and uninfluenced by the analyst (who was himself ignorant of the fact), seemed to create this terminal situation quite regularly, it became clear that this was a matter of fundamental import, and that here again one would have to have the courage to follow on the track of the Unconscious and to take it seriously. It is proved, then, without doubt that the essential part of the work of analysis, the solving and freeing of the libido “neurotically” fixed on the analyst, is really neither

1 Cf. Freud, “History of an Infantile Neurosis,” Collected Papers, vol. iii., p. 583 ff., and the discussion involved there which we continue and attempt to solve in the last chapter but one.

more nor less than allowing the patient to repeat with better success in the analysis the separation from the mother. But this is by no means to be taken metaphorically in any way—not even in the psychological sense. For in the analytic situation the patient repeats, biologically, as it were, the period of pregnancy, and at the conclusion of the analysis—i.e., the re-separation from the substitute object—he repeats his own birth for the most part quite faithfully in all its details. The analysis finally turns out to be a belated accomplishment of the incompletely mastered of the birth
trauma. This conclusion, to which I was forced by a mass of heterogeneous material, but especially by dreams which will be published in a wider connection, immediately aroused in me certain objections to which I will only allude, since they were soon removed by further experiences. It is possible, I reflected, that owing to my individuality, or owing to a special application of the technique which, according to the classical Freudian method, begins, though it certainly does not end, with the disintegration of “complexes” — it is possible, however, that I may be driving back the Ego of the patient to earlier and yet earlier libido positions, so that finally it would not be surprising if, in the terminal stage of the analysis, the last flight of the libido were to the intrauterine stage. One might even hold that this would be the final result in the case of very prolonged analyses. On the other hand, I would like to emphasize that first of all it is not a matter of a mere phenomenon of regression, in the meaning of the “womb-phantasy” familiar to us all, which has long been considered by

1 Ferenczi accepted a similar assumption for the process of disintegration in progressive paralysis. Hollos-Ferenczi, Psychoanalysis and the Psychic Disorders of General Paresis.

Psychoanalysis to be a typical primal phantasy. But it is a matter of much more substantial reproductions under the influence of a real repetition compulsion. Further, my analyses, as far as I know, are some of the shortest in duration, lasting from four to eight months at the very longest.

But this and other thoughts of a similar kind, which came to me at the beginning, soon disappeared under the following overwhelming impression. In focussing attention analytically on these facts one noticed that people, theoretically and therapeutically entirely uninfluenced, showed from the very beginning of their treatment the same tendency to identify the analytic situation with the intrauterine state. In some cases, started at the same time, but differing completely in type and character of neurosis, the patients of both sexes identified the analyst with the mother from the beginning in a very decided manner, and in their dreams and reactions they put themselves back again into the position of the unborn. Hence the real transference-libido, which we have to solve analytically in both sexes, is the mother-libido, as it existed in the prenatal physiological connection between mother and child.

When one has become more accustomed to this conception it almost seems as if one had always tacitly, or rather unconsciously, worked with it in view; but at the same time one notices with
astonishment how much goes to support it, how many dark and enigmatic problems in analysis, and especially in the healing process, vanish at a stroke as soon

1 I shall also publish the proof for this just as it came under my observation, in a work *On the Technique of Dream Interpretation in Psychoanalyses* (already partly published in the first volume of *The Technique of Psychoanalysis*).

as one is able to grasp the full meaning and the fundamental importance of this fact.

Above all, the analytic situation, which historically has developed from the hypnotic state,1 seems to challenge a direct comparison between the Unconscious and the primal state. Consider only the restful position in a half-darkened room, the dreamy state of phantasy (hallucinations) almost free from any of the claims of reality, the presence and at the same time the uncertainty of the libido object, and so on. This unconscious conception of the analytic situation explains why the patient, in his associations, which unconsciously have ultimately in view the primal mother situation, is able spontaneously to go back into his childhood and so bring the analyst to recognize the importance of infantile material and infantile impressions. Also the consciously directed associations correspond to an asymptotic approach to that primary attitude of transference in which the patient unconsciously puts himself from the beginning.

The increased memory capacity, especially for forgotten (repressed) impressions of childhood, occurring in the analysis, is thus to be explained (like the similar phenomenon in hypnosis) by the tendency of the Unconscious, encouraged by the suggestion of the doctor (transference), to reproduce the real, that is, the primal, situation, as automatically happens, for example, in the likewise hypermnestic state of the dream, of certain neurotic conditions (*double conscience*)

1 The hypnotic sleep, as all similar conditions in the dreams of rebirth, appears as a typical element of the intrauterine state; it may be assumed that the essence of hypnosis itself, the capacity of being hypnotized, goes back to the primal relation of the child to the mother. Moreover, Paul Bjerre expressed a similar thought many years ago (*Das Wesen der Hypnose*).
or of psychotic regressive formations (the so-called “archaic thoughts”). In this sense all memories of infancy must, to a certain extent, be considered as “cover-memories”; and the whole capacity for reproduction in general would be due to the fact that the “primal scene” can never be remembered, because the most painful of all “memories,” namely the birth trauma, is linked to it by “association.” The almost incredible findings of the technique of “free associations” received in this way their biological basis. But we will not yield to the temptation to tackle the whole psycho-physical problem of memory from this Archimedean point, from which the whole process of repression starts, and which is analytically easy to undo.1 One can only advance the supposition that the primal repression of the birth trauma may be considered as the cause of memory in general—that is, of the partial capacity for remembering. Thus the fact that detached memories remain with one as if specially chosen out shows on the one hand that they have been absorbed by the primal repression, and on the other hand that they will be reproduced2 later on as a substitute for the really repressed, the primal trauma.

It is therefore quite natural that the analytic resistance to the giving up of this phase of the mother-binding, once

1 See the last chapter.

2 It would lead us too far to pursue this important theme in detail. In the case of one patient with a phenomenal memory, it was analytically easy to establish that her entire skill rested on the intense repression of a severe birth trauma. Her whole association mechanism was built up on numerous dates of birth, taken from relatives, acquaintances, and historical persons. From this a new light fell on the problematical analysis of the occurrence of numbers, in which almost always birth dates appear as the centres of association. See also further remarks below as to time.

really experienced, should concern the father (substitute), who actually initiated the primal severance from the mother and so became the first and lasting enemy. The task, then, of the analyst, who in the course of the treatment represents both objects of the infantile libido, is to
sever this primal fixation on the mother, a task which the patient was unable to accomplish alone. The analyst has also to deal with the libido thus freed and to make it capable of being further transferred to the father or mother image, according to the sex of the patient. When the analyst succeeds in overcoming the primal resistance, namely the mother-fixation, with regard to his own person in the transference relation, then a definite term is fixed for the analysis, within which period the patient repeats automatically the new severance from the mother (substitute) figure, in the form of the reproduction of his own birth. Thus the frequent question as to when an analysis is at an end seems in this sense to be answered. A definite length of time for the termination of this process (i.e., birth) is naturally necessary and maintains its biological explanation and justification from the following conception—viz., that the analysis has to make it possible for the patient subsequently to overcome the birth trauma by fixing a corresponding time-limit, which from this therapeutic standpoint can, to a great extent, be regulated. Naturally the patient constantly shows the tendency behind all his resistances to prolong indefinitely the analytic situation.

1 *Cf.* my explanation in the joint work with Ferenczi, *Development of Psychoanalysis*.

2 It is well known how frequently the length of pregnancy (seven to ten months) is preferred, but this concerns not merely the familiar phantasy of pregnancy (child by father), but in the deepest layer refers to one’s own birth.

*Cf.* also the well-known cures of Dejdrine, who treats his patients which yields him such considerable satisfaction. And from the very beginning this tendency must become the object of analysis.

This also follows quite automatically through a strict observance of the Freudian rule, which prescribes that the patient must be seen daily at the same time and for a full hour. Each of these hours represents for the patient’s Unconscious an analysis in miniature with the renewed fixation and gradual solving, which, as is well known, the patients often dislike very much at the beginning. They already take the daily dismissal in the meaning of the freeing from the mother as a too active therapy, whilst on the other hand the general inclination to run away from the
analyst is to be explained as the tendency towards an all too direct repetition of the birth trauma, which is just what the analysis has to replace by a gradual detachment.

as prisoners; locks them up in a dark room from everyone, and has their food brought to them through an opening; after a certain time they are glad to be discharged from this dungeon.

1 Many of them cannot wait till the analyst sends them away, but wish to decide this themselves, and often look at the time; others —or even the same— want to shake hands at their departure, etc. Cf. the passing symptom described by Ferenczi, “Schwindelempfindung am Schluss der Analysenstunde” (Zschr., 1914) (“Sensation of Dizziness at the end of the Hour of Analysis”), where the patient reacts to the psychical trauma of sudden separation with an analogous disturbance of his equilibrium, as an hysterical symptom.

10

INFANTILE ANXIETY

The immediate conclusion which can be deduced from these analytic experiences and from the significance they have for us is that the patient’s Unconscious uses the analytic healing process in order to repeat the trauma of birth and thus partially to abreact it. But before we can understand how the birth trauma can be expressed in such various neurotic symptoms, we must first trace its general human effect in the development of the normal individual, particularly in childhood. We shall take as our guiding principle Freud’s statement that all anxiety goes back originally to the anxiety at birth (dyspnœa).

If we look at the psychical development of the child from this point of view, it may be said that the human being needs many years—namely, his whole childhood—in which to overcome this first intensive trauma in an approximately normal way. Every child has anxiety, and from the standpoint of the average healthy adult, one can, with a certain amount of justification, designate the childhood of individuals as their normal neurosis. Only this may continue into adult life in the case of certain individuals, the neurotics, who therefore remain infantile or are called infantile.
Instead of numerous examples with the same simple mechanism, let us investigate the typical case of infantile anxiety which occurs when the child is left alone in a dark room (usually the bedroom at bed-time). This situation reminds the child, who still is close to the experience of the primal trauma, of the womb situation—with the important difference that the child is now consciously separated from the mother, whose womb is only “symbolically” replaced by the dark room or warm bed. The anxiety disappears, according to Freud’s brilliant observation, as soon as the child again becomes conscious of the existence (the nearness) of the loved person (contact, voice, etc.).1

From this example we can understand the anxiety mechanism, which is repeated almost unaltered in cases of phobia (claustrophobia, fear of railways, tunnels, travelling, etc.), as the unconscious reproduction of the anxiety at birth. And at the same time we can study the elements of symbol formation, and last but not least, the importance of the fact of being separated from the mother, and the calming “therapeutic” effect of the reunion with her, although only a partial or “symbolic” one.

Whilst reserving for later chapters more detailed discussion about these prospects which promise so much, let us look at a second situation, likewise typical of childish anxiety, which is nearer to the actual deeply repressed facts. We mean the universal childish fear of animals. We must not look for its explanation in an inherited human instinct of fear, in spite of its frequent relation to beasts of prey (carnivorous animals such as the wolf). For it is obvious that such a fear, could not relate to the domesticated animals, used thousands of years ago, whose harmlessness was experienced and met with by numerous generations of adults, in the same way as was the danger from beasts of prey. One would need to go further back to the primeval times of man—or even to his first biological stage (as do Stanley Hall and others)—and thence to the wild ancestors of our domesticated animals, in order to explain a typical anxiety reaction,

1 See Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, 1918, p. 84, footnote.
which has its origin in our individual development. There are other, namely psychological (symbolic), factors, which are decisive for the choice of these objects of fear, which occurs originally according to the size of the animal (horse, cow, etc.), impressing the child. As the analysis of childish phobias has clearly shown, the size or fatness (circumference of the body) of the animals causing fear refers to the state of pregnancy of which the child, as we can show, has more than a vague memory. The beasts of prey, then, provide a rationalization, also sufficient, apparently, for grown-up psychologists, of the wish—through the desire to be eaten—to get back again into the mother’s animal womb. The significance of animals as a father substitute, which in the psychology of neuroses Freud has emphasized for the understanding of Totemism, remains not only undisturbed by this conception, but maintains a deepened biological significance, showing how, through the displacement of anxiety on to the father, the renunciation of the mother, necessary for the sake of life, is assured. For this feared father prevents the return to the mother and thereby the releasing of the much more painful primal anxiety, which is related to the mother’s genitals as the place of birth, and later transferred to objects taking the place of the genitals.

The equally frequent anxiety about small animals, which, however, is usually accompanied by dread, has the same foundation, and the “uncanniness” of these objects clearly betrays this origin. From the analysis of such phobias or anxiety dreams, which have been found even in men, although less frequently than in women, it is clearly proved that the feeling of weirdness or uncanniness in the presence of these small creeping animals, such as mice, snakes, frogs, beetles, etc., can be traced to their peculiar ability completely to disappear into small holes in the earth. They therefore exhibit the wish to return into the maternal hiding-place as completely accomplished. And the feeling of dread which clings to them arises because they materialize one’s own tendency, namely, to go back into mother, and one is afraid because they might creep into one’s own body.1 Whilst one is able to go into large animals, still in the meaning of the primal situation, although repressed (anxiety), the dread of small animals lies in the danger that they can enter one’s own body. Moreover, all such small animals as insects, etc., were long ago recognized by Psychoanalysis as symbolic representations of children or embryos, not only on account of their small size, but also because of the possibility of their growing bigger (symbol of fertility).2
1 A little girl of three years, who feared small dogs just as much as if not more than large ones, was also afraid of insects (flies, bees, etc.). When asked by her mother why she was afraid of these small animals, which could not harm her, the little one replied without any hesitation, “Yet they can swallow me!” But at the approach of small dogs, she makes the same characteristic movements of defence that a grown-up person makes with a mouse; she bends her knees so low, at the same time pressing her legs close together, that her little dress touches the ground, and she can cover herself as if she wanted to prevent them from “creeping in.” Another time, when directly asked by her mother as to the cause of her fear of bees, she explained with many contradictions that she wanted to go into the bee’s body and yet again not to go in.

2 Recently in Freud’s History of an Infantile Neurosis, p. 569, Collected Papers, vol. iii., he shows that in the fear of butterflies the opening and the shutting of the wings is the disturbing factor, which again clearly reminds one of the opening in the body (cf. the widespread mythical motive of symplegades, or closing rocks).

The spider is a clear symbol of the dreaded mother in whose net one is caught. Cf. the “unconscious birth phantasy” which Ferenczi quotes from the description in a diary of a patient’s attack of anxiety (“Introjection and Transference,” p. 70 in Contributions to Psychoanalysis): “Hypochondria surrounds my soul like

But they become a penis symbol or rather a penis ideal just because of their capacity completely to go in and disappear into holes, etc., whereby their essential peculiarity, the special smallness, which has led to their being interpreted even as spermatozoa or ova, directly indicates the womb as their place of abode. Thus the (large) animal represents at first the pleasure-laden, then the anxiety-laden, mother symbol. Later, by displacement of the anxiety into a phobia, the animal becomes an inhibiting father substitute. Finally, by means of observation of the sexuality of animals and of small animals, which symbolize the fcetus as well as the penis, it again becomes invested with maternal libido.

This explains why a number of small animals became soul-animals in popular beliefs. The best-known example is that of the snake, whose phallic significance can undoubtedly be traced back to the ease with which it can completely enter and disappear into a hole (in the earth).
This is shown in the well-known belief in animal-spirits of the Australians and certain Central Asiatic tribes. According to this belief, children go into the mother, mostly through a fine mist, or rather like a cobweb, just as a fungus covers the swamp. I have the feeling as though I were sticking in a bog, as though I had to stretch out my head so as to be able to breathe. I want to tear the cobweb, to tear it. But no, I can’t do it! The web is fastened somewhere—the props would have to be pulled out on which it hangs. If that can’t be done, one would have slowly to work one’s way through the net in order to get air. Man surely is not here to be veiled in such a cobweb, suffocated, and robbed of the light of the sun.”

1 That the peculiarity, especially in large snakes, of swallowing their prey alive and whole, thus causing their body to swell up, belongs to this circle of ideas, appears to me just as certain as in the case of the other remarkable fact of their shedding their skin (rebirth).

the navel, in the form of little animals. Thus the natives of Cape Bedford believe “that boys go into the mother’s womb in the form of a snake, and girls in the form of snipe.”1 The quite primitive identity of child and phallus—the phallus goes completely into the woman and there grows into a child—appears later in popular beliefs and in fairy tales, as a soul endowed with a body, where the soul of a sleeping or dead person creeps out of the mouth in the form of such animals as mouse, snake, etc. Then after a while it enters again through the mouth into the same human being (dream) or into another one (fertilization, new birth).2 Here may be added the very ancient popular practice of picturing the womb as an animal. This belief hitherto has found no explanation,3 but presumably is also connected with the idea of the animal which has crept into the womb and has not come out again, and thus finally refers to the content of the impregnated uterus. In Braunschweig it is the custom not to let the child during the first twenty-four

1 See F. Reitzenstein’s article “Aberglaube” in Handworterbuch der Sexualwissenschaft, edited by Max Marcuse, 1923, p. 5.
2 In the Malay Fanany-fairy tale, the East African snake of death develops into a soul-worm, which appears from the grave, after about six or eight months, by means of a bamboo reed stuck in the earth (according to H. L. Held, *Schlangenkultus Atlas Africanus*, vol. iii. München, 1922).

3 That this animal is most frequently a toad, which creeps (*verkriechen, krote*) into dark and inaccessible holes, would seem to agree with this idea. See “Die Kröte, ein Bild der Gebärmutter,” by Karl Spiess (*Mitra*, i., column 209 ff., 1914, No. 8). Even in ancient Egypt the goddess of birth was thought of as frog-headed (see Jacoby and Spiegelberg, “Der Frosch als Symbol der Auferstehung bei den Ägyptern,” *Sphinx*, vii.); on the other hand, the head of the “uterus-toad” shows at times human characteristics (see picture in Spiess, *l.c.*, column 217). Cf. Ernest Fuhrmann on the same significance of the toad in ancient Mexico: *Mexiko*, iii., p. 20 ff. (*Kulturen der Erde*, vol. xiii. Darmstadt, 1922).

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hours after its birth lie by the mother’s side, “otherwise the uterus can find no rest and scratches about in the woman’s body, like a large mouse.”1 “It can also creep forth during sleep through the mouth, bathe, and return in the same way,” as in the legend recorded by Panzer of a woman pilgrim who lay in the grass for rest (*Beitr. z. d. Mythologie*, ii., 195). If it cannot find the way back the woman becomes sterile.

The reference to these typical childish situations of anxiety and their parallels in folklore should suffice to show what we mean. In thoroughly investigating the conditions under which the child’s anxiety arises, we find that the anxiety experienced at parturition really continues, undisposed of, to influence the child. And every opportunity, which somehow “reminds” the child—mostly in a “symbolic” way—of the birth trauma is used again and again for the abreaction of the undisposed-of affect (*cf.* for instance the frequency of *pavor nocturnus* in children). If one ventures to accept literally and seriously the origin of the anxiety-affect which Freud recognized as arising in the process of birth—and one is forced to do so by a number of experiences—then it is easy to realize how every infantile utterance of anxiety or fear is really a partial disposal of the birth anxiety.

We will approach later, in the discussion of the pleasure-pain-mechanism, the pressing question as to how the tendency to repeat so strong an affect of pain arises. But we wish to dwell for the
moment on the equally indubitable analytic fact that, just as the anxiety at birth forms the basis of every anxiety or fear, so every pleasure has as its final aim the re-establishment of the intrauterine primal pleasure.

1 See article “Aberglaube,” l.c.

The child’s normal functions, the assimilation of nourishment (sucking) and the expulsion of the product assimilated, both of which functions analysis recognizes as libidinal, betray the tendency to continue as long as possible the unlimited freedom of the pre-natal state. As we know from the analyses of neurotics, the Unconscious never gives up this claim, which the Ego has to set aside in favour of social adjustment, and the Unconscious, in its predominating states, which approach the primal condition (dream, neurosis, coma), is ready every time to come forward with this regressive tendency.

More clearly still do the “childish faults,” resulting from a too persistent clinging to these sources of pleasure, show the origin and tendency of this libido-gratification. I mean such “faults” as sucking on the one hand, and wetting and dirtying themselves on the other, when these go beyond a certain length of time or to a certain degree of intensity (for instance, in the exquisite “neurotic” symptom of enuresis nocturna). In the consciously uncontrollable and apparently automatic ejection of urine and discharge of feces (“as proof of love” for the mother) the child behaves as if it were still in the womb; inter fæces et urinas.1 The proverbial connection between fear and defecation rests on a similar mechanism. The temporary (or, after weaning, the complete) substitution of a finger for the mother’s breast shows on the other hand the child’s first attempt to replace the mother’s body by its own (“identification”), or by a part of its own. And the enigmatic preference for the toes clearly betrays the tendency to re-establish the

1 The water closet appears in dreams as a typical representation for the womb (Steckel, Die Sprache des Traumes, 1911).
intrauterine position of the body. From sucking as well as from the pleasurable discharge of the urine (enuresis), the way discovered by Psychoanalysis leads to the “childish fault” *par excellence*, masturbation of the genitals (*cf.* also the later replacing of enuresis by pollution). This leads to and helps to prepare for the final and sublimest substitution for the reunion with the mother, namely, the sexual act. The attempt to associate with sexuality the mother’s genitals, originally invested with anxiety, causes the guilt feeling, because the mother anxiety became attached to the father according to the mechanism of the phobia. In this way the partial change of the primal anxiety into the (sexual) guilt feeling occurs. One can observe clearly how the fear of animals originally referring to the mother changes into fear of the father, resting on sexual repression. Then it can become perfectly rationalized through displacement to robbers, criminals, black men, etc., according to the phobia mechanism. Here the so-called real fear arising from danger comes into existence as a connecting link and as an outlet for the displaced primal anxiety. Thus the change of the claustrophobia referring to the mother into the anxiety of something entering oneself referring to the father completely corresponds to the (child’s) attitude to the large (motherly) and to the small (phallic) animals.

At this point we anticipate from the psychoanalytic side an objection which we hope easily to dispose of. The general

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1 According to a verbal communication, the Viennese child specialist, J. K. Friedjung, was able on many occasions to observe children who came into the world with a finger in the mouth. This shows the tendency to an immediate substitution of the mother in *statu nascendi*. Recent experiments on the reflex excitability of the fœtus have been able to show that already in the sixth or seventh month sucking reflexes can be produced.

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validity of the experience that the child’s every anxiety consists of the anxiety at birth (and the child’s every pleasure aims at the re-establishing of the intrauterine primal pleasure) could be called in question in view of the so-called castration anxiety, which has recently been so strongly emphasized. Yet it seems to me quite intelligible that the childish primal anxiety, in the course of
its development, should cling more especially to the genitals just on account of their vaguely imagined (or remembered) actual biological relation to birth (and procreation). It is conceivable, indeed obvious, that precisely the female genitals, being the place of the birth trauma, should soon again become the chief object of the anxiety-affect originally arising there. Thus the importance of the castration fear is based, as Starcke thinks, on the primal castration at birth, that is, on the separation of the child from the mother.

But it does not seem quite appropriate to speak of “castration” where, as yet, there is no clearer relation of anxiety to the genitals, than is given by the fact of birth from the (female) genitals. This conception finds a strong heuristic support in that it solves the riddle of the ubiquity of the “castration complex” in a natural way by deriving it from the indisputable universality of the act of birth. This is a point of view which proves to be of the greatest importance for the complete understanding and also for the real foundation of other primal phantasies. We believe that we are now better able to understand why the castration threat should cause such a stupendous and lasting effect on the child—and, moreover, why childish anxiety and the guilt feeling brought on by birth and arising from it cannot be avoided by any kind of educational measure or removed by the usual analytic explanations.1 The threat of castration hits not only the vaguely remembered primal trauma and the undisposed-of anxiety representing it, but also a second trauma, consciously experienced and painful in character, though later obliterated by repression, namely weaning, the intensity and persistence of which falls far short of that of the first trauma, but owes a great part of its “traumatic” effect to it. Only in the third place, then, does there appear the genital trauma of castration regularly phardasied in the history of the individual and, at most, experienced as a threat.2 But this, just on account of its unreality, seems predisposed to take


2 In dreams at the end of the analytic cure I found the phallus often used as “symbol” of the umbilical cord.

3 See also Freud, “The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido,” Collected Papers, vol. ii. (quoted only after the conclusion of this work).
upon itself the greatest part of the natal anxiety-affect as guilt feeling, which, as in the meaning of the biblical fall of man, actually proves to be connected with the differentiation of the sexes, the difference in the sexual organs and the sexual functions. The deepest Unconscious which always remains sexually


2 The typical duality, which as symbol of defence and consolation for castration should compensate the loss of one irreplaceable member (often by a multiplicity), seems originally to belong to the weaning trauma, and to go back to the possibility of obtaining nourishment at both breasts, whereby actually the one breast replaces the “loss” of the other. Also the “symbolic” use of the testicles proves to be not infrequently a point of transition between the breasts and the penis, like the udder of a cow (cf. Stekel’s symbolic equation of “pairs of organs”). On another level, the duality of the castration defence seems to serve infantile irony in face of the lies of the grown-ups (see also infra, pp. 21-2).

indifferent (bi-sexual) knows nothing of this and knows only the first primal anxiety of the universal human act of birth.

In comparison with the painfully experienced actual traumata of birth and weaning, a real threat of castration seems even to make easier the normal discharge of the primal anxiety as genital guilt feeling, in so far and just as soon as the child has discovered the insincerity of the castration threat as of all other untruths of adults. In contrast to the primal trauma, then, the castration phantasy, which is soon unmasked as an empty threat, can occur rather as a consolation since the severance cannot take place.1 From this point we are led directly to the infantile sexual theories (see later, p. 32 f.) which refuse to recognize “castration” (the female genitals), obviously so as to be able to deny along with it the trauma of birth (primal-separation).

It should be noticed, moreover, that every playful use of the tragic primal motive, which occurs with the consciousness of unreality, works in a pleasurable way in that it advantageously denies the reality of any trauma. Examples of this are the typical children’s games from the earliest “hiding” (hide-and-seek) to the games of swinging, trains, dolls, and doctor,2 which, moreover, as Freud very soon recognized, contain the same elements as the corresponding neurotic
symptoms, only with positive pleasurable signs. The game of hiding (also conjuring), which children tirelessly repeat, represents the situation of separation

1 The same mechanism of solace or consolation is again to be found in the faulty acts of losing things, recognized as actions of sacrifice. One cuts oneself off from a valuable part of one’s ego instead of being completely “cut off” (“the ring of Polycrates,” which is thrown into the sea, but which comes to light again in the fish’s belly).

2 The last two with direct reference to childbirth (doll = fœtus in dream).

(and of finding again) as not of a serious kind; the rhythmic games of movement (swinging, hopping, etc.) simply repeat the rhythm felt in the embryonic state. This rhythm shows, in the neurotic symptom of dizziness, the other side of the Janus head. Soon the child’s every game will somehow be subordinated to the viewpoint of its unreality. And Psychoanalysis has been able to show how, from the child’s game, the higher and the highest pleasure-giving unrealities, namely, phantasy and art, emerge.1 Even in the highest forms of these pretended realities, as, for example, in the Greek tragedies, we are in a position to enjoy anxiety and horror because we abreact these primal affects, in the meaning of Aristotle’s catharsis, just as the child now works off the separation from the mother, originally full of dread, in its game of willing concealment,2 which can easily and often be broken off and repeated at the child’s pleasure.

The child’s constant proneness to anxiety, which originates in the birth trauma and is transferable to almost anything, is expressed in a more direct, and so to speak, a more biological way in the child’s characteristic attitude towards death, important also from a general point of view. What astonished us at first was not the fact that the child knows nothing at all of the idea of death, but that here also, as in the sexual realm, it is, for a long time, not in a position to accept the facts and explanations as to its real significance. It is one of Freud’s greatest merits that he has called our attention to the child’s negative idea of death, which is expressed, for example, in the fact that it treats a dead

1 Freud, Der Dichter und das Phantasieren, 1908.
In fairy tales also, as, for example, in the Seven Kids, the concealment has the significance of birth and rescue, that is, return to the mother’s womb in the case of external danger.

person as one temporarily absent. It is well known, also, that the Unconscious never gives up this idea, to which not only the ever-reviving belief in immortality bears witness but also the fact that we dream of the dead as living. It would be quite wrong, too, to suppose, according to our intellectualist attitude, that the child cannot accept the idea of death on account of its painfulness and its unpleasant character; this is not the case for the reason that the child turns away from the idea of it a priori, without having any understanding of its content. In general the child cannot be said to have any abstract idea of death, and reacts only to cases that have been actually experienced or to those that have been described (explained) to it in connection with the persons well known to it. To be dead has the same meaning for the child as to be away (Freud) — that is, to be separated — and this directly touches on the primal trauma. The child thus accepts the conscious idea of death by unconsciously identifying it with the primal trauma. It may, therefore, seem brutal to adults that the child should want the death of an unwished-for rival, a new little brother or sister whose intrusion is not pleasing to it: this is much the same as when we ourselves say to someone, he can go to the devil — that is, leave us alone. Only the child betrays a far better knowledge than the adult of the original meaning of this “manner of speech,” when, for example, it advises the intruding little brother or sister to go back to where he came from. The child means this quite seriously and can do so again on the strength of those dim memories of the place whence children come. And so with the thought of death is connected from the beginning a strong unconscious sense of pleasure associated with the return to the mother’s womb. This pleasurable affect has been maintained undiminished through the whole history of mankind, from the primitive customs of cremation to the spiritual return in the form of an astral body.
But it is not merely the human idea of death that has this libidinal background, for man also unconsciously plays the trump-card of prenatal existence—the only condition of which we have any experience apart from our conscious life—against the idea of destruction in death, consciously recognized as real. When the child wants to remove a competitor disturbing to his peace, and therefore wishes he were dead, he can do this only by means of his own pleasurable memory of the place he came from and whence the little brother or sister also came—from the mother. One could also say that he wishes himself back again in the place where there is no kind of disturbance from outside. In the childish wish for the death of others, the justification for emphasizing their own unconscious wish element is made clear from the understanding of the self-reproaches with which neurotics regularly react at the accidental realization of such a wish. When one loses a closely connected person of either sex, this loss reminds one again of the primal separation from the mother; and the painful task of disengaging the libido from this person (recognized by Freud in the process of mourning) corresponds to a psychic repetition of the primal trauma. In the different human customs of mourning it is undoubtedly clear, as recently shown by Reik in a lecture, that the mourner tries to identify himself with the dead, showing how he envies him the return to the mother. The marked impressions, which the premature death of a brother or sister leaves in the Unconscious of the survivors, who

1 “Tabnit, Konig von Sidon” (Wiener Psychoanalytic Association, March, 1923).

later often become neurotic, clearly show the strange after-effects of this identification with the dead. This not seldom expresses itself in the fact that the person in question spends his life, as it were, in perpetual mourning, that is, in a state which is adapted in a bewildering way to the dead person’s supposed place of abode. Many neuroses, taken as a whole, can be understood as such an embryonal continuance of the prematurely cut-off existence of a brother or sister. And melancholy frequently shows the same mechanism as a reaction to an actual death.1

As one clearly sees in analyses, the child envies the dead the happiness of return to the mother and so links his real jealousy to the new brother or sister, generally at the period of pregnancy, that is, at the time of the abode in the mother. The well-known adjustment to the fact of the new competitor, on the other hand, begins soon after its birth (the child as a living doll) by identification with the mother (the child from the father). In the child’s unconscious tendency to
identify itself in the mother’s womb with the child whose imminent arrival has been sufficiently announced lies the decisive factor, which in the meaning of psychoanalytic investigations might be described as the *Trauma of the Second Child* (brother or sister trauma). Its essential factor consists in the fact that the later coming child materializes the deepest wish tendency of the already present child to be again in the mother, and, as it were, spoils once for all the chances of ever returning there. This can become a determining factor for the whole further attitude and development of the first or previously born.

1 It would be worthwhile in the anamneses of melancholies to find out whether they had experienced a death in the family in their childhood.

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(see *The Psychology of the Youngest*, p. 107, “Heroic compensation”). From this many otherwise unintelligible traits in adult love life (neurotic limitation of children, etc.), as also certain neurotic organic sufferings of women, become analytically accessible (pseudo-sterility, etc.).

The identification of death with the return to the mother also explains why the dead must not be disturbed in their rest and why such a disturbance is regarded as the greatest punishment. This proves the secondary nature of the whole rebirth phantasy, which has no other meaning than to re-establish the original condition and remain there. This is shown also by various biological facts which lead to the exclusion of the ethical-anagogic element of the rebirth idea, held erroneously by Jung to be essential.1 A certain species of *Cichlides* (mouth-brooders) forms a particularly instructive example. The female carries the spawn till their maturity in a pouch in her throat.2 In the existing North African species, *Haplochromis strigigena*, which fasten their eggs to plants and stones, the mother’s throat-pouch is a receptacle and protection only for the hatched-out young ones. Should any danger threaten, or when night comes,

1 Jung has here blindly passed over the biological facts, because he seeks to protect himself from the “analytic” tendency to regression, and thereby overlooks the biological. So he has slipped into the opposite ethical anagogic direction, which places in the centre the idea of rebirth, which is only an intellectualized ramification. *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 251.
The brood hatched in the mouth is found in numerous bony fishes, and in isolated cases even among the higher vertebrate animals. S. Meisenheimer, *Geschlecht und Geschlechter im Tierreich*, Jena, 1921, vol. i., chap. 20; “Die Verwendung des elterlichen Körpers im Dienst der Brutlege,” viii., Stufe, p. 566 f. Here belong also the wonderful homing instincts of birds of passage and migrating fish, which return to *their place of birth* from every strange place to which they *have been taken* or to which they *themselves have migrated*.

The mother opens her mouth and a whole brood of young Haplochromes creep into it and stay there till the danger is past or the morning dawns. This behaviour is especially interesting, not only because it proves that physiological sleep throughout the whole animal kingdom is a temporary return to the mother’s womb but because in this species the real incubation takes place on stones or plants outside the mother’s body; this is compensated for later by these animals because they apparently cannot do without it.

Other animals, differing from the pouched animals (kangaroo) in that they have no partial return to the mother’s body for protection, replace this in a way that can only be called “symbolic,” as, for example, the birds by building their nests (which Jung has already referred to). We want here to draw attention to the fact that what we call animal *instinct* contains in its essence the adjustment of the pre-natal libido to the outer world, and also the tendency to make this outer world resemble as faithfully as possible the previously experienced primal state; whilst man, because of his long period of pregnancy and with the help of later-developed and higher capacities for thought, attempts, in every conceivable way, to re-establish, as it were, creatively the real primal condition. He succeeds in doing this with a great amount of pleasure in the socially adjusted phantasy products of art, religion, mythology; whereas he fails piteously in the neurosis.

The ground for this lies, as Psychoanalysis has shown, in a psycho-biological arrest in development, which we shall discuss in the next chapter from the point of view of the

1 An American kindergarten teacher once told me that little children, when playing with plasticine, mostly spontaneously formed birds’ nests.
sexual trauma. The essential factor in the development of neuroses seems to be that man, in the biological as in the cultural overcoming of the birth trauma, which we call adjustment, comes to grief at the cross road of sexual gratification, which most nearly approaches the primal situation, yet does not completely re-establish it in the infantile meaning.
SEXUAL GRATIFICATION

The whole problem of infantile sex is really contained in the famous question as to the origin of children. This question, to which the child comes sooner or later quite spontaneously, arises, as we have experienced, as the final result of an unsatisfactory process of thought. This can express itself in the child’s manifold ways and peculiarities (always asking questions), proving that it seeks in itself for the lost memory of its earlier place of abode, which, in consequence of an extremely intense repression, it cannot find. Hence, as a rule, the child needs some outside stimulus, most frequently the repetition of the experience through the birth of a brother or sister, for the question to express itself openly. And thus the child appeals to the help of grown-up people, who obviously appear to have recovered in some way this lost knowledge. But, as is well known, the mere answering of the child’s question, even when done by analytically enlightened educators, brings just as little solution to the child as the communication to an adult neurotic of any of the unconscious causes of his symptoms, which he cannot accept because of similarly unconscious inner resistances and repressions. The child’s typical reaction to the truthful answer (the child grows in the mother’s body somewhat as the plants grow in the earth) shows also where the real interest of the child lies—namely,

1 According to various analytic experiences, the only child or the youngest (or also those who have had to repress a severe birth trauma) does not ask the question so directly.

in the problem of how to get inside. This, however, does not refer so much to the problem of procreation, as adults conclude from themselves, but points rather to the tendency to return to the place where one was before. As the trauma of birth has suffered the most intense repression, the child cannot re-establish the memory of it, in spite of the explanation, and still holds on to its own theories of the origin of children. These manifestly correspond to unconscious reproductions of the pre-natal condition, and leave open the illusion of a possible return which the child would forfeit if it accepted the adult’s explanation.

First and foremost is the renowned fable of the stork, which seems to have originated for the following reason: that the bird of passage, returning periodically to the same place to fetch a child, can just as well take the child back again with it;2 whereby, too, the traumatic effect of the plunge into the depths is replaced by the soft even flight of the hardy flier. Another infantile
theory of birth, inferred from the Unconscious by Freud, with its reference to the digestive process, links on directly to the mother’s womb; the child enters the mother through the mouth (as food) and is ejected as faeces through the rectum. Moreover, this proceeding, which as we know is pleasurable for the child and is daily enacted, would guarantee the ease and possi-

1 Mephistopheles: “Tis a law of devils and ghosts:

Where they crept in, there must they creep out.

In the first we are free, in the second we have no choice.”

Indians, when they weave baskets, etc., do not completely close the circle in the ornamentation, because the women would otherwise bear no children (according to the verbal communication of a traveller).

2 It may be to other parents (family romance), it may be to the place of its origin (death wish). See the Author’s treatise on the Lohengrin Saga, 1911.

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bility of repetition in the sense of a compensation for the trauma. The later theory, moreover, to which many people cling for a long time, that the child is born by cutting the mother open (generally around the navel), is based on the denial of one’s own pains at birth which are then completely imposed on the mother.1

The common characteristic of all infantile birth theories, which is also richly illustrated2 in myths and fairy tales, is the denial of the female sex organ, which clearly shows that it is due to the repression of the birth trauma experienced there. The painful fixation on this function of the female genital as organ of birth lies finally at the bottom of all neurotic disturbances of the adult sex life, of psychical impotence, as of feminine frigidity in all its forms. But it is particularly clearly expressed in certain kinds of phobias (attacks of dizziness), which accompany the feeling that a street is becoming narrower or wider.

Furthermore, perversions which, according to Freud, represent the positive side of neuroses, point in different ways to the infantile primal situation. As I have already
Here may be mentioned the typical myth phantasy that the fearless hero is invariably one cut out from the womb, and—usually prematurely—accomplishes, even as a child, wonderful deeds; obviously he is spared the anxiety at birth, and with it also the overcoming of an early neurotic period (see the chapter on “Heroic Compensation,” p. 102).

Moreover, from isolated cases, it would seem that children who are brought into the world by means of an operation actually develop better in certain respects. On the other hand, a woman who gave birth to her child while in a narcotic state, felt that it was not hers, because she had not been conscious of its birth. Her infantile interest as to where children really come from has thus remained unsatisfied.

2 See my treatise: *Volkerpsychologische Parallelen zu den infantilen Sexualtheorien* 1911.

stated elsewhere, the behaviour of a pervert is characterized by the fact that he keeps the infantile anal birth theory from being repressed, by a partial realization of it and by means of the guilt-feeling; he himself plays the part of the anal child before he has to undergo the birth trauma, thus approaching as nearly as possible to the condition of the (“polymorphous-perversion”) pleasurable primal situation. There is no need of further explanation for *coprolagnia* and *uroagnia*. All other kinds of mouth perversions in some way continue the intrauterine libido gratification (or the post-natal gratification at the mother’s breast). The *exhibitionist* is characterized by the desire to return into that paradisiacal primal state of nakedness in which he lived before birth, and which the child so loves on that account. A specially keen pleasure is taken, therefore, in the acts of undressing and stripping off coverings, as we find in strongly marked cases. The uncovering of the genitals at the hetero-sexual stage of development corresponds, therefore, to the substitution of the representative part (penis—child) for the whole body, the man preferring the first signification (namely, the penis), the woman the second (child), all of which is connected with the various forms of development of the castration complex (normal feeling of shame). The peculiar characteristic of the sexual shame feeling, shutting or covering of the eyes and blushing.


2 From the analysis of a woman who preferred cunnilingus, it appeared that the pleasurable sensation was connected with the feeling of having her clitoris (analogous to the penis) in a warm hole.
3 The deep connection of the motives of nakedness, dressing, blinding, and chaining (see below) explained by me as “exhibition-

refers to the pre-natal situation, in which, as is well known, the blood flows to the head in the downward position. The defensive significance, moreover, of exposing the genitals, predominating largely in superstitions, is originally nothing other than an expression of the curse of repression heaped on the organ of birth and clearly shown in the various existing maledictions and curses.

The same applies to Fetishism, the mechanism of which Freud long ago described as a partial repression with compensatory substitute formations. The repression quite regularly concerns the mother’s genitals in the meaning of the traumatic anxiety-cathexis, and the genitals are replaced by a pleasure-invested part of the body or its aesthetically still more acceptable covering—dresses, shoes, corsets, etc.

Earlier analytic experiences have already allowed me to infer that in masochism it is a question of the conversion of the pains caused by parturition (phantasy of being beaten) into pleasurable sensations.1 This is explained from other typical elements of masochistic phantasies—for instance, the almost regularly occurring state of being bound (punishment, see later) as a partial reinstatement of the intrauterine pleasurable condition of immobility, which is

1 Apparently connected with this is the prevalent fertility spell of being beaten with rods (rod of life) as it appears in the myths of the virginal Bona Dea as punishment from her own father, whose desires the chaste goddess resists. One may compare with this the whipping of the bridal pair in the German wedding customs (W. Mannhardt, Antike Feld- und Wald-kulte, i., 299-303), in the Roman Lupercalia, and the Mexican festival of Mid-Summer, at which the young girls were beaten with small sacks in order to make them fertile.
apparently only imitated in the widespread custom of binding the baby in swaddling clothes (Sadger). On the other hand, the typical sadist, the slayer of children (Gilles de Ray) or murderer of women (Jack the Ripper), who wallows in blood and in bowels, seems completely to play the part of infantile curiosity, and seeks to discover the nature of the inside of the body. Whilst the masochist seeks to re-establish the original pleasurable condition by means of affective revaluation of the birth trauma, the sadist personifies the unquenchable hatred of one who has been expelled; he really attempts with his fully grown body to go back into the place whence he came as a child, without considering that he thereby tears his sacrifice to pieces—this being by no means his main intention (see later about sacrifice, p. 98).

Homosexuality also seems to fit easily into this conception. It is based quite obviously in the case of the man on the abhorrence of the female genitals, and this because of its close relation to the shock of birth. The homosexual sees in woman only the maternal organ of birth, and hence is incapable of acknowledging it as an organ for giving pleasure. Moreover, as we know from analyses, the homosexuals of both sexes only consciously play the part of man and woman. Unconsciously they invariably play the part of mother and child—which is directly manifest in the case of female homosexuality—and so far actually represent a special kind of love relationship (“the third sex”), namely, a direct

1 In the last-mentioned forms (exhibitionism, masochism) the especially prominent part played by the “skin, mucous membrane, and muscle erotism,” so called by Sadger, seems directly deducible from the intrauterine position, where the whole body is, so to say, pleasantly tickled by a snug feeling of softness, warmth, and fluidity.

continuance of the asexual but libidinal binding of the primal situation. It is worth emphasizing the fact that homosexuality, being that perversion which apparently relates only to the differentiation of sex, really rests, as a whole, on the bisexuality of the embryonal condition surviving in the Unconscious.1

These considerations take us straight to the heart of the problem of sexuality, which later submits the simple manifestations of the primal libido to such complicated and unlooked-for changes. I
think that by adhering to the conception we have been elaborating, we shall gain a better understanding of normal sexual development, and overcome the apparent difficulties.

It has been noticed, especially in recent times, that our whole mental outlook has given predominance to the man’s point of view and has almost entirely neglected the woman’s. The clearest example of this one-sidedness both of social and scientific thought is possibly the fact that long and important periods of the development of human culture stood under the sway of the so-called mother right (“discovered” by Bachofen). These periods were under the rule of the woman, and obviously special efforts in overcoming resistances had first to be made in order to accept as facts these periods which had been “repressed” even from the traditions themselves. How far this attitude survives even in psychoanalysts is shown in the fact that, as a rule, we tacitly represent the sexual relations only from

1 This shows the weakness of Adler’s “masculine protest” as a principle for the elucidation of perversion (homosexuality).

2 See M. Vaerting, *Die weibliche Eigenart im Männerstaat und die männliche Eigenart im Frauenstaat*, Karlsruhe, 1921.

the man’s point of view, ostensibly on account of its simplicity, but if we are more honest, from an insufficient understanding of the woman’s sexual life. I hardly think that this attitude is the consequence of a social under-estimation of woman, as Alfred Adler thinks, but the reverse. Both are the expression of that primal repression which tries to degrade and to deny woman both socially and intellectually on account of her original connection with the birth trauma. In attempting to make conscious again the repressed primal memory of the birth trauma, we believe that we shall re-instate the high estimation of woman which was repressed simultaneously with the birth trauma, and we can do this by freeing her from the weight of the curse on her genitals.

We have learnt with astonishment from the analyses accomplished by Freud that there is a valid, although intensely repressed, masculine counterpart to the girl’s envy of the penis, already familiar to superficial observation. This is the boy’s unconscious wish to be able to bear children through the anus. This wish-phantasy, which through the unconscious identification of child and faeces (anal child), later of child and penis, remains active in the Unconscious, likewise
represents nothing other than an attempt to reestablish the primal situation in which one was still an “anal” child. But this is before one has learnt to know the female genitals, the primary perception of which remains physiologically certain, but which psychologically is represented, for the first time, by the birth trauma. That the boy, soon after birth, presupposes his own member in all other beings, is indeed easily intelligible from the anthropomorphic attitude of man in general. Nevertheless, the obstinacy with which he clings to this conception, against all appearances, should warn us not to credit this to his narcissistic self over-estimation alone. It is much more probable to assume, that, for as long as possible, the boy wants to deny the existence of the female genitals, because he wishes to avoid being reminded of the horror of passing this organ, which still haunts him in every member. In other words, he does not want to reproduce the anxiety-affect connected with his birth. As a proof of this, however, it seems to me that the little girl has the same negative attitude towards her own genitals, precisely because they are the female organs, and she cannot share in the narcissistic advantage of possessing a penis. This attitude is manifested in the so-called “envy of the penis,” which shows, moreover, that the chief part is by no means played by the more or less conscious motivation of the Ego (envy). On the contrary, it is proved that both sexes attempt, in the same way, to deny and disregard the female genitals, because both, regardless of sex, are subjected to the primal repression of the mother’s genitals. In both, the over-estimation of the penis—explained by Adler in conformance with his academic sex-psychology from the feeling of “inferiority,” which is not even a secondary feeling—finally proves to be a reaction formation against the existence in general of female sex organs from which one was once painfully thrust out. The acceptance of “castration” as a normal condition of female development, but one which we also see typically expressed in the masculine neurotic’s wish for castration, is well fitted, in consequence of the already mentioned phantastic element, to replace the actual separation from the mother, by identification with her, and thus indirectly, through sexual love, to approach once more to the primal situation.

For, as Ferenczi has ingeniously shown, the man, penetrating into the vaginal opening, undoubtedly signifies a partial return to the womb, which by identification with the penis known as a symbol for a child (Tom Thumb. German Däumling) becomes not only a complete but also an infantile return. But in the case of the woman, the attitude is quite similar, as analytic material has shown. By means of the clitoris libido, experienced so intensely in masturbation, the woman
is able—often only too able—to identify herself with the penis or the man and so indirectly to approach the return into the womb. The tendency to apparent masculinity revealed in it rests on the unconscious identification with the father and finally aims at becoming, at least a participator in the inestimable advantage which the man has over the woman, and which consists in his being able partially to go back into the mother, by means of the penis, itself representing the child. For the woman there results a still more far-reaching and normal gratification of this primal wish manifesting itself as mother love in the identification with the fruit of the body.

Two facts analytically revealed are able to explain the unconscious equivalence of child and penis, which we so frequently find to be conscious in psychoses. First, as described by Boehm (Zschr., viii., 1922), the (homosexual or impotent) man’s frequent fear of an enormous “active” penis (like a sort of trunk or horse’s penis), hidden in the woman and suddenly flung out, clearly refers to the identification with the child who is hidden inside the maternal genitals, and suddenly, in parturition, comes out. The feminine counterpart to this idea, of a “woman with a penis,” was

1 “Versuch einer Genitaltheorie” (Congress, report), Zschr., viii. 1922, p. 479.

given to me from analyses, especially of frigidity in women. It was not, as one might expect, the first sight of a little boy’s (a brother’s or playmate’s) member that had a pathological influence in the sense of the “penis-envy.” But rather was it the sight of a large (erected or paternal) genital organ that had the traumatic effect, because it was a reminder of the size of the child. Thus, instead of the entrance, perceived (through masturbation) on one’s own body, it showed that there is already something hidden inside, which obstructs the presumed entrance, and later (at the sexual stage) manifests itself, as something which will enter one’s own body (compare with this the fear of small animals). The often conscious fright of neurotic women as to how the large organ shall go into them rests indirectly on the primal repression of the birth trauma. On the other hand, woman’s well-known high estimation of a large penis shows that through this and even on account of this there is found the greatest possibility of pleasure, which sometimes can be increased through possible pains in the sense of the primal situation. From the analyses of feminine frigidity (vaginismus) it became certain that the typical (masochistic) phantasies of being violated or raped, which are repressed in these women, represent nothing else than a failure in their attempt to adjust themselves to their (feminine) sexual part, because these phantasies prove to be the precipitate of the initial identification with the man (penis), which
should make possible the aggressive-libidinal entering into the mother. The masculine prototype to this we find in (for most men) the especially pleasurable (sadistic), act of defloration, with its painful and bloody

penetration of the female genitals into which no one has yet entered.

Thus, in the first stage of childhood, both sexes behave in the same way towards the primal object of their libido, the mother. The conflict which we see so impressively revealed in neuroses occurs first of all with the knowledge of sex differences, which for both sexes alike represents the decisive trauma for later formation of neuroses. For the boy, because he has learnt to recognize the female genitals, from which he originated and into which later he has to enter; for the girl, because she has learnt to recognize the masculine genitals, which not only seem to make an entrance into the love-object impossible for her, but which later are even destined to enter forcibly her own body. If the girl successfully overcomes this trauma by a fortunate adjustment to the ÒEdipus situation, then, in later love life, through the sexual act, she comes to a partial gratification of the primal wish, or, at any rate, to as far-reaching a satisfaction as is possible. The coming to grief at this trauma is, however, decisive for later neuroses, in which the ÒEdipus and cas-

1 Compare also the later references to mythological material (p. 110). It would seem, moreover, that these unconscious strivings, as so many others, exist in folklore as facts not yet understood. For example, the Australian aborigines’ well-known operation, which is carried out mostly after circumcision (between the ages of twelve land fourteen years), and which produces an artificial hypospadias which makes the penis, in the erected state, flat and lobe-shaped. In women—whose labia and clitoris are frequently cut in order not to harm the children (obviously in birth)—the hymen is forcibly cut to make coitus possible, and the vaginal entrance is widened by a cut towards the anus. Nevertheless, the man introduces his penis still with great difficulty, obviously from the fear of getting stuck or completely falling in. (For details about the operations, see Reitzenstein’s already mentioned article in Handwörterbuch der Sexualwissenschaft, p. 5 ff.)
Tration complexes play so astonishing a part, and in which in both sexes the aversion to sexuality stands in the foreground. Both, then, are thrown back into neurosis at the stage of the first genital conflict, and from there flee further back into the original libido situation, which again for both sexes consists of a return to the mother.

The man can from the beginning remain attached to the same object, which represents for him, mother, lover, and wife. The father then soon becomes the representative of the anxiety connected with the mother (the mother’s genitals). In the case of the woman, on the other hand, it is necessary to transfer a part of the original mother libido to the father, which is parallel to the movement to passivity already estimated by Freud. It is a matter, then, for the girl to give up all idea of an active return to the mother, a penetration which is recognized or imagined to be the masculine privilege, and in the supreme joy of motherhood, to be content with the wish to regain the blessed primal state by means of passive reproduction—that is, by means of pregnancy and the birth of her own child. The failure of this psycho-biological metamorphosis is to be seen in female neurotics, who, without exception, reject the man’s genitals, and in the sense of the so-called “masculine complex” want the penis only as an instrument for their own penetration into the love-object. Thus both sexes become neurotic, when they wish to gratify the primal libido for the mother, as compensation for the birth trauma, not by means of the sexual gratification designed for them, but by means of the original form of infantile gratification, whereby they again inevitably stumble upon the anxiety-borders of the birth trauma, which are best to be avoided just by means of sexual gratification.

Sexual love, then, which reaches its climax in the mating of two beings, proves to be the most sublime attempt partially to re-establish the primal situation between mother and child, which only finds its complete realization in a new embryo. And when Plato explains the essence of love as the yearning of two parts which, formerly united, have become severed, he gives poetical utterance to the supreme biological attempt to overcome the birth trauma, by the genuine “platonic love,” that of the child for the mother.
On the strength of this concept it is somewhat easier to understand the development of the sexual instinct, which in opposition to the libido is still condemned to “procreation” as the only means of final gratification. The first clear expression of the sexual instinct is manifest in the Œdipus complex, the connection of which with the wish to return to the mother’s womb has been interpreted by Jung in the sense of the anagogic “rebirth phantasy,” whereas Ferenczi (as quoted above) has rehabilitated it as the latter’s biological foundation. At the back of the Œdipus saga there really stands the mysterious question of the origin and destiny of man, which Œdipus desires to solve, not intellectually, but by actually returning into the mother’s womb.2 This happens entirely in a symbolic form, for his blindness in the deepest sense represents a return into the darkness of the mother’s womb, and his final disappearance through a cleft rock into the Underworld expresses once again the same wish tendency to return into the mother earth.

1 One can compare with this the Biblical expression: “Man and woman are one flesh,” etc. (Erant duo in uno).

2 The vaginal symbolism of the ravine (or three ways) in the Œdipus saga, recently shown up by Abraham, recurs in the well-known intrauterine phantasy into which the father (or his penis) disturbingly enters (see Imago, ix., 1923, p. 124 ff.).

We are now in a position to understand the psycho-biological meaning of the Œdipus complex, as manifested in normal development. From the standpoint of the birth trauma, we have in the Œdipus complex a glimpse of the first valuable attempt to overcome the anxiety or fear of the (mother’s) genitals, by being able to accept them in a pleasurable way as libido-object. In other words, this is to transfer the original, i.e., intrauterine, possibility of pleasure to the genital outlet which is charged with anxiety, and there to reopen a former source of pleasure buried by repression. The first attempt is from the very beginning condemned to failure, not only because it is undertaken with an imperfectly developed sexual apparatus, but chiefly because the attempt is made upon the primal object itself, with which the entire anxiety and repression of the primal trauma is directly connected. But this also explains why this (one is inclined to say) “still-born” attempt has to be made at all. Obviously, it is a necessary condition for success of the later normal transference in the love-choice that the child should repeat the separation from the primal object at the first stage of its sexual development as a sexual trauma. But this also condemns the Œdipus complex, as the third important repetition of the primal trauma of separation, to be drawn down to Œreus by the primal repression of the birth trauma, only to go on reacting with the typical relapse-symptoms at every new libido privation.
We are therefore of opinion that the inception of sexual development, which according to Freud occurs twice, is made intelligible from the history of the individual, because we recognize in it the reminiscence of the conditions so deeply sundered by the trauma of birth—the pleasurable intrauterine life and the difficulties in adaptation to the extra-

uterine world. The “latency-period ” then follows the sexual trauma of the severance from the mother on the sexual level (Œdipus complex). During the latency period there occurs a temporary renunciation of direct regressive tendencies in favour of adjustment, till, at puberty, is reached the primacy of the genital zone which, in the meaning of our arguments, we must think of as a regaining of the appreciation of the (mother’s) genitals, once experienced as primal object of value. For the genital primacy, which, by means of the (male) genitals, signifies the final substitution of the whole body as object in place of the mother, can only be admitted when the primal and painful experience connected with the genitals has successfully been changed back into the nearest possible approach to the pleasure experienced inside the mother as one’s original abode. The possibility for this is provided under the extensive disturbance known as puberty, culminating in the act of love with its many phases and variations, all of which tend towards a contact as intimate as possible (to eat for love) (L’animal a deux dos). It is therefore not without cause that the state of being in love, which can go as far as identifying the whole outer world with the object of affection (Wagner’s Tristan and Isolde), has been described as a neurotic introversion, and coitus with its momentary loss of consciousness as a slight hysterical attack.
NEUROTIC REPRODUCTION

After having followed the development of the child’s libido up to the sexual trauma of the Œdipus complex and recognized in it the decisive point for the formation of neuroses, we can return to the question as to how far each neurotic symptom, as it becomes intelligible in the analytic process of healing, conforms to the birth trauma. The formula seems to be quite simple: analysis, as is well known, has proved anxiety to be the nucleus of every neurotic disturbance, and as we know through Freud that the primal anxiety lies in the birth trauma, the connection with it should be everywhere as easy to prove as it is in the case of the child’s emotional reactions. The point, however, is not merely that the anxiety-affect, which then attaches itself in various forms to definite contents, originates in that primal source, but that in analysis isolated symptoms and the whole neurosis formation point quite definitely to reproduced reminiscences of birth or of the pleasurable, stage preceding it. If finally we turn to the original “traumatic” theory of neuroses, as it was formulated in the classical Studien fiber Hysterie more than twenty-five years ago, I think that neither we nor the originator of this theory need feel ashamed of it. Indeed, one might say that in all these years of analytic investigation, rich in results and experiences, none of us—even after taking all other factors into consideration—has abandoned the certainty that there is still more in the “trauma” than we trust ourselves to admit. In any case, we must admit as justifiable the doubt in the activity of those apparent traumata which Freud early recognized as mere repetitions of “primal-phantasies,” the psychobiological foundation of which we now believe to have found in the universal human trauma of birth with all its consequences.

We can trace this becoming neurotic in statu nascendi as a short circuit, so to say, in the real traumatic neurosis, especially as it was observed during the war (war neurosis). There the primal anxiety is directly mobilized through shock, the otherwise unconsciously reproduced birth situation being affectively materialized through the outer danger of death.1 The fundamental significance of the birth trauma as a means of expressing every neurotic anxiety is proved by the fact that it forms the starting-point of the most diverse neurotic symptoms which in other cases can arise without the operation of a shock. But the traumatic neurosis with this particular combination of form and content stands at the beginning of a pathogenic series, whereas the straightforward psychoneuroses, the content of which is determined by the sexual trauma, stand at the end. The latter avail themselves of the same universal expression of regression as a means
of defence and as an outlet as soon as the individual in some way or other comes to grief in Reality. The neurotic, generally speaking, as analysis has proved, fails in sexuality; which in this connection is as good as saying that he is not content with the gratification of partially returning to the mother, afforded in the sexual act and in the child, but has remained fixedly “infantile” and even still desires to go completely or as a

1 The dreams of patients with “traumatic” neuroses “repeat” in typical ways the birth trauma in the form of an actual traumatic experience, but mostly with some betraying detail of birth.

whole back into the mother. Finally, he is incapable of settling the birth trauma in the normal way by preventing anxiety through sexual gratification, and is thrown back to the primal form of libido gratification which remains unattainable and against which his adult Ego strives by developing anxiety.

At various points in our discussions about the development of the child's libido, the corresponding phenomena of the neurosis have incidentally been shown, especially in conditions in which anxiety is manifest, just as in the direct disturbances of the sexual function (“actual neurosis”). To give us a better understanding of neurotic anxiety conditions, let us once again recall the simplest case of the release of childish anxiety, which remains typical for every neurotic release of anxiety—namely, the anxiety shown by the child left alone in a dark room. This situation—one can scarcely express it in any other way, although it is not entirely so—“reminds” the child’s Unconscious of the dark abode in the mother’s womb, which at that time, indeed, was an experience of extreme pleasure—thus explaining the tendency to re-establish it—but which was brought to an end by the frightening severance from the mother, whom now the child misses when alone. In the fear of being alone the child is obviously reminded (er-innert) of the anxiety-affect of the first separation from the libido-object, indeed by an actual re-experience, by the process of reproduction and discharge. This compulsion to the reproduction of a strong painful affect, the mechanism of which we shall discuss later, illustrates, at any rate, the validity and reality of this “reminiscence.” All forms of the neurotic development of anxiety, including phobias, conform to the same process, according to the mechanism revealed through analysis. The same
may be said of the so-called actual form of anxiety neurosis, which like neurasthenia can be traced to direct disturbances of the sexual function, since the coitus-interruptus causing it corresponds to the anxiety roused by the mother’s genitals (dangerous *vagina dentata*). All forms of masculine impotence—the penis being scared away from going in—and all forms of feminine anaesthesia (vaginismus) rest in the same way on the primal fixation on the mother and on infantile anxiety as we have described it. Here, according to the hysterical mechanism described by Freud, the one function of the organ is renounced in favour of another unconscious one; pleasure-function versus bearing-function, wherein lies the opposition between the species (propagation) and the individual (pleasure).

These pronounced symptoms of anxiety show that the neurotic has overcome the birth trauma only in a highly insufficient degree. The physical symptoms of *hysteria*, not only in their manifest forms but also in their deepest unconscious content, show various directly physical reproductions of birth with the pronounced tendency to deny it, that is, to return into the previous pleasure situation of the intrauterine life. To this category belong pre-eminently the phenomena of hysterical *paralysis*, of which, for example, the inhibited function of walking or moving is nothing other than the physically materialized agoraphobia, while the

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1 See the corresponding arguments in my work entitled “Perversion and Neurosis,” *Internat. Journal of Psychoanalysis*.

2 *Cf.* Federn’s work (*Jahrh.*, vi., 1914), “Über zwei typische Traumsensationen,” of inhibition and flying, as well as their relation to the neurotic symptoms of paralysis or of dizziness. All these sensations prove to be unambiguous reproductions of corresponding sensations at birth (see in the chapter “Symbolic Adaptation” what is said about the dream, p. 78).

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immobility brings to realization at the same time the pleasurable primal situation, with the dread or horror of being freed therefrom. The typical phenomena of paralysis, characterized by the drawing in of the extremities to the body, just as the disturbance of co-ordination, seen for example in *chorea minor*, approach even more faithfully to the intrauterine position.
When we give foundation to these hysterical symptoms as being reproductions of the intrauterine state, or of birth, the problem of conversion also appears in a new light. What needs to be explained is, not the “conversion” of psychical excitations into physical, but how means of expression which were purely physical in origin could come to demand psychical expression. But this demand appears to be the mechanism by which the anxiety arises, which is, so to say, the first psychical content of which the human being is conscious. From anxiety to the further psychical superstructure many ways lead, of which we will follow the culturally, as also pathologically, most important under the name of symbol formation. Here we want only briefly to allude to phantasy formations, those psychical offshoots of hysterical physical symptoms, as expressed for example in the so-called hysterical dream or twilight states (including loss of consciousness). From Abraham’s (Jahrb., ii., 1910) excellent description it is obvious that in them it is a matter of “psychical conversions”—i.e., of reproductions of the primal situation in the psychical sphere—whereby the physical return to the mother is replaced by the mere introversion of the libido. Withdrawal from the outer world is represented by psychical isolation, which we see then materialized

1 One sees how this concept links on to Meynert’s, who already traced the movements of chorea minor to the movements of the suckling.

in psychoses. Moreover, it is characteristic of these dream states that they frequently end with the affect of anxiety, which sets a limit to regression in the phantasy, as anxiety often does to the night dream. How near these states approach to mystical ecstasies and inner meditations is well known, although their origin is not understood.1

Further, all neurotic disturbances in breathing (asthma), which repeat the feeling of suffocation, relate directly to the physical reproductions of the birth trauma. The extensive use of the neurotic headache (migraine) goes back to the specially painful part allotted to the head in parturition, and ultimately all attacks of convulsions noticeable in quite small children, even in the new-born, can be regarded as a directly continued attempt to get rid of the primal birth trauma. Finally, the great hysterical attack uses the same mechanism, occurring, as it does, at the full height of sexual development, and showing a complete defence mechanism in the well known arc de cercle position, which is diametrically opposed to the doubled-up embryonal position.2

2 This entire conception, perhaps, contains a reference to the deeper significance of Hysteria as “uterus”-disease (see also Eisler, *Hysterische Erscheinungen am Uterus*, Kongress-vortrag, Berlin, September, 1922).

Also the typical menstrual difficulties can be easily understood in this sense, as birth is actually only a menstruation *en masse*. Menstruation, which also “periodically” continues the womb existence, seems to have been drawn into the general repression of the birth trauma by our civilization. Originally the sign of the woman’s extremely desirable ability to become pregnant, it has become, with repression, the meeting-point of the most various neurotic disturbances.

Starting from the hysterical attack which Psychoanalysis has recognized as the equivalent of and defence against the position of coitus, let us touch upon some problems of the mechanism and choice of neuroses. The eminent aversion to sexuality, so clearly to be seen in hysterical attacks, is a consequence of the mother fixation. The female patient denies in “organ speech” simultaneously with the sexual wish, also the wish to return to the womb, which prevents her from accepting the normal sexual adjustment. This pathological sexualization of parturition is the caricature of the normal sexualization necessary for the attainment of the heterosexual aim. On the other hand, the whole quantum of sexual desire (libido) is, so to say, transferred from later development back again to the infantile primal situation, a fact which gives to the attack that lustful character described by so many observers. One could formulate the hysterical attack, translated into conscious language, as a cry “Away from the (mother’s) genitals!” and indeed in the sexual as well as in the infantile sense. But the same mechanism is shown also in all other hysterical “displacements” (made intelligible by analysis), which mostly tend towards the upper half of the body (displacement upwards), whereby it may be not without importance, that the head is the first to leave the mother’s genitals, and is therefore that part of the body which not merely experiences the birth trauma the most intensely, but is also the first to pass it.

From particular analyses, one gets the definite impression that the later “choice” of the *form* of neurosis is determined quite decisively by the process of birth, the special point of attack of the trauma,1 and the individual’s reaction to
it. Without wishing to anticipate detailed investigations, I would like to formulate the general impression that displacement both above (globus—dyspnœa) and below (paralysis—cramps) corresponds in every case to a divergence from the genitals as a centre. This point of view is of paramount importance for the understanding of the neurotic type of character in general and its entire method of reaction, as it embraces the psycho-biological reactions to the birth trauma in their entirety. Thus, the physical symptoms, mostly by evading the border of anxiety, attempt to regress directly into the pre-natal stage, so that the anxiety, evaded either directly or according to the above mentioned (p. 19) form of defence on the part of the Ego, is manifested as sexual guilt-feeling. This would explain the sexual significance of such symptoms as, for example, stiffness, reddening, erection. From the same point of anxiety—viz., the mother’s genital-exit-and-entrance, the psychical symptoms attempt to approach the same goal in the opposite direction to the psycho-physical apparatus, by means of phantasy formation, introversion, hallucination, and the stuporous and katatonic twilight states understood as the final stage of this series. Both ways lead finally to the so-called “sexual disinclination,” which ultimately goes back to the aversion to the mother’s genitals; the physical symptoms of displacement and conversion accomplish this in allowing the genitals to be replaced by a substitute for the genitals less invested with anxiety; the psychical symptoms, by at first attempting to lead away and to turn aside from the physical in general, give rise to the processes of sublimation and reaction formations, which we then see expressed in the highest forms of developed accomplishments, such as Art, Philosophy, and Ethics.

To have recognized and investigated in detail these widely branched psychical connections is the undisputed merit of Psychoanalysis today. On the other hand, it still lacked a firmly-established foundation for the psychical “meaning” of physical symptoms. But now we believe that our concept of the birth trauma in its psycho-biological importance is able to fill up these gaps, because it recurs to a state which gives us for the first time, so to say, a real substratum for all psycho-physiological connections and relations. The conception outlined in Ferenczi’s1 studies of hysteria and made valid for organic diseases by Groddeck2 seems to me to maintain its real
biological foundation only through the full theoretical valuation of the birth trauma. From the reproduction in dreams of the birth and intrauterine situations it is only a step to the corresponding manifestations in hysteria, and from there again only a step to similar purely organic disease symptoms, which always seem to have the same “meaning” and to serve similar tendencies. The transition of these different forms of phenomena into one another is so fluid, that sometimes it is scarcely possible to form any diagnostic differentiation. In tracing these phenomena back to a primal state, where the psychophysical is still united, where no separation has yet taken place (Groddeck), not only the mechanism but also the form and content of neurotic physical symptoms become intelligible. This is valid for cases recognized as “psychical” just as much as for those qualified as neurologic or organic. From the standpoint of our concept it is a matter of indifference whether an anatomic lesion of the brain, or a

1 Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, 1919.

2 Psychische Bedingtheit und psychoanalytische Behandlung organischer Leiden, 1917. Also Das Buck vom Ês.

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toxic irritation, or lastly a purely psychogenetic experience compels the Ego to give in to the eternal pressure of the Unconscious and to regress to the primal source of libido gratification and protection. The similarity of the symptoms from these different causes then becomes obvious; all the artificial setting up of problems disappears, for the individual can do nothing but go back as far along the channels of psycho-physical development as the individual fixation of anxiety and the limits of repression respectively will allow. A problem would arise only if the symptoms were not so similar as they actually are and must necessarily be.

I must be content here with referring to a few striking examples, and must leave the further pursuit of these highly suggestive explanations to experienced neurologists and internal specialists. Thus cases of narcolepsy, genuine as well as hysteroid, manifest the typical condition of the embryonal sleep; in these cases the symptom of sudden paralysis of the will, cataleptic inhibitions, might turn out to have a biological relation to this fœtal state (position of the limbs). It does not seem accidental that the sudden desire for sleep overtakes the patient just in dangerous situations (when crossing a street or travelling by rail, etc.); which again reminds one of the somnambulists who love to put themselves in positions which, under normal conditions, would be the cause of fear. In the parallel organic disease, encephalitis, the well-known symptoms of changing day into night, dyspnœa, and tics, seem to refer directly to the birth
trauma. The practical importance of this insight is given by linking it on to the well-known clinical experience of how easily these and similar conditions can be psychically influenced.1

1 I refer here to Paul Schilder’s remark made at the time of writing this work (April, 1923) which showed that attacks of

There is, however, no doubt that just as the same symptom can originate from either side, it must also be possible to influence it therapeutically from both sides. When recently there was some talk of attacks of asthma—even such as were of a psychic nature—having been influenced favourably by operating on the larynx, similar recent experiences of the removal of nervous phenomena in children (such as anxiety states and dreams, etc.), by freeing the nasal passages, admitted of just as little doubt.1 On the other hand, through the knowledge of the psychophysical mechanism at work in these cases, one will not be surprised to hear that children who have been under anaesthetics develop some time later direct states of anxiety, which apparently they had long ago overcome. Nor ought we to be surprised to hear that, after an anaesthetic, existing states of anxiety (of sleeping alone in a dark room, anxiety dreams, nightmares, etc.), occur in greatly intensified form.2 All these facts may be explained by saying that the physical symptoms (for instance, striving for breath) automatically mobilize the birth anxiety and the entire psychical complex connected

choria minor, for example, disappear as soon as one puts the patient to bed, and which also emphasized the ease with which senile states of abasia and astasia can be psychically influenced.

1 See Dr. Stein in the Wiener Klin. Wochenschrift (April, 1923) and the simultaneous communications (in the Gesellschaft der Ärzte zu Wien) by Eppinger (Klinik Wenckebach) and Hofer (Klinik Hajek) concerning treatment by operation in cases of angina pectoris.

2 To an English child specialist I owe the report that children, after having their tonsils operated on under a narcotic, for years after often have attacks of nightly anxiety, which have been traced even by the parents themselves (or other observers) to the trauma of the operation. Moreover, this is according to individual experiences quite frequent among grown-up people, who react to operations under anaesthetics with typical dreams or symptoms symbolizing regression to the mother.
with it, or that the narcotic sleep goes back again to the primal situation. It will depend on the kind and severity of the case whether one will determine for it an organic (operative) or psychical treatment. The latter at present is still too unfamiliar, but sooner or later it will be adopted with appropriate simplification.

Finally, one should mention in this connection a problem which seems of general importance. If, for instance, we consistently carry through the analysis of a compulsion neurosis, we note it as a first success, when we have enabled the patient to go back from his purely intellectual speculations to the early infantile stages of the neurosis—namely, to the compulsive actions and eventually even to the original pleasurable actions. Quite frequently even physical “conversion” symptoms are thereby renewed. Analysis then shows that the compulsion neurosis frequently—my limited experience prevents me from saying always, although I have regularly found it so—issues from an hysterical kernel, which we must assume as the foundation of every child’s neurosis.

And as one can almost invariably discover an hysterical nucleus, directly dependent on the birth trauma in the background of the compulsion neurosis, so the analysis of some hysterical cases has taught me that, besides the disposition to physical symptoms (“conversion”) existing since earliest childhood (severe birth trauma) and tumultuously pressing forward into a neurosis, there is nearly always a vein of neurotic compulsion running through the hysterical primal stratum. Without discovering this, a completed analysis of hysteria and the removal of its symptoms remain impossible. In cases which I remember of hysteria in women, it was quite clear that the physical symptoms, based

on the birth trauma, were almost completely used to express the (heterosexual) Oedipus complex: thus they could be traced back to the transference of the libido to the father, the reaction to disappointment, and subsequent guilt-feeling. Physical symptoms of the neurosis in women patients thus prove to be a sediment of the libido pathologically displaced on to the father (mother identification).
At the disillusionment in the father a part of the girl’s libido turns back to the mother, in order to enjoy again the earliest libido fixation which had been partially given up (transferred to the father). As this is doomed to fail, because the mother in the meantime has become a rival in the Œdipus situation, a yet stronger means of defence must now be seized in order to complete the final liberation from the mother which is biologically necessary. This occurs by the means, discovered through analysis, of converting love into hate, which is the characteristic mechanism for the compulsion neurosis. But this hate, which should serve the purpose of setting the individual free from the binding love to the mother, signifies only another kind of fixation to the mother to whom one is now bound by hate. The secondary attempts to become free mostly occur under the traumatic impression of a newly born brother or sister, and lead to the displacement of the affect on to the infant, or to the father, who is the real cause of separation from the mother. Here is to be sought the main root of the “death wish” (in women patients) for the mother, which attempts to overcome their own longing to return by getting rid of the mother. Further ways of forming reactions to this “sadistic” death wish not compatible with the Ego are already analytically understood and valued in detail from the ethical inhibitions (hyper-morality, compassion) to the most severe self-punishment (masochism, depression).

The attempts which recur in such exaggerated form in compulsive thoughts and ponderings to master this ambivalent primal conflict through intellectual work belong to the later decisive period of the child’s sexual “interest.” In pulling down this speculative superstructure, which we accomplish by releasing anxiety and by freeing libido, we are really driving the primal anxiety, entrenched in the system and scarcely discoverable, back again into the physical, in order to disperse it in this normal way—by conducting it, as it were, to earth.

This process, likewise moving along psychobiological channels, can now work itself off in a normal measure under less extreme conditions. And one actually has the impression, from very many purely organic sufferings, that they save the individual—if one may so express it—from the luxury of a neurosis formation. But it would be more correct to say that the neurosis is a more pretentious substitute for a banal organic suffering, both of which have at bottom the same cause. One is not infrequently astonished to see how it is precisely a neurosis, with its “counterfeit” physical symptoms, that prevents the development of any real disease of the same organ, just because it is a substitute for it. Moreover, it is also remarkable—as Freud incidentally
mentions—that patients who, for example, have suffered many years from the severest attacks of anxiety, yet look flourishing, just as patients who suffer for years from sleeplessness do not become so exhausted as individuals who “really” have not slept for a long time. Obviously the Unconscious gets so much primal libido from the symptom that it makes up for the “neurotic” deficiency.

From hysterical phenomena in the extremities, which characteristically go back to the complex of the primal trauma, we are led directly to certain ceremonial and compulsive positions in bed, such as we can observe in young children and in certain obsessional patients, who also insist upon meticulous arrangements of their clothes. That this ceremonial is related to the position in bed is in harmony with our conception of sleep as being a temporary return to the embryonal situation.

Without considering the forms of transition from hysterical symptoms to obsessional actions, for example, the tics, etc., we want to lay stress only on the classical obsessional neurosis, in which the way from the original physical symptoms (obsessional actions) to the purely psychical and, indeed, intellectual attempt at mastery, has been completely cleared up by analysis. If what has been said about hysteria is completely valid for the physical phenomena (i.e., tics) of the obsessional neurotic, so the typical obsessional thoughts and ponderings, as shown by analysis, go back to the infantile problem concerning the origin of children, and link on to the first childish attempt intellectually to master the birth trauma. The obsessional neurotic, therefore, finally succeeds by means of the “omnipotence of thought” in getting back to the longed-for primal situation (Ferenczi). He accomplishes this indirectly, however, in his individual way by plunging into philosophic speculations about death and immortality as well as the “beyond” and its eternal punishment. In this way he repeats the seemingly unavoi-

1 Here also belong the so-called “impulse actions” (Stekel), which are obsessional actions mostly performed in (hysterical) twilight states (migratory instinct: homesickness—“going back”; pyromania: fire—warmth—mother).

2 Contributions to Psychoanalysis, p. 181.
able projection of life before birth into the future after death. This projection made by mankind for many thousands of years in the entangled bypaths of mistaken religious superstitions, and crowned by the doctrine of immortality, still continues to exist today in the widespread, intense interest in the supernatural, and in occultism with its world of spirits. The changes of moods in obsessional neurotics are closely related to circular insanity (cyclothymia), whereas their speculative system formation is closely related to certain pronounced forms of psychoses. Circular insanity, with its sudden changes from melancholy to mania, goes directly back to the reproduction of sensations before and after birth, in that the primal mechanism of change from pleasure to pain at the loss of the first libido object, namely, the severance from the womb, is repeated over and over again. The form of disease is therefore of quite special importance for the study of the pleasure-pain problem. In analyses of deep states of depression, one is able to crystallize the libido consumed therein, so to speak, as a precipitate. The libido then often expresses itself, as one patient put it, as “a sexual excitement over the whole surface of the body.” The melancholic stage, which is so aptly called “depression,” is characterized by physical symptoms, all of which tend to regress to the intrauterine position.

1 I cannot here refrain from quoting a characteristic expression of Thomas Mann, who in describing a spiritualistic seance at Schrenck-Nötzing’s at which he was present, gave his impression of the medium, etc. (in a lecture in Vienna on March 29, 1923). “The situation gave a mystical impression simply through the struggling for breath of the medium, whose state decisively and unambiguously reminds one of parturition.”

2 A bent carriage of the body, curling up in bed, lying without movement and speech for days at a time, refusal to feed oneself, etc.

or sorrow expresses the fact that post natum omne animal triste est. The manic stage frequently following the depressive is physically distinguished, on the other hand, by the post-natal liveliness and movement, whilst the feeling of extreme happiness and blessedness conforms to the pre-natal libido gratification. We will explain the interesting mechanism of this peculiarly alternating distribution of affect and content in discussing the pleasure-pain mechanism (see pp. 187 and 199). Here where it is only a question of briefly mentioning this new point of view, we must refrain from showing how the finer details of symptom formation or the mechanism of the distribution of affect can be understood purely analytically in the meaning of our concept. The symptomatic conformation of the pre-natal and post-natal libido situation becomes complicated in practice through the fact that in parturition itself the accompanying psychical phenomena of
which we are not able directly to observe, in addition to the chief traumatic experience, there occur also pleasurable or, at least, relatively pleasurable moments, to which one presumably can regress.1

We would like just to emphasize the fact that melancholia differs in a remarkable way from the purely neurotic symptoms in that it uses not only the body (or the Ego) as a means of representing the primal state, but also shows the tendency to use objects in the outer world, as, for instance, darkened rooms, in the same sense. This tendency we can designate as a psychotic “characteristic.” Thus the melancholic, by his withdrawal from the outer world, to a certain extent regresses from his adjustment to the same, while, on the other hand, the psychotic delusions, the content of which so obviously strives to re-establish the primal state, have to replace the outer world, no longer compatible with the libido, by the best of all worlds—namely, the intrauterine existence. Wherever one turns to such a case history, especially from among the wide group of the so-called dementia praecox, one finds many representations of the birth phantasy, which are in the last resort reproductions of their own primeval history, whether expressed in direct language robbed only of its affect, or whether in symbolic expression, the importance of which has become easily intelligible in the light of psychoanalytic dream investigation.

The first useful steps taken towards the understanding of the “content of the psychoses” we owe to the Zurich School of Psychiatry, under the leadership of Jung and Bleuler, which very early recognized the supreme importance of the psychoanalytic discoveries and used them in Psychiatry.1 After Freud, in 1894, had brought into prominence the defence mechanism as an explanation of certain hallu-

1 It seems predominantly to be a matter of the normal possibilities of regression, which in contradistinction to mania have been called merely “euphoric.” For the designation of this state of affect, the term “anxiety-pleasure” (Angstlust), coined by Hattingberg, would be very useful.

1 See Jung’s review of the relevant literature in the Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische und psychopathol. Forschungen, Bd. ii., 1910, pp. 356-388, the corresponding literature of German and Austrian authors reviewed by Abraham (see also his work “Die psychosexuellen Differenzen der Hysterie und Dementia
præcox,” 1908) in Jahrb., i., p. 546 ff.; continued in Jahrb., vi., 1914, p. 343 ff., and finally in Bericht über die Fortschritte der Psychoanalyse in den Jahren, 1914-1919, Vienna and Leipzig, 1921, p. 158 ff. Special mention should also be made of Jung’s first works: Uber die Psychologie der Dementia præcox, Halle, 1907, and Der Inhalt der Psychose, Leipzig and Vienna, 1908. Further, the relevant basic works of Honegger, Itten, Maeder, Nelken, Spielrein, and others in the different volumes of the Jahrbuch. Finally, Bleuler’s large volume, Dementia præcox oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien, 1911, which tends for the most part to be an application of Freud’s ideas to Dementia præcox.

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Cinatory psychoses, and in 1896 could prove for the first time that “repression” was also a determining factor in cases of paranoia,1 a complete decade elapsed before the Zurich clinic undertook the first psychiatrical advance in this field. Soon after this (1911) Freud brought forward his broadly outlined analysis of a case of paranoia (Schreber). This, by linking on to his previous work, and also by making use of the valuable results of the Zurich school, established for the first time an understanding of the psychical mechanism and the structural formation of psychoses. The “homosexual” attitude and the patient’s defence against this feminine libido position showed itself to be the most important part of the mechanism, which also is again to be subordinated to the general tendency to overcome the birth trauma2 in the sense of identification with the mother and the function of bearing (anal child). Through these investigations of Freud’s, the theoretical understanding of the psychoses has been made possible for the first time, and a number of Freud’s pupils have since devoted their work to the subject.3 Into general psychiatry these revolutionary conceptions naturally penetrate very slowly, but more recently they seem to have exercised a decisive influence on the younger generation of psychiatrists.4 In the


2 In the classical paranoia, behind the boisterous symptoms, the primal symptom of anxiety can easily be discovered (being persecuted), just as behind the protective construction of the phobias or the reaction barriers of the obsessional neurosis.

3 Literature, Jahrbuch, vi., p. 345 ff.; Bericht, p. 158.
foreground stands the phylogenetic point of view, which is an undisputed merit of the Zurich school (Honegger, Jung), but against the methodical misuse of which Freud already turned his attention when he showed how much there is still accessible and intelligible in the individual analysis, before one need turn to the phylogenetic material or view-point. Naturally this warning has not been of much use, and so we now see the advanced psychiatrists involved in a descriptive comparison of the psychology of the schizophrenic with that of the primitives.1 When, for instance, in his interesting work, Storch compares the archaic-primitive attitude to the “magic-tabuistic” attitude and emphasizes the “mystical union” as well as the “cosmic identification,” he retrogresses from Psychoanalysis in so far as he does not use the analytic understanding of the primitive attitude as an explanation of the schizophrenics; is content with a juxtaposition, without noticing that he has only replaced an obviously simple problem of individual psychology by a more complicated ethnological one.

Our concept tends rather to lead to a further understanding of individual psychology, and so also to find further explanations of the psychological enigma in ethnology. The viewpoint of the fundamental importance of the birth trauma, here represented, seems to us actually to facilitate the solution of this problem. The regressive tendency is so strongly pronounced in psychoses, that we may expect to find in them

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4 See especially the interesting work of Paul Schilder (Vienna) in his comprehensive presentation Seele und Leben (Springersche Monographien, Berlin, 1923). The work, appearing almost at the same time, of Alfred Storch (Tübingen: The Primitive

Archaic Forms of Inner Experiences and Thought in Schizophrenia) rests almost entirely on the analytic conception without admitting this so unreservedly as Schilder. Purely analytic are the valuable contributions by Nunberg in the Internal. Zschr. für Psychoanalyse.

1 See also Prinzhorn’s work, interesting in its material, Bildnerei der Geisteskranken, Berlin, 1922.
the nearest approach to the primal situation. Actually the content of psychoses, whether obviously or in the patient’s own symptoms of collapse of thought and speech, achieves complete representation, in the most extended form, of the intrauterine state and of birth.

We owe it to the industrious work of psychiatrists, that through the detailed communication of patients’ case histories already valued from the psychoanalytic point of view, we are in the position to confirm in so striking a way the experiences gained from the analysis of neuroses. Having referred to the large amount of material relating to the psychoses in the literature already quoted, I would like to give some illustrations from Storch’s last publication known to me. “A patient approaching a stuporous state makes continuous revolving motions with his hand round the navel. On being questioned he explains he wants to make a hole (what for?) in order to come out into freedom. Nothing further is to be learnt from him.” It is, however, clear that the patient unconsciously means by it the return into the womb, otherwise the “symbol” remains unintelligible. Likewise for a manifestly expressed castration action there is the same motive; “the patient one day, after the above-mentioned incident, bit off a part of his finger; only after overcoming many inhibitions did he give a motive: ‘In biting off part of my finger I have drawn the other people to me, in order to show that there is something missing in one place.’ After further questioning, he continued: ‘I wanted freedom; through the hole I have crept out like a beetle’” (p. 7). Storch assumes that this does not only mean leaving the clinic in the analytic sense, but also suggests the “vague” idea of freeing from the womb (birth through the navel), and remarks in addition, that to the

patient as to so many schizophrenics, the idea of a re-embodiment was throughout a self-evident fact; just as reincarnation was to primitive folk. A young schizophrenic, who as a child had been misused by her own father and ran away from service, experienced in a catatonic state a birth phantasy in which she appeared at the same time as the Christ child and his mother (p. 61). The same patient spoke of “a splitting of her own youth from her present person.” She had the feeling that there were two persons in her body, one representing the ugly past and another who was in a high position beyond sex (pp. 77-78). Another patient (p. 63) made the nurse her “Lord God,” and said “everything is comprehended in myself and the nurse, everything from Christ to the very lowest thing.” (On being questioned about her relation to the nurse), “We are completely one, both one; she is the Lord God, I am the same as she. I am in the nurse and the nurse is in me.” Another time she said, “she has the whole world in herself,” and explained this (on being questioned) in a characteristic way (p. 80).
Some patients show the regressive tendency in the form of a wish not to be grown up, the counterpart of which one often finds in children, as the longing to be grown-up. “A schizophrenic, in the thirties, complained in an excited tone, that he was turned into a child; I am no longer a man, but am already a child; when my wife visited me, I was not the husband belonging to the wife; I sat beside her as a child, by its mother” (p. 57). In contrast to other cases, where “the change into the feminine or childish state of life is experienced by the patients as a diminishing and depreciating of their Ego,” Storch remarks, “we often meet with the opposite experience in young schizophrenics, who even

step over the threshold of childhood into the life of a grownup being; not seldom we find in them a pronounced fear of life and of being grown up, under circumstances in conflict with a strong desire to live and a need for love. From this conflict they want to flee back again into childhood ...” (p. 89). I think that in this tendency we have before us the kernel which would justify psychologically the designation of this form of illness as dementia praecox. Others directly restore the old cloaca theory, that is, the abode in the womb, like the patient (p. 42) who “did not, indeed, believe that children are born through the rectum, but that between the ‘pouch,’ in which according to her opinion the child grows in the mother, and the lowest part of the bowel, there exists a passage through which the embryo can empty its dirt. The child is in the ‘pouch’ and sucks inside at the little nipples giving nourishment (which are in place of the breasts). From the ‘pouch’ an ‘outlet’ goes to the rectum,’ so that the child is purged of the food which it takes with the milk.’ Before parturition the outlet heals up, goes away, is for a cleansing purpose.” Another catatonic with coprophagia explicitly gave the embryonal motivation for her act, when she stated “that during her psychotic conditions she was compelled to drink urine and to eat fæces”; after having previously lived through the sensation of dying, she meant that she needed the substance for her building up again. In a catatonic case analytically and thoroughly investigated by Nunberg, swallowing excrement signified self-fructifying and renewing.1 Summing up, Storch says (in the chapter on “Rebirth”): “We meet with the idea of being dead and reawakened, the idea of going through to death, of becoming

new and finally becoming god; we also find the primitive sensual expressions of rebirth, the idea of really being born, and so forth. Thus the complex thoughts of patients often rush pell-mell into the ideas of birth and pregnancy, giving birth and being born, being the mother and the child” (p. 76).

Not only the content of the delusions seems clearly determined in this direction, but the psychotic states such as hallucinations, twilight and catatonic phases, also become intelligible as far-reaching regressions to the fcetal state. We owe the first bold attempt to formulate such a conception from analytic material to the valuable work of Tausk, who died prematurely. His paper is entitled “Über die Entstehung des Beeinflussungsapparates in der Schizophrenie,” and he conceives this apparatus by which the patient thinks he is influenced as a projection of one’s own genitalized body in the womb. “The projection of one’s own body would thus be a defence against a libido position which corresponds to the development at the final stage of the fcetal condition and at the beginning of the extrauterine development” (l.c., p. 23). From here onwards Tausk attempts to explain different schizophrenic symptoms. “Could not catalepsy, flexibilitas cerea, correspond to that stage in which the human being perceives his organs as not his own, and in which he must resign them, as not belonging to himself, to the force of a strange will? Could not the catatonic stupor, which represents a complete rejection of the outer world, be a withdrawal into the womb? Might not these extremely severe catatonic symptoms be the ultimum refugium of a psyche which also gives up the most

1 Italics mine.

womb, which must be accepted as a further atavistically performed “primal phantasy,” comes up symptomatically “as a pathological reality in the regressive psyche of schizophrenics.”

If at this point one introduces the reality of the birth trauma with its momentous after-effects, then not only can one affirm Tausk’s assumptions, but one also comes to a really fundamental understanding of other psychotic symptoms, which relate directly to the birth trauma, and only indirectly to the intrauterine stage. This is true of all seizures and attacks, especially the so-called epileptic, which in content and form betray the clearest reminiscences of parturition. There, moreover, we find a similar division as in circular insanity (cyclothymia), although without the reversal of the order in the latter. For the aura preceding the great epileptic attack, with its feeling of blessedness described so wonderfully by Dostoievski, corresponds to the pre-natal libido gratification, whilst the convulsions themselves reproduce the act of birth.

All these psychotic symptoms have in common the fact that they represent in the analytic sense a further regression of the libido than the neuroses. For, by freeing their libido from the outer world, replacing the mother, they supplement the loss of the primal object by a so-called cosmological projection, by which they only go back again to the primal situation through the incorporation (introjection) of objects with their Ego (mother and child). In this peculiar psychotic mechanism, which contains a disturbance of the relation to the outer world, the classical paranoia—and the paranoid forms of psychoses—stand closest to the mythological world view. Paranoia seems characterized by the fact that in it the outer world is charged with libido far exceeding that in a normal adjustment; the whole world is, so to say, a womb, to the hostile influence of which the patient is now exposed (electric currents, etc.). By means

1 He remarks besides that the expression womb-phantasy (Mutterleibphantasie) originated from Gustav Grüner.

2 In his work (likewise fundamental for the concept here brought to the fore) entitled “Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality,” Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, p. 181, Ferenczi has already alluded to the traceability of epileptic attacks to an early phase of language by gestures.
1 See the “paranoid” characterization in the mythical phantasy formation in *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*.

2 It is worthy of note that the paranoiac, Strindberg, has recognized in the pre-natal influence the explanation for the child’s first reactions—namely, fear and hunger (in his autobiographical work: *Die Beichte eines Thoren*). To the references given there for providing for the pregnant, allusions only can be made. We may here reproduce some utterances of Strindberg’s which are specially expressive in this connection (according to Storch, *l.c.*, p. 46 f.). When his loved one is taken by a stranger, it is for him “a shock to his whole psychic being,” for “it was a part of himself, which was taken

of the reversal of feeling (hate) towards the father, the entire situation of the mother’s protecting womb, in its cultural and cosmological significance, has here become a unique, gigantic, hostile entity, which pursues the hero, identified with the father, and ever challenges him to new battles. In the meaning of this tendency to return to the mother, which the psychotic strives after by means of projection, the course of the psychotic disease, as Freud recognized, is actually to be interpreted as an attempt to cure. We see this clearly in the analytic process of healing, from which we started. Only the psychotic loses the way to the light of health in the underground labyrinth of the womb situation, whilst the neurotic is enabled to find the way to life again, by the Ariadne-like threads of remembrances thrown to him by the analyst.

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*by another*, a part of his bowels, with which one now plays” (*A Soul’s Development*, chap. 5). “In love, he melts together with the loved woman, but then when he has lost himself and his form, the desire for self-preservation grows, and in the anxiety at ‘losing his Ego through the equalizing power of love’ he attempts to free himself from her in order to find himself again as *self existing*” (“Entzweit,” chaps. 2-3). After the psychosis he withdraws himself into loneliness, encloses himself “within the cocoon of his own soul” (“Einsam,” chap. 3). From his later schizophrenic times he tells of protective measures which he uses against the currents disturbing at night; “When one is exposed to the *currents of a woman mostly during sleep,* one can isolate oneself”, “Incidentally one evening I placed a woollen shawl over my shoulders and neck, and this night I was protected although I noticed the attacks of currents.” Finally, he shows also that the “idea of persecution” is linked on to anxiety in which he makes the “panicky fright at everything and nothing” responsible for his restlessness. Strindberg’s sad childhood and his peculiar “mother complex” are well known (see the allusion in *Inzestmotiv*, 1912, p. 32, note). From this point onwards, one can understand his whole development, personality, achievement, and psychosis.
As, according to the Freudian concept, hysteria is closely related to artistic production, the obsessional neurosis to the formation of religion and philosophic speculation, so the psychoses are closely related to the mythological world view. When analytically adjusted psychiatrists have recognized that the content of the psychosis is “cosmologic,” we need not avoid the next step, that of analysis of cosmology itself, for then we shall find that it is nothing other than the infantile recollection of one’s own birth projected on to Nature. As I am reserving the more detailed foundation of this concept in the rich soil of mythical and cosmological material for a book planned long ago under the title *Mikrokosmos und Makrokosmos*, I can here only refer to my various preliminary studies in the field of mythology, which attempt to show that the human problem of birth stands actually at the centre of mythical as of infantile interest and determines conclusively the content of phantasy formations.1

1 See the works: *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, 1909; *Die Lohengrinsage* (1911); *Das Inzestmotiv in Dichtung und Sage* (1912), especially chap. ix., “Die Weltelternmythe”); and finally *Psychoanalytische Beiträge zur Mythenforschung*, collected studies in the year 1911-1914; second and altered edition, 1922 (especially “Die Sintflutsage,” “Verschlingungsmythen,” “Tiermärchen,” etc.).
Before turning to the mythical elaborations of the birth trauma exhibited in such impressive compensatory creations as hero formation, we must examine those facts which touch us more closely and are of more human consequence, showing as they do in an overwhelming manner the fundamental importance of the birth trauma and the everlasting longing to overcome it. These biological facts can also make intelligible to us the normal adjustment lying between asocial neurotics and exaggerated heroic accomplishment, and can explain, moreover, how this adjustment or adaptation, which we call culture and civilization, could succeed at all.

The condition of sleep, which takes place automatically every night, urges us to the idea that even the normal individual never completely overcomes the birth trauma, since he spends half his life in a state similar to that of the intrauterine. We fall into this state automatically as soon as it is dark, thus again, as in the case of the child’s fear of the dark room, when the external conditions urge the Unconscious to an identification with the primal state. Hence the approach of darkness is anthropomorphically conceived.

1 See especially Freud, *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, and Ferenczi, “States in the Development of the Sense of Reality” (*l.c.*).

Neurotic sleeplessness, like somnambulism in all its forms, seems regularly to rest on a too intense repression of this biological necessity at the cost of libidinal strivings (to the mother). The frequent fear of being buried alive also falls in this category (Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*), just as its “perverted” counterpart, necrophilia.

In the imagination of all races as the return of the sun to the womb (underworld).1

In the state of sleep, in which we daily return to a considerable degree to the intrauterine situation, we dream, and there we make use of curious symbols which were known to the ancients, and which have been empirically established by Psychoanalysis, but are not yet...
completely understood in their origin and general human importance. Now dreams, from which we start in the analytical healing process (Chapter I.), show that these symbols, regularly appearing in the wish dream, ultimately represent the abode in the womb. On the other hand, in the anxiety dream the birth trauma, the expulsion from Paradise, is often reproduced with all its really experienced physical sensations and details. The hallucinatory wish fulfillment of the narcissistic dreamEgo, for the understanding of which Freud goes back to the

1 The moon, with its periodic waxing and waning, seems to fit still better into the mythological representation of the constantly renewed longing to return, and appears in myths not only directly as a pregnant woman and one giving birth, but also as the disappearing and returning child. The goddess of the moon is also of importance as giving help in birth (midwife), which is connected with her influence on menstruation. The “congruence of a woman’s menstruation and the lunar phases, which in our popular beliefs is still identical,” leads Th. W. Danzel to think that the astronomic-cosmic period arose first into consciousness as a symbolic expression of subjective periods and rhythms, and is the foundation for the calendar which, in the astral countries (China, Babylon, Egypt, Mexico), was originally a “Book of good and evil Days” (see Mexico, vol. i., p. 28 [“Kulturen der Erde,” vol. xi.], Darmstadt, 1922).” The period of 260 days of tonal-anatl, which plays a special role in the Mexican calendar, has perhaps as a foundation besides the astronomic periods also the duration of pregnancy (Danzel, Mexico, ii., p. 25, Darmstadt, 1922). Fuhrmann (Mexico, iii.) raises this assumption to greater certainty in tracing back the Mexican year to the pre-natal period of human beings, and the new (not based on the sun’s course) time-reckoning to this embryonal year (p. 21).

embryonal condition,1 is really proved by dreams completely uninfluenced analytically, to be an actual return and reproduction of the intrauterine situation, as already physically realized to a certain extent in the purely physiological condition of sleep. Indeed, dream formation shows in various ways—at least, according to its unconscious tendency to fulfil wishes, postulated by Freud—that it is a more complete return in uterum than seems to be accomplished through the mere physiological fact of sleep.2 The infantile character of the dream goes much further back and has a much deeper basis than we hitherto would admit because, with our consciousness created for the perception of the outer world, we could not previously grasp the character of this deepest Unconscious.

As I am reserving for publication some valuable analytic material, I can here only allude to the fact that the wish and anxiety dreams, regarded by Freud as the two main types, fit in perfectly with the concept of going back to the primal situation or with its painful interruption through the birth trauma.3 Yet I would like to mention a third type of Freud’s—namely, the punishment dream—in which the dreamer, mostly successful in life, later reinstates himself into a painful

We also claim to be better able to understand why dream life under the influence of the analytic situation begins to flourish and to grow so luxuriantly, often in such an astonishing way.

The *awakening*, especially from anxiety dreams, regularly repeats the process of birth, the coming into the world; this is the meaning of the so-called “threshold symbolism” (Silberer), which seems also mythologically to have but one meaning, the birth situation (see Roheim, “The Significance of Stepping Over,” *Int. J. of Ps.A.*, iii., 1922, in addition to the preceding work by Frau Sokolnicka). Moreover, the threshold birth symptom is also expressed in the frequent twitching of the legs on going to sleep.

The opposite to the punishment dream, namely, the *dream of indulgence*, although it may be apparently caused by such real necessities as hunger or other bodily needs, can be explained as an attempt to re-establish the intrauterine situation. For with the physiological sleep situation there returns the tendency to uninhibited gratification of all physical needs in the intrauterine form. Enuresis, which at the sexual stage is pollution, has the same meaning as incest. Just on that account incest dreams frequently occur with pollution, and, on the other hand, pollution dreams nearly always represent an unconcealed desire for incest. But even the wish for the indulgence of sleep (which Freud emphasizes as essential for dream formation in general) corresponds to the tendency to return to the intrauterine situation.
All dreams of physical sensations, even when caused by external stimuli— as the indulgence dreams are caused by inner stimuli—allow an unconstrained return to the primal situation. For instance, the sensation of cold caused by the bedclothes slipping off is interpreted by the Unconscious as the first loss of the protecting covering and is compensated for by a dream-like withdrawal into a symbolized womb. Likewise sensations of inhibition or flying, which frequently alternate in the same dreamer, the former sensation frequently occurring in individuals who had a difficult birth (hindrance), is used by the Unconscious in fulfilling its wish not to come away from the mother. But the latter flying sensation, changing the violent birth trauma into an easy floating out, as suggested by the stork fable, reproduces deep down in the Unconscious the state of wellbeing, namely, that of floating in the primal fetal condition (cf. the winged angels, the souls of the yet unborn, etc.). The corresponding anxiety situation seems to be reproduced in dreams of falling.

We notice here summarily that our previous remarks concerning sensations and types of dreams refer to quite general dream experiences, the typical character of which is explained by the universal human experience of birth. 2

1 New light is shed here on the so-called experimental dreams. The applied stimuli are interpreted in the meaning of the experienced primal situation (position of the limbs, etc.), all the more as they are chosen by the experimenter according to his own unconscious experiences; the putting of masks on the face, stimuli to the nose, tickling the soles of the feet, etc.

2 This is also valid for the so-called tooth dreams, which Jung already recognized as birth dreams in the case of women (quoted in Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams, as also the example there given by me). In the meaning of our concept as here set forth, the tertium comparationis is the typical painless falling out of teeth, which

But our remarks hold good also for the dreams recognized by analysis as typical in their latent content, of which I would like to mention here the so-called birth dream (dreams of birth). According to my experience this certainly represents the wish (or disinclination) to have one’s own child, but only by means of the reproduction of one’s own birth or intrauterine situation (in water). The reversal of direction, which for birth (coming out) is represented by plunging into the water, is to be explained as the simultaneous production of the trauma (plunge) and the regressive tendency, which it strives to neglect. This necessity simultaneously to represent both these regressive tendencies in the manifest dream content is of paramount importance for the
understanding of dreams. It not only explains the Freudian observation that the so-called “biographical dreams” are as a rule to be translated backwards (that is, they end according to one’s desires, with the intrauterine condition); but it also makes it obvious that a far more extensive use must be made of the technique of reversal in the interpretation of dreams, by which the secondary meaning of the so-called progressive tendency is clearly palpable in its relation to the regressive tendency. The double level, which is best seen in birth dreams, is mostly expressed by the appearance of two generations or by the repetition of situations (for example, the act of birth itself, as also in the hero myth) and clearly compensates for the severity of the trauma (pain). The interpretations given hitherto (birth, fear of death, castration, masturbation, etc.), can easily be subordinated to this primary meaning.


2 See also my earlier treatise, “Die Symbolschichtung im Wecktraum,” Jahrb., iv., 1912.

shows how the identification with the mother (from the Œdipus complex) is used to represent simultaneously mother and child, the latter, indeed, by means of the reproduction of one’s own birth.

These dreams are thus the best proof of the primal narcissistic tendency of the dream Unconscious, and show that it can do nothing else than portray the situation which gratifies the primal narcissism in the completest way.1 And thus also Jung’s interpretation at the so-called “subjective level,” of which so much anagogic misuse has been made, finds a real basis, as do all ostensibly prospective tendencies of the dream which, when unmasked, are projections of the womb situation into the future.2

1 To a quite primitive stage of development belongs the mode of representation on one’s own body and from one’s own material, as it is re-established, for example, in hysterical attacks (Ferenczi, GebärdenSprache): Freud first called attention thereto, by showing how the hysteric represents on himself also the action, for instance the embrace, desired from the love partner, “General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks,” 1909, and “Hysterical Phantasies and their Relation to Bisexuality,” 1908, Coll. Papers, vol. ii.
One must add to this the interesting observations of Kohler in his *Mentality of Apes*, where he shows that apes express what they want by indicating it on their own bodies. Thus a chimpanzee expressed the embrace which her master should give her by putting her arms round her own body.

2 The so-called telepathic dreams are analytically easy to solve as projections of the primal situation into the future. Likewise the whole of modern occultism, which rests on the ancient Indian symbolism of rebirth, can be understood completely from the primal trauma and its projected elaboration (astrology). For example, the occultists are right in assuming that memories of things in dreams go back to a *previous life* of the dreamer, and were then of importance, only they project the pre-existence further back than to the intrauterine existence.

On the other hand, the basic idea of telepathy corresponds to something projected into the future, perhaps to something already once experienced, anticipated, *déjà vu*, which likewise can have

Finally, we must mention, on account of its general interest, another typical form of anxiety dream, which well shows us how all the prospective tendencies interpreted into the dream show the effect of the primal repression of the birth trauma. This is the so-called “dream of travelling,” the characteristic details of which may easily be understood from the primal trauma. Such details as not catching the train, packing and not being ready, losing one’s luggage, etc., which in the dream are so painfully realized can be understood only when one interprets the departure as meaning *separation from the mother*, and the luggage (trunk, box) as a symbolic substitute for the womb, which as we know is replaced by all kinds of vehicles such as ships, automobiles, railway carriages, waggons, etc. The apparent death symbolism (Stekel) contained therein is just as preconscious as are any prospective tendencies (journey of life). The Unconscious can think of separation, departure, and dying only in terms of the wish-fulfilling regression to the womb, because it knows and can portray no other wish tendency. The *reversal tendency*, by which every forward movement in the dream must be interpreted as only a regression, explains simultaneously a number of

no other reference than to the pre-natal existence (compare with this Dr. Szilagyi’s interesting material published under the title “Der junge Spiritist,” Zschr., ix., 3, 1923. Quoted after the conclusion of this work.
The Language of Dreams, 1922, where, in addition to Freud’s dream investigation, a rich collection of the so-called “death symbolism” is brought together. Also in the chapter “Mutterleibsträume” there are a number of observations which, however, go beyond the merely practical “symbol interpretation” only with the supposition that perhaps a trace of memory may give the material basis for the birth dream.

otherwise unintelligible dream situations1 (see the previous mention of the reversal of birth). It shows further that not the physical sensations alone (position, etc.), but also the apparently higher psychical functions (not only in dreams) of form, orientation and time2 are related to the deepest of our unconscious wishes. The functional interpretation of single dream elements, which was certainly overestimated by Silberer and from which we have always inferred a “resistance” to the analytic interpretation, here manifests itself as a direct consequence of the tendency to flee away from the trauma. This tendency certainly

1 The disinclination of so many people to sit with their back to the engine is thus explained. It is the same primal repression which forbids the mythical hero to look backwards on his way (turned into stone), which places the mocked-at hero the reverse way on the horse (Christ), and finds an echo in the manner of speech—“to put the cart before the horse.” The childish games of travel (coachman, railway, etc.) show the corresponding pleasurable situation whereby in the meaning of the womb situation (waggon, ship, train, etc.) the absence of forward movement, which strikes adults as so laughable, forms just the exact wish-fulfilling element (see Peer Gynt’s childish “journey” with the dying mother, after which his world’s journey follows).

2 In women who are analyzed during pregnancy and up till the time shortly before delivery, it is shown that time and especially numbers go back to pregnancy and birth (months, years, children, brothers and sisters, etc.), in which the birthday plays a quite special part, and on which most analyses of numbers rest. One ought not to wonder at there being in the unconscious, instead of the number 9, referring to the nine months of pregnancy according to the artificial sun calendar, other numbers corresponding to the “natural moon calendar” (see note 1, p. 75), as also in mythology the sacred numbers oscillate between 7, 9, 10. For instance, there are in Mexico 9 underworlds, in New Zealand 10 (“the lowest layer, tneto, or place of decomposition, is where is completed the process of change of the decomposing corpse into the form of a worm,” Danzel, Mexiko, i., p. 21). In China, the ten infernos are in the bowels of the earth, and are called “the prisons of earth,” etc.
follows the established psychical channels, and in the psychical development of the individual probably leads from the repression of the primal trauma to the development of the so-called higher functions.

Before we turn from dream symbolism to a comprehensive understanding of symbols in general and their use in cultural adjustment to civilization, we should like specially to emphasize that our view of the paramount importance of the birth trauma finds its strongest support in the analytic interpretation of dreams. But a more detailed representation of this I must reserve for a bigger work. The fact must be stressed, however, that the previously mentioned analytic experiences enable us to give a real basis to the ” womb phantasy,” discovered long ago by Freud in analysis, and since corroborated by numerous examples in the literature of analysis. As the consequence of this experience seems of such great importance, there should be no doubt as to its meaning. It is not to be denied that there is a phantasy of going back into the womb,1 or that there is a wish tendency at a still later stage of development, illustrated by Silberer in excellent examples of “spermatozoa dreams,” to go back into the father’s body.2 These are, as we said, phantasies which are partly connected with explanations about sex heard or read of at a later date. But in reality, as opposed to phantasy, in dream formation there occur during analysis many definite but quite unconscious reminiscences

1 The classical presentation is to be found in a book written in 1795 under a pseudonym entitled Meine Geschichte eh’ ich geboren wurde. Eine anständige Posse vom Mann im grauen Rocke (Neudrucke literarhistorischer Seltenheiten Nr. 2, Berlin, J. Ernst Frensdorfi).


or reproductions of the individual intrauterine posture, or peculiarities relating to one’s own birth. These could arise from no conscious memory or phantasy formation, because they could not be known previously by anyone. The dream naturally uses subsequently what has been learnt from hearsay about one’s own birth, but often in such characteristic ways that one is compelled to consider the dreamer’s unconscious impression (often an impression in the literal sense of the word) as being right in preference to his conscious memory. That the period of dwelling in the father’s body is able to be reproduced I would not care to maintain. On the contrary, it seems to me that if one continued the analysis of these “spermatozoa dreams” from the point of view here
set forth, they would finally prove to be “back to the womb” dreams which have been remodelled by means of a later acquired conscious knowledge.\(^1\) Often enough, indeed, the so-called “spermatozoa dreams” prove to be directly disguised “womb dreams,” since the only way to come again to the mother’s body is by way of the father’s spermatozoa. Hence these dreams in no way conform to phantasies of returning to the father’s body, but they are used rather as a means of newly severing oneself from the father in order to be permanently united to the mother. For the fœtal situation— at least, in the last period of pregnancy—and the birth situation itself are directly apprehended by the individual, and as such are certainly capable of being reproduced. We maintain, then, neither more nor less than the reality of “the womb phantasy” as it is manifested in child life, in neurotic symptoms, and in the physiological state of sleep (dream).

If we try to draw the most obvious conclusion from this fact, we must be prepared to meet various objec-

\(^1\) Winterstein has rightly assumed this (\textit{Imago}, ii., 1913, p. 219).
human creation of the world on the pattern of one’s own individual creation.

The study and understanding of so-called dream symbolism now enables us to trace back cultural creation to its origin in the depths of the Unconscious. From the overwhelming and confusing mass of existing cultural material, which humanity, compelled by the same old primal yearning, still constantly produces, we shall mention here only one example. This has already been brought to our attention for the understanding of infantile anxiety, and it places us in the midst of our sphere of culture, yet at the same time affords us a glance back to its historical development. It concerns the room, the space, which for the Unconscious regularly symbolizes the female genitals. And, indeed, ultimately it symbolizes the womb as relating to the only female genital known to the Unconscious, and the place in which before the birth trauma one was protected and warmed. There is now no doubt, according to anthropological investigations, that just as the coffin and its primitive forerunners the tree, the earth, the doubled-up burial position (embryonal posture), merely copy the womb situation, to which after death one wishes to return, so the primitive dwellings of the living, whether caves \(^1\) or hollow trees \(^2\) were made or chosen

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1 See Ferenczi’s allusion to the “Psychogenese der Mechanik” (*Imago*, v., 1919), and the works quoted there of Mach, E. Kapp, and others. In addition, *Die Maschine in der Karikatur*, by H. Wettich (with 260 illustrations), Berlin, 1916, and *Die Technik in Lichte der Karikatur*, by Dr. Anton Klima (with 139 illustrations), Vienna, 1913.

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2 Emil Lorenz in a study “Der politische Mythus, Beitrage zur Mythologie der Kultur” (*Imago*, vi., 1920, and separately enlarged, 1922), linking on to Jung’s mythological and Ferenczi’s biological point of view, has emphatically shown this symbolic importance, and has proposed the term “psychic integral” for the understanding

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in instinctive remembrance of the warm, protecting womb, analogous to the birds building nests for protective covering. Whatever has developed later in the course of continuous repression, which involves a gradual withdrawal from the primal trauma into sublimated forms substituting the primal state, is still quite obviously in the deepest sense linked to that primal situation. This we can see in the way in which the present-day child expresses fear when alone in a dark room. Whether it is the primitive hut covered with foliage (nest), or the “altar” which originates from the hearth fire (warmth from the mother), or the prototype of the temple (such as the Indian cave temple) which represented the roof or house as protection for this fire; whether it is the exaggerated Oriental temple buildings answering the purpose of the heavenly and cosmic projection of these human dwellings (tower of Babel), attaining the highest artistic idealization of their human origin in the Greek temple with its pillars replacing the primitive tree-trunks and representing human legs and with its variously formed capitals representing heads, as is naively allegorized in the Song of Songs; or whether it is the Gothic churches of the Middle Ages with their return to the upward reaching and yet depressing dark vaults; or finally, whether it is the American skyscraper with its flat, outer surface and the elevator shafts within; everywhere it is a matter of a reproduction, extending beyond the mere “symbol formation” of the dream or even of art, everywhere it is creative shaping of approved objects, approximating in form to the substitution of the primal situation.

of the adaptation of reality to our wishes and needs under the determining influence of the prototype of the first severance of the complete Ego from the world by means of the mother-image.

This simple case of “symbolic” adaptation to reality opens up new vistas in the understanding of the development of culture: from the nursery, which is only an extension of the kangaroo’s pouch and the bird’s nest beyond the swaddling clothes and cradle, to the house,1 instinctively formed to imitate the womb, thence to the protecting town,2 the fort,3 and thence linking on to the earlier mythical construction (projection or introjection) of Nature (earth, cosmos), on the one hand, and on the other hand to the social displacement-and-substitute-formations of such concepts as fatherland, nation, and state. These latter, according to

1 The sacrifice to the building, which consisted originally in walling up a living child into the foundation of a new house, should make clear the character of the building as womb substitute.
Ernst Fuhrmann, who in his interesting work has referred to the human physical prototype of secular and sacred buildings as the protecting room into which one creeps at night-time, or from which a new birth is expected (temple), refers also to a remarkable linguistic agreement, “The house corresponded to the skin (Haus, Haul), and to the water into which the sun goes, and also the entire group of words for Dorf, village, etc., shows that the idea of setting was connected with it. From Haut (skin) are derived Hut (hat), Hütte (huts), Haus (house); from Fell (pelt) were derived Ville (village), Bull. From Schaf (sheep), Schuppen (shed), also Russian schuba, Pelz (pelt). From Wat (water) were derived bett, beth (Hebrew), house, Ved in Swedish, Wald (wood), Holz (wood). When a man went to bed, he reached the water. The coverings between which he lay were the waves, and they were made of a material which was soft and flowing. On the posts of the bed were frequently carvings which had reference to the monsters of the underworld, but also angels, the spirits who brought the body to life again had to be present . . .” (Der Sinn im Gegenstand, München, 1923; and Der Grabbau, Munich, 1923, 43 and ff.).

2 For the town as mother symbol, cf. my work Um Städte werben, 1911. The seven hills of Rome correspond to the teats of the shewolf.

3 Burg (fort) from Berg (mountain), verbergen (to hide), originally Fluchtburg (refuge), (Lorenz, p. 87).

Freud’s reconstruction, I link on to the history of the primal horde, and to the common possession and renunciation of the primitive mother in the later social community.

As Freud has shown, the primal father is slain by the sons who succeed in possessing the mother, or in other words, wanted to return to the mother. This was prevented in the primal horde by the “strongest male,” the “father,” who was the external opponent and object of “fear” (of the mother). But the reason for renunciation is—as the primitive orgiastic death feasts show—that although all take possession of the mother sexually (promiscuity), not all can return into her. This is the real psychical motive for the “heroic lie,” namely, the fact that in the myths and fairy tales there is only one who is able to do the primal deed with the mother, and he is the youngest, who has no successor.

From this psychological motive there follows the formation of man-governed states, so momentous for human development, since it has now become socially necessary for a single
individual to take the father’s place by identification with him, thus breaking through the ban on
the inaccessible mother which finds its sociological expression in the so-called “Mother Right.”2

The establishment of the father’s power thus follows, whilst the fear of the mother, moderated
into respect, is transferred to the new usurper of the father’s place, namely, the captain, leader,
king, etc. The protection afforded him by reason of certain privileges or contracts against a
repetition of the primitive crime, namely, being slain, he owes to the fact that he has taken the
mother’s place, and so by

1 Totem and Taboo. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,

2 Bachofen, Das Mutterrecht, 1861 (second unchanged edition, 1897).

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a partial identification with the mother he takes over the privileges belonging to her. In the so-
called dominance of the Father Right, right or justice—i.e., the privilege of mutual (conciliatory)
protection, social forbearance, and care of others—springs from the natural phase of mother
attachment which, on the one hand, rests on the protection given by the mother (womb), on the
other hand is due to the fear of her caused ultimately by the birth trauma. The peculiar
ambivalence towards the lord, the ruler, is thus explained. He is loved, protected, and spared, that
is taboo,1 in so far as he represents the mother. He is hated, tortured, or slain, as representative of
the primitive enemy near the mother. In all the restrictions or ceremonials imposed on him,
which often seem completely to cancel his “rights,” he himself partially returns into the
pleasurable primal situation, to the place where even the King must go unaccompanied and on
foot.

This is especially clear in the “cult of the sun,” the significance of which is by no means
exhausted in the conscious identification with the powerful father. On the contrary, it has its
deeper-lying unconscious sources of pleasure in the original idea of birth, according to which the
daily rising and setting of the sun is conceived of as the new-born child returning at night time
to the mother (sun—son). This is clearly expressed in the life of the Peruvian rulers, whose
ceremonial conforms to identification with the sun. The “Inca” never goes on foot, but is always
carried in a sedan chair. He does not feed himself, but is fed by his wives. He wears a robe only
for one day, then lays it aside, and after six months this robe is taken away and burnt. The Inca
The primal taboo is the maternal genital which from the beginning onwards is invested with ambivalent feeling (holy-cursed).

Thus the Inca becomes every day a new being, he is the women’s suckling who has to be fed by them. The Inca is an entirely ephemeral being in statu nascendi, so Fuhrmann rightly sums up the situation. But every ruler must submit more or less to a similar ceremonial of birth. The Priest-King of New Guinea may not move, and must even sleep in a sitting posture (in order to provide equable atmospheric conditions). In Japan’s olden days the Mikado had to sit on the throne every forenoon for some hours at a time with the crown on his head (today our children’s idea of “ruling” really means to exercise omnipotence on earth); but he must remain stiff as a statue, without moving hands or feet, head or eyes, otherwise evil will fall over the land (according to Kampfer, History of Japan). The king therefore originally is not “father,” but son, and indeed a little son, infans, a minor, “his majesty the child,” who rules through the clemency of the mother. We have already suggested how these earliest steps to a

Fuhrmann, Reich der Inka, Hagen, 1922, p. 32 (Kulturen der Erde, vol. i.).

But the king or god does not sit “like a statue,” rather the statue perpetuates this blessed state of immobility (see chapter on art). The crown, the noblest of all head coverings, goes back originally to the embryonal caul, as also our hat today, the loss of which in a dream signifies separation from a part of one’s Ego. The sceptre, of which there is no doubt as to its phallic signification, originates from the most primitive phase of the mother’s dominance (woman with a penis), and thus the sceptre has for the male ruler originally the one meaning of making him again a man by this substitute—for the ruler was formerly castrated like the ancient priests, that is, was the mother (see the wooden copy which Isis has made of the lost phallus of Osiris. Rank, Die Matrone von Ephesus, 1913).

Perhaps Kaiser, Caesar, is connected with “to cut”; the one cut out (cf. also “Caesarian” operation, Kaiserschnitt?).
social organization, to the state in “children’s shoes,” may have been taken. The earlier high valuation of woman (her genital), which is still apparent in the ancient worship of goddesses and which has left its traces in the later “Mother Right,” had to be replaced by the social father-organization traced by Freud from the primitive horde. The strict, just, but no longer violent father must again be set up as the “barrier to incest ” against the desire to return to the mother, whereby he only assumes once more his original biological function, namely, to sever the sons from the mother. Anxiety of the mother is then transferred as respect to the King, and to the inhibiting Ego (ideal) motives which he represents (justice, state, etc.). The sons’ (burghers and subjects) attitude towards him is that of the well-known two-sided ÒEdipus libido. The systematic social depreciation of woman from her original heights finally results in a reaction against that infantile dependence on her, which the son, now become father, can no longer bear.1

This is why the ultimate aim of every powerful and successful conqueror is to gain sole possession of the mother2 (father identification). And every revolution which strives for the

1 An extremely instructive illustration to this biological root of “matriarchy ” is that published by Leo Frobenius (Das unbekannte Afrika, Munich, 1923, p. 23), and on p. 41 ff., illustrating this meaning, is a drawing on rock from Tiot in Algeria, which shows a hunter bound by the navel string to the (praying) mother.


One must pay attention, moreover, to the characteristic confession of the young Napoleon who, on October 26, 1798, writes: “There is seldom, perhaps, a more faint-hearted man than me. When engaged on a military plan, I am like a girl waiting for her confinement. But if I have made my decision, then everything is forgotten except that which will contribute to success.”
overthrow of the masculine dominance shows the tendency to return to the mother. But these bloody revolutions against the dominance of the father are ultimately caused and made possible by woman, and that entirely in the sense of the mythical “heroic lie.” As shown by the French revolution, it is less the king than the dissolute queen—characteristically suspected of committing incest with her son—the dominance of mistresses and of women in general, which stirred the rage of the crowd, and which also determines the predominating part of women in revolutionary movements. Through her sexual power woman is dangerous to the community, the social structure of which rests on the fear displaced to the father. The king is slain by the people, not in order that they may be free, but that they may take upon themselves a heavier yoke, one that will protect them more surely from the mother: 2 Le roi est mort, vive le rot.3

Woman has an antisocial influence,4 which gives psycho-

1 See Beate Rank, “Zur Rolle der Frau in der Entwicklung der menschlichen Gesellschaft” (Lecture given at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Association, May, 1923).

2 Bachofen (p. 31) derives parricidium of the Roman law, which originally signifies murder of the king or father, from pareo—to bear. “In the word parricidium, the act of birth is especially emphasized. Parricidium is the outrage committed on the primal mother in any of her offspring” (see also A. J. Storfer, Zur Sonderstellung des Vatermordes. Eine rechtsgeschichtliche und völkerpsychologische Studie, 1911).

3 See also Paul Federn, Die Vaterlosegesellschaft. Zur Psychologie der Revolution, 1919, who comes to the conclusion that man cannot put up with a fatherless society for any length of time.

4 Napoleon Buonaparte, when a lieutenant, wrote a dialogue on love, in which he says: “I maintain that Love is harmful to society, to the happiness of the individual; I think that it causes more evil than good, and I should consider it a benefit if the deity would free the world from it.”
logical reasons for her exclusion from social as from political life in primitive (club houses) and in highly developed civilizations.\(^1\) Man depreciates her only consciously; in the Unconscious he fears her. On this account she is also desexualized and idealized in the French Revolution as Goddess of Reason. And in ancient Greece, Athene was represented as born from the head of Zeus. “Freedom” (la Liberte) has always had a feminine form, and goes back finally to the freeing from the maternal prison (the storming of the Bastille).

The development of the paternal domination into an increasingly powerful state system administered by men is thus a continuance of the primal repression,\(^2\) which has as its purpose the ever wider exclusion of woman—just on account of the painful memory of the birth trauma—even at the cost of establishing the uncertain descent (\textit{semper incertus}) from the father as a foundation for the entire law (name, inheritance, etc.).\(^3\) The same tendency completely to

\(^1\) In his valuable work on “Die Pubertätsriten der Wilden,” Th. Reik has shown how becoming a man is represented by a symbolic repetition of birth, namely by a detaching from the mother (\textit{Imago}, iv., 1915-16).

\(^2\) Winterstein, in addition to Bachofen, has already used this for the understanding of the formation of philosophical systems (\textit{Imago}, ii., 1913, pp. 194 and 208).

\(^3\) The original oath sworn by the testicles of the father (testes) on which our oath still rests (position of the fingers), is for the Unconscious always a false oath, since it knows the origin from the mother only, as the popular oaths and curses sufficiently prove, which all clearly and coarsely indicate the mother’s body.

That the name “right,” derived from the side of the body which physiologically is less concerned with the birth trauma and so is stronger, shows in what way these biological facts determine the development of mankind. The left, which appears so frequently in birth dreams as the endangered side, and which Bachofen has recognized in mythical traditions as the “maternal,” was,

exclude the painful share of woman in one’s own origin is preserved in all myths in which man creates the first woman, as, for example, in the biblical story of creation.
It seems, moreover, that a number of discoveries have as their aim the permanent establishment of the father’s power, just as the previously mentioned creations of civilization aim at the permanent extension of the mother’s protection. We mean the discovery of implements and weapons, all of which really directly imitate the masculine sexual organ, which in the biological development preceding any civilization was qualified to force its way into the yielding feminine material (mother).1 As this can only be achieved to a degree that fails to satisfy the Unconscious, the attempt carried out upon this substitute material (materia) is brought to greater and greater perfection by means of implements which, as is well known, may be considered as improvements on other natural tools such as hands, feet, teeth, etc. But this task obtains its unconscious incentive from the mother libido, namely, the perpetual insatiable tendency to force one’s way completely into the mother. In agreement with

owing to the anatomical peculiarities of human beings, ontogenetically destined to be considered inferior (the normal birth is in the left position). So also the (ethical) symbolism of right and left (meaning bad) to which Stekel has alluded, is rooted in the birth trauma—indeed, in the intrauterine state. See also the psychical peculiarities of the left-handed (Fliess and others), as well as Ferenczi’s explanation of hysterical hemi-anæsthesia, “Erklärungsversuch einiger hysterischer Stigmata ” (Hysterie und Pathoneurosen,1919). In addition, there is, in Jewish mysticism, the concept that the left (feminine) repels, the right (masculine) attracts, also similar concepts in Chinese mysticism (Langer, Die Erotik der Kabbala, Prague, 1923, p. 125).


this is the surprising fact that the penis itself has, in consequence of the primal fear, experienced no similar artificial “lengthening” such as is represented by the tools for the other limbs,1 and on to which even this tendency seems to be displaced, just as the mother is replaced by the materia. In this unwillingly achieved substitute (earth),2 which is the first task of cultural adaptation, there now appears to have taken place a decisive and purely physical turning away from woman as the primal object of aggressive libido. It would seem that in man’s upright position, in his being raised from the earth, which has recently been connected3 with the invention of tools, we can see the decisive step in the process of actually becoming man, that is, in the cultural overcoming of the birth trauma by turning aside from the female genitals to an adjustment to the genitalized external world, which again ultimately has only a maternal signification.
Weapons in their origin were closely connected with tools or implements. It may be assumed that originally they were even identical and were used at the same time for the elaboration of material, as for the hunt (killing). The hunt itself again links on directly to the substitution for the

1 In contrast to the enhancement of pleasure in the sexual act itself, as the customs (quoted p. 41, footnote 2) of the primitive peoples show, and which we may consider psychologically as a “preservative” from the fear of being completely engulfed.

2 According to the (hitherto unpublished) bio-analytical investigations of Ferenczi, the earth itself seems to be a substitute for the primal mother of all living beings, the sea water (Meer als Muttersymbol).

3 Paul Alsberg, *Das Menscheitsrätsel. Versuch einer prinzipiellen Lösung* (1922), who tries to represent the completion of man the other way round, as a result of the use of implements, and, indeed, originally as a result of throwing stones with the hands.

mother’s nourishment, and indeed all the more directly, the further we go back. The warm blood of slain animals was drunk in direct continuance of the intrauterine nourishment, and the raw flesh was swallowed—lingering echoes of which still reach us in the myths of swallowing, where the hero in the interior of the animal eats of its soft parts. The “incorporation” of the animal’s flesh, to the maternal significance of which Roheim has recently alluded,1 is to be interpreted even at the stage of the totemistic father-sacrifice, in the sense of the intrauterine situation as a gift of the devoured creature’s strength; just as the lion’s skin in which Heracles covered himself lent him not merely the strength of the male animal (father), but also the invulnerability of the child protected *in utero* (compare with this the African hunting under the “protection” of the navel string). But here we must remind ourselves that, after all, every protection from elemental dangers or human attacks (with weapons), whether it be the hole in the earth or hollow trees, the mobile shield or war chariot, submarine or tank, ultimately signifies a flight to the mother’s protective covering.2 The warm hide (skin), which was likewise man’s first protective covering against the cold, is thus the real counterpart to the mythical creeping into the animal’s warm body.3 Part of the ambi-

2 This is shown in the classical tradition, according to which the Persian women checked the panic-stricken flight of their husbands and sons from the Medes, by uncovering their shame; *rogantes num in uteros matrium vel uxorum velint refugere* (Plutarch, *De virt. mulierum*, 5).

3 The enveloping of the body in the warm skin of the newly slain animal holds good today among the people as a curative means because it establishes the pre-natal situation.

The amnion, surrounding the embryo, was known to Empedocles

valence of the later sacrifices of animals, which already lies in the word “sacrifice,” is explained from this maternal libidinal signification and is expressed in the regret that the partial realization of this primal situation is bound up with the killing of the mother (sadism). For the slaying of the mother there is substituted later the imposing totemistic sacrificial death of the primal father, entirely in the sense of the earlier mentioned substitution of the maternal libido object by the paternal Ego ideal.

This transition period is shown very beautifully in the great Mexican festival of the spring (Ochpaniztli—to sweep away), in which a woman representing the goddess *Tlazolteotl* was slain by cutting off her head. “Then was the skin stripped from the sacrifice. With this skin a priest covered himself, and thenceforth represented the goddess in the further ceremonies. From the thigh skin of the sacrifice a mask was made (*schenkelmaske*) with which the son of the goddess, the god of Maize, *Cintcotl*, was clothed” (Danzel, *Mexiko*, i., p. 43). These strange customs also represent a birth (that of the maize god) which is symbolized on the images of the goddess by the sprawling attitude of the legs (which seems to be connected with the thigh mask drawn over the son’s head). It is obvious, moreover, that the transition from the sacrifice of the mother (the goddess) to the sacrifice of the father (the priest) proceeds by way of the son, who *in the course of this sacrifice enters again into the mother.* For the
by the name of “sheep skin” (see Schultz, *Dokumente der Gnosis*, 1910, pp. 22 and 128). Thus clothes made from animal material, still predominant today, prove to be a simultaneous bodily protection from the cold (which one first experienced at birth), and libidinal gratification through a partial return into the mother’s warm body.

original human sacrifice, as preserved in its purest form in the Mexican cult, leaves no doubt as to the fact that the victim sacrificed was identical with the one sent back into the mother, and that the sacrificial act itself was performed in order to cancel the process of birth.1 “The thought of the captive sacrifice so dominated the views of the Mexicans that even the birth of a child was compared with the capturing of a prisoner. The woman who has borne a child is the warrior who has made a prisoner, and the woman who dies in childbirth is the warrior who has fallen into the hands of an enemy and is killed on the sacrificial stone” (Danzel, *Mexiko*, i., p. 29).2 Accordingly, we find in the feast *Toxcatl* a boy victim, who has been worshipped for a year as the god and as whose representative he must be sacrificed. This year conforms to the previously mentioned embryonal period of 260 days, during which time the boy is constantly surrounded by eight pages, a girl being added (as ninth companion) for the last twenty days, (see Fuhrmann, *Mexiko*, in., p. 15).

We believe we have understood “symbolism” as the most important means for adjustment to reality, in the sense that every “comfort” that civilization and technical knowledge continually strive to increase only tries to replace by durable substitutes the primal goal from which, in the meaning of so-called development, it becomes ever further removed. From this fact the peculiar character of the symbol is explained and the just as peculiar reactions to it of

1 In the Mexican picture script the victim is mostly represented as a collapsing figure *with drawn-in limbs and head downwards* (Danzel, *Mexiko*, vol. i.).

2 This conception is psychoanalytically explained by Alice Balint, “Die mexikanische Kriegshieroglyphe *atltlachinolli*” (*Imago*, ix., 4. 1923).
human beings, who easily recognize it in certain connections but in other connections turn away from it in indignation. For the real world itself, created by man, has proved to be a chain of symbol formations, uninterruptedly renewed, which must represent not merely a substitute for the lost primal reality which they copy as faithfully as possible, but at the same time must remind us as little as possible of the primal trauma connected with it. This explains among other things how a modern invention, for example, the “Zeppelin,” can be used as an unconscious symbol; because it is itself modelled upon the unconscious prototype which recognizes therein only itself. And so in all practical discoveries it is ultimately only a matter of a reduction of external resistances to a productive libido gratification, approaching as closely as possible to the primal condition. This is shown from the analysis of the mania to invent, which Kielholz has attempted in an interesting work.1 In some of his cases it is obvious that the patient who wishes to discover perpetuum mobile or the squaring of the circle wants in this way to solve the problem of permanently dwelling in and fitting into the mother’s womb. In other cases of electrical inventions (apparatus through which run warm unseen currents), etc., a detailed study of the patients’ delusions ought to show clearly their importance as a reaction to the birth trauma.2

We have thus recognized “symbol formation” as the essentially human primal phenomenon which enables human beings to become different from animals, and instead of


2 See Tausk’s conjecture that the “electric currents” of the schizophrenics perhaps represent the sensation of the first nerve and muscle functioning of the new-born (l.c., p. 28, note).

changing their own body (autoplastic),1 as in the case of the giraffe, which stretches itself “to the covering”—that is, to the food—to change or mould the external world in the same way into an exact copy of the Unconscious (alloplastic). Yet there still remains for our consideration the intellectual means of expression which, along with the upright position of man, fundamentally separates him from the animals. I mean, of course, speech and its development. The remarkable discovery of analysis, that, on the one hand, in symbolism as a soundless universal language2 we have resemblances that extend far beyond the boundaries of speech, and, on the other hand, that bewildering linguistic assonances and similar sounds are to be found among peoples in whom a direct influence seems excluded—this discovery becomes intelligible as soon as we understand “symbolism” not as a sediment of speech formation, and the formation of speech as a continuous development of the “primal symbolism.” The dreams of animals which pass through a foetal development may be assumed to reproduce the situation in the womb, only they lack the means for linguistic expression so characteristic of human beings. Just how man has attained this is
naturally connected with the phylogenetic development of the higher centres and functions. But over certain portions of individual development the origin and function of animal sounds are closely parallel to the primal stage.

1 According to Ferenczi, “Hysterische Materialisationsphänomene” (Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, 1919, p. 24); furthermore “that there appears in hysteria a part of the organic foundation on which symbolism in the psychical is built up,” p. 29.

2 Even Schelling emphasized in a work of his youth that the ”oldest language of the world knew nothing else than sensuous indications of concepts.” See also the work of Hans Apfelbach, Das Denkgefühl. Eine Untersuchung über den emotionellen Charakter der Denkprozesse, Wien, 1922.

of articulated speech. The first reaction after birth is the cry which, by violently abolishing the difficulty of breathing, may presumably relieve a certain amount of anxiety.1 The same cry is then repeated as a desire for the mother, whence the formation of the lips, practised by the infant at the breast, leads as a wish motive to the formation of the universal human syllable ma? This enables us to grasp the formation of sound from symbol in statu nascendi;3 for the lips formed for sucking represent the first substitution of the mother by a, so to say, autoplastic attempt. Should the desire which causes the sucking formation of the lips be ungratified, then again is released the first painful cry of anxiety which signalized the separation from the mother. This conception also fits in with the theory of the sexual alluring call, which only repeats on the sexual level the desire for reunion with the object. Naturally also in word and speech formation, which is constantly becoming sexualized, in its later stages a good part of the primal symbolism proves to be surviving and at work.4 Similarly in the next stage of substitution for words, namely, in writing and its previous stage of drawing (picture writing), a great part is still played by symbolism, which the artist then knows how to use for the purposes

1 From the forced cry, a direct way leads according to Pfeifer’s phylogenetic theory to voice formation and to song (Congress Lecture, Berlin, September, 1922). According to analytic conclusions the way to music seems to branch directly not from the birth trauma but from the intrauterine situation.

2 See also S. Spielrein, “Die Entstehung der kindlichen Worte Papa und Mama,” Imago, viii., 1922.
3 The American school of Behaviorists say that words were first formed plastically in the larynx.


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of aesthetic enjoyment by rediscovering it and reproducing it in his own special way. Whilst the painful anxiety effects seen in the analyses of disturbances in speech (stuttering—stammering), as well as in the neologisms and in the speech distortions of the mentally diseased, again regress to the original symbol signification.1

We have thus surveyed the whole circle of human creation, from the nocturnal wish-dream to the adjustment to reality, as an attempt to materialize the primal *situation*—i.e., to undo the primal trauma. From this survey the so-called advance in the development of civilization has proved to be a continually repeated attempt to adjust to the enforced removal from the mother the instinctive tendency to return to her. Following along the path of the development of culture, we will now trace the unmistakable approach to the primal trauma in the expression “Back to Nature!” But if we look more closely into the relation of man to Nature we recognize in it only a clearer kind of anthropomorphic assimilation which results in the apperception of everything cosmic in the same unconscious meaning that culture tries to reproduce. In mythology we see the most sublime survival of what is perhaps the most primitive adjustment both in the phylogenetic and also in the ontogenetic sense. For the new-born child could not live at all unless that part of the external world lying nearest to it and, finally, the world itself, were immediately made into a substitute for the mother; whether it be the hands of the midwife, or the warm water, or later the swaddling clothes, the bed, the room, etc. The phylogenetic counterpart is shown in myths where at first the tangible earth, and later the


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heavens just on account of their unattainableness, appear as the protecting mother covering. Before the earth, by assimilation to the intrauterine life, water represented the maternal primal source, whilst this significance is given also to the sun as source of warmth and continues still to
exist in the “symbolism” of fire. The mountains with their hollows and caves, with their forests (hair), were looked upon as a gigantic primal mother, stressing especially the protective characteristic. With the advancing knowledge of the inadequacy of all these given substitutes, we come to an actual creation of possibly more adequate culture formations, and in so far as these, too, are insufficient, we have the naive parallel compensatory fantasy—formations of Paradise and a future life, as realistic Utopias or as idealistic lands of desire.

With regard, then, to the creations of man—i.e., civilization in the narrowest and widest sense—we have to deal with adjustments to reality and supplementary phantasies which extend from the biologically-instinctive to the socially conscious acts, and which, from the point of view of the adjustment of reality to the Unconscious, may be considered as the real principle of the development of man.1 With regard to the absorption of Nature into this “symbol-circle” given by the long period of the human foetal stage, we have to deal with the mechanism of mythical projection by means of which man alone is in the position to subsume given “Nature” under these inborn primal forms. In this light we can explain the myths of world-creation and of “worldparents,” which, in the process of cosmic assimilation,


have preserved for us the most sublime attempts to “undo” the birth trauma, to deny the separation from the mother.1 The first conscious recognition of this severance was reserved for the philosophical theory of cognition with its distinction between the Ego and the non-Ego, after philosophic speculation had exhausted itself on the problem of “identity,” which in the last resort lies hidden in the physiological relation of mother and child.

1 Similarly the phantasies and myths of the end of the world (Schreber) which attain in the most radical “separation” the innermost reunion (absorption into the All). The Flood which initiates a new world period is nothing but a “universal” reaction to the birth trauma, as the myths of the origin of the earth or the sea also show. Moreover, here seems to lie the key to the understanding of the traditions of a new world period. This I will deal with elsewhere.
HEROIC COMPENSATION

When we look back from our newly gained standpoint to the psychoanalytic investigation of myths, we notice that it was here, where the material speaks a more universal language than in the neuroses and psychoses, that the importance of the birth trauma was first brought home to us. Already “The Myth of the Birth of the Hero,” which Freud with his keen observation had recognized as the nucleus of the myth formation, could have thrown full light on the question if we had been sharers in those analytic experiences, for they would have encouraged us to admit a still greater value in these “fairy tales” and, according to Freud’s injunction,1 to re-translate these phenomena of projection into psychology. Instead of this the general human tendency, to react with repression to any too clear approach to the recognition of the primal trauma, led to an evaporation of this first clear insight into Jung’s anagogic ethical interpretation of myths.

The myth of the hero’s birth begins, as is well known, with the situation of the child in the protecting womb (small box), where it is already persecuted by the father, who—in the meaning of the primal wish fulfilment—does not want the child to come into the world at all. The rest of the hero’s fate is nothing but the working out of this situation, namely, the reaction to a specially severe birth trauma, which has to be mastered by over-compensatory achievements, among which the most prominent is the regaining of the mother.

1 See The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (last chapter).

For these achievements, known as the deeds of a hero, are used in the myth exactly as in the neurosis and all other creations of the Unconscious for the purpose of winning again the primal situation in the mother, with the consequence that the father is fought as the chief object of resistance. As we recognized in the neurotic a human being who cannot, without harm, overcome the primal affect of anxiety arising in the birth trauma, so the hero represents the type who, being free from anxiety, seeks to overcome an apparently specially severe birth trauma by a compensatory repetition of it in his deeds. And so in the subsequently formed (infantile) wish phantasies, the hero is regularly one cut out of the mother’s womb, and spared in this way from the beginning the trauma of anxiety. On the other hand, this theme of the myth of the hero’s birth shows how difficult it has been at the beginning for the hero to leave the protecting womb to which behind the mask of such bold deeds of reform and conquest he constantly strives to return.
again. The theme of heroic *invulnerability* is also to be explained as a kind of permanent uterus, which the hero brings with him into the world as armour, horny skin or helmet (magic hood), but which still betrays in the single mortal place, as, for example, Achilles’ heel, how strongly even the hero was once purely physically attached to the mother. On that account the motive of exposure, which

1 Here also belong the “clouds” or “mist” of Athene, protecting the Trojan heroes in danger. Sometimes the hero is born in full armour, as Uitzilopochtli, the tribal hero of the Aztecs.

2 In contrast to the “protected” head (caul, crown), which first leaves the womb, the feet, which come out last of all, are mostly the weak part. The swollen feet of Œdipus, besides Achilles’ heel, show that it is a question of that part of the body which actually on leaving last touched the mother’s genitals. This would also explain

simultaneously represents the return to the mother and the trauma of birth (plunging in), attempts a second and less painful severance from the mother by a phantastic reproduction of the primal situation. On the other hand, the motive of the two mothers, which Jung interprets as a symbol of rebirth, refers, through its characterization of them as mother and nurse (fed by animals), directly to the second trauma of weaning. Authentic reminiscences of the two experienced primal traumata are, therefore, at the bottom of myths exactly as they are of neuroses. This may be illustrated by a short reference to the Heracles myth, which expressly reports how *difficult the birth of Heracles was*. And it is described in detail that, when he, as a suckling, was exposed by his mother, namely, expelled from the womb, he was taken by the mother goddess Hera herself to her breast. But the vigorous boy caused her such pain (as the Saga further relates) that she angrily threw the child to the ground. One could scarcely expect a clearer recollection of these earliest traumata even in analyses unless it were in the form of neurotic reproductions which, however, are manifested in the heroic over-compensation as heroic deeds.

The typical reaction to the primal trauma is shown more how this weak point can later become a “symbolic” representative for one’s own genitals (foot=penis, castration fear).
Also Adler’s theory of organ inferiority and its over compensation (Achilles is called “swift-footed”), which the author attempts to establish as an embryological inheritance, seems individually rooted in the reaction to the birth trauma.

1 Cf. The Myth of the Birth of the Hero, where similar traditions are quoted.

Also Achilles, the later hero of the Æolian emigrants, shows in his name the signs of the weaning trauma; he is called the Lip-less (acheilos), because his mother had burnt his lip in the fire where she put him in order to make him immortal.

naively in children’s fairy tales than in the hero formation, stamped as is the latter with the mark of mythical compensation; especially in those fairy tales in which the hero himself, while still a child, is represented as a kind of passive hero. Besides the already analytically valued birth fairy tale of “Little Red Riding Hood,” which does not forget even the asphyxia of the child cut out from the wolf’s belly, and the congestion of blood to the head (red hood), (and its variations, “The Seven Kids” and others),1 mention may be made here of the fairy tale of Hansel and Gretel, perhaps the clearest representation of the birth theme. This again portrays the evil primal mother (witch) as an animal which swallows the children, and shows how the post-natal situation of bodily need (hunger)2 is continually replaced by new representations of the womb and its unstinting supply of food;

1 See my Psychoanalytische Beiträge zur Mythenforschung, 2nd edition, p. 67.

2 I must here leave it an open question as to how far the primeval trauma of the Ice Age, which may be represented in the myth of the Flood, finds a close parallel and explanation in the primal ontogenetic trauma of the individual. The Unconscious still knows the sudden changes of temperature, the opposites of warm and cold, as typical reproductions of the birth trauma, represented in the dream as in certain neurotic vaso-motor disturbances, as shivering and blushing, etc. In any case, this individual experience seems to have been not without its influence on our idea of the Ice Age, the scientific conception of which is in no way yet proved. Probably it is a question of not one but several slowly advancing cooling periods which the individual, moreover, could not have perceived at all. However, by means of Ferenczi’s bioanalytic theory of catastrophes both conceptions could be united on the ground of phylogenesis.
Fuhrmann notices that fairy tales originally were winter tales, that is, they were told only in winter in order to give consolation through the long dark months (Das Tier in der Religion, Munich, 1912, p. 53). One can also there compare his interpretation of the Danish Saga of King Lindwurm (Dragon) in the meaning of birth (p. 51 ff.).

such as the Utopian motive of the edible house, or the cage where one is so richly fed that one has finally to escape, but only to come back again into the hot baking-oven.1

A second type of fairy tale no longer presents the child in his direct reactions to the birth trauma, but as the matured youth in his love life. These popular narratives of the successful fairy prince,2 who rescues the virgin destined for him and wins her against the opposition of all his rival brothers, are, in our view, to be understood in relation to the sexual trauma, namely, as the reaction of the primal libido to heterosexuality.

Whereas in the birth myth the hero is saved by the mother—that is, hidden in the womb, away from the father3—in order later, as a social and ethical reformer, to enforce progressive civilization against the older father generation,4 the family romance of the fairy Prince reveals to us the rescue of the mother (or daughter figure) from the power of an evil tyrant as a motive of revenge. But the typical fairy tales of deliverance disclose to us how he is in the position to do this and what the fearless victory over all these terrifying adventures ultimately signifies. The typical details of the

1 The well-known birth symbolism of bread and baking, which Fuhrmann has recently presented (see Der Sinn im Gegenstand, p. 6).

2 Moreover, the “Family Romance,” forming a basis for the hero myths and quite naïvely appearing in the fairy tales, besides its conscious ennobling tendency and the unconscious aversion to the father, has the final meaning of cancelling one’s own birth.

3 The type of legends of cannibalism. Attempts at its analysis in my treatise, “Die Don Juan-Gestalt” (Imago, viii., 1922).
As “founder of a town” he attempts to materialize anew the primal situation of the material protection.

Even in the Psychogenesis of intellectual reformers, of the mental hero, as perhaps represented most clearly by Nietzsche, we recognize in the “freeing” from all traditions and conventions the same tendency towards detachment.

Deliverance show very clearly that the rescue of the woman from the sleep of death represents nothing else than the revaluation of one’s own birth by means of the “heroic lie.” The difficulty and danger of coming out is therefore replaced by the difficulty of going in or penetrating—for example, the thorns around the Sleeping Beauty, the flames surrounding Brunnhilde, climbing slippery glass mountains or passing through closing rocks, etc. The final breaking of the protective covering, is represented by the splitting of armour, the opening of coffins, or the ripping open of garments, in which the girl appears to be enclosed. That all these actions are also obviously symbols of defloration, only strengthens the idea that coitus itself is only concerned with remodelling in a pleasurable way the going into the mother, so that the physiological ideal of virginity proves to be not merely a renunciation but also a direct substitution for the mother ideal.

The fact, important for the understanding of fairy tales, that behind the genital signification of symbols there is also the birth signification, refers further to the double quality of pleasure and pain in parturition, and shows how the anxiety arising from the birth trauma can be overcome by “redeeming” love. So it follows that the rescue of the sleeping woman by the fearless hero has as its foundation the denial of the birth anxiety. This is clearly shown in those tales where the hero, after slaying the dragon

1 The penetration is the more pleasurable the more it brings to remembrance the difficulties of coming out. On the other hand, the virginity decreases the primal anxiety, since no one can have yet been inside. Cf. also Freud’s treatise, “The Taboo of Virginity,” Coll. Papers, vol. iv., 1918.

2 As an example of this, one would like to say “phylogenetic” symbolism may be proved from the fairy tale of the Frog-Prince, where the frog represents not only penis but also fetus.
from which he rescues the virgin,1 himself falls into a deathlike sleep during which his head is
cut off and afterwards is put on again back to front (birth situation).2 The deathlike sleep, as in
all states of hypnosis, stiffness (turning into stone), etc., but likewise in dreams and all neurotic
and psychotic conditions, is therefore reproduced as a typical detail of the intrauterine situation.3

This also makes it clear why it must always be the youngest who appears as the hero in
preference to his brothers. His attachment to the mother does not merely rest on the psychical
motives of tenderness and pampering (mother’s little son), for this itself has a biological
foundation. Physically he remains as it were permanently attached to her, because no one after
him has occupied the place, in the mother (motive of virginity). Thus he is really the only one for
whom return to the womb and remaining there would be possible, for whom it is, so to say, a
reward. The elder brothers, indeed, seek vainly to dispute his place, which in spite of his
characteristic “stupidity” he struggles for and maintains.4 His superiority really consists in the
fact that

1 In Babylonian cosmology, the world is made from the monster Tiamat’s body, which has been cut in
two.

2 For instance, in the “Brother fairy tales.” See my Psychoanalytische Beiträge zur Mythenforschung,

3 Here fits in the theme of fertilization (coitus) in sleep, portrayed in the form of anecdote or novel.

4 This foolishness, which is always portrayed as sexual inexperience (Parsifal sleeps several nights beside
his beloved without touching her) seems to correspond to the original situation of libido gratification, as
the African narratives which Frobenius heard from the Hamites in the Nile district show. There a king’s
son frequently sleeps for months at a time with a princess, every night “they embrace with their legs” and
”suck constantly at the lips.” After months the discovery follows. The prince is sacrificed within an
he comes last, and, so to say, drives the others away. In this he is like the father, with whom he alone, and from the same motives, is able to identify himself.

To the same type of deliverance myths belongs also the biblical Legend of Paradise where, as a direct reversal of the real occurrence, the woman is cut out of the man, that is, the man is born “like a hero,” because there it is he who falls into the death-like sleep.1 The ensuing expulsion from Paradise, which has become for all of us the symbol of the unattainable blessed primal condition, represents once again a repetition of painful parturition, the separation from the mother by the father to which men and women are subjected in the same way. The curse following on the original sin of birth, “In pain shalt thou bring forth thy children,” clearly divulges the motive lying at the bottom of the entire myth formation, which is, namely, to make of no effect the primal trauma whose unavoidable continuous repetition is expressed in the fruit simile. The command not to eat of the fruit of the tree of Paradise shows the same unwillingness, in the sense of the birth trauma, to separate the ripe fruit from the maternal stem as, in the myth of the birth of the hero, the original hostility of the father to the hero’s coming into the world at all. Also the death punishment decreed for the breaking of this command clearly shows that the woman’s offence consists in the breaking off of the fruit, namely, giving birth, and here again in the inch of his life. Then his position is revealed, the marriage is celebrated and consummated, and on the wedding night “he found an unpierced mussel shell and blood-stains on the sheet” (Das Unbekannte Afrika, p. 77).

1 The breathing of breath into the nostrils again refers to the accompanying dyspnœa of the newly born. The later Greek and New Testament pneuma doctrine has its root here.

meaning of the tendency to return death proves to be a wish-reaction to the birth trauma.

As I have already broadly indicated in The Myth of the Birth of the Hero and fully stated in the Lohengrinsage, this idea is valid for all mythical traditions of the death of the hero, and is revealed in the manner of his dying and in the burial customs of all peoples and periods, in a way that is often surprising to our minds, but quite familiar to our Unconscious. It is in no way determined, as Jung concluded from the manifest content, by the idea of rebirth, burdened from
the beginning with the curse of death (reincarnation), but is to be understood from the
Unconscious concept of death itself as an everlasting return to the womb. Everyone born sinks
back again into the womb from which he or she once came into the realm of light, roused by the
deed of man. Indeed, the ancients recognized in this taking back of the dead the highest
expression of mother love which keeps faith with her offspring at the moment when it stands
there abandoned by all (Bachofen).2 Bachofen has demonstrated this very beautifully in the
death-bringing Nemesis springing from

1 In the Polar zone the dead are placed in a squatting attitude in a prismatic receptacle with a skin drawn
over it; similarly also in ancient Egypt before the time of embalming, in a crouching position, wrapped in
a skin (Fuhrmann, Der Grabbau). In New Guinea the burial places were underneath the women’s houses.
In later civilization the dead man’s wife was buried with him or, if he was unmarried, a widow or young
girl was sacrificed, later to be replaced by the so-called “concubines of the dead” (naked female clay
figures) (Handwörte der Sex. Wiss.).

81). The Oknos Motif belongs to the series of those underworld works which we shall understand in the
next chapter as the conversion of the primal pleasurable situation into a painful one; he twists unceasingly
a rope, the other end of which is swallowed by a she-ass (attachment to the umbilical cord).

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the (bird’s) egg,1 as well as in a number of other ancient goddesses of the underworld and of
death. “We see how this point of view required throughout a she-ass and (in the Oknos myth) a
female Typho, and we recognize the close connection that unites the she-ass with the egg-shaped
mother of death on the Lycian Harpy monuments, with the burial of the King’s daughter in the
body of the cow expressly made for that purpose (Herod., 2,131), with the sterile and deathly
character of the Gorgonic Minerva, with the representation of huge grave mothers, and with the
Demetrian naming of the dead. Everywhere Woman appears as bearer of the law of death, and,
in this identification, at the same time appears as affectionate and as a dark threatening power,
capable of the deepest sympathy but also of the greatest severity, like the maternally formed
Harpies and the Egyptian-Phœnician Sphinx who bore in herself the law of all material life”
(Oknos, p. 83). According to Bachofen, this also explains why men were excluded from the
ancient rites of mourning (cf. the “Wailing Women” at Hector’s corpse, and the mourning
women at the foot of the cross), and the “female” death ceremonial, as it survives even in the
superstitions of the German people in isolated unintelligible rites; for example, the southern
German corpse-boards, which have no other purpose than to enable the dead to touch the
maternal wood; further, carrying the corpse feet first from the house—thus in the reversed birth position—and pouring out water behind it (amniotic fluid).

1 “On the Lycian Harpy monument the egg itself forms the bird’s body. Egg and hen here occur together. What the myth places together through the representation of the daughter (Leda) and the mother relation, plastic art gives in more complete form” (Mutterrecht, p. 70 ff.)

2 According to Lorenz, l.c., p. 75. See also the sentence from the Rigveda (x., 18, 49, and 50), pronounced beside the grave, to the

How this simple mythical mother symbol becomes transformed into the picture of everlasting punishment characteristic of religion Bachofen has shown in a particularly beautiful manner in the Danaïdes Myth (Oknos, p. 89 ff.). So if even the death punishment, which in the biblical narrative repeats and inflicts the expulsion from Paradise, finally seems to be the most definite wish fulfilment of the Unconscious, this is in complete harmony with the infantile conception of dying, namely, a return to the place from where one came. In the legends of Paradise and the Golden Age we have before us a description of this primal condition, with emphasis laid on the pleasurable side of it, whilst the great systems of religion, dualistic from the beginning in the meaning of the compulsion-neurotic ambivalence, represent the ethical reaction-formations against the breaking out of this fearful yearning to go back, and the attempts to sublimate it.

earth: “Creep now into mother earth, into the very spacious, wide and most holy. Soft as wool is the earth to the one who offers up the sacrifice, it protects thee on thy further journey. . . . Lift thyself up, O thou spacious one; press not downwards, be easily accessible to him and easily approachable. As the mother covers the son with the corner of her garment, cover him also, O Earth.”
Every form of religion tends ultimately to the creation of a succouring and protecting primal
Being to whose bosom one can flee away from all troubles and dangers and to whom one finally
returns in a future life which is a faithful, although sublimated, image of the once lost Paradise.
This tendency is most consistently developed in the Christian mythology, summing up and
embracing the entire view of the ancient world. Christian mythology with its richly peopled
heaven represented a re-humanizing of the ancient Oriental mythology of heaven; to which, at a
later stage of repression, was linked the astrology of the Middle Ages, with its birth-horoscopes,1
and which finally emerged as scientific astronomy, though still containing a wealth of
unconscious phantastic elements. How the ancient world picture, culminating in the Babylonian
world view, finally developed only a real psychological analysis could teach us. For as far back
as tradition goes, even presented in sculpture, we see only an apparently accomplished purely
astral world picture, about the origin of which the Babylonian tradition itself gives no
information. A more recent attempt of this kind by Hermann Schneider, to establish a “neolithic”
Sun-worship in the earliest Babylonian and Egyptian2 religion, seems to me to

1 One might even describe astrology as the first doctrine of the birth trauma. The entire being
and fate of man is determined by what occurs (in heaven) at the moment of his birth.

2 Die jungsteinliche Sonnenreligion im ältesten Babylonian und Ägypten, Leipzig, 1923.
(Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-Ägyptischen Gesellschaft, 1922, 3, 27, Jahrgang.)

have failed in so far as the learned author is too ready to find what he is looking for, and by so
doing frequently neglects the meaning of the material. But in any case it is a fact that the material
given by him, from the pre-Babylonian seal-pictures, existed about 4000 b.c. Here we already
see before us as a finished product (l.c., p. II) “the entire symbolism of neolithic Sun-religion, as
known from the Northern rock drawings.” Only when one takes as much trouble over the
psychical origin as one takes over the historical is one in a position to grasp the whole problem
of the development of this neolithic Sun-religion.
The astral world view which meets us in this apparently completed form is, as I shall show in
detail elsewhere, the late product of a long psychical process of projection, on which, in the
course of the following arguments, some light will be thrown. Here it will be sufficient to
emphasize the fact that, according to Schneider’s view, this entire development “may have
started from the high valuation of fire” which “exists as sun in the heavens,” as it “is present in
the warm bodies of men and animals” (l.c., p. 4). As the maternal origin of the worship of the sun
is thus obvious, a simple juxtaposition of the “cult of the stars” of primitive folks, for example,
the Cora-Indians, may serve to show how these “religious” ideas also have their roots in the
relation of the child to the mother. The starry heaven is there identified with the underworld, as
night prevails in both places. Thus it is the place of Death. The stars in this connection are the
dead ancestors who appear in the night sky at the same time as they enter the underworld. But as
all vegetation grows up from the underworld, the night sky, which is a reflection of the
underworld, is likewise a place of fertility.1 In the

1 Preuss, Nayarit Expedition, pp. xxvii and xxx (quoted by Storch, l.c).

old Mexican myths the stars were designated as sacrifices, serving the purpose of nourishment
for the setting sun who could not renew himself without this food. The earthly human sacrifices,
as Preuss argues, are to a great extent only imitations of this sacrifice of the star deities (l.c., p.35).

Quite apart from, indeed directly opposed to, this ancient projection into the macrocosm, is the
development of the other large branch of ancient Oriental religion: the old Hindu mystic doctrine
of meditation directed into the human microcosm. And there in the doctrine of the transmigration
of the soul it reaches the highest point in the victory over the birth trauma. F. Alexander, in an
excellent study1 based on Heiler’s2 presentation, has recently shown up the pronounced
“therapeutic” character of this religiously coloured philosophy and ethic, the “Yoga practice,”
and has there alluded3 to its similarity to analytic procedure. The aim of all these practices is
Nirvana, the pleasurable Nothing, the womb situation, to which even Schopenhauer’s half
metaphysical “Will” yearned solely to return. The way to it, as in analysis, is the putting oneself
into a dreamy attitude of meditation approaching the embryonal condition, the result of which,
according to Alexander, actually makes

1 “Der biologische Sinn psychischer Vorgänge. Eine psychoanalytische Studie über Buddhas
3 Recent attempts, such as that of Oscar A. H. Schmitz, to combine Psychoanalysis and Yoga, bear evidence only of the insufficient psychological conception of both phenomena, for these can replace one another only in a certain sense. The tendency to modernize ancient forms of overcoming the birth trauma betrays only the indestructible character of the regression pressure, the source of which, moreover, Schmitz approaches at one point in his presentation, in making use of psychoanalytic ideas (Psychoanalyse und Yoga, Darmstadt, 1923, p. 89)

possible an extensive reminiscence of the intrauterine situation.

To Hauer’s recently published investigations we owe our access to the ancient Hindu descriptions of ecstatic experiences, which allow the meaning of all these preparations to be clearly recognized. The pupil of the sacred Brahmins, the Brahmacarin who tries to absorb the secret magic power, which for the Hindu means the primal cause of Being, during his initiation (Upanayana) must experience in the teacher’s womb an hypnotic sleep condition lasting for three days. “The teacher who initiates the pupil makes of him an embryo in his inmost parts. Three nights he carries him in the womb. Then he brings forth him who comes to see the Gods” (Atharvaveda, xi., 5, according to Hauer, p. 86). As Oldenburg has ascertained for the so-called Diksa (holy sacrifice), the novitiate probably sat for three days in a hut, with clenched fists and legs bent upwards in the embryonal position, surrounded with all kinds of coverings (amnion) (Hauer, p. 98). “The priests convert that one with whom they consummate the diksa again into an embryo. The hut of sacrifice is for the Diksita (the one offering the sacrifice) the womb; thus they allow him to enter the womb again; they cover him with a robe. The robe is for the Diksita the amnion; thus they surround him with the amnion. A black antelope skin is placed above, outside the amnion is the Chorion (cloak or mantle); thus they cover him with the Chorion. He clenches his fists. With clenched fists lies the embryo inside; with clenched fists the boy is born — putting aside the black antelope skin he descends to an underground room (Avabhrthabadd); for that reason the

1 Die Anfänge der Yogapraxis : eine Untersuchung über die Wurzeln der indischen Mystik, 1922.
embryos are born free of the Chorion. With his robe he descends; for that reason is the boy born
with the amnion.”¹ There is clearly described in the Rigveda a position, *uttana*, which has been
preserved in the present-day Yoga practices, and which as Storch (*l.c.*, p. 78) remarks, “is similar
to certain embryonal positions, as we see them not infrequently in the stereotyped position of
catatonics.” In other places of the Rigveda are mentioned rolling movements of the head and
eyes, swinging motions, tremblings and rockings to and fro, all of which again seem to relate to
the birth trauma.

We have before us here the primal phenomenon of the pleasurable-protecting situation. From this
there later emerges, through severance from the mother and transference to the father, the figure
of the almighty and all-loving, but also punishing, God, as a religious sublimation by means of
projection. As Rudolph Otto thinks,² there exist as the origin of all historical religions, before the
development of definitely outlined forms of demons and gods, certain “nebulous primal
feelings,” feelings of shuddering before the gruesome, of marvelling at the mysterious,
manifested at first in the primitives as “fear of demons.”³ We now know through Freud’s
explanations⁴ that the demons relate originally to the fear of the dead, that is, they correspond to
the feeling of guilt projected outwards, whilst on the other hand the indefinite anxiety itself, as
exhibited


² *Das Heilige. Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen*, 11th

³ The positive side of this religious primal feeling, the “mystical continuous-power ” subsisting between
all human beings and things, and conceived as active under the names *Orenda, Wakondo, Mana*, has been
recognized by Lorenz as projection of the mother-child relation (*l.c.*, p. 58 ff.).

in the child, is to be explained as a continuance of the primal trauma. It becomes clear from the development of the individual that the primal fear is again directly linked up with the dead, representing the pre-natal situation. The steps leading from belief in demons to belief in gods have been well investigated both in mythology and folklore. But the psychological factor of the entire development lies in the gradual substitution of the mother (demons), to whom anxiety clings by the form of the father appealing to the sublimated anxiety, the guilt feeling. This process of religious development runs absolutely parallel with that of social development as we have described it (pp. 89-93). Here also there appears at the beginning the cult of the great Asiatic mother goddess, who is regarded “sometimes as the wild, sensuous goddess of love and of the fertility of Nature in general, sometimes as the pure queen of heaven, the virgin goddess,” 1 who appears again in Eve and Mary, and is continued in the Charis of Ireneus, in the Helena of Simon Magnus, in Sophia and others. “A sublime flexibility,” says a recent investigator of the ‘Gnostic Mysteries,’ 2 “is manifested in the belief in the mother goddess. In it positively everything which was religious in any sense or kind found a place, from orgies, aesthetic and artistic tendencies, from the Mysteries of συνουσία to astrology and the star of Bethlehem. The mother goddess could be everything, the world soul, world mind, world development, world pleasure, world pain, and world deliverance, world light, world seed, world sin, and everything in which may be seen in successive stages a reflection of Being, even down to the very vegetables. She could be laughter and weeping, mind and body, goddess and demon, heaven, earth, and hell.” As Winterstein has already recognized, the later religious and philosophic ideas of a creation of the world by a male god are only the result1 of a renunciation of the primal

1 See Bousset in Realenzyklopädie von Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, vii., 1513 ff.

2 Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des christlichen Gottesdienstes, by Dr. Leonhard Fendt, Munich, 1922, p. 41.

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Yet in the Christian religion God is provided with a uterus. In Petavius, de Trinitate, lib. v., chap. 7, 4, it is written: “Even so, says the writing, the Son is begotten of the Father from the uterus: although in God
there is no uterus, moreover nothing physical, yet in him there is a real creation, a real birth which is shown even in the word ‘uterus’ ” (quoted by Winterstein, *I.e.*, p. 194).

Further, relevant and intensely interesting material appears in Wolfgang Schultz, *Dokumente der Gnosis*, Jena, 1910.

I cannot refrain here from quoting the chief idea and some sentences from the wonderful “Buch von der Schopfung des Kindes,” as it stands in the *Kleine Midraschim*. The “Book” begins with the cohabitation of the parents, and with the first adventures of the “drop,” which is guarded by an angel. After “the soul” is brought to the drop, the Angel of Morning leads it into Paradise, and the Angel of Evening leads it into “hell” and then shows it the place where it will dwell on earth, and the place where it will be buried. “But the Angel leads it back again into the body of its mother, and the Holy One, praise be to him, makes doors and bolts for it. And the Holy One, praise be to him, says to it, ‘As far as this shalt thou come and no further.’ And the child lies in the womb of its mother nine months. . . . The first three months it dwells in the lowest chamber, the three middle months in the centre chamber, and the three last months in the uppermost chamber. And it eats of everything which its mother eats, and drinks of all which its mother drinks, and excretes no dirt; otherwise would its mother die. And as soon as that time is come when it must go out, the first Angel comes and says to it, ‘Go out, for the time is come when you must go out into the world.’ And the spirit of the child answers, ‘Before him who spoke and the world was, I have already said that I am satisfied with the world in which I have lived.’ And the Angel answers, ‘The world into which I bring you is beautiful.’ And again, ‘Against your Will have you been formed in your mother’s womb, and against your Will, shall you be born, to go out into the world.’ Immediately the child weeps. And why does it weep? Just because of that world in which it was and which it now leaves.

mother, such as is to be found in the biblical creation of man. Corresponding to this we find the heretical sects, as well of the Jewish as of the Christian belief, characterized by a sexually emphasized return to the mother goddess. These revolutionary movements within religion thus proceed entirely along the same way as in the social movements, namely, the way of regression to the mother.

Thus the well-known cult of the sperm in the Gnostic Eucharist of the sect of the Phibionites (about a.d. 200-300) seems to be connected with the service of the Asiatic-Egyptian mother goddess called Mani by the Sumerians, Ishtar in Babylon, Magna Mater, Cybele, Ma, Ammas in Asia Minor, the Great Mother in Carthage, Isis in Egypt, Demeter among the Greeks, Astarte among the Syrians, Anahita among the Persians, Alilat among the Nabateans, Kwannya in the Indian, Kwannon in Japanese Buddhism, and the “Primal Mother” in Chinese Taoism. The
Phibionite meal, this *religio libidinum*, which “in spite of all the real heathenism in it, still consists essentially, as the old abstruse commentaries on the Christian Last Supper and its derivative the Mass assume,”¹ and, as Fendt rightly recognized (*l.c.*, 4), not in sexual intercourse, which was so much urged against it as a reproach,² but in eating (devouring) the sexual excreta. “The woman and the man take the sperm in their hands. . . . And so they eat it and communicate their own disgrace and say: This is the body of Christ. . . . But they do likewise with that of the woman, when the woman is menstruating . . . and they eat of it likewise in common. And they say: ‘This is the blood of Christ.’ ”¹ Fendt sees logically (*l.c.*, 5) in the third feast, which is called “the perfect Pasha,” the supplement and explanation of the other two in the sense that the sexual act is used only for the purpose of destroying the semen, the sole means of the Archon of Desire. “If, in spite of all, a child is begotten, then the child is to be the sacred food of the third meal! From every woman thus accidentally made a mother, the embryo is cut out, torn to pieces, and prepared with honey, pepper, oil and perfumes, and every one eats of it with the finger. . . . And afterwards as a thank-offering they say these words: ‘The master (Archon) of Desire was unable to fool us, no, we have gathered up the brother’s transgression.’ ”²

“Now,” Fendt adds (p. 5), interpreting, “we are familiar with a kind of struggle against the Archons in the form of a breaking of the commandment which Clement of Alexandria reports of

And as it goes out, the Angel strikes it under its nose and blots out the light over its head. He brings it out against its will and it forgets everything which it has seen. And as it comes out it weeps.”


Minucius Felix (about 200) reproaches the Phibionites with; “Post multas epulas, ubi convivium caluit et incestæ libidinis ebriatis fervo exarsit” (Fendt, *l.c.*, 12).
the Antitaktes and Nikolaitans in this way: all which God the father created was good; but an Under-God mixed evil with it; from this Under-God came the command . . . the Archon of Desire wills that children be created . . . therefore everything is done to prevent the begetting of children.”

We have related in detail this cult and its commentaries, because in it the whole mechanism of religious sublimation, thus the real formation of religion, is revealed undisguised.

1 For a similar comparison of the Great Mother with Christ as the Logos, see Fendt, p. 80.

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The evil Under-God, who brings children into the world thus compelling them continuously to endure the birth trauma, is the mother; and the entire (incestuous) unchastity of the Gnostics amounts simply to going back again into the mother’s womb, and thereby excluding the renewal of the birth trauma; this is why the semen is assimilated through the mouth (eaten). Should, however, conception result, then the embryo is cut out in order to prevent the trauma, and again assimilated only through the mouth. Fendt says: “The world development is comprehended as an enormous failure; salvation comes only through withdrawal of that which is All Effective in the Universe.”

1 Also the Brahmin pupil who suffers loss of semen prays: “To me return again Sensual-power, Life, and Blessing, to me come back again my Brahmanship, my Property. The semen which today from me has slipped to earth, which has escaped to the herbs, to the waters, I receive again into myself for long Life and Splendour” (Oldenburg, l.c., 430). Of the Yogi it is said: “By practice he compels the drop which wants to enter into the womb of the woman, to return. But if a single drop has already fallen, he forces it
to return to him and he keeps it. The Yogi who thus maintains the drop, will conquer death. For as the fallen drop signifies death, even so its preservation signifies Life” (Schmidt, *Fakir und Fakirtum*, 1908).


followed by an increased puritanical reaction, as we can see in the history of the Jewish belief. The best-known movement of this kind is the pseudo-messianic period of the “Schabbatianians,” about 300 years ago, whose founder, Schabbethai Z’evi, was a Spanish Jew from Smyrna.1 Like the Gnostics, he also proclaimed a breaking of the commandment, and his disciples then—especially after his death—broke away completely from the puritanical laws of Judaism. The peculiarity of this movement consisted in the fact that woman was the deity, and forbidden forms of the sexual life, especially the incestuous, were esteemed divine service. “In caves in the neighbourhood of Salonika they organized the wildest orgies for religious purposes. At the beginning of the Sabbath they placed a naked virgin in their midst and likewise naked danced around her. Orgies were substituted for prayer. Similar customs spread throughout nearly all Jewish communities of the world. Naturally they were most severely persecuted by the Rabbis. Nevertheless they failed for 200 years to exterminate the sect. In Turkey there are remains of it even to the present day” (Langer, *l.c.*, p. 39). The direct reaction, which according to Langer’s ingenious explanation led not only to the ascetic exclusion of woman but to an increase of socially effective homosexuality,2 is linked to the name of the famous Rabbi Israel ben Elieser, Baal Schem Tow (1700-1760), and to the Hassidism created by him. Langer comes to the conclusion that “the entire inner history of the chosen people appears really as a chain of more or less conscious battles in two


2 Deuteronomy (xiii. 7) speaks of the “friend who is to you as your soul,” and directly after of “the woman of thy womb” as of something quite generally known (Langer, p. 91).
directions. The battle was generally terminated by a compromise, which in prehistoric times added new laws and new symbols to those already existing. In this Freud’s so-called OEdipus complex and the conception of death are powerful forces, and thus the whole Jewish legislation is really performed by Eros, before it obtained its godly sanction through revelation.” (I.c., p. 93).

To this excellent definition we would like to join a methodological remark, which also has reference to the psychoanalytic investigation of religion. There is no doubt that in these maternal sects and cults we have to deal with phenomena of reversion in the sense of a “of the repressed.” But here, as in the biological sphere, one must be on one’s guard against an untimely introduction of the phylogenetic point of view, as also against the attempt to find or to reconstruct an historical basis, where in any case it is a question of a psychological basis, though this is certainly in the Unconscious. Thus the modern Jewish sectarians apparently go back to the Asiatic cult of the mother, although naturally they need know nothing at all of it, but are simply producing the same reactions from their Unconscious individually experienced. But cases where direct borrowing is possible or even probable, as in the Jewish “golden calf,”1 which seems to represent “the new-born” as Son-God, are psychologically more important and more interesting than that of the “tradition” which is always only mechanical. If in the tradition of the father-religion itself, on the other hand, we are enabled to reconstruct and to recognize fragments of the repressed preliminary stages of the mother-

1 “Idolatry” seems to signify simply service to the mother deity. Cf. the service of Baal (Canaan, El) to whom among the Phœnicians and other people little children were thrown into the fiery mouth of the idol.

religion, we shall have to hold fast to the fact that these are only preliminary stages in the formation of religion, in the real meaning of the word, and must, as Freud has pointed out, be regarded as the final result of primal battles for and against the mother and as the victory of the social power of the father.

From this point of view, besides the social development of the “horde of brothers” into the community, described by Freud, we can also trace its religious development a little further and, indeed, in harmony with our assumption of social development (king-infant) as the transition of
the mother-cult to the father-religion, by means of the Son-Godhead, which has found in Christianity its purest expression. It may be, moreover, that the world-wide historical importance of Christianity rests on the fact that it was the first to place the Son-God in the centre without simultaneously attacking the original rights of the mother and the secondary rights of the father. The high valuation placed on the child by Christ in the text of the Gospels would further agree with this. Christ himself has ever remained an infant, even as sculpture represents him, when dead (Pieta).

In the ancient mysteries every single mystic himself became directly a God. The formula of confession: “I have fasted, I have drunk the mixed drink (Kikeon), I have taken it out of the box, and after I worked, I laid it in the basket and from the basket into the box,” shows that we are here concerned with regression (and return) into the womb, which the cysta mystica (holy box) is now held to represent even by the archaeologists.” In taking from the holy box (χιογη) the image of a womb and slipping it over his body,

1 Totem und Taboo.

the mystic is assured of being reborn from the womb of the earth mother, and of becoming her bodily child.”1 This also explains the still more obscure allusions in which many Christian writers spoke of the secret of the Eleusinian Mysteries: “Is there not the dark descent and the imposing companionship of the Hierophant and the Priestess, between him and her alone, and does not a numerous multitude consider holy what is consummated between the two in the dark.”2 It is not a question of mere coitus nor even of a “sacred one, in which ‘a numerous crowd’ can be participators, but it is a matter of union with the mother. This is proved not only by the symbol cysta mystica but still more clearly by the realistic Phrygian mystery cult, in which the mystic descends into a grave, ‘where the blood of a slaughtered bull is poured over him. After the rebirth he receives milk nourishment as the God in him or he in the God is yet a child, then he steps up and is worshipped as God by the community.’3 The Hindu Yoga practice through mystical meditation likewise enables each individual himself to become God—that is, by entering the womb, by being transformed back into the embryo, he participates in the god-like omnipotence” (see Ferenczi, Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality).

So the infans—ultimately the unborn—proves to be God, like his earthly substitutes, whether king or Pope,

2 De Jong, *Das antike Mysterienwesen*, 1909, p. 22.

3 Reitzenstein, *Hellenisiche Mysterienkitte*, 2nd edition, 1920, p. 32. In a hermetic rebirth mystery, the mystic calls out: “I am in heaven, I am in earth, in water am I, and in the air, I am in animals, in plants, in the womb, of the womb, after the womb, I am everywhere” (*ibid.*, pp. 29 and 35). Cf. also the Mysteries of the Persian Mythra and their bull sacrifice (Cumont, *Mithras*; Dietrich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*).

though subject to still greater limitations; whence it follows that each individual himself was once “God” and can be so again, if or in so far as he can reinstate himself into the primal condition, and this is the reason why each one is so easily able to identify himself with the later “one and only God.”1 But as not everyone can go back into the mother, so not everyone can be king or God. Hence the chosen of a multitude, the priests, are originally castrated; that is, they must finally renounce this privilege of going into the mother in favour of an only one, namely, the youngest, who is enabled to put himself actually in the place of the father, and by means of religious sublimation to convert the most pleasurable action, by which the crowd undoubtedly intends to punish him, into a voluntary sacrifice for the others.2 In this way he saves the social community from destruction. The mother is thereby partly exalted to the queen of heaven, partly, as the evil alluring primal principle of all production, used for the formation of the religious-ethical concept of the ancient underworld, which, arising from the mythology of heaven (the beyond), leads, by way of the religious sublimation prepared for in the Johannine Apocalypse, to the other extreme of the medieval idea of hell.

In its gross physical details hell manifests itself as the fearsome counterpart to the phantasy of the intrauterine Paradise and heaven. *Eternal punishment in hell*, in par-

1 See the same conception in the *Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, that each one is a “hero” and birth is the real achievement. When, for example, a schizophrenic (Storch, p. 60) identifies herself with Christ, since she also came into the world in a stable, she is perfectly right; for she also was born in the natural way and wants to deny the birth trauma.
2 So Mahomet in his epileptic states (Aura) seems to have described the Islamic Paradise with its blessedness (Houri).

The analysis of the Unconscious shows why the later lord of this “Hell” has the characteristics of the primal father, for it is he, indeed, who has reversed the original scene of all pleasurable sensations into its opposite. The original feminine signification of the devil, personified even in the mouth of hell, is perhaps still preserved in the half-comical figure of his grandmother, surviving in the witches—and not only in those in fairy tales—as the old evil and dangerous primal mother. In the medieval delusion about witches and the cruel persecutions of the Inquisition, we see the hell situation with its punishments transferred into reality, which, according to a verbally expressed conjecture of Freud’s, may go back to a real trauma, which seems to me to have struck the sexual trauma and with it the birth trauma in our own Unconscious in a very direct manner.

With the interpretation of everlasting punishment as representing the intrauterine situation with negative indications, we have approached a theme already mentioned which we shall realize in the last chapter to be the psychological nuclear problem of the birth trauma. We cannot here pursue the complicated development of these primitive projections, as illuminated by the study of the compulsion neurosis, and leading eventually to highly important reaction formations which reach their climax in ethical ideas.

1 See in addition Groddeck, “Der Symbolisierungszwang,” *Imago*, vii., 1922.
want only to refer to an advancing process which is therein completed and which goes parallel with an increasing insight into the psychical origin of ethical formations ultimately rooted in the unconscious guilt feeling. The higher powers who punish and reward, whom one dare not disobey, are finally transferred back again into the Ego whence they once had been projected from out of the narcissistic feeling of omnipotence into the world above and below, and there had taken shape accordingly as maternal representations (protection, help, mercy) or paternal representations (one’s own feeling of omnipotence). To the rigid ethical philosophy of Kant was reserved the titanic task of once again separating the moral law in us from the starry heavens above us, and even he was only able to accomplish this by re-establishing, at least metaphorically in the well-known phrase, the identity which had been given up with such difficulty.

It is significant, for the development of the concept of punishment, that not only all punishments devised by mankind in phantasy, but also those converted into deed, represent the primal condition of the womb situation with emphasis laid on its painful character. Without involving ourselves in a detailed interpretation of the punishments of the Greek underworld, we need only point out that the best known of them show typical characteristics which are easily understood with reference to the locality, namely, the underworld. The crime of these primal offenders generally consists in rebellion against the highest of the gods, usually caused by the desire for his wife, the primal mother, as in the case of Ixion, who, moreover, is the first murderer of relations. His punishment consists in this: at the command of Zeus to be “bound with snakes on a winged, fiery, four-spoked wheel, which turns ceaselessly and to be rolled through the air, lashed by the scourge and the exclamation ‘Benefactors should one honour.’ This punishment for Ixion seems doubly hard in so far as he is immortal.”1 Similarly, Tantalus, a “personification of abundance and riches,” is punished on account of his transgressing insolence towards the gods with whom he desires to be equal. The original version, in which a stone hangs above his head always threatening to fall down, shows a permanent anxiety
situation; the other punishment of being eternally tormented by hunger and thirst obviously relates to the favourite who, as guest, shared in every luxurious repast of the gods, and who, in order to test the gods, placed before them human flesh. He is portrayed, moreover, on a sarcophagus (see Roscher, vol. v., sp. 83-84) twisted in a quite naturalistic way on a wheel, whilst Ixion is appropriately represented in a double circle. Finally Sisyphos, who also demands the same “immortality” of the gods, gets this wish fulfilled in

1 Roscher, Lexikon der Mythologie, ii., 1.

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the same way—namely, the eternal *rolling back* of the stone, which he attempts again and again to push over the summit of the mountain against its natural tendency to rush down: “Sweat pours from his limbs and a cloud of dust envelops his head.”

But all these punishments and offenders, according to Greek tradition itself and in keeping with the development of Greek civilization, were not transferred to the place of the underworld called Tartaros until later. Originally they were not only real and as such had the same unconscious signification, but they were again materialized in the dark Middle Ages, which compared with Hellenism itself represented a hell-like underworld. Burning and breaking of witches on the wheel—not to mention bodily dislocation of the chained and tortured (head hanging down)—blinding or exposure in water, the typical punishment
for the parricide who was sewn in a sack and sunk in the sea: all this shows quite clearly the indestructible wish-character of the Unconscious, as Freud has recognized; even the most horrible forms of punishment which man could imagine and which he directs against himself in the physical symptoms of neurosis, are clothed in the form of the first and strongest pleasure experience of the intrauterine life. It is therefore possible and intelligible that punishments of this kind were not only endured but were also pleasurably experienced, as, moreover, the habits of masochists daily prove. This explains to a large extent the pleasurable character of certain neurotic symptoms, in which the patient makes himself prisoner by withdrawing into a room which he locks, or by pessimistically phantasying the whole world as a dungeon and thereby unconsciously feeling comfortable in it. The real punishment which struck him long ago and from which apparently he wants to escape through these phantasies of self-punishment, was originally the expulsion from the womb, that primal paradise, which is sought for again and again, with unquenchable longing and in every possible form.

Crucifixion, which as punishment for rebellion against God the Father stands at the centre of the Christ myth, corresponds to the same conversion and assimilation of the intrauterine situation as the confining of Ixion in the wheel, with the abolition of which the spokes become the cross.

1 See Storfer, Zur Sonderstellung des Vatermordes, 1911.

2 From this alone the deep psychology of the so-called “Prison Psychosis” is to be understood.

3 Thus the cross itself still represents something “inward,” namely, the spokes freed from the clasp of the rim. Also the hooked cross belongs in this connection: the spoked cross growing again into the rim of the wheel is naturally an emblem of life and victory” (Schneider, I.e., p. 8, note 2).

Consequently crucifixion likewise corresponds to a painfully emphasized return to the womb, after which follows quite consistently the resurrection, namely, birth and not rebirth. For here it is also a question of nothing but a repetition and reproduction of the process of birth, ethically
and religiously sublimated in the sense of a neurotic overcoming of the primal trauma. Hence the
great part which the Christian mystery of redemption plays in the phantasy life of neurotics and
also of the insane is explained as identification with the passive hero who succeeds in returning
to the womb by means of pleasurable suffering. This identification is a sublime attempt at
recovery, which has saved mankind from the destruction of the ancient world and as such is
clearly recognizable in the traditional miracles of Christ. He makes the blind and the lame
healthy through his example. That is, he provokes them to identify themselves with him, because
they could see in him one who had overcome the birth trauma.

The infantile theory of the Immaculate Conception, as a dogmatic concept of the birth trauma,
fits in unconstrainedly with this explanation of the Christ legend. It announces in the sense of the
hero myth, the most extreme development of which is represented by the Christ figure, that also
this negative hero, who has succeeded to a great extent in the mastery of the birth trauma, was
not born in the natural way, indeed, did not even enter the mother in the natural way. This
human imperfection of a severe

1 Christ himself in the Gospels explains their untrustworthy opposition from the fact of the compulsion to
repetition: “That the word of the Prophets might be fulfilled.”

2 The new era which begins with Christ’s Birth corresponds psychologically to the embryonal year and
its eternal repetition (see the Mexican parallel, p. 75, note).

birth trauma is, in harmony with our view of the determination of neurotic symptoms, made good
to a certain extent in the later life of the adult by the latter’s physical and psychical sufferings. In
this way the manifest punishment represents, according to its latent content, the ideal wish
fulfilment, namely, the return into the mother, whilst the artistic idealization of the crucified
Saviour expresses, according to its latent meaning, the real punishment of the underworld, the
prevention of the embryonal position.
Lukas Cranach. Crucifixion.
Lukas Cranach. Crucifixion. (1502)

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ARTISTIC IDEALIZATION

An exact illustration of this all too human conception of the Christ myth is given in the realistic representation of the Crucifixion by Lukas Cranach,1 where, by the side of the Saviour crucified in the well-known stretched-out attitude of the body, the other sinners appear nailed to the tree-stem in characteristic embryonal posture. Thus Christ’s idealized position on the cross in art indicates a mechanism of defence or punishment similar to that of the *arc de cercle*. So the contrast of the realistic figures by Lukas Cranach gives a picture of the idealizing tendency of artistic representation, which seems to aim at softening, by aesthetic treatment,2 the all too clear approach to the primal condition, lending it also the character of punishment.

In this process of artistic idealization which, in the faithful portrayal of Nature, yet aspires to aesthetic semi-

1 There are still more realistic representations of the malefactors by Urs Graf and others.

2 It is interesting that for Schopenhauer the essence of aesthetic achievement consisted in the deliverance from “Will.” Nietzsche, who had clearly recognized the “sexual repression” working behind it (*Genealogy of Morals*, 6), quotes the well-known sentence about it (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, i., 231: “That is the *painless condition*, which Epicurus praised as the highest good and as the condition of Gods; we are set free at that moment from contemptible will-pressure, we celebrate the sabbath of the penal-work of willing, the *wheel of Ixion stands still.*” To this Nietzsche remarks: “What vehemence of words! What pictures of torment and lasting weariness! What almost pathological time-opposition between ‘that moment’ and the eternal Wheel of Ixion’!”
right in instancing as the measure and standard of this process of idealization, which stands out
unique in the history of the human mind, the completely changed attitude to death as expressed
by the wisdom of Silenus in eulogizing the fortune of being unborn, as compared with the
attitude towards life of the Homeric heroes. So that we might now say of them with a reversal of
the Silenian wisdom, that1 “to die early is worst of all for them, the second worst—some-day to
die at all. ...” “So vehemently does the will at the Apollonian stage of development long for this
existence, so completely at one does the Homeric man feel himself with it, that the very
lamentation becomes its song of praise. Here we must observe that this harmony so eagerly
contemplated by modern man, in fact, this oneness of man with Nature, to express which Schiller
introduced the technical term ‘naïve,’ is by no means such a simple, naturally resulting, and, as it
were, inevitable condition which must be found at the gate of every culture, leading to a paradise
of man. ... Wherever we meet with the ‘naïve’ in art, it behoves us to recognize the highest effect
of the Apollonian culture, which in the first place has always to overthrow some titanic empire
and slay monsters, and which, through powerful dazzling representations and

1 The Birth of Tragedy, pp. 34-35; ibid., pp. 36-37.

pleasurable illusions, must have triumphed over a terrible depth of world contemplation and a
most keen susceptibility to suffering. ...”

“The Greek knew and felt the terrors and horrors of existence: to be able to live at all, he had to
interpose the shining dream-birth of the Olympian world between himself and them. The
excessive distrust of the titanic powers of Nature, the Moira throning inexorably over all
knowledge, the vulture of the great philanthropist Prometheus, the terrible fate of the wise
Œdipus, the family curse of the Atridas which drove Orestes to matricide; in short, that entire
philosophy of the sylvan god, with its mythical exemplars, which wrought the ruin of the
melancholy Etruscans — was again and again surmounted anew by the Greeks through the
artistic middle world of the Olympians, or at least veiled and withdrawn from sight.”

In these sentences Nietzsche has, with unprecedented boldness, grasped the problem of the
development of Greek culture at its very root. We need only take a short step further in
psychological comprehension of the “Dionysian” and we shall stand at the original source which
has fed the whole development, namely, anxiety! But in order now to trace the path from
anxiety to art, and simultaneously to understand how the Greeks could reach the highest
perfection of artistic idealization, we must go back again to the nuclear symbol of primal anxiety in its origin from the trauma of birth, namely, to the Sphinx.

In his suggestive book, Das Rätsel der Sphinx, Ludwig Laistner (1884) has connected the Greek popular legend of the monster choking human beings with the goblin legends of German tradition, and has traced both back to the human experience of the nightmare. That the anxiety dream itself reproduces the primary birth anxiety has now become psychoanalytically clear to us. Even so, the mixed figure of the Sphinx representing the anxiety experience as such has been recognized by Psychoanalysis as a mother symbol, and her character as “strangler” makes the reference to the birth anxiety unambiguous. In this meaning the role of the Sphinx in the ÒEdipus saga shows quite clearly that the hero, on the way back to the mother, has to overcome the birth anxiety, representing the barrier which the neurotic also comes up against again and again in all his attempts to regress. Reik1 has explained very ingeniously how the Sphinx episode really represents a duplicate of the ÒEdipus saga itself. Only, being obviously led astray by the masculine type of the Egyptian Sphinx, which is in no way primary, although perhaps historically earlier, he wanted to prove the maternal character of the figure, originally established by Psychoanalysis, as secondary. This is proved to be untenable not merely in the connection here developed, but also in other different directions. The ÒEdipus saga is certainly a duplicate of the Sphinx episode, which means psychologically that it is the repetition of the primal trauma at the sexual stage (ÒEdipus complex), whereas the Sphinx represents the primal trauma itself. The man-swallowing character of the Sphinx brings it into direct connection with the infantile fear of animals, to which the child has that ambivalent attitude, arising out of the birth trauma, which we have already described. The hero, who is not swallowed by the Sphinx, is enabled, just through the overcoming of anxiety, to repeat the unconscious wish in the pleasurable

1 “ÒEdipus und die Sphinx,” Imago, vi., 1920.
form of sexual intercourse with the mother. But the Sphinx, conforming to its character as strangler, represents not only in its latent content the wish to return into the mother, as the danger of being swallowed, but it also represents in its manifest form parturition itself and the struggle against it, in that the human upper body grows out of the animal-like (maternal) lower body without finally being able to free itself from it. This is the riddle of the Sphinx figure,

1 In Hesiod’s *Theogony*, where the Sphinx seems first mentioned in literature, she originates from the union of Echidna, dwelling in the subterranean cave in the land of Arimi with her own son. She is also called “Offspring of Echidna of the Underworld” by Euripides (Roscher’s *Lexicon*).

2 An obvious psychological preliminary step to this is shown on the famous Terra-cotta Relief of Tenos, which portrays the Sphinx as a Goddess of Death snatching away the blossom of Youth (Roscher, iv., sp. 1,370). In addition, see the similar “Harpie des Grabmals von Xantos” in Roscher i., p. 2, sp. 1,846). This connection of the Sphinx with death becomes easy for us to understand when we remember that the large Egyptian Sphinx of Gizeh is also nothing less than a grave, which differs from the other

“animal coffins,” as, for example, the Elephant-avenues of Ming graves in China, only in the special combination of man and animal, that is, by emphasizing the origin of man from the animal-like body in
the sense of the hero myth. The purely genital signification of the Sphinx’s body (as womb) finally comes to light in the late Greek period manifestly as erotic salve receptacles for feminine use in

and in its solution lies the key to the understanding of the whole development of Greek art and culture.

If we compare even hastily the classic period of Greek art with its Oriental forerunner, we can say that the Greeks have consistently carried out the tendency to free themselves from the womb, which has found such a remarkable expres-

Sphinx form, as Ilberg (in Roscher’s Lexicon, iv., sp. 1,384) describes them (for example, the beautiful Sphinx vase in the British Museum from San Maria di Capua, which Murray states to be about 440 B.C.). We see the same in the old Peruvian ceramic art, which likewise proves that the Sphinx figure was originally a receptacle and indeed the receptacle in which the human being itself was preserved and from which he also came out. Hence the remarkable representation of a “sphinx-like” human being with the teeth of a beast of prey under a snail’s shell, the feelers growing out of the eyes (according to Fuhrmann, Peru, ii., 1922, Table 57); or illustration 31 from the Hamburg Museum for Ethnology, about which Fuhrmann remarks: “A very remarkable representation with a human head which appears to grow out of the back of the animal, showing a strongly curved belly, might refer to the body of the human being still hidden inside.” Illustration 30 from the Vienna Natural History Museum already approaches the Centaur type in the advanced stage of the appearing man, the psychological importance of which in our sense is supported by Fuhrmann, who points out that an animal for riding is not known in Peru, and that “the foundation for this representation has yet to be explained.” In any case, the “origin” of the rider becomes intelligible, which again represents nothing else than the one united with the mother and therefore the Stronger, Higher, More Powerful, Preferred (king, leader, ruler). (When the primitive inhabitants of Mexico saw the Spanish conquerors on their horses, they thought horse and rider were one inseparable whole.) Not only do the rocking horse and hobby horse of children form the infantile example of these almost “psychotic” regressions into the animal-like body, but still more clearly does the so-called “game at horse,” in which the child moves (jumps) legs and lower body in the manner of a horse, whilst the upper part of the body represents the human rider. . . . The primitive arrest in this condition is symbolized very beautifully in the “Illustrated Hallucinations” of a schizophrenic, published by Bertschinger (Jahrbuch f. Psa., iii., 1911).
sion in the forms of the Sphinx and centaurs, in the whole development of their art, by replacing the animal-like gods of the Asiatic world by human, indeed in Homer’s presentation, all too human figures. All the fabulous beings of mixed form so abundant in Greek mythology seem to reflect again the pain and torture of this striving to be free from the mother, the result of which we admire in their sculpture of the nobly formed body freed from all earthliness and yet remaining so human.

So the deep cultural and historical importance of the development of the Greek art lies in this, that it repeats the biological and prehistorical act of becoming human, the severance from the mother and the standing upright from the earth, in the creation and perfection of its aesthetic ideal of the human body.1 In the typical form of the gable composition, which represents a series of intermediate links—amongst them also centaurs—from the wounded warriors lying on the ground to the upright standing god, I would like to see a reflection of this biological principle of development. Moreover, the type of sitting figure (enthroned) has been dominant in the whole of Asiatic art, in so far as it copied the human being, as for example in the Buddha statues with crossed legs and in Chinese plastic art, etc. Egyptian art was the first to give prominence to the upright standing or stepping body (though still with the animal head) which in Greek art emerges as it were out of the bestial composite body as an aesthetic ideal purified from the dross of birth. In Egyptian plastic art, and in ancient Chinese rock sculpture, the figure

1 In Laokoön Lessing states that among the ancients “beautiful human beings created sculpture and the state owed to the beautiful sculpture beautiful human beings.”

gradually grows out of the stone (“stone birth”) as, for example, the granite statue to be found in the Berlin Museum of Senmut (about 1470 B.C.) holding a princess; one sees only their heads projected from the mighty block of granite. The same motif, already more detached from the artistic symbol of birth, is shown by a similar group in Cairo. Hedwig Fechheimer, in her beautiful work on Egyptian plastic art,1 states that, according to its nature, it could only accept forms remaining in complete repose as free from all objection; sitting, firmly standing, squatting, kneeling, are its most frequent motives. The granite statue of Senmut, in which the human form is completely composed in one block crowned by the head, represents in its rugged conventionality perhaps the most consistent expression of this form of spatial phantasy which borders on the architectural (pp. 25-26). From here onwards plastic art and architecture, which originally were obviously one, seem to regain their psychological connection: architecture, as
“the art of space” in the true sense of the word, is a negative plastic art, just as plastic art is a “space-filling” art. “The cube figures surpass all plastic art—as do also the monumental statues by Didymaion in Miletus—in the rigid consistency of their cubistic conception. The scheme to which the complicated position of squatting with knees drawn up high and arms folded can be simplified is completely realized in sculpture. Both figures are completely surrounded by the cube” (p. 39).

How closely this extricating of the human being from the primal form is related by the Egyptian mind itself to the act of birth is shown in their language; “to create a piece of sculpture is, in Egyptian, to bring to life; the sculptor’s

1 In the collection *Die Kunst des Ostens*, Bd. i., Berlin.

work is designated by the causative form of the word ‘to live.’ That this is no mere question of assonance but of inner similarity is confirmed by the occurrence of proper names for statues, raising them to the level of individuals. . . . The myth developed the theme as follows; the primal god Ptah, who once created even himself, the gods and all things, is simultaneously the creator of art and the workshop. His High-priest bears the title ‘foreman of all works of art,’ his name seems closely connected with a rare word for ‘to form’ ” (p. 13).

The double-formed Sphinx figure, which represented for the Egyptians’ belief in immortality the most perfect artistic-architectural expression of rebirth, became for the Greeks the starting-point of a process of overcoming this maternal religion and thus led to the creation of the most sublime masculine ideal of art. The way in which this development advanced is easy to follow in the history of the Greek culture. Side by side with the adopted Sphinx, the Greek air is filled with phantoms which betray to us on what foundation this process of “Hellenization” rests, namely, on the most intense repression of the mother principle. Although the Sphinx, as Ilberg (see Roscher’s *Lexicon*) argues, referring to Rohde and Laistner, was an adopted fabulous being, it soon became fused by the popular phantasy of the Greeks with their own products of a similar kind. These consist of the spectral army of feminine monsters which originate in very ancient beliefs and appear in such numbers only in the Greek legendary world under the form of Hecate, Gorgon, Mormo, Lamia, Gello, Empusa, under the aspect of the Keres, the Furies, Harpies, Sirens, and similar spirits of Hell and demons of death. They are all representatives of the primal mother; they portray the birth
anxiety, and as such show the fundamental difference between Greek and Asiatic culture. In
Asiatic culture the great primal mother enjoys godlike worship (Astarte-Kybele), whilst in
Hellenism she was repressed through a reactivation of the anxiety and was replaced by a heaven
of male gods, to which corresponded the man-governed state on earth.1 Egyptian culture, from
which indeed the Sphinx figure was taken over into Greece, seems to form the transition between
these two extreme world views.

Egyptian culture is produced by three factors, which can all be traced back in the same way to
the first effort to repress the positive attitude to the mother, which in the Asiatic world view
seems to work itself out in a sexual high esteem of the primal mother, and reappears in
sublimated form in the Christian mother of God. First, the religious factor, appearing in a
peculiar cult of the dead, which in every particular detail, especially the preservation of the body,
is equivalent to a further life in the womb.2 Second, the artistic factor, appearing in an
exaggerated esteem of the animal body (animal cult); third, the social factor, appearing in a high
valuation of woman (“right of the mother”). These originally purely “maternal” motifs, in the
course of a process of development lasting thousands of

1 How incompletely this repression of the woman succeeded is shown even in the marital quarrels of
Zeus, father of the gods with the mother goddess Hera; these do not lack a comical treatment even in
Homer and justify the figure of the god-like “henpecked husband” which Offenbach has made of him in
the gay adventurous husband. . . . The Christian counterpart to this is the devil’s grandmother, who
remains undisputed mistress of the underworld (p. 132). In India it is the frightful Durya.

2 Freud has shown that the placing of the mummy in a coffin of human form indicates the return into the
womb (quoted by Tausk, _l.c._, p. 24, note).
years and making its contribution to the overcoming of the birth trauma, became masculinized, that is, remodelled in the sense of adjustment to the father libido. Typical of all three manifestations of this mother principle, as of the initial tendency to overcome it, is the veneration of the moon goddess Isis, alongside of the gradual gain in importance of her brother, son, and husband Osiris. The same is reflected in the gradual development of the Cult of the Sun, which not only allows assimilation with the rebirth-phantasy in Jung’s sense, but in the meaning of the more original moon veneration also gives expression to the mother libido. Not only because the sun rises does the hero identify himself with it, but because it disappears every day afresh into the underworld and so corresponds to the primal wish for union with the mother = night. This is proved beyond doubt precisely by the Egyptian sun worship, with its numerous pictures that represent by preference the sun-ship on its night journey into the underworld, as also in the texts of the Book of the Dead: “Under the earth, thought of as a disc, another world lies, which belongs to the Departed; if the sun God meets them, the Dead raise their arms to him and praise him; the God hears the prayers of those who lie in the coffin and gives breath again to their nostrils. The ‘Song of the primal Gods’ calls to the sun God, ‘When you go into the underworld in the hour (?) of darkness, you wake up Osiris with your rays. When you rise over the heads of the inhabitants of the hollows (the Dead) they shout to you. . . . Let them rise who lie on their sides, when you penetrate into the underworld by night!’ Special privileges enable the dead one’s soul to step into the barque of the Sun and journey with him. The Dead praise the sun God with songs, which are preserved for us in the graves of the

Theban kings. . . . Because of this strong dependence of the Dead on the sun, the sun God is represented, at the end of the new Empire, in the graves; in the kings’ graves the dead one meets the God as an equal” (Roscher, Sonne, vol. iv.).

Accordingly the very conception of the sun’s origin in the Egyptian cosmology is that the sun god has begotten himself. In the song of the ancient gods, these pray: “Secret are the forms of his origin . . . who arises as Re . . . who originates from himself . . . who created himself from his own body, who bore himself; he did not go forth from a mother’s womb; (whence) he went forth is Infinity.” The other “Song of the primal Gods” says: “There is no father of him, his phallus begot him: there is no mother of him, his seed bore him. . . . Father of fathers, mother of mothers” (l.c., col. 1,191). Another conception of this birth myth approaches still nearer to the embryonal primal situation, according to which the sun god created an egg, from which he himself then went forth. In the Book of the Dead it is written: “Re, who has risen from the ocean, says, ‘I am a soul, created by the ocean. . . . My nest is not seen, my egg is not broken. . . . I have made my nest at the ends of the heavens.’ ” And the well-known “Illustrations of the Beetle” (mentioned by Roeder in this connection, Roscher’s Lexicon), “which rolls a ball (that is, its egg?) in front of it (illustration 7, l.c.) and indeed into the body of the heavenly goddess, from
whom it is later born,” leave no doubt that it is a matter of the primal tendency to return to the womb which also originally gave the same significance to the cult of the sun in such widely distant places of the earth as Egypt and Peru.

But the development of sun worship always goes hand in hand with a decisive turning from mother-culture to father-culture, as is shown in the final identification of the newborn king (infans) with the sun. This opposition to the dominance of the woman both in the social sphere (right of the father) and in the religious, continues as the transitional process from Egypt to Greece, where it leads, by means of the entire repression of woman even from the erotic life, to the richest blossoming of the masculine civilization and to the artistic idealization corresponding to it. The point of transition and also the kernel of this decisive crisis in the development of our Western civilization lies in Crete, where, as is well known, Egyptian influences first mixed with the Greek, forming the Mycenaean culture.
This is apparent, for example, in the griffin-like figure which, according to Furtwangler, shows unmistakable agreement to the Sphinx type of the new Empire, and so also in the supposedly Egyptian Minotaur, which is formed wholly in human shape, only that the head is the head of a bull. The prison of this monster, the famous Labyrinth, has also since Weidner’s important discovery become accessible to analytic understanding (verbal communication by Professor Freud). Weidner1 has recognized from inscriptions that the inextricable, complicated dark passages of the Labyrinth are a representation of the human intestines


(“Palace of the Intestines” it is called in the inscriptions deciphered by him). The analytic conception of these as the prison of the misshapen form (embryo) unable to find the exit, is clear in the sense of unconscious wish fulfilment. Whilst I reserve for a larger work1 a detailed demonstration of this conception, the consequences of which are of immense importance for the understanding of other periods of culture (not only of the Cretan-Mycenean, but also of Northern) and of art (Labyrinth dances, Ornamentation, etc.), I would like

for the moment to set in relief the counter figure of Theseus who succeeds, by means of the thread (navel string) thrown to him by Ariadne, in finding the exit from the Labyrinth, or, according to other traditions, in freeing her from it. This, his freeing, which is represented in the phraseology of the mythical compensation as the deliverance of the chained maiden by the hero, represents the birth of the Greek ideal
human being, the hero, and his detachment from the ancient primal mother.

From this point we can understand retrospectively how the near-Eastern world picture, which was a purely maternal one, led, as indicated by way of the masculinization in the Egyptian world, to the men-governed social organization of the Greeks (Sparta) and to the idealization of this purely masculine culture in the artistic creation of human beings. The most perfect expression of this course of development we find in the myth of Prometheus, the bold fire-bringer and creator of men, who, like his human prototype the unrivalled Greek sculptor, ventured to form men from earth and to breathe into them the fire of life. This, as well as the creation of the first woman, Pandora, especially ascribed to him, places him on a level with the God of the Old Testament; only Prometheus was worshipped by the Greeks because of their need of deliverance, as friend and saviour, and his deeds were punished as titanic offences by the lord Zeus. We may expect to find again also the deepest wish fulfilment of the Unconscious in his punishment, which corresponds to his crime; he is riveted firmly to a rock standing all alone—later tradition also speaks here of “crucifixion,” a bird of prey ceaselessly devours his liver, which always grows again in the night, in order to make his torture—and his unconscious pleasure—eternal. Hence also the old tradition by

1 As Bapp (Roscher’s Lexicon) has already shown, it is in no way a question of the “heavenly fire” (lightning) which Prometheus steals, but of fire from the earth (mother). Here links on the closely related Hephaistos-myth of the divine smith, who himself lame (birth trauma in the plunge from heaven) forms men no longer from dirty earth (Lehm =loam) but from noble pure metal. See also in addition McCurdy: “Die Allmacht der Gedanken und die Mutterleibspanasie in den Mythen von Hephästos und einem Roman von Bulwer Lytton” (Imago, iii., 1914).
Hesiod knows nothing of his deliverance, which only later is ascribed to Heracles, who himself represents such a hero bound eternally to a woman (Omphale), from whom he continually but vainly attempts to free himself.1

But the artist does the same in that he, like Prometheus, creates human beings after his own image, that is, he brings forth his work in ever new, constantly repeated acts of birth, and in it brings forth himself amid the maternal pains of creation. So the renowned artistic Greek, who understands woman only as an organ for child-bearing, and who pays homage to the love of boys, has raised himself in identification with the mother to creator of men, in that he attempts in his works of art to detach himself gradually and under great resistance from the mother, as all the Sphinx-like fabulous beings so convincingly prove. From this “moment” of simultaneously longed-for and yet not wished-for freeing from the bestial womb, from this eternal sticking fast in birth, which the neurotic constantly experi-

1 Cf. also the later satirical conception of “Misfortune as a wife” (the unlucky box of Pandora, in which Preller recognized the cysta mystica, the woman’s genitals) links on to the old tradition in Hesiod, according to which Zeus allows Pandora to be created on earth by Hephaistos, in order to punish Prometheus for stealing the fire, Hesiod’s narrative ends with these words: “Thus Prometheus the saviour himself cannot escape the anger of Zeus, and the mighty chains entrap him, and forcibly hold him, however cunning he is.” That a womanly trap is meant in the deepest sense is shown by one of the oldest representations of Prometheus’ punishment in a gem on one of the so-called “Island-stones” of the British Museum, which goes back again to Crete, the seat of an art “which may perhaps be called Pelasgian” (according to Roscher, iii., 2, col. 3087).
Greek art, then, constitutes the first representation of movement. It broke up the clumsy rigidity of the Asiatic and Egyptian figures into movement, but was itself condemned again to rigidity (Lessing’s Laokoön). The Greek, who was also the first “sportsman,” has the element of movement in his physical culture, his games, his contests and dances, to the importance of which as idealized (rhythmical and composed) physical paroxysms of the unconscious (spasms, attacks) we can here only refer in passing.2

After all, we may have to look for the beginning of every art in general in plastic art. But before primitive man started like Prometheus, to form men in clay, presumably, on the analogy of the instinct of nest-building, he first created a vessel for a receptacle and a protection, in imitation of the womb.3 The ancient Babylonian tradition of

1 The process of idealization can be followed in the transition from the horrifying Gorgonic gorge, to the Medusa Rondanini, the Greek Madonna (see the corresponding illustration in Roscher, i., 2, col. 1716-17, 1723). Cf. Ferenczi, “Zur Symbolik des Medusenhauptes” (Int. Zschr. f. Ps.A., ix., 1, 1923, p. 69) and the supplementary remark of Freud’s, “The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido,” Coll. Papers, vol. ii., p. 247, note 2.

2 Cf. the description and history of the “Labyrinth dances” by Krause. In the Roman circus games which still survive in our race-course, the race, going round and round, takes place as if in labyrinthine passages.

3 Fuhrmann (Der Sinn im Gegenstand, p. 2 f.) distinguishes two types of vessels: those not made for liquids are formed after the shape of the animal intestines, from which the roll-shaped technique of the ceramic art developed (l.c., in New Guinea). “The belly-

the god who makes men on the potter’s wheel—as the god Chnum is represented in the temple of Luxor—points in the same direction. The original vessel, as in the “Myth of the Birth of the Hero,” is the womb, which it first imitates. Soon the vessel undergoes a still clearer development in the direction of representing the original content, namely, the diminutive human being, the child, or its head (Kopf, Toff, pot). It gets a belly, ears, a beak, etc. (cf. the typical headbreakers, for example, of the primitives, the urns with faces, etc.1 This early human creation, therefore, faithfully repeats the biological development from vessel to (the therein found) child. And when
the later real art, which, so to say, completely freed human beings from the vessel, produced completed human beings, as did Prometheus and the Greek sculptors, we have to recognize in it the tendency to avoid the birth trauma, the painful deliverance.

In this we perceive the real root of art, namely, in this shaped pot faithfully represents in its foundation the lower body of man, thus an endless line of spirally arranged intestines, which are clothed outwardly by a skin and contain the stomach inside, or receive the stock of nourishment. . . . Those made for liquids are formed like the udder of the animal or like the breast of a woman (see Schlauch = outre = uterus; Bocksbeutel, Beutel = bouteille = bottle), so that every bottle is an udder, that stands on its base “the teat upwards.”

1 The later decoration on the vessel replaces the original content in the vessel, as the Peruvian ceramic shows with particular clearness (see in Fuhrmann’s Peru, i., especially the remarkable animal and human figures on the bellied, body-shaped vessels of the Chimu culture, illustration 6 ff.). Similarly also the ornamentation on the famous pitcher of Tragliatella is to be understood as the representation on the surface of what is inside. . . . In the Hindu Bhagavad Gita bodies are called Kscheta, that is, vessels, fruit-bearing ground, womb (according to Winterstein, I.c., p. 8).

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autoplastical imitation of one’s own growing and origin from the maternal vessel; for the copying of this vessel itself might have been made subservient to practical needs, whilst the formation according to one’s own body signifies the achievement characteristic of art, of apparent purposelessness which is yet somehow full of meaning. In this sense art developed, so to say, as a branch of “applied art,” which indeed it was originally, and as such it plays a quite important part in real culture. Moreover, it is certainly no accident that the Greeks, idealizing above everything the masculine body, should have attained in the composition and refinement of the maternal vessel the highest stage of perfection in their vases.

In the naturalistic animal representations of the Ice Age we have before us the corresponding beginnings of painting. In these cave-drawings man seems to have reproduced the animal body as a symbol to him of the warmth-giving shelter, the cave. Only thus is it intelligible, why “single animals or groups of animals in deep places in chapels and niches, are accessible only after overcoming considerable and difficult obstacles (which can bring the ignorant in danger of life) often only by creeping on hands and knees” (Schneider, I.c., p. 5).2 This conception would
not only not contradict the prevailing “magical” explanation, but would make it psychologically (from the unconscious) intelligible: it is still a question of animals, which warm,

1 Verworn has inferred the character of prehistoric art, called by him “physioplastic,” from the perfection and lack of development of diluvial naturalism (Zur Psychologie der primitiven Kunst, 1908). Reinach has coined the aptly ambiguous phrase for it: “Proles sine matre creatâ, mater sine prole defunctâ” (according to Scheltema, l.c., p. 8).


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protect, and nourish human beings, as once the mother did.

In the later painting, for example, in Christian art, the whole life of Jesus from His birth to His death is pictorially represented to people ignorant of reading, so that identification easily becomes possible. Mary with the child finally develops in Italian art as the symbol of the blessedness of motherhood, that is, of the blessedness of child and mother in union. So the individual redeemer dissolves again into the separate divine individuals, the children. The crucified and “reborn” Christ is here pictured as an ordinary child at the mother’s breast.

The modern art movements which betray so many primitive characteristics would then be the last projections of the “psychologizing” art school which consciously represents “the interior” of man, namely, his unconscious, and predominantly in “embryonal” forms.1

We have now come to the very root of the problem of art, which is finally a problem of form. As it appears to us, all “form” goes back to the primal form of the maternal vessel, which has become to a large extent the content of art; and indeed in an idealized and sublimated way, namely, as form, which makes the primal form, fallen under repression, again acceptable, in that it can be represented and felt as “beautiful.”
If now we ask how it was possible for the Greek people to bring about such an extensive idealization of the birth trauma, ancient Greek history may give us a hint for the understanding of this remarkable development. I am


thinking of the Doric migration, which drove out a part of the Greek people in early times from their native land and compelled them to look for a new motherland on the Ionian Islands lying opposite and on the coast of Asia Minor. This compulsory separation from the native land seems, in the sense of a repetition of the birth trauma, the violent severance from the mother, to have determined the entire further development of Greek culture. It seems quite certain that the Homeric epics, especially the *Iliad*, represent the first artistic reaction to the conclusion of this great migration of people, this colonization of the coast of Asia Minor by the Greek settlers. The battle for the Trojan fortress, and the eternally youthful Helen, abducted thither from her native land, reflects again the desperate attempts of the Greek emigrants to establish themselves in a new land; whereas the Homeric battles of the gods seem to indicate a repetition of the battle of the laboriously set-up Olympic dominance of Zeus against the cult of the mother idol (Athene), still prevailing in Asia Minor. I hope sometime to be able to show from the analysis of the content of epic phantasies how real historical truths can be peeled off from the luxuriant growths of unconscious elaboration, and thus how ancient Greek history can be reconstructed. Professor Freud proposed this to me many years ago, urging me to trace the psychoanalytically recognized mechanism of epic formation in the Homeric poems. I For the present I should like only to emphasize the fact that the Greek cult of Demeter (Γή-μήτηρ = Mother earth) related to the Asiatic

1 See my preparations for this (*Imago*, v., 1917-19), “Psychologische Beiträge zur Entstehung des Volksepos I Homer” (Das Problem), II, “Die Dichterische Phantasiebildung” (where, p. 137, note, will be found a sketch of the work, which hitherto has not gone beyond the stage of preparation).
mother goddesses, was, according to Herodotus, established on the Peloponnesian Isles before the Dorian immigration. This supports our assumption that the population driven forth by the Dorian invaders was firmly fixed on the mother earth, whilst, on the other hand, it may perhaps indicate that the Dorians took refuge in the love of boys as a reaction to this all too maternal attachment. The figure of Heracles, according to Wilamowitz a faithful reflection of the valiant nobility of the Peloponnesian Dorians, would then have preserved, in the sense of making heroic, the difficulties of this severance from the mother. For Heracles appears also in pre-Homeric tradition as conqueror of Troy.

The Homeric representation gives us a good example of how the poet, in attempting to remember painful historical events, sinks back to his own unconscious wish phantasies. Whilst the Iliad describes only the unavailing battles for Troy, in the Odyssey, the famous conclusion of this ten years’ contest is narrated retrospectively. The cunning hero brings the contests to an end in the famous history of the wooden horse, in whose belly the hidden Achæan heroes reach the innermost fortress. This human and at the same time deeply poetic tradition clearly shows that the emigrants, violently driven from their native land, had as their final goal the regaining of the eternally young and

1 Similarly as regards the expulsion of the Israelites from Egypt, this most important traumatic event in their history, from which their entire further fate follows and which corresponds exactly to the primal trauma of the expulsion from Paradise. Since that time the Jews seek this promised land where milk and honey flow, without being able to find it (Ahasuerus). Moreover, the expulsion from Paradise, on account of enjoyment of the forbidden fruit (mother’s breast), reflects the strict necessity of the weaning trauma, which man by means of adjustment to reality seeks to compensate by the winning of artificial nourishment from the earth (agriculture).

beautiful maternal ideal (Helena) from a strange land. And the only possible form of fulfilment for the Unconscious was the return into the animal-like womb, which would be unworthy as a refuge and protection for fearless heroes did we not know that their heroic nature itself springs from the difficulty of the birth trauma and the compensation of fear. So the Trojan horse is the direct unconscious counterpart to the native Centaurs and Sphinxes, which creations were later to initiate and carry out the sublime process of freeing from the mother. But also Troy itself, the impregnable, the innermost part of which one can reach only through cunning, is like every fortress a symbol of the mother.2 Thus is explained the signification of the underworld which mythologists assign to Troy, and even its close relationship with the Cretan and northern Labyrinths, which Ernst Krause (Carus Sterne) has established3 beyond any doubt in a brilliant book, marred only by too much historico-mythological thought.
The proverbial cunning of Odysseus, which, moreover, is appropriate to all “celestial hotspurs” of Greek mythology and brings them to their downfall into Tartaros (underworld) and to eternal punishment, throws an important

1 As is well known, it is told that, before taking possession of the town, the protecting statue of Athene had been carried off by Odysseus and Diomedes from an Adytum placed under the cella of the goddess, through subterranean canals or brook ravines.


light on the psychology of the poet.1 Odysseus, the narrator of all these false fairy tales which tell of the return to the womb, quite obviously represents the poet himself, and may, moreover, be considered the representative and primal father of all epic poets, whose function seems to be to depreciate the primal trauma through fictitious exaggeration, and thereby still maintain the illusion of a primal reality lying behind the primal phantasy. Yet the latest followers of this kind of story-telling, as, for example, the now famous Baron von Münchausen, try to represent the impossible, the unattainable—even that directly contradicting Nature, as, for instance, to draw oneself out of the water by the hair—as the easiest thing in the world, so that the very impossibility of the situation represents for the Unconscious the most calming and gratifying element.2

In contrast to this artful breaker of natural and divine laws who yet somehow enables this constantly unfulfilled wish to be gratified in the fictitious narratives, stands the typical *simpleton* who in a remarkable way performs the most impossible tasks in play. But his stupidity is nothing

1 I have touched on the psychological relationship of the poet to the hero in my study on “Die Don Juan-Gestalt,” *Imago*, viii., 1922, p. 193.
2 The *unnatural* often proves to be connected with the non-realization of the womb situation and its representation. So in Macbeth, the threat that he will fall when the Birnam wood moves on him (instead of his going into the wood); this warning corresponds to the others that only an unborn, namely, Macduff, cut out of his mother’s body, will conquer him (*cf.* also the head of the unborn child which appears to Macbeth and the bloody head). From this cardinal point of the play, which according to Freud rests on the theme of childlessness, much that is enigmatical becomes intelligible. One may compare with this Freud’s remarks about “the uncanny” (*Imago*, v., 1917-19) in poetry, which finally also corresponds to the womb situation (*i.e.*, 261 ff.).

but an expression of his infantilism; he is also an *infans*, as inexperienced as the new-born god Horus, who is represented with his finger in his mouth. The more stupid and therefore the more childlike he is, the sooner will he succeed in the fulfilment of the primal wish, and if, like little *Tom Thumb* of the fairy tales, he has only the stature of the first embryonal phase, then he is almost omnipotent and has attained the ideal state of which the neurotic still so often dreams, and which the new-born mythical heroes seem to represent, namely, that of being quite small again, and yet participant in all the advantages of a grown-up person.

On the other hand, tragedy (which likewise was brought to the highest perfection by the Greeks, and which according to Nietzsche perished in “aesthetic Socraticism,” that is, in the hypertrophy of consciousness) grew up from the mimic representations of the mythical rites, and symbolized the sufferings and punishments of the mythical hero on account of his “tragic guilt.” This has become known to us in its unconscious significance from the analysis of mythical tradition, and the origin of tragedy from the dances and songs of the participants in the sacrifice who were enveloped in goat skin shows clearly what was involved. The skin in which the participants envelop themselves after the sacrifice and disembowelment of the animal is again nothing but a substitute for the protecting womb. This partial realization of the return to the mother has likewise found a lasting

1 *Cf.* the expression of one of Freud’s patients (*Interpretation of Dreams*) who regretted not having made better use of his nurse’s breast when a child.

2 Ferenczi first drew attention to this “dream of the wise suckling” (*Int. Zschr. f. Ps.A.*, ix., p. 70).

pictorial expression in the numerous goat-legged and goat-headed fauns and satyrs of Greek mythology1 and sculpture. In the art of tragedy which, like the dance, takes the living human being itself as its object, the frightful and primitive character of the repressed primal wish lives on in a milder form as tragic guilt, which every individual mortal spectator can re-enact by continuously re-experiencing it: whereas in epic poetry we see the attempts to overcome the primal wish by fictitious transformations. The highest idealization of the birth trauma attained in plastic art is, in compassion-arousing tragedy, resolved once again into the malleable primal element of the anxiety affect, capable of outlet, whereas in epic and satiric poetry the too highly strung idealization breaks out as boastful untruthfulness.

Art, as a representation and at the same time denial of reality, thus resembles the childish game in which we have recognized the attempt to depreciate the primal trauma through the consciousness of not being serious. From here the way leads to the understanding of humour; this highest stage in the overcoming of repression is achieved by a quite definite attitude of the Ego to its own Unconscious. But we cannot here trace the origin of humour, for it would lead us again deeply into the theory of neurosis and its therapy based on the psychology of the Ego.

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1 In a thoroughgoing psychoanalytic investigation, “Panik und Pan-Komplex” (Imago, vi., 1920), Dr. B. Felszeghy has traced the affect of “panic” fright, in connection with Ferenczi’s investigations concerning the development of the sense of Reality, back to the repetition of the birth anxiety, and has made the remarkable mythical form of Pan completely intelligible from this significance. Much already finds expression in Felszeghy, which in our work gains fresh illumination from another side.

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PHILOSOPHIC SPECULATION

Greek philosophy, which is really the first to deserve the name, and which was later linked with physics—although Aristotle was right in designating his predecessors as near relatives of Philomythos—shows in its origin among the Ionian Nature philosophers the naive counterpart to the idealizing tendency which was stretched to its utmost in Greek art and mythology. These early Western thinkers from Thales to Socrates seem to form the transitional stage between the cosmic world view of the ancient East and our natural scientific point of view, and are, therefore, the forerunners of our present-day Western European mentality.
Whilst the Oriental world view attempted by a sublime cosmic projection to derive earthly destiny from the cosmic celestial-image,1 the Ionian thinkers accomplished the separation of these spheres in an unsophisticated view, and in going back to the original mother, Nature, they attempted to conceive earthly life as freed from supernatural influence. That this could only succeed because the Greeks simultaneously banished the entire Oriental mythology of the heavens into the underworld, in the real sense of the word, we have already mentioned in the previous chapter. Through this purification of the air from cosmological phantasies, they were in the position to see and to com-

1 Among the Babylonians astrology goes parallel with augury applied to the intestines of the sacrificial animal. The human being and his inward parts were projected to the heavens (see my _Mikrokosmos und Makrokosmus_, now in preparation).

prehend natural laws in their simple form, just where the Oriental world view recognized only heavenly laws which worked themselves out on earth.

Greek philosophy begins, as is well known, with Thales’s statement that _water_ is the origin and womb of all things.1 Before following the further development of Greek thought from this concentrated formula,2 let us make clear to ourselves that with this statement the first dim conception of the individual origin of Man in the mother is extended to a universal natural law. The mechanism of this cognition, which is doubtless right biologically,3 is distinguished from the cosmic and mythical projection of the heavenly waters (milky way) and the rivers of the underworld (stream of the dead) by the fact that this is a real discovery, the drawing away of a curtain, or, as we should say, the removal of a repression, which had hitherto prevented the discovery of the origin of all life in water, just because man himself had once come out of the amniotic fluid. The prerequisite for the discovery of a truth is therefore the recognition of the Unconscious in the outer world by the removal of an inner repression, which starts directly—as the development of philosophy clearly shows—from the primal repression.

Thales’s successor, Anaximander of Miletus, the first philosophic author of the ancients, already shows a reaction to this, when he says: "Whence things originated, thither,

According to Nietzsche, Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen (“Philosophy during the Tragic Age of the Greeks,” Early Greek Philosophy) (1873), from which all following quotations are taken. Works, edited Levy, p. 73 ff.

In addition, now see Ferenczi’s phylogenetic parallel to individual development (Versuch einer Genitaltheorie, 1924).

according to necessity, they must return and perish; for they must pay penalty and be judged for their injustices according to the order of time.” Nietzsche rightly interprets this oracular expression as the first pessimistic note of philosophy, and compares it with an utterance of the classical pessimist Schopenhauer, whose whole attitude to life and to the world is thus explained: “The right standard by which to judge every human being is that he really is a being who ought not to exist at all, but who is expiating his existence by manifold forms of suffering and death: What can one expect from such a being? Are we not all sinners condemned to death? We expiate our birth firstly by our life and secondly by our death.” Anaximander’s statement thus supplements Thales’s knowledge by emphasizing the return to the very origin of all, and reveals through psychological intuition a second law of Nature which was taken over only in somewhat changed form into our scientific thought.

1 Nietzsche, “Philosophy during the Tragic Age of the Greeks,” Early Greek Philosophy, p. 92.

2 Ibid., pp. 92-93.

3 Who knows whether Nietzsche’s casual anthropomorphic “idea” that “all inorganic material has arisen from organic; it is dead organic material, corpse and man” will not sometime “revalue” natural science. S. Rado has recently attempted to show how far also the exact natural sciences are unconsciously determined: “Die Wege der Naturforschung im Lichte der Psychoanalyse” (Imago, viii., 1922). For the first steps in chemistry, alchemy, Jung has already coined the comprehensive formula that it sets out ultimately to beget children without a mother (cf. H. Silberer’s “Der Homunkulus,” Imago, in., 1914, and Probleme der Mystik und ihrer Symbolik, 1914). One should read in connection with modern chemistry the interesting article by Dr. Alfred Robitsek: “Symbolisches Denken in der chemischen Forschung” (Imago, i., 1912). It is, moreover, psychologically remarkable that the actual destroyer of alchemy and the first natural scientific chemist, Justus Liebig, was the inventor of artificial manure and of meat extract and so fulfilled the alchemistic wish-dream in a symbolically realistic manner.
By showing how, from the transience of all earthly things, the Greek thinker comes to the necessary assumption of an “indefinite” one, a primal being, the womb of all things, Nietzsche succeeds in giving us a glimpse into the way which leads from there beyond the platonic “idea” to the Kantian “thing-in-itself,” in which Schopenhauer was the first to recognize the “will” once again, although still in philosophic disguise. From this conflict between origin and disappearance, arising directly from the repression of the primal trauma, Heraclitus tried to save himself by his law of eternal becoming, in that he recognized, quite in the sense of the primal repression, “the proper course of all becoming and passing which he conceived of under the form of polarity, as the divergence of one force into two qualitatively different opposite actions striving after reunion.”

If what is meant here is the primal ambivalence connected with the act of becoming (birth), then the qualitative substratum of this state is not lacking. Anaximander had already developed the theory of (cold) water by stating that it originated from “warmth” and “dampness” as its primary stage, and the “physicist” Heraclitus then reinterpreted “this Anaximandrian ‘warmth’ as the respiration, the warm breath, the dry vapours, in short, as the fiery element; about this fire he now enunciates what Thales and Anaximander had enunciated about water: that in innumerable metamorphoses it was passing along the path of Becoming, especially in the three chief aggregate stages as something Warm, Moist, or Firm.”

In this way Heraclitus discovered atmospheric circulation with its periodicity, which, in contrast to Anaximander, he conceives, in the sense that the constantly renewed extinction in the all-destroying universal conflagration “is characterized as a demand and a need; the state of being completely swallowed up by the fire as satiety.”

With this knowledge of the pleasurable return into nothingness, which again seems to make the becoming an insoluble problem, simple contemplation freed from repression turns once more to speculation under the influence of a new wave of repression.

Whilst Heraclitus could rightly say, “I sought and investigated myself,” his successor Parmenides, turning away from this close contemplation of realities, launches forth into the logical abstractions of “being” and “not being.” He spun these out of the originally quite real and human facts of being and not being, which in their anthropomorphic application to the world can yet be traced linguistically; for “esse means at the bottom: ‘to breathe!’” (Nietzsche).
deduction Parmenides then arrived at the first criticism of our instrument of knowledge through which we can only recognize appearances, and thus prepared the way for that philosophical separation of “mind and body” which still continues to exist in our scientific thought. Here an attempt is made for the first time to establish logically the idealistic world view, which in Plato, and still more clearly in his Hindu forerunners, started from a withdrawal by mystical meditation into the primal condition.

Anaxagoras then took a further step in natural science and in the theory of knowledge by disputing the possibility that, from the one primal element, the womb of Becoming, a plurality of qualities could proceed. According to him, there are from the beginning numerous substances which

Only through movement produce the variety and multiplicity of the world. “That Motion, however, is a truth and not Appearance Anaxagoras proved in opposition to Parmenides by the indisputable succession of our conceptions in thinking.” But now in order to explain the movement of ideas, he assumed in “mind in itself,” in Nous, “a first moment of motion in some primeval age, as the Chalaza of all so-called Becoming; that is, of all Change.” And so finally by the roundabout way of logical deduction he reached that now famous primal state, Chaos, in which Nous had not yet operated on material, and was therefore still unmoved, resting in a blessed mixed state, which Anaxagoras described by the expression “seed of all things.” The way in which this thinker pictures to himself the formation of the Cosmos, from out this chaos of the circle moved by the Nous, approaches, despite all its primitive representations of the human procreation (as already shown by Nietzsche), the laws of mechanics, which two thousand years later Kant was to proclaim in his inspiring pronouncements on the natural history of the heavens.

The early Greek philosophers could not, therefore, get away from the primal problem of Becoming, from the question of the origin of things. They wandered along different ways, followed by the later philosophers, and withdrawing ever further and further from the real problem of the origin of man, which lay behind the primal repression. It was reserved for the genius of Plato to reverse the problem in his doctrine of Eros, and so also in the field of philosophy to rediscover the human being as the measure of all things, as almost simultaneously Greek art had discovered it.

1 Ibid., p. 145.
Plato’s philosophy of Eros, which has already been fully appreciated from the psychoanalytic side, places the human instinct of procreation at the centre of things, and points in its world explanation to the different stages of Eros, as shown in the sensuous, the psychical, the philosophic, and the religious (mystical) attitude. Here for the first time the philosophical problem is grasped at the root, and we ought therefore not to be surprised if Plato uses for the presentation of his doctrine similes which come very close to the biological facts. He conceives Eros as the yearning for a lost state, indeed still more clearly, for a lost union, and he also explains the essence of the sexual impulse in his famous allegory of the primal being cut in two, as a striving towards reunion. This is the clearest conscious approach to the desire for reunion of the child with the mother which had hitherto been attained in the history of the human mind, and with which Freud was able to relate his libido theory. Indeed, Plato, in harmony with the Orphic-dionysæ religion, approaches most nearly to ultimate biological knowledge when he says: “Eros is the Pain wherewith the Demon, who through his own enigmatic guilt was plunged into birth, reclaims the lost Paradise of his pure and original Being.”

But because Plato through some extraordinary intuition felt this intense longing within himself and represented it,


2 Freud, Jenseits des Lustprinzips, 1921.

3 “The expression ‘plunge’ in birth is found not only among the Orphics, but also in Buddhism” (Winterstein, l.c., p. 184).
for his insight into the inner world, finds in the famous comparison of human existence with a subterranean cave, on whose walls one perceives only the shadows of real processes, a wish-fulfilling representation, which throws a clear light on the subjective source of Plato’s insight. The comparison to the cave is not merely “a womb phantasy,” as Winterstein (l.c) has already supposed, but it gives us a deep glimpse into the mind of the philosopher, who experienced Eros driving everything onwards as a yearning for the return into the primal state, and at the same time created the expression of the highest philosophic sublimation for it in his doctrine of ideas.

If man’s philosophical cognition reached its climax in Plato, it now remains to explain what compelled the thinkers of the following two thousand years to turn aside from this sublime synthesis and idealization of early Greek philosophical development and to pursue the stony path of repres-

1 Winterstein (l.c., p. 193).

2 The phylogenetic supplement to this, according to Nietzsche’s thought, is Pythagoras’ transmigration of souls, which answers the question how we can know anything about ideas: by remembering an earlier existence; but biologically expressed, this can only mean the embryonic state.
akin to him, shows that, with the intellectual removal of repression, his whole psychical attitude approaches ever closer

to the primal situation of meditation and abandonment which he tries to avoid in the content of his thought.

The philosophical mystics thus represent the direct continuation of religious mysticism, which consists in sinking into one’s own inner meditation. They call the God, whom they now look for in their own inner being, Knowledge, but the aim is the same: the unio mystica, the being at one with the All. That this mystical experience is strongly coloured sexually, that the union with the godhead is felt and experienced under the likeness of a sexual union1 (to know = coire), is shown by the libidinal foundation for this fundamental striving, the return into the primal state. It is written in the Upanishads: “Just as when a man is embraced by the beloved, he has no consciousness of that which is outside and inside, so also the mind which is engulfed by the primal self, has no consciousness of that which is outside or inside.” And Plotinus says of the mystical ecstasy: ”There is no intervening space there, there are no longer two, but both are one, they are not separate one from another, so long as that one is there. This union is imitated here in this world by lover and the beloved, who desire to fuse with one another into one being.”

1 In a work submitted to the editorial staff of Imago by E. Roeder, “Das Ding an sich,” this is shown in detail even for the biological thing in itself, the embryo in the womb, from which idea especially the entire (geometric) space concept of Aristotle is deduced.

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2 Plotinus himself suffered from such ecstatic, visionary soul-raptures, as he reports in the Enneads (iv., 8, 1). This freeing of the soul from the compulsion of fatal necessity and of rebirth is taught also by theurgists, magicians, and Gnostics. Genuine theurgists, such as the Neo-Platonists, attained this in themselves by
asi (you yourself are that) shows, it is a question of doing away with the boundaries between the Ego and the non-Ego; in prayer, this is attempted by becoming one with God (with this compare the verse of Mechthild: “I am in you and you are in me,” Heiler, Das Gebet). And an Islamic mystic cries out in blessed ecstasy: “The Ego and the You have ceased to exist between us, I am not I, You are not You, also You are not I; I am at the same time I and You, You are at the same time You and I. I am confused whether You are I or I You” (l.c.).

As we have seen, the neo-Platonists and their successors completely succeeded, though certainly at the cost of philosophical insight, in realizing that striving for union with their origin which was so poetically formulated in their Founder’s philosophy of Eros. As a reaction to it appears modern philosophy, which, like Greek philosophy, took its point of departure from the discovery of man as a part of Nature and sought intellectually to deny and to abolish his separation from it. This begins on a higher psychical stage of development with Descartes’ discovery of the Ego, as something distinct from the non-Ego, in order finally to culminate in the ingenious expansion of the Ego in the Kantian system, whilst the hypertrophic Ego systems, such as Fichte’s, represent the counterpart to the mythological projection of the Ego into the surrounding world. But even Kant only succeeded in recognizing and conceiving as a theory of knowledge the apriority of the ideas of space and time as inborn categories from the immediateness of the

meditating and pondering in detail over ultimate things and also by physical preparation, such as continuous fasting and self-castigation of all kinds (see Th. Hopfner, “Über die Geheimlehren von Jamblichus,” Quellenschr. d. Griech. Mystik., Bd. I., Leipzig, 1922).

intrauterine state, in that he gratified the transcendental tendencies of his Unconscious on the one hand through the sublime compensation of his knowledge of cosmic laws, and on the other hand
through his pathologically eccentric existence. The “thing-in-itself,” which he allowed as the only transcendental, and therefore impenetrable, reality, naturally escaped him.

Not merely does this development of philosophical thought betray to us that this “thing-in-itself” is again identical with the mysterious, strongly repressed primal foundation of our being, the mother’s womb, but Schopenhauer’s further philosophical modification of this concept through the “will” again humanizes the “thing-in-itself” and transfers it to our inner self, where Nietzsche claims to see it as the egoistic will to power, whilst Psychoanalysis by its new-found paths to “self-knowledge” has made it psychologically comprehensible as the unconsciously working primal libido.

This “know thyself,” which Psychoanalysis first really took seriously, leads us back to Socrates, who took this command of the Delphic Apollo as the foundation of his doctrine. Up till now we have not spoken of this direct predecessor of Plato, without whom Plato himself and all who came after him are psychologically inconceivable. For before the picture of Socrates going consciously and fearlessly to his death his friend and pupil Plato, as Nietzsche says, “threw himself down in fervent and enthusiastic devotion,” and dedicated his life to the fostering and preservation of his master’s memory. But Socrates’ philosophy only shows the concrete substratum of the primal trauma, to which his pupil Plato and his successor Aristotle have reacted in such far-reaching ways. With the appearance of Socrates,

who is distinguished as a special type among the philosophers before and after him, that decisive turning towards the inner self enters into Greek thought which preserves its philosophic formation through Plato and is already characterized by the fact that Socrates, as Xenophon reports in his Memorabilia, expressly rejects as useless meditation about the origin of the world and the questions related to it.

In order to be able fully to appreciate the importance of Socrates, in whom Nietzsche sees “the turning point and crown of so-called world history,” we must go back again to Nietzsche’s penetrating psychoanalysis of this his archadversary in the Birth of Tragedy. “‘Only by instinct’: with this phrase we touch upon the heart and core of the Socratic tendency. Socratism condemns therewith existing art as well as existing ethics. . . . From this point onwards Socrates believed that he was called upon to correct existence; and, with an air of disregard and superiority, as the precursor of an altogether different culture, art and morality, he enters single-handed into the
world. . . . Here is the extraordinary hesitancy which always seizes upon us with regard to Socrates, and again and again invites us to ascertain the sense and purpose of this most questionable phenomenon of antiquity. Who is it that ventures single-handed to disown the Greek character?1”

“A key to the character of Socrates is presented to us by the surprising phenomenon designated as the ‘daimonion’ of Socrates. In special circumstances, when his gigantic intellect began to stagger, he got a secure support in the utterances of a divine voice which then spoke to him. This voice, whenever it comes, always dissuades. In this

1 Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, pp. 103-4. (Works, edited by Dr. Oscar Levy.)

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totally abnormal nature instinctive wisdom only appears in order to hinder the progress of conscious perception here and there. While in all productive men it is instinct which is the creatively affirmative force, consciousness only comporting itself critically and dissuasively, in Socrates it is instinct which becomes critic, it is consciousness which becomes creator—a perfect monstrosity per defectum.”1

To this diagnosis Nietzsche almost twenty years later added an analysis of the man Socrates, which in its inexorableness not only does not pause before the all too human, but applies itself just to that: “To judge from his origin, Socrates belonged to the lowest of the low: Socrates was mob. You know, and you can still see it for yourself, how ugly he was. But ugliness, which in itself is an objection, was almost a refutation among the Greeks. Was Socrates really a Greek? Ugliness is not infrequently the expression of thwarted development, or of development arrested by crossing. In other cases, it appears as a decadent development. The anthropologists among the criminal specialists declare that the typical criminal is ugly; monstrum in froute, monstrum in animo. . . . Not only are the acknowledged wildness and anarchy of Socrates’ instincts indicative of decadence, but also that preponderance of the logical faculties and that malignity of the mis-shapen which was his special characteristic. Neither should we forget those aural delusions which were religiously interpreted as ‘the demon of Socrates.’”2

“On the occasion when that physiognomist had unmasked Socrates, and had told him what he was—a crater full of evil

1 Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, pp. 104-105. Translated works edited by O. Levy.
desires—the great Master of Irony let fall one or two words more which provide the key to his nature. ‘This is true,’ he said, ‘but I overcame them all.’ How did Socrates succeed in mastering himself? His case was at bottom only the extreme and most apparent example of a state of distress which was beginning to be general; that state in which no one was able to master himself and in which the instincts turned one against the other. As the extreme example of this state, he fascinated—his terrifying ugliness made him conspicuous to every eye; it is quite obvious that he fascinated still more as a reply, as a solution, as an apparent cure of this case.”


“Reason—Virtue—Happiness, simply means: we must imitate Socrates and confront the dark passions permanently with the light of day—the light of reason. We must at all costs be clever, precise, clear: all yielding to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads downwards. . . .”

Thus Nietzsche saw in Socrates “the type of theoretical human being” who, in unshakable optimism, believes “that thought, following the clues of causality, reaches even into the deepest abyss of Being, and that thought is able not only to recognize Being but also even to correct it.” Socrates, as is well known, left no literary work, but was content to influence his pupils and disciples through “mere speech.” In this technique, in its aim at self-knowledge, in its intuition that insight leads to virtue, and not least in its whole therapeutic effect, one ought indeed to designate him as the primal father of the analytic technique, which found in Plato its worthy theorist. This comparison contains deep justification, when we remember that Socrates himself likened his dialectic therapy of drawing forth thoughts to the practice of midwifery, as he practises it in imitation of his mother,
who was a midwife. This anecdote, like the tradition of his evil wife Xanthippe, shows that in his case, and obviously from purely individual motives, that violent reaction to the primal trauma had set in, which apparently had made him the *type dégénéré* described by Nietzsche. The biological results of this, his ugliness, deformity, aural delusions, the unrestrained character of his instinctive life, as Nietzsche described it, become comprehensible in a flash. And the same may be said of his psychical reactions, in which he is obviously compelled, through his identification with the mother, to attain the detachment from the overstrong fixation on her, and to give himself up to the love of boys, in which he could constantly renew the lost mother-child relation. Finally, he succeeded in overcoming the birth trauma in yet a third way, namely, in overcoming the fear of death. As Nietzsche rightly recognized, Socrates voluntarily willed his death, since only banishment was customary for transgressions of his kind. He had willed it, and he *could will* it; “He appears to us as the first who could live not only under the guidance of that instinct of science, but—what is more important—could also die. And on that account the image of the *dying* Socrates, of the human being freed, through knowledge and reason, from the fear of death, is the armorial bearings which, over the entrance-door to science, reminds every one of its purpose, namely, to make existence seem comprehensible and justified.”

Thus Socrates—although he undoubtedly made use of various partially neurotic compensatory gratifications, and although he had to pay the price by drinking hemlock—was the first who succeeded in intellectually overcoming the birth trauma, and thereby establishes his claim to be the forerunner of Psychoanalysis.
We have recognized from the analytic situation and the patient’s unconscious representation of it the fundamental importance of the birth trauma, its repression and its return in neurotic reproduction, symbolic adaptation, heroic compensation, ethical reaction formation, aesthetic idealization, and philosophic speculation. We believe we have shown, in a bird’s-eye view of the essential achievements and developments of civilization, that not only all socially valuable, even over-valued, creations of man but even the fact of becoming man, arise from a specific reaction to the birth trauma, and, finally, that recognition of this through the psychoanalytic method is due to the most complete removal as yet achieved of the primal repression, through the overcoming of the primal resistance, anxiety.

The development of psychoanalytic knowledge itself gives an instructive picture of the power of this primal resistance, and of Freud’s stupendous accomplishment in overcoming it. As Freud continually emphasizes, the real discoverer of Psychoanalysis was not himself but the late Dr. Josef Breuer of Vienna, who in 1881 treated the case of hysteria mentioned above, and was thus brought by the patient to the idea of the talking cure, symbolically spoken of as chimney sweeping. When Freud incidentally among friends spoke of Breuer’s part in Psychoanalysis, he betrayed very deep understanding, which likewise appears in the most personal of his works, The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement (1914), where he states that Breuer finally fled from the consequences of this discovery, as from an untoward event, because he did not want to recognize the sexual factor, the courageous recognition of which helped Freud himself much later to the understanding of his teacher’s reaction. And the later secessions in the movement which took place among the adherents of Psychoanalysis, and which had led to new theories based not on observation but on opposition, Freud himself characterized in the same publication as “regressive movements struggling away from Psychoanalysis.” As he himself sufficiently experienced, the last thing for which human beings seem to be created is to bear psychoanalytic truths, and he often said, when one or another of his disciples refused to follow him any further, that it was not for everyone to be continuously investigating the dark ravines of the Unconscious with only an occasional glance at the light of day. One does not know which to admire most, Freud’s courage in discovery, or the fighting tenacity with which he defended his findings against the resistances of the whole world. He defended them still more strenuously against single fellow-workers who were close to him, and who, horrified like Breuer at these discoveries, took to flight, in the various directions in which they could see any hope of escape from these opinions, disturbing to
the sleep of the world. Whatever of value they found as a refuge on their ways of retreat, Freud has distinguished with remarkable objectivity from the distortions and denials of the truth only imperfectly divined; but at the same time he has eliminated them from his own field of work as not really “psychoanalytic.”

In the exaggerations and misunderstandings of the disciples who have remained faithful to Freud, and who, after their fashion, interpreted the master’s teachings all too literally,

the history of the psychoanalytic movement shows the same oscillating picture as every intellectual movement which discloses the truth on one decisive point. This decisive point was actually Breuer’s discovery, from which Freud was undoubtedly the first to draw the practical and theoretical conclusions with equal consistency. If, therefore; we are now trying to establish a direct connection with Breuer’s discovery, it is in order to show both how logical Freud himself was in all his views, and also how the concept brought forward here logically completes Breuer’s discovery, and Freud’s conception and elaboration of it.

Breuer’s starting-point was “the fundamental fact that the symptoms of hysterical patients depend on impressive but forgotten scenes of their life (traumata), the therapy based on it causing them to remember and to reproduce these experiences under hypnosis (catharsis), and the consequent fragment of theory, that these symptoms correspond to an abnormal use of undischarged quantities of excitation (conversion).” If into this Freudian definition1 of the nucleus of Breuer’s primal discovery we insert the birth trauma, which is repeated and solved in the cure, the psychophysiological starting-point of analysis from the problem of “conversion” (Freud) seems to be connected with the likewise psychophysical factor of the birth trauma. What lies in between is the psychology of the Unconscious created by Freud alone, namely, the first psychology which at all deserves this independent name, since the academic psychology originating from philosophical speculation gradually encroached more and more on to medical ground (philosophy of the senses, neurology, anatomy of the brain).

Now we understand better how the first difference arose between Breuer’s “physiological” concept, the “hypnoid theory,” and Freud’s purely psychological concept, “the doctrine of defence,” which then led to the discovery of repression and, further, to the investigation of the repressed (preconscious—unconscious), and finally to the repressing forces of the Ego (and its derivatives, conscience, guilt-feeling, ideal-formation, etc.).

It is not only interesting from an historical scientific point of view but also from the human point of view, that the separation of Freud from Breuer concerned the psychophysical borders of “conversion.” The name, indeed, originates from Freud, but the fact yielded itself, as Freud stated, “simultaneously and in common” to the two investigators. It is as though this ground of division, the severance of the pupil from his master, had been tabooed ever since, for not only has the problem of conversion remained unsolved till today, but scarcely a pupil has ventured to approach it. If, by consistently following the Freudian method, we are driven back on to this analytic primal problem, we are fully conscious of the responsibility which the attempt to solve it bears, but we believe our point of view to be sufficiently justified by the universal importance which we have shown it to possess.

In the course of our arguments we have evaded the question as to how it comes about that the striving for the recovery of the pleasurable primal situation in the womb, recognized as the primal tendency of the libido and regarded by us as an expression of the greatest possibility of pleasure,

1 With the exception of Ferenczi (Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, 1919), who conceives conversion to have a meaning similar to ours, namely, “regression to the proto-psyche” (l.c., p. 24).

is bound up in so inseparable a way with the primal anxiety (as shown by the anxiety dream, neurotic symptoms, and also by all derivative and related formations. In order to understand this we must bear in mind that the pleasurable primal state is interrupted through the act of birth—presumably also shortly before, through displacement and pressure (movements of the child)—in unwished-for ways, and that the rest of life consists in replacing this lost paradise in the above
described highly complicated roundabout ways of the libido, the primal state being actually no longer attainable.

It would seem that the primal anxiety—affect at birth, which remains operative through life, right up to the final separation from the outer world (gradually become a second mother) at death, is from the very beginning not merely an expression of the new-born child’s physiological injuries (dyspnœa—constriction—anxiety), but in consequence of the change from a highly pleasurable situation to an extremely painful one, immediately acquires a “psychical” quality of feeling. This experienced anxiety is thus the first content of perception, the first psychical act, so to say, to set up barriers; and in these we must recognize the primal repression against the already powerful tendency to re-establish the pleasurable situation just left. Conversion, the normal forms of which Freud recognized in the so-called physical expression of emotion, thus proves to be identical with the emergence of the psychical out of physical innervations, namely, with the conscious impression of the perceived primal anxiety. If this were purely physiological, it probably could sooner or later be completely removed; but it is psychically anchored in this way in order to prevent the backward striving tendency of the libido, which then, in all later circumstances where anxiety develops, breaks itself against this barrier wall of the primal repression. That is, the perceived and psychically fixed impression of the primal anxiety blots out the memory of the former pleasurable state, and with this, prevents regression which would make us unfit for life, as is shown in the “brave” suicide, who contrives to pass this anxiety barrier retrogressively. It seems as though man were completely unable to bear this painful separation from the primal object, and as if, moreover, he would not accomplish the compensatory adjustment to reality without being held back from a far-reaching regression by a threatening repetition of the primal anxiety. As soon as one approaches this barrier—whether it be in sleep (dream) or in waking life (unconscious phantasies)—anxiety appears, and this explains the unconscious pleasurable character as well as the conscious painful character of all neurotic symptoms. The only real possibility of an approximate reinstatement of the primal pleasure is given in sexual union, in the partial and purely physical return into the womb. But this partial gratification, to which is joined the highest sensation of pleasure, does not satisfy every individual. More correctly expressed, some individuals, owing to a stronger influence of the birth trauma derived from the germ plasm and to a consequently stronger primal repression (reaction), can establish this partial physical relationship to the object only in a more or less unsatisfying way. Their Unconscious strives to reproduce the complete return, sometimes through the establishment of complete physical identity of mother and child with the sexual partner (masturbation, homosexuality),1 sometimes by
Martial said of the homosexual: *pars esi una pair is cetera matris habent.*

means of the defence mechanism of identification in neurotic symptoms, instead of attaining this through the consummation of the sexual act, and through the creation of a new living being with whom they can identify themselves. Here lies, moreover, the fundamental difference in the whole psychical development of man and woman. The woman is in the position, through a complete reproduction of the primal situation, namely, through actual repetition of pregnancy and parturition, to procure for herself the most far-reaching approach to the primal gratification, whilst the man, here depending on unconscious identification, has to create for himself a substitute for this reproduction, by identifying himself with the “mother” and the creation resulting from it of cultural and artistic productions. This explains the lesser part played by woman in cultural development, from which, then, her social under-valuation follows as a secondary effect, whilst virtually the whole creation of civilization has only resulted from man’s libidinal over-estimation of the maternal primal object and from its elimination through the primal repression. Thus one could say that the normal social adjustment corresponds to an extensive transference of the primal libido to that which is paternal and creative, whilst everything pathological (but also supernormal) rests on an all too strong mother fixation or the defence reaction against it. In between lies complete sexual gratification, which also includes the wish for children, and allows an almost complete conversion of the primal anxiety back into primal libido; hence the numerous dis-

1 Here lies the deepest motivation for the idea brought forward as the *primum movens* by Alfred Adler, of the “inferiority” of woman, which, moreover, is a direct consequence of the repression of the birth trauma, quite independently of sex.

disturbances possible within the complicated sexual mechanism likewise release anxiety, which, in the case of direct disturbances of the sexual function (Freud’s “actual neuroses”), immediately becomes free, whereas in the case of the psychically anchored psychoneuroses, on the other hand, it seems bound by the protective structure of symptoms, and in every kind of attack the anxiety is discharged by reproduction.
Thus, with the birth trauma and the foetal condition preceding it, we have at last made tangible the much-disputed border of the psychophysical, and from this we understand not only anxiety, that primal symptom of mankind, but also conversion, as well as the entire life of the affects and impulses which take root in the psychophysical. Impulse is actually nothing but the immediate reaction to the psychically anchored primal anxiety; it is, so to say, instinct modified by it. For the Ego, in its retreat from the confines of anxiety, is constantly urged forwards to seek for Paradise in the world formed in the image of the mother, instead of seeking it in the past, and, in so far as this fails, to look for it in the sublime wish compensations of religion, art, and philosophy. In reality this enormous task of adaptation, in so far as it is a matter of the creation of genuine values, is successfully accomplished by only one type of human being, which the history of mind has handed down to us as the hero, but which we would like to designate as “artist” in the broadest sense of the word. In so far as it is a question of a creation of ideal values, of phantastic superstructure, created from the remains of primal libido unsatisfied in real creation. Thus the normal man is born into a world which already represents the primal symbol, and finding ready-made forms of gratification in conformity with the general average of repression, he has only to perceive again and make use of these out of his own primal experience (symbolism).

This is the place to draw one of the most important theoretical conclusions from our concept, which in any case proves to be a quite direct continuation of the investigation made by Freud. From the very beginning, the specific analytic point of view put in the background for the time being all hereditary and phylogenetic influences. For one thing, these were to a great extent difficult to grasp, and Psychoanalysis corrected the immoderate overvaluation to which they were submitted by making accessible to investigation a large and highly important part of individual development, namely, early childhood, which was thus shown to be a determining factor of very great importance. But since the development of the analytic technique has enabled us in the course of our experience to trace this infantile stage of development ever further back, till finally we reach the pre-natal stage, it follows—especially from a more thoroughgoing study of dream symbolism—that we may dispense with the phylogenetic point of view of an inherited psychic endowment or can limit it, in Haeckel’s sense, to the biogenetic fundamental law. Hence all problems of symbolism are explained in a simpler and more satisfying manner than by...
Jung’s untimely introduction of the phylogenetic point of view into analysis; for, being purely a psychiatrist and using mythological material as a comparison, he lacked the real experience of the analysis of neuroses which would have allowed him to go beyond mere description and the speculation connected with it. Freud likewise recognized

the unproductiveness of Jung’s attempt to explain the phenomena of individual psychology by means of uninterpreted ethnological material, and he pursued the only correct way, which we now pursue still further and thus place the phylogenetic point of view considerably further in the background.

After having been able to trace the primal phantasies of castration and the Œdipus situation back to the birth trauma (separation), or to its pleasurable previous stage (reunion with the mother), it was not difficult, referring directly to Freud’s observations, to trace to its real substratum the prenatal situation, the spying on the parental intercourse as a typical situation, embracing both separation and reunion with the mother. Already in the second edition of The Interpretation of Dreams Freud mentions typical dreams, “at the basis of which lie phantasies of the intrauterine life, namely, dwelling in the mother’s womb and parturition” (p. 198). He gives as one of the examples the dream of a young man, “who in phantasy already uses the intrauterine occasion for spying on the intercourse between the parents.” This, as well as the next communicated birth dream of a patient who must separate herself from the analyst, is, as Freud first recognized, a dream of the analytic cure, from the regular occurrence of which our investigation took its starting-point. With reference to the healing situation, indeed, they correspond to phantasies, which, however, only correspond to the reflex of an actual reproduction of the birth act with real “remembered” material. Many years later, after the so-called “womb phantasy,” long scoffed at by all critics, had maintained its place in Psychoanalysis, Freud again followed up this problem in his classical presentation of the history of an infantile neurosis,¹ and obstinately defended the certainly incomprehensible reality of the “primal scene,” not only against the attempts of former disciples to re-interpret it, but even against his own scientific doubt. Starting from the analytical rebirth phantasies of the patient,
whose complaints “that the world seemed to him disguised by a veil” could be traced back to his birth in a caul, Freud came to the conclusion that the patient wished himself back in the womb (l.c., p. 580), in order there, in identification with the mother, to be fertilized by the father, and to bear him a child. The first part of the wish, as we can show by indisputable evidence, is really to be taken biologically; the second part shows the degree of disguise and elaboration which this original wish tendency has suffered through the specific experience of the boy in childhood. In a footnote (l.c., p. 695) Freud himself designates this question of the power of remembering back as “the most ticklish of the whole analytic doctrine,” and comes to the conclusion that “a kind of knowledge difficult to define, perhaps a sort of preparation for understanding, operates in the child in the reactivation of the primal scene. What this consists in we have no idea; we have at our disposal only the one excellent analogy of the far-reaching instinctive knowledge of animals” (l.c., p. 604). The fact that in the completely uninfluenced dreams at the beginning of analysis, conforming, moreover, to the general type of dream of the person in question, in addition to the spying out situation re-phantasied from hearsay or facts, there are purely biological elements (as position of the limbs, particular birth pains, etc.) which cannot have been known by the mother, yet can be proved in connection with the physical symptoms of the neurosis, and place us in the position of comprehending the real foundation of the “spying out” phantasy.1 For this we need only follow again the already described manner of “symbolic” adjustment to reality from the parental bedroom, to which the scene is mostly transferred, to its real prototype, the womb situation. In this way the real essence of the “primal phantasy,” namely, the fact that it is a matter of indifference whether the scene was experienced or not, becomes intelligible without further ado, for even the observed coitus could not have the traumatic effect if the patient were not reminded of the primal trauma, the first disturbance of the blessed peace by the father. So the later childish Œdipus complex proves to be an immediate derivative, that is, the psychosexual elaboration of the intrauterine Œdipus situation—which thus proves to be the “nuclear complex of the neuroses,” since this paternal disturbance, although not the first “trauma,” yet deserves to be called its immediate forerunner.2

From these points of view the real substratum of the “primal phantasies” becomes tangible, the primal reality which lies at the bottom of them is shown up, and so the “psychical reality” which we, like Freud, must ascribe to the Unconscious, is to be grasped and understood as a biological reality. We can provisionally renounce the assump-
1 The phantastic element therein, the throwing back of the heterosexual stage, has found its precipitate in obscene jokes as well as in numerous mythical traditions, where the hero has intercourse while still in the womb (Osiris).

2 Hence it cannot be altogether a matter of indifference up to what time sexual intercourse is continued during pregnancy. Cf. the late Dr. Hug-Hellmuth’s argument (A Study of the Mental Life of the Child), where it is hinted that small children’s joy in rhythm is in actual relation to the foetal experiences of movement in the womb.

1 A proof of this is the fact, known analytically but not yet understood, that the same symbols are used in dreams to represent the Unconscious and the womb (room, building, cupboard, ravines, hollows); these symbols Silberer was able to grasp only as psychical self manifestations of the Unconscious. See his last work referring to this in the report of the Vienna group (Int. Zschr. f. Ps.A. viii., 1922, p. 536).
mental psychical mechanism of the Unconscious, (a) the striving for projection, decisive for the development of cultural adjustment which has to replace the lost condition in the outer world; and (b) the enigmatic inclination to identification, which again aims at the setting up of the old identity with the mother.

Also the complete lack of negation per se—i.e., the idea of death—belongs essentially to the character of the Unconscious, and is of the highest importance for the understanding of the whole life process, as Freud soon discovered in his studies of infantile life. The child and its psychical representative, the Unconscious, knows only of the situation before birth, given to it in experience, the pleasurable remembrance of which continues in the indestructible belief in immortality, in the idea of an everlasting life after death. But what biologically seems to us the impulse to death, strives again to establish nothing else than the already experienced condition before birth, and the “compulsion to repetition”1 arises from the unquenchable character of this longing, which exhausts itself again and again in every possibility of form. This process is what biologically speaking we call “life.” If in the course of life the “normal” individual, detached by the birth trauma, amidst the difficulties of the child’s development and by the avoidance of neurotic relapses, succeeds in adjusting himself to the outer world as “the best of all worlds,” namely, as a mother substitute, it is nevertheless clear that the Unconscious has, in the meantime, pursued with tenacious perseverance the

1 See Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle. With the conception here represented, Roheim’s summary remarks at the end of his series of articles almost entirely coincide, “Das Selbst” (Imago, vii., 192-1, p. 503 ff.).
regressive way which was prescribed for it, and which still leads it back to its original goal against the will of the Ego. But this process, which we call “ageing,” has, in order to attain the unconscious aim, to apply itself to the systematic destruction of the whole body, which, through all kinds of illnesses, it finally leads to death. At the moment of dying, the body once more severs itself from the mother substitute, “Dame World,” whose front is comely and beautifully formed, but whose back is thought to be ugly and horrible. This separation is still easy for the Unconscious, as it is only a matter of giving up one substitute for the attainment of real blessedness. Here is not only the root of the popular idea of death as deliverer, but also the essential factor in all religious ideas of deliverance. On the other hand, the fearful idea of death as a scythe-bearer, who severs one sharply from life, is to be traced back to the primal anxiety which man reproduces for the last time in the last trauma, in the last breath at death, and so gains from the greatest anxiety, namely, that of death, the pleasure

1 Cf. the Buddhistic Evils, Age, Disease, Death. Socrates said, when he took the cup of poison: “Life—that is to be long ill; I owe a cock as sacrifice to the saviour Asklepios.” (Naturally, the mythical saviour Asklepios is a deity of rebirth, who was punished by Zeus in being killed by lightning because he had awakened a dead person.)

2 See “Frau Welt” by H. Niggemann (Mitra, i., 1914, No. 10, p. 279).

3 Hufeland, the great doctor and observer of men, speaks of the apparent painfulness of dying. In an essay which accidentally came to my notice during the writing of this work Heinz Welten (Über Land und Meer, April, 1923) shows in the traditional last words of our great men “how easily one dies.” Goethe’s now famous utterance, “More light,” shows clearly the unconscious birth phantasy, the wish to look at the light of the world. Goethe’s abnormally difficult birth trauma, of which he himself speaks, explains that which was so puzzling in his life and works.

of denying death by again undergoing the birth anxiety. How seriously the Unconscious conceives dying as a return to the womb may be concluded from the death-rites of all nations and times, which punish the disturbance of the eternal sleep (through the father) as the greatest iniquity and the most malicious crime.

As the soul, according to the profound dogma of the Church Fathers, passes into the embryo only at an advanced stage of pregnancy when the child is able to perceive the first impressions, so it
leaves the body in death, to become participator in immortal life. In this separation of the soul from the body the unquenchable wish attempts to recover immortality. Here once more we stumble on the original, apparently phantastic, but in reality perfectly genuine content of the idea of the soul, which, according to the skilful arguments of Rohde’s *Psyche*, developed from the idea of death. The soul is originally imagined to be endowed with a body, a second self of the deceased (the Egyptian Ka and parallel forms),1 which has to replace him after death in the meaning of a quite real survival. How the religious idea of a soul and the philosophical soul concept have developed from the primitive belief in souls I have attempted incidentally to portray in another connection.2 Psychoanalytic investigation, which has unmasked all these creations as unconscious wish phantasies, now turns back again to seize the real soul content, as it is realized in the ever-recurring embryonal state.

In the face of all these sublime, constantly renewed


2 “Die Don Juan-Gestalt” (*Imago*, vii., 1922, p. 166 ff.).

attempts to re-establish by means of the most varied forms of substitutional gratification the lost primal state, and to deny the primal trauma, one can for a moment understand the whole wavering course of history, with its apparently arbitrary and changing phases, as subject to the conditions of biological law. The same mechanism is here at work which was so magnificently elaborated from the primal repression.

Times of great external distress, which remind the Unconscious too strongly of the individual’s first affliction in life, namely, the birth trauma, lead automatically to increased regressive attempts which must again be given up, not only because they never can achieve the real aim, but just because they have approached too near to it and have come up against the primal anxiety, which keeps watch in front of Paradise, like the Cherubim who hold the flashing sword before its gates. So the primal tendency to re-establish the first and most pleasurable experience is opposed not only by the primal repression, acting as a protection against the repetition of the most painful
experience associated with it, but simultaneously also by the striving against the source of pleasure itself, of which one does not wish to be reminded because it must remain unattainable. In the erection of this double barrier of repression, which corresponds to the prevention of the memory of the primal pleasure through the birth anxiety, and to the forgetting of the painful birth trauma by remembering the previous pleasure experience, in other words, in this primal ambivalence of the psychical, is answered the riddle of human development, which could be solved in only one way, namely, through the discovery by Psychoanalysis of the process of repression itself.
THE THERAPEUTIC ASPECT

When we bring to mind the power of the primal repression (once more in evidence at the close of the previous chapter) and the attempts to overcome it repeated by man indefatigably and ever fruitlessly throughout thousands of years, our first inclination might be to add to the pessimistic consequences to which this concept seems everywhere to lead, the thought of the hopelessness of all psycho-therapy. For what power on earth could prevail upon the Unconscious to renounce its inborn nature and to take another direction? From what has been said no other conclusion seems possible than that there can be no such power. On the other hand, analytic experience shows that something must exist which makes it possible to an extensive degree to free highly neurotic human beings from the excessive dominance of their Unconscious and put them in a position to live as those do who are not neurotic. That, to be sure, is all that can be done. It is very much and at the same time very little, according to the point of view from which one considers the result. Now apparently only the analyst himself is inclined to consider it from the first point of view, whilst the patient frequently enough can judge it only from the second. This contradiction, indeed, seems at first to need no further explanation, but yet it deserves to be investigated with regard to its psychological motivation.

It is not a question of cases where the analyst may believe with subjective justification that he has done not only his best but everything, and where a real success actually fails to appear. I have rather cases in mind where the patient is actually freed from his suffering, is again made capable of work and enjoyment, and yet behaves like a discontented person. Yet in spite of this we must neither be discouraged in our task nor become irresolute. For who can say that all the other people who have not undergone an analysis, in whom perhaps it is not at all necessary, are more contented or more happy? We remember a remark of Freud’s in which he stated that the cured neurotic often shows afterwards only ordinary unhappiness, where he previously had “neurotic” unhappiness! In the case of severe physical diseases the doctor can scarcely fulfil the patient’s demands for perfect health, much less then in the case of the neurotic, who is ill just because of the excess of his claims and, indeed, of those libidinal claims which according to their very nature and according to psychoanalytic knowledge never can be gratified. This latter-day knowledge of the causes of neurosis tends, therefore, to make us give up every attempt to cure it, instead of giving into our hands, along with the knowledge of its causation, the means for its removal. And is not this the most complete nihilism in psycho-therapy—nay, more, a denial of that spirit of scientific enquiry which is the modern practical application of the Socratic saying, “Knowledge is power”?
Now in the first place Psychoanalysis has in fact shaken this prejudice which is handed down from its ancient forerunner as the sum of wisdom. Psychoanalysis has compelled us step by step to lay aside our intellectual pride and to learn to attach less and less value to the power of our consciousness as against the biological and elementary force of the Unconscious. I believe we have to go further along the same way in the field of psychoanalytic therapy itself.

After having acquired sufficient knowledge, we are able to recognize—modifying Socrates’ statement—that all we know is that our knowledge is not of much value therapeutically if we are not able to apply it effectively. Freud himself soon warned us against confusing our own knowledge and understanding with that of the patient, in that he sharply distinguished between Psychoanalysis as a method of investigation and as therapy. So long as we had found out so little about the Unconscious, investigation was often unavoidably pushed into the foreground at a time when existing knowledge was not sufficient for the attainment of therapeutic effects. But the fruitful experiences of the last few years have convinced us that therapeutic possibilities do not conform, in any expected degree, to the increase of our knowledge, and that even simple therapeutic action can be arrested by too much knowledge and too much insight. On the other hand, experience has long shown that the communication of our knowledge to the patients, and even their intellectual acceptance of it, in no way changes their symptoms. Analysis had to ascribe therapeutic value to the affective acceptance which was finally equivalent to abreacting the affects, and was possible only after the removal of unconscious resistances. In place of conscious memories, such as were allowed in the old days of hypnosis, there soon appeared repetition in positive and negative transference, to which was attached real affective reproduction.


2 Such experiences seem to have been the reason for Professor Freud making at the last Psychoanalytic Congress (September, 1922,) “The Relation of Psychoanalytic Theory to Technique,” the subject for a prize essay.

further apparent that one has by no means to avoid this, but often rather to provoke it, as when
the patient uses his memory as a guard against repetition, *i.e.* in its biological function. As is well
known, Ferenczi was the first vigorously to indicate the necessity for an “active” therapy;1 he
then sought to justify this view in a thorough presentation, and to give it a basis against
misunderstandings.2 He rightly emphasized the fact that the activity criticized as an innovation
has been at all times silently practised in Psychoanalysis, and I know of no further argument to
add than that all therapy, by nature, is “active,” that is it purposes an effect through volitional
influence and a change resulting from it. The passivity rightly commended in Psychoanalysis is a
virtue in the investigator, and places him, moreover, in a position to find something new which
he does not yet know. Just as little as the specialist at a patient’s bedside need refer to the history
of medicine or even to a text-book in order to form a correct diagnosis, need the practical analyst
take his patient, step by step, through the whole development of psychoanalytic investigation and
unroll historically his patient’s psychical life. He has rather to absorb in the right way the sum of
all knowledge achieved so far, and then to apply it to the demands of the case in a practical way.
That in this he must proceed “actively” is obvious if he aims at attaining any therapeutic effect
worthy of the name. His intervention is no less active than that of the surgeon,

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2 “Weiterer Ausbau der ‘aktiven Technik’ in der Ps.a,” *ibid.*, vii., 1921.

and has for its aim the correct severance of the primal libido from its fixation, by the removal or
the lessening of the primal repression, and with it the freeing of the patient from his neurotic
fixation; and this ultimately means going back to a repetition of the birth trauma, with the help of an experienced midwife. I have purposely avoided writing “doctor,” because I want to emphasize the purely human and practical factor of the process.

If we linger for a moment longer and consider this newly fixed therapeutic aim, we shall see with satisfaction the first gleam of hope in the darkness of therapeutic pessimism into which we seem to have landed. We shall recognize then that we have really done nothing more than that which the patient has attempted his whole life long only with insufficient success, namely, to overcome the birth trauma in the sense of adjustment. According to our conception the newborn individual would immediately fall back into the abandoned state, that is, practically expressed, would die, unless Nature undertook the first “therapeutic” intervention and prevented the striving back by the anchoring of anxiety. From this moment every further activity of the individual in life acquires a “therapeutic” character, in that, in opposition to the backward striving tendencies, it preserves the “abandoned” patients for a while longer in life, without however succeeding in this for ever. We should like here to point out the high “cathartic” value possessed by just those manifestations possessing least obvious utility, namely, the activities expressing unconscious tendencies, from childish games1 to grown-up people’s play which in tragedy reaches its highest cathartic development. Indeed, as Freud


was able to show in the caricature in the psychoses, we have to consider their course rather as an attempt at healing which, like that of Analysis, shows up regressive tendencies. Analysis, moreover, must follow up these tendencies if it wishes to gain the possibility of influencing them. But it is in the position to grant the patient just enough pleasure not to endanger the final weaning from the libido-misuse. Psychoanalysis thus replaces for the patient, in the way already described, the lost primal object, the mother, by a surrogate, whom he learns to renounce the more easily by being continually made conscious of the surrogate as such. The great value which this surrogate has for him, nevertheless, and which is expressed in the phenomenon of the transference, lies in its reality, namely, in the fact that the analyst allows the patient not only to fix his libido on him for a while, but directly provokes this through the conditions and arrangements of the cure. So the neurotic introversion is paralyzed by the analytic situation, and the remedy which Psychoanalysis uses is the human being who, in a way similar to the magical practices of the medicine man, works by appealing directly to the patient’s Unconscious.1 If one likes to call this suggestion, there is nothing to object to it beyond the fact that one has replaced a process at present psychologically intelligible by an empty technical term.2
Not only analytic therapy, but every therapy, every medicament finally operates in the same sense “suggestively,” that is in so far as it impresses the patient’s Unconscious. This is already expressed in the choice of, or in the personal relation to, the doctor, which invariably rests on transference and thus indirectly lends the necessary weight of the Unconscious to his therapeutic measures. But from numerous experiences in analyses, we are in a position to elucidate this Unconscious effect of the transference in its mechanism. We know that in the child’s life the “doctor” plays a quite definite part, which clearly comes to light in the familiar game of doctor; he represents the child’s unconscious ideal in so far as he certainly seems to know whence children come and also what goes on in the inside of the body. Whether he listens and knocks, tests the excretions or operates with the knife, he always vaguely arouses the primal trauma. The psychoanalytic situation, in which this transference must be made conscious, shows us with complete clearness to what degree the Unconscious of the most grown-up human beings has remained fixed the whole life long on the “doctor game,” which is directly related to birth. Indeed, every patient behaves in a manifest way like a frightened child in a dark room, that is he calms down, as is well known, immediately the doctor appears and speaks to him consolingly. Although at present the majority of doctors do not wish to acknowledge this—and perhaps many cannot, as they themselves still “play doctor” in the Unconscious too much—because they fear an injury to their scientific reputation, yet they might learn from the few analytically influenced medical specialists and doctors, to whom the serious recognition and practical use of this fact has brought much unexpected success. But analysis, which has led not merely to the recognition of this fact but also to the enlightenment of the patient about it, seems to prove that this, far from being

harmful, is the only possibility of giving a lasting effect to therapeutic success. For this severance from the analyst, which is the essential part of the analytic work, is accomplished by reproduction of the birth trauma, so that the patient loses his doctor and his suffering at the same time, or, better expressed, must give up his doctor in order to lose his suffering.

The understanding of this parallel process leads to the real question concerning the healing process, its mechanism, and the technique which one has to use therein. Now these problems can be studied only from the material itself and its detailed analysis, which I intend to publish very shortly. But, quite briefly, I would like to circumscribe the part of the Unconscious on the one hand and of conscious knowledge, so often misunderstood, on the other.

We must here especially guard ourselves from falling into “Socratism,” rightly criticized by Nietzsche, and constituting a danger which Socrates himself finally escaped only with effort. We are all always far too “theoretical,” and are inclined to think that knowledge alone makes us virtuous. That is not the case, as Psychoanalysis has proved. Knowledge is something entirely different from the healing factor. The depths of the Unconscious can, according to the latter’s very nature, be changed just as little as the other organs necessary for life. The only result we can attain in Psychoanalysis is a changed attitude of the Ego to the Unconscious. But this means very much—indeed, as the history of man’s development shows, practically everything. For man’s psychical health and power of

1 See for the present, “Zum Verständnis der Libidoentwicklung im Heilungsvorgang,” Zschr., ix., 4, 1923.

achievement depend on the relation of his Ego to the Unconscious. In normally efficient men the various inhibiting Ego elements, which correspond to the Socratic “daemon,” are in a position to keep the Unconscious in check through critical condemnation and moderate emotional rejection (conscience and guilt feeling). In neuroses of the hysterical type, a stronger means, namely the anxiety of the primal trauma, must again and again be mobilized, in order to prevent the Unconscious from drawing back into regression the Ego which has arisen from it. In neuroses of the obsessional type the same effect is attained through hypertrophy of the Ego.
elements; whilst in psychoses we have before us the terrible result which occurs when the Unconscious proves to be too powerful and the Ego too weak. The sphere in which Psychoanalysis can be therapeutically effective includes all those cases in which it is a question of so regulating the relation of the Ego to the Unconscious, that through an adequate distribution of libido and anxiety, there results a harmonious relationship which we denote as normal adjustment. This sphere not only embraces all neurotic disturbances and the initial states of the psychoses, but also everything which one could denote as psychical “secondary affects”—that is, sexual conflicts—and, to a certain extent, character abnormalities. Thus are included

1 See Freud’s last work, *The Ego and the Id*, 1923.

2 I have the impression that at this point therapeutic possibilities could open up psychoses, as the points of view here explained seem to offer the first indication for an essentially simplified therapeutic operation capable of more immediate effect. The neuroses of simple men and the primitive content of psychoses compel one to look also for a simpler way of influencing them. I refer here to the well-known clinical fact, that mentally diseased women often show an improvement after the birth of a child; but also the reverse cases, the puerperal psychoses allow us to recognize the connections outlined above.

not only the crude disturbances of the relation between the Ego and the Unconscious, but also a number of finer functional disturbances within this relationship.

Taking into consideration the importance of the birth trauma, a new theory of character and types may be formed which has the advantage over existing attempts of this kind of giving a far-reaching understanding of the individual determinants and, consequently, the possibility of influencing them.1 To these introverted and extroverted types (the names originated by Jung) correspond similar types of character, which may likewise be derived from the primal trauma or from the reaction to it. The introverted type of character seems to cling to the weak, delicate, fragile children, who are often born early and for the most part have an easy birth, whilst the nine-month and hence mostly stronger children frequently show the opposite type of character. This is explained by the fact that in the former, in consequence of the relatively slight birth trauma, the primal anxiety is not so powerful and the backward striving tendency has less resistance opposed to it; if these human beings become neurotic they generally show an introverted depressive character. The second type drive the intensely experienced primal anxiety forcefully outside, and they tend in their neuroses to reproduce less the primal situation than the birth trauma itself, against which, in their striving backwards, they violently collide.
Whilst we believe we have reached the first trauma-producing neuroses, we must be careful not to fall into an error which Psychoanalysis, through Freud’s clear observations and thought, has repeatedly avoided. Just as the

earliest “traumata,” which one was inclined to make responsible for neurotic symptoms, prove to be a universal human normal experience, and as finally the analytically discovered nucleus of neuroses, the Œdipus complex, has been recognized as the typical normal attitude of the child and civilized man, so also is the last analytically comprehensible trauma, the trauma of birth, the most universal human experience. From this the process of development of the individual and of mankind is to be derived and explained in the way already described. It is obviously no mere coincidence that, again and again, as soon as we think we have found the key to the understanding of the neuroses, this changes itself in our hands into an instrument which seems still better fitted to unlock the hitherto unknown psychology of the normal. Thus Freud’s main work may be explained as really signifying the first understanding of normal psychological phenomena (dream, wit, everyday life, sexual theory), the creation of the first general psychology, which certainly was gained from pathological material, and, indeed, by means of psychoanalytic method and technique generally. And so we would like to regard our arguments concerning the importance of the trauma of birth for Psychoanalysis only as a contribution to the Freudian structure of normal psychology, at best as one of its pillars. At the same time, we feel confident of having considerably furthered the doctrine of neuroses—including their therapy.

But we want to make quite clear to ourselves how far this has succeeded, because on it depends the further course which investigation must take. We believe that we have succeeded in recognizing all forms and symptoms of neurosis as expressions of a regression from the stage of

sexual adjustment to the pre-natal primal state, or to the birth situation, which must be thereby overcome. For medical understanding and for therapeutic intervention this insight must by no
means be underestimated, although in reference to the theory of neurosis it may have remained unsatisfying, in the meaning indicated above, since it traces what is specific in the case, or in the symptom formation, to something so universal as the birth trauma. On the other hand, within the birth trauma, there is room and to spare for hereditary influences of the germ plasm as also for incidental individual peculiarities of parturition. Nevertheless, our concept attempts to replace the theory of different places of fixation, which are supposed to determine the choice of neurosis, by one traumatic injury (producing various forms of reactions) in a single place of fixation namely, the mother (parturition). There is then, according to our view, only one fixation place, namely, the maternal body, and all symptoms ultimately relate to this primal fixation, which is given to us in the psychobiological fact of our Unconscious. In this sense we believe we have discovered in the trauma of birth the primal trauma. There is, therefore, no need to ascertain the “pathogenic traumata” in single cases by the lengthy way of analytic investigation, but only to recognize the specific birth trauma in reproduction, and demonstrate it to the patient’s adult Ego as an infantile fixation. In reproduction the consoling mechanism effective in the birth trauma (best known from the examination dream: “also at that time it ended well!”) supplies a healing factor which should not be underestimated and which justifies optimism in the therapeutic sphere. Although our new insight into the essence and charac-

ter of the Unconscious (the It) has an eminently practical advantage, we must admit, with regard to the doctrine of neurosis, that from this point the theory of neurosis has yet to develop. But first of all we have recognized the neuroses in all their manifold forms as reproductions of, and reactions to, the birth trauma, and this gives us the foundation for normal cultural adaptation as well as for all man’s higher achievements. Here we come back to Freud’s early statement that psychoneuroses are really not diseases in the strict medical sense of the word, but arrests in the process of sexual adjustment. They represent attempts to overcome the birth trauma, although the attempts have failed. In cultural adjustment, with all its difficult normal and supernormal achievements, we witness various largely successful attempts to overcome the birth trauma, among the most successful of which we must reckon Psychoanalysis—and by no means only in its therapeutic application.

In the last resort, then, the neurosis problem reduces itself to one of form. For we see in the child’s biological adjustment to the extrauterine situation, in the normal adjustment of civilized man, as well as in his compensatory superproductions of art (in the widest sense), the same striving to overcome the birth trauma enacted in similar forms, the only essential difference being that the civilized human being and still more the “artist” can reproduce this objectively in manifold, strictly determined forms, fixed by the primal trauma, whilst the neurotic is compelled again and again to produce it in a similar way only on his own body. But the
1 A statement which Jung could confirm for the psychoses, which, according to him, struggle with the same “complexes” which the normal individual has mastered.

2 See Ferenczi’s quotation of the Freudian conception of an autoplastic stage.

essence of most pathological processes seems to rest on this compulsive “return of the same” product on one’s own body. The neurotic is thrown back again and again to the real birth trauma, whilst the normal and supernormal throw it, so to say, forwards and project it outwards, and are thus enabled to objectify it.

In conclusion we shall give a short account of the way in which we work therapeutically and in what the healing factor consists. Thus we have once more to accept analytic knowledge and the way to it, as something already given. Analysis is now in the position to free itself to an extensive degree from the work of investigation, since we know from the outset not only the whole content of the Unconscious and the psychical mechanisms, but also what for the time being is the final element, the primal trauma. As the patient as a rule begins with a transference, it is technically possible to begin with the disclosure of the primal trauma, instead of giving the patient time automatically to repeat it at the end of the analysis. By this method one is enabled to sever the Gordian knot of the primal repression with one powerful cut, instead of laboriously troubling to unknot it—a process which succeeds with great difficulty since every bit of unravelling on the one side draws the knots so much the more tightly together on the other. After the disclosure of its foundation the reconstruction of childhood history proceeds without any trouble according to its clearly outlined plan, as it were, from its base upwards, whereby also memory, which was repressed with the primal trauma, appears on the scene. Thus it is a matter of allowing the patient, who in his neurosis has fled back to the mother fixation, to repeat and to understand the birth trauma and its solution during the analysis in the transference, without
allowing him the unconscious reproduction of the same in the severance from the analyst. The enormous therapeutic advantage which one attains through the disclosure of the primal fixation at the right time is that, at the end of the analysis, instead of the reproduction of the birth trauma one can obtain in a pure form the sexual conflicts from which the patient has fled (Œdipus complex, etc.) and the guilt feeling (instead of anxiety) belonging to them; and thus one can solve them undisturbed by the regression mechanism. The means to this end is the identification with the analyst following from the transference. Through the libidinal element in the identification the patient learns to overcome anxiety through the sexual side of the transference. Thus, finally, in therapy the compulsion to the repetition (reproduction) of the primal trauma or of the primal situation is removed, in that the direction of the libido is changed in the sense of striving for adjustment.

All this results by means of the technique of association and of interpretation, developed by Freud, whereby we use our own Unconscious as the main way leading to the patient’s Unconscious.1 This is the only means by which we can operate on his libido. In this way we allow him, so to speak, temporarily, a far-reaching restoration of the primal situation, in that we urge his Unconscious to it by “privation” (Freud), in order then immediately to convince his conscious Ego of the impossibility and objectionableness of this aim; we show up the infantile character of this tendency instead of allowing it to be discouraged through continuous productions of anxiety. The most important technical means, the severance from the substitute object of the libido, the analyst, is not merely employed at the height of the unfolding of the transference by the irrevocable fixing of the termination, but it comes into action quite automatically from the beginning. Not only is the patient always conscious that the cure must one day be finished, but every single hour demands from him the repetition in miniature of the fixation and severance, till he is in the position finally to carry it through. In addition, the analyst is placed before him as the master to the pupil, and the patient, like the pupil, can only learn by identifying himself with the teacher, that is, by accepting the attitude of the analyst to the Unconscious and by taking him as an Ego-ideal. This brings us up against the problem of the father transference, the importance of which for analytic technique is justified by its therapeutic function. The patient must learn in the course of the analysis so far to solve the primal repression, clinging to the mother, through “transference” that he is able to transfer it to a real substitute object, without taking with it the primal repression. This attempt, which occurs automatically in normal development with more or less success, the neurotic, by the aid of conscious forces, has to make in the analysis, in which, by every means of making conscious his

unconscious regressive tendencies, we appeal to his conscious Ego in order to strengthen it against the overpowerful Unconscious.

We notice in this process that the patient has finally nothing else to do than to supplement a part of his development which was neglected or lacking (what Freud calls re-education). And the part in question is that stage of social and human development which, on the one hand is made necessary and, on the other hand, is rendered more difficult by the birth trauma, namely, detachment from the mother fixation by transference of the libido to the father (Bachofen’s “masculine principle”). Analytically expressed, this is the phase before the development of the Œdipus complex. Against this re-education the Unconscious of the patient defends itself by means of libido resistance, by desiring the full maternal libido gratification from the analyst, whether it is in the heterosexual or homosexual repetition of the Œdipus situation. That his Ego is in the position, through identification with the analyst, to overcome in the transference these actual libidinal tendencies as well as the regressive maternal tendencies, can be explained from the fact that his Ego from the very beginning was created and developed from the Unconscious for this special task. In analysis this normal means of help to development is then finally strengthened through conscious modification, and the fact of his identification with the analyst is ultimately made conscious to the patient, thereby making him independent of the analyst.

If in the end we have to turn to so weak a thing as consciousness for support, we may yet console ourselves with the following reflections. Though consciousness is but a feeble weapon, it is the only one accessible to us in the fight against neurosis. The psychical anchoring in consciousness of the anxiety perception at parturition acts biologically as a therapeutic means against the backward striving tendency, and determines, as we have attempted to show, the actual process of becoming a human being. And consciousness is the human characteristic par excellence. Should not then the removal, by analysis, of the primal repression and its anchoring in consciousness be sufficient to make the neurotic grow up to the same limited degree as that reached by the ordinary civilized human being, who even today is only in the “short clothes” stage? For
the neurotic has only remained fixed in the birth trauma a little earlier than most people, and all we can ask of Psychotherapy is that it should bring him up to the “short clothes” stage, at which the bulk of humanity has remained to this day.
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MODERN EDUCATION

A Critique of Its Fundamental Ideas

By

OTTO  RANK
Psychologists are of the opinion that a man’s character is derived from his mother; it begins to form in the second year of life and is established at four or five years of age. . . . These individuals have from childhood a definite way of seeking their happiness, a way, that later adjusts itself to changing conditions, yet always remains the same.

Stendhal

These words of Henry Beyle’s, written more than a hundred years ago, begin only today—as, moreover, he predicted with regard to his works—to be generally accepted by therapeutists and pedagogues. I do not know what “psychologists”—apart from his own intuition—Stendhal refers to, although apparently he has been influenced by Montaigne’s and Rousseau’s views.

1 Stendhal: Gedanken, Meinungen, und Geschichten. Selected and translated by Arthur Schurig. Leipzig. Insel-Verlag. The quotation is to be found in the Napoleon Fragments, begun in the year 1816, written in 1818—1821, and continued in 1837 (p. 466 of the Edition mentioned).
this view nowhere else expressed. Although it appears to be an astonishing statement for Stendhal in writing his biography of Napoleon, yet nowadays, I consider it only a convenient excuse for modern psychologists who do not understand the individual and his development dynamically, but only from the causal mechanistic point of view. If with his reference to the anonymous "psychologists" Stendhal evaded the responsibility for the initiation of this view, it has been the main concern of modern psychology to establish this viewpoint scientifically. This scientific theory, however, maintains not only the psychological assertion that the child forms and establishes the kernel of its character in the first years of life, but, by means of this knowledge, it also includes the hope of developing therapeutically and pedagogically other and better characters.

This last assumption leads us into the nuclear problem of all education, namely, moulding and developing better characters. But the question immediately presents itself, better for whom? For the individual or for the community, and further, for what kind of community? For education is a community problem, or rather, education as such, is no problem at all but is a product of the community. It becomes a problem only subsequently, through and in the individual. If we divest Stendhal's diagnosis of Napoleon's character formation of its general form, there is revealed the hidden educational problem as to whether it would be desirable to create other men better than Napoleon, presupposing that it could be done. But we immediately recognize the inadequacy, not to say absurdity, of such an objective which the psychologist Stendhal avoids because he speaks as biographer and historian and not as pedagogue. For even if we ourselves had at our disposal the pedagogic recipe for training a Napoleon, it probably would do no good at the present time since we should have no use for him. On the other hand if the need for a Napoleon existed, we should scarcely be able to prevent his coming into existence through purely pedagogic measures. Presumably, in the days of the French Revolution, there were several "born" Napoleons roaming round, of whom one among them crystallized into the Napoleon. And probably the others also inherited their character from the mother. Moreover, it is not only determined in what way the individual seeks his happiness, but also whether and how he finds it. Only too frequently it happens that man seeks the happiness—that he found or desired in the mother—but only finds success, which however does not make him happy. For happiness and success seldom go hand in hand and mostly they arrive when unsought for; but success or failure in this re-

spect determine the further development of inherited characteristics in just as decisive a manner as the mother may determine the way in which they are sought for. Finally, the mother-complex which, moreover, Psychoanalysis thought necessary to reveal in Napoleon1 is by no means characteristic of Napoleon, but rather of Stendhal himself,
for instance 2, without his having been a Napoleon. Thus it is more than probable that the psychologist whom Stendhal refers to is himself at the time when he was studying his own psychology in Napoleon, and that the man of whom he speaks is Stendhal at an earlier date before this intuition was perceived.

In other words we have two Stendhals before us—just as there are two Napoleons, namely, the one before he became Napoleon and the other after he had become Napoleon. That means, however, that the individual has at least two characters, the one formed and shaped by the mother, whereas the other is the self-created character formed from it. Sometimes perhaps also this self-created personality is only a materialization of what the mother (or some other person) wanted to make of us, although often enough it is not only opposed to it but turns out to be completely different from it. In either case, however, this second character which alone moulds the creature into the individual is self-created, certainly created from given elements in the past and in the present, namely, from the original Ego and from present circumstances, yet nevertheless created by one’s own Self, sometimes in harmony with the first character, sometimes in contrast to it, but mostly as a compromise between the two.

Moreover, we have to differentiate not only between these two characters in the individual, that are often in lifelong conflict with one another, but in the first phase of the individual’s life we also have to differentiate, as it were, between the two mothers that determine the early character formation. The one would be the physical mother who conceives, carries, gives birth to, suckles and nurses the child; the other would be the psychical mother, that is, her personality, her own character that determines to what extent she will carry out all these necessary physical functions dictated by Nature, and to what extent she will herself individually turn aside from their performance. Stendhal has in mind this latter personal character of the mother which the man to a certain extent assimilates; the modern psychologists of the analytic schools emphasize the other, physical side of the mother which operates directly on the impulse life, and influences the childish character formation. Through this biological consideration, they naturally came upon quite general hu-
influences seem to be as regular as they are inevitable, if we do not want to neglect the physical basis of our existence. Education has no power over this early influence of the mother, yet the mother’s influence is necessarily the first instrument of education. In the same way also the adult’s final self-conscious character formation lies beyond pedagogic influence, since it takes place only when the individual has outgrown education. The question is, then, where and how can education be employed, and what are its aims and limitations?

From what has been said it follows that the educational influence lies between the two essential factors contributing to the formation of character; namely, the mother who represents the surrounding world and lays the foundation stone of education, and the individual Self, the personality, which is the aim and final product of the whole process. Hence we had better differentiate between the impulse-disposition and the impulse-character following from it mainly under the early influence of the mother; further between the disposition influenced by the milieu or environment and the social character resulting from it and influenced by other members of the family and particularly by the school; finally, on the basis of all this there is built up the individual character or personality created under the influence of experience. Education cannot alter the impulse-disposition, but can only influence its development or inhibition, and this in two ways through the What and the How offered to the child, that is, through the content and also dynamically, through the emotional force with which the content is presented. Fundamentally, education is still today, and has been since primitive times, focussed on the What, that is, on giving some definite content to the child-like thoughts, feelings, and actions. This content conforms at all times to the ideology of the community, without giving much thought to the How; indeed it has made use of any means for the attainment of its end.

In primitive communities the What and the How merge into one indissoluble unity, as for example manifested in the mythes and ceremonies of the boys’ initiation rites. The training of the primitive is divided into two relatively simple parts which become separated rather than united by the conscious ceremonies of education. Up to puberty the child belongs to the mother and mixes with the women, then follows an ”education” compressed into a relatively short period of time to adulthood. This education aims at, and also attains, practically nothing else than adjustment and subjection to the tribal ideology. The fact that the separation of the child from the mother (in the rebirth ceremonial of the boys’ initiation rites) takes place only at puberty, is closely related to the primitives’ whole concept of
life, to their social and religious ideology which is founded on the belief in the soul. In the course of our investigation we shall return to this theme, since here we must further elucidate the two phases of education and the two corresponding aspects of character formation in the relatively simple example of the primitives. In the first phase of spontaneous expression of the impulses their training falls to the mother, and originally takes place by means of imitation; its emotional correlate in the present-day individual has been psychoanalytically designated love-identification. The second phase of impulse idealization falls to the community and takes place by means of instruction, through correction, or by application of force, through a mechanism that Psychoanalysis has called sublimation. At the later stage of the social development, the family—including the father and brothers and sisters—forms the intermediary and connecting link between these two phases of education sharply defined and quickly alternating in the primitive community. There is in connexion with this, another important difference that will later occupy our attention. In the primitive community the child belongs to the mother, a quite general concept which found, so to say, its official recognition in the so called matriarchy but

which is everywhere at the root of the primitive's world-concept. Our family organization first makes the father the joint owner, and finally the exclusive possessor of the child; this was crudely manifested in the Roman patriarchy. However, in every case, it is the community that sooner or later, in greater or less degree, reclaims the child as a co-equal member of the whole.

Thus, the actual ideology of education emanates from the community with the expressed purpose of making the child a valuable member of society. This has remained the aim of education from the time of the primitive tribal organization up to the time of our highly developed state organization. The social community furnishes the prevailing ideal to be striven for, also certain traditionally obtained means for its attainment, these means however, always remain subordinate to the purpose which sanctifies them. In case of difficulties it was assumed that the child and not the education was to blame and therefore force was used, from which developed the educational concept of punishment. Frequent difficulties in the education of many individuals—not merely of isolated ones—nevertheless indicate that the collective ideology of the community is shattered. Hence these difficulties cannot be overcome by a change in the educational method because fundamentally this would only mean an aggravation of punishment. For the changed ideology that can be

established only after passing through long periods of crisis produces methods of education adapted to it, whereas experimenting with the methods in order to save an old ideology leads only to an intensification, perhaps also hastening, of the crisis.
The great crisis in the ideology of Europe which also provided the New World with its new ideology, was at the same time the birth of modern pedagogy. I mean the French Revolution with its climax in American democracy prepared for and determined by Rousseau’s concept of the world and his ideal of education. But only when Rousseau's-educational idea of the equality and equal inheritance of all men had been forcibly materialized in the French citizenship, only then did modern pedagogy emerge with the aim of creating citizens who would be placed on an equal footing one with another. This ideal of citizenship seems to be a revival of the primitive tribal community of men on a higher organized social level. But here we are interested solely in the educational aspect of this movement, not in its historical and social aspects which only contributed to the content of the new ideology but did not supply the driving force. This emanated from an individual, a strong personality who opposed and who could oppose the traditional ideology because it had already been severely shaken. Rousseau created the ideal of equality from his own personal experiences and suffering. These may be of interest to psychologists and pathologists but are irrelevant to our theme. However, the pedagogic significance of the ideal of equality is as great as its social significance. Rousseau’s idea that all men are equally free-born gave modern pedagogy the scientific presupposition implicit in every system of education; namely, that also the psychical aptitude of all men is the same and hence any individual can be made a representative of any ideology that the community likes. This is correct to a certain extent as the great educational systems of civilized peoples show. This has been dealt with in a masterly way by Ernst Krieck (“Bildungssysteme der Kulturvolker,” Leipzig, 1927). On the other hand one dare not overlook the decline of these great civilizations, the cause of which lies in a changed ideology that proceeded from an individual with apparently a stronger inequality of aptitude and power of development. But with regard to freedom, even Rousseau, presumably from personal motives, was not able to see that every human being is also equally unfree, that is, we are born in need of authority and we even create out of freedom, a prison; as for example Rousseau himself had to buy his spiritual and moral independence at the price of masochistic bondage to a person1.

At first the child was blamed and punished if he did not readily accept education, then Rousseau’s idea of equality started modern pedagogy to realize that now the methods must be wrong if the desired ideology cannot be impressed on this natural tabula rasa of the child’s mind. So the coercive method of

1 It is probably no accident that not only the emancipator of the child, Rousseau, but also the spiritual emancipator of woman, Bachofen, reveals clear characteristics of the mother complex.
education was followed by the pedagogy that endeavoured to improve its means without, however, giving up its chief means, the use of force and punishment which was further employed in the home and in the school, till finally it has been projected into the newest phase of education, namely, the psychological. Even this last phase which is just beginning, has its ideological forerunner in Nietzsche’s new ideal of the superman (in contrast to Rousseau's man of equality) and in Freud’s psychological return to the man of instinct that opposes this idealization. But it also found its historical and social correlates in the World War which, in essence, corresponded to a European collective revolution as is shown by its political results of Communism in Russia, and in the idea of a European Confederacy of States. As it was in the French Revolution, however, it was again the case here, that the bearers and supporters of the old ideologies were forcibly removed before the social reorganization could furnish the content of the new ideology for which the slogan and the scientific foundation had previously been given (just as it had been by Rousseau).

This *psychological phase of education*, in contrast to the earlier one, is distinguished through the fact that the responsibility for its failure is not so much attached to the pupil or to the method but rather to the educator himself. This apparent step forward to selfrealization amounts, however, to a tacit admission that there is something wrong with the ideology itself, the supporters of which are the "educators," meaning by that, either the parents or professional pedagogues. The scientific character of this new psychological attitude in education has been one reason why today the chief blame has been placed by professional specialists in education on the parents, who through their unsystematic influence in the pre-school period, and their foolish, often obstinate attitude towards the school, are supposed to hinder and make more difficult the teacher’s task of education rather than to further it. Behind this obvious demand that the education of the children should actually begin with the education of the parents, there is concealed the tacit exclusion of the educators themselves from this claim, and thereby they give the appearance of possessing a superiority in which they themselves can hardly believe.

Here Psychoanalysis may be considered for the time being as the last educational ideology, in that it finally places the blame on the educator himself who actually belongs in the class of parents, or at least in his pedagogic capacity corresponds psychologically to a parental representative. Psychoanalysis emphatically de-

mands that the educator himself shall be educated, a request which in its general form has at all times served as the foundation and means of educational tradition. But Psychoanalysis not only demands that he shall be trained as an educator, this being
taken for granted since the spread of scientific pedagogy, but it also demands of each individual that he shall be trained for the vocation of parenthood. "With this, Psychoanalysis goes beyond the narrow field of pedagogic education and encroaches into that of the first maternal or family character formation which hitherto had been a sphere withdrawn from pedagogues, in which outside the parental authorities only the collective forces of religion with its moral and ethical codes prevailed. In going back to the training of the instincts, Psychoanalysis at the same time questions the content and methods of the prevailing educational ideology, or rather, it formulates in an apparently objective way the shattering of the old ideology prepared for and precipitated by Nietzsche and the World War.

In so far as this formulation is possible in a scientific manner, analytic psychology signifies a final summing up, the diagnosis of our rotten ideology, the symptoms and genetic origin of which have moreover already been classically described and investigated by Nietzsche. Attempts to deduct from Psychoanalysis, positive aims and methods of education—not implied by Freud himself but by virtue of the propagandizing tendencies of Psychoanalysis—seem to me not only premature but also questionable. Because for the formation of a new ideology, ever so good an insight does not suffice as a recipe without a previous or simultaneous formation of a type of man who will supply the prototype of the educational ideal. At present, however, neither the new type of the European of post-war period, nor the New World type of American in process of formation, has taken definite enough shape to supply a correspondingly austere ideology for a new ideal of education: although the advancing Americanization of Europe and the acceptance of continental methods of education by America, already point to a mixed type formed from both spheres of civilization. For the time being, however, the educational idea of our transitional crisis, corresponding to the educator’s own uncertainty, paradoxically consists of a lack of a coherent ideology. It is obviously a time of educational experiment on a large scale as particularly the two extremes of the present civilization show:— America and Russia in revolutionary form, and the school reforms of the conquered, in more moderate form1 (for example in Austria, Germany).

1 Russia with its consciously purposed communistic ideology, needs no kind of new educational method and gives only its new content to the old and tried methods, whereas Germany in endeavouring to re-establish the overthrown national ideology has also to reform the methods of education although it has experimented less than America which is still developing. See the two excellent and informing works "The New Education in the Soviet Republic" by Albert

It seems yet once more confirmed that a nation, having lost its ideology, can only produce similarly unstable individuals, since it is able to transmit to its citizens only confused or shattered ideologies. But whether any kind of an ideology that is derived
from perception, such as Psychoanalysis, can help at all before the political, economic, and social conditions are established, is a question that as a matter of principle one must answer in the negative, although one may be only too willing and ready to see this turn out to be an error. But for the moment whilst one endeavours to consider Psychoanalysis not only as a symptom but also as a remedy, it is important for us to investigate what it has to offer which is of positive value to education. In other words there needs to be an investigation of the psychoanalytic ideology itself from the standpoint of its pedagogic productiveness, leaving out of the question the possibility of any practical achievement in the present or the future. For such an investigation it is necessary to go beyond the rational formulae of the analytic program of education itself and to press forward to the ideology, the manifestation of which Psychoanalysis itself is. For the three expedients that Psychoanalysis has offered pedagogy are, first, the education of the educator leading to a better under-


1 Anna Freud: Technique of Child Analysis (Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, No. 48, Washington 1930).

standing of himself, secondly, to a better understanding of the child, and finally, in extreme cases, the treatment of the child leading to a better understanding of itself; all these remedies presuppose, however, the acceptance of the psychoanalytic ideology as one that is educational and constructive.

In order to test this claim it will be advisable to investigate how Psychoanalysis first happened to make this claim at all. To repeat here only briefly what is already well known, we may remind ourselves that Freud got the impression from the analysis of adult neurotics (analyses undertaken for therapeutic purposes) that the patients’ symptoms all had their origin in early childhood. The obvious conclusion seemed to be that an improved and more appropriate education in childhood endeavouring to avoid certain crude mistakes would at least prevent later neuroses. This hope seems not only to have diminished with experience but even deeper reflection shows that the situation cannot be so simple. Not only every individual, but the successful person in particular, has to wrestle in childhood and in later life with difficulties and emotional conflicts. Genius and insanity dwell side by side, at least, extreme talent and neurosis seem to be inseparably bound together although they appear in the most varied and mixed relationship1.

1 Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum “Genie, Irsinn und Ruhm” (Munchen 1928). Further concerning this in the discussion on the Role of the Leader.
We must ask ourselves the question if in the prevention of neurosis there may not also be a danger of preventing genius, perhaps even the proximate danger of preventing the development of men—in the human sense of the word. But this question leads back again to the problem of the ideology of education, for in order to be able to answer it we must first be quite clear as to what the aim of education is. For the present, however, we can determine it only diagnostically, that is, one-sidedly and negatively, as long as there is lacking a human type representative of a new ideology. Thus we know, or believe we can state with certainty, that we do not want neuroses. But who shall determine the concept, that is, the border or extent of neurosis, when the medical concept of illness very soon proved to be inadequate for its delimitation? And then we may ask, do we want no neurosis for the child or for adults, or do we want no neurosis at all? Apparently that; but who is going to tell us that a childish neurosis must unconditionally continue to an adult neurosis, or whether or not a neurosis acquired in childhood may make that person immune from psychical illness later on? Experience speaks for both, statistics rather for the second. For doubtless, there is a majority of more or less adjusted average human beings as against a minority of manifest neurotics and both groups have in childhood passed through the same difficulties of education, difficulties that were designated childish

faults by parents and pedagogues, and neurotic symptoms by psychologists with therapeutic inclinations. Where then is any latitude given for childish deviations from the norm of education? And who guarantees that a good child who gives no trouble to the educator shall be invulnerable to later neurosis? Experience certainly does not! Nor does reflection, which rather recalls to mind the fact that this goodness may be attained at the cost of a too extensive repression of instincts which later in life avenges itself and may lead to neurotic inhibition.

We have already hinted that the whole therapeutic attitude to the problem of education seems to us inadequate. For if we could prevent neurosis in the adult by correct education in childhood, the next question would be, of what does a right education of the child consist? The answer could only be, in the prevention of childish neurosis, and everything would again depend on what concept we have of the neurosis. Perhaps the neuroses themselves or at least their symptomatic forerunners in childhood, are unavoidable products of education, that is, are the individual's reactions to the necessary restriction of instincts. That is precisely what Psychoanalysis maintains in that it urges at the same time a radical alteration in this instinct-training. But this has been recognized by judicious analysts themselves as dangerous, since one runs the risk of remaining behind the minimum standard of education, and

of increasing the quota of the delinquent and criminal instead of decreasing that of the neurotic (Aichhorn, Anna Freud). Two considerations lead us further. First, with such mass production as the present-day system of education strives for, must we not reckon with a certain percentage of waste product? We can as little turn a deaf ear to this argument, as to the justified hope of lowering this percentage where possible. We
should certainly prefer to attain this end through an improvement of the methods of production instead of by lowering the quality of the average produced. Again, is there not a possibility that the claim to produce high quality, a claim present in every system of education, might also be the cause for a relatively high percentage of failure?

The second consideration reaches further and is more important. Real education, in the sense of the prevailing ideal of type, is a community affair and as such it is far less problematical in primitive groups as well as in rigid state organizations, than in middle-class democracies where everyone carries a marshal’s staff in his satchel. But if individualization has reached a certain latitude, as in our Western civilization, it becomes the rule and no longer the exception. Hence education in the meaning of a mass-ideal and mass-influence becomes altogether impossible and new methods must be sought; of these the psychological method of education seems to be preferred because it is manifestly in-

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dividual. The fact is, whether intended or not, that many children through naughtiness or illness compel individual and special treatment which education cannot allow because this would be anti-pedagogic. However, one need not feel so smart if one "sees through" the child and compels it either by force or cunning to go back again into the educational machinery. Perhaps the child is also right if it protests in its way against the oppression of individuality by a mighty ideology, though a dying one, and in so doing unmask the adult who himself no longer believes in it but still has to preach it. 

Rousseau’s idea, that appears in practice grotesque, of an individual teacher for every single pupil, has been materialized by the naughty child who obstinately keeps his individuality. But this individual education must be based on a quite different principle which Psychoanalysis has likewise formulated, although it has been known for a long time and naturally practised in every nursery. This is the principle of love on which the child’s first education by the mother is based and which indeed makes education possible at all. It is fundamentally different from the principle of coercion that dominates the community education and that starts with the idea of making individuals uniform, and of suppressing individuality. But we can introduce the love principle into community education as little as we can achieve anything in the first phase of the tender unfolding of individuality with the principle of force.

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For love respects, protects, and wants individuality; the state on the other hand wants none of it, and hence it must necessarily have a system (or several systems) of compulsory education. As far as I know, there is only one historical example of a people who achieved the later education of the youths in the community ideal by means of this principle of love, which is a continuation of the maternal development of individuality in the child. These are the Greeks, who, in their adoration of the youths, continued individually the maternal education by love at a later stage of mature development. But it seems that this educational ideal was not possible without falling under the spell of
We must be quite clear about the love-education urged by Psychoanalysis; it is, according to its very nature, individual education and as such must be opposed to every prevailing community ideology; hence also its failure in radical but anti-individualistic Russia. In Greece it was possible to reconcile these two fundamental opposites of every educational system by means of the principle of love, because the individual ideology coincided to a great extent with that of the community. Hence also the love principle in its direct effect could be utilized pedagogically, in that the pupil by identification with the teacher realized his own

1 Hans Blihler has understood and has taught that the present pedagogic endeavours at reform could only be undertaken in the same spirit (Die humanistische Bildungsmacht in Pedagogik der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen).

ideal. This system of education was indeed built up on the individual love principle, but it did not intend to create individualities, so much as to produce a type of individual, although from a relatively high average standard. Paradoxically it might be said that the community-ideal of the Greeks was "individuality" adjusted to the collective ideology, was, so to say, a collectively approved individuality, and this today might be designated "artist." Nevertheless, it seems as if the artistic type, so abundantly produced by Hellenism, was not consciously aimed at as an ideal, but was only an unexpected by-product of their educational system. From Hellenic tradition we clearly see that the Greek ideal was wisdom and we know well enough that even Plato wanted the poet omitted from the ideal state. This Greek ideal of wisdom has nothing to do, however, with our concept of "Knowledge is Power"—on the contrary the Greeks seem to have perished from their unpractical philosophizing (Kriek)—but this their ideal is an expression of their dearly fought for rational world concept that wisdom can at the same time be virtue and beauty, or at least, can bestow them. The Greeks, as Nietzsche first recognized, overcame the impulsive dangerousness of their nature through reason and harmony, and this Apollonian victory was their world-ideology and their educational ideal. They considered art as the necessary correlative to it, as a permissible form of discharging affects and gratifying im-

pulses, that helped to maintain the ideal of wisdom and virtue.

This idea that virtue—in the broadest meaning of the Greek concept—is teachable, seems in spite of existing experience to have become the slogan of the modern psychological doctrine of education. But the definition of the concept of virtue again depends on the collective ideology of the community; whereas among the Greeks it designated a definite mental and physical bearing, in our world concept it has a peculiarly moralistic connotation and at the same time a more negative character,
namely, the absence of vice. Similarly, also, the Greek ideal of wisdom has become among us the ideal of knowledge, which no longer signifies a definite attitude to life but the accumulation of concrete matter for instruction which has become necessary for practical and technical control of the external world. In this knowledge alone which to a certain extent everyone must possess, the collective community ideal seems to have found its only expression, since most of the other community ideals have been sacrificed to advancing individualism. Hence the lack of a definite community-type that could serve as an educational ideal. The prototype of the present-day education is not only negative in that it lacks, as already stated, a community ideology, but it is destructive in the pedagogic sense, indeed, is anti-pedagogic, for it produces individuals who must stand in opposition to

every community type and hence this latter, where it still exists, is pushed further and further into the background.

This viewpoint leads beyond the present-day problem of education as confined to prophylaxis and therapy to the actual problem of educating human beings. This is something other than the prevention of neurosis, or of types; it is besides not negative, but is positive in setting up its aim and purpose, that ensues from the community culture and from its ideology. This aim is given in rising civilizations with the necessity for an austere unified ideal-formation; just as the child’s individual disposition is also a given factor with which education has to operate in order to attain the prevailing community ideal. Between the child’s individual disposition, and the community ideal, education has to establish a compromise which must always be somewhat unsatisfactory, but for which also it produces in all the different forms of this conflict a variety of individuals such as no deliberate education, however lenient or however careful of the preservation or formation of individuality, could create. In other words, the education and development of individualities is like a game of chance1, uncontrollable through the cooperation of disposition and milieu (education) as is the occasional departure into neurosis, and the State

risks deviations from the norm above as below, in the educational endeavour to attain as many as possible average values.

But this knowledge does not help us much at the present time, since the difficulty lies momentarily in the lack of a sufficiently established community ideology. Striving educationally for individuality apparently tends more to neurosis than would the enforcement of a strong educational ideology permitting rather of a reaction towards constructive individual development. In other words, the suppression of individuality by a strong community ideal may also lead to the formation of neurosis, but the educational furtherance of individual development seems to produce still more neuroses, and ever less strong personalities who rather spontaneously develop in resisting the pressure of a collective education. From this it follows that the modern ideal of education cannot simply consist of a replacing of the community type by developing individual personalities. For the formation of individualities can never be the program of education, the very nature and system of which is to form types. For every individual education according to its nature would be anti-pedagogic, just as the educator himself must be fundamentally conservative if he wants to attain the pedagogic aim of the collective type. A more revolutionary individualistic educator is a contradiction in terms, for because of his educational principles

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he would be able to train only like-minded pupils and this continually advanced process would precipitate in a few generations the collapse of the whole system of education. For not only must such pedagogues struggle against influencing the children in any kind of way but also the children themselves would soon resist any educational influence.

Nevertheless, educators must at least attempt, even in such a transitional stage as we find ourselves in today, to build into the old scheme of education certain new factors of individual education, such as those urged by therapy and prophylaxis. Of course, according to the very nature of the task, there will be difficulties. Two of these we should like to emphasize here. First, the present reform in education proceeds from the pedagogues themselves. This was not always the case; indeed, to a certain extent it is an innovation, that must also be considered a symptom of individualization. Many modern pedagogues who emphatically speak of the emancipation of the child, really mean the emancipation of themselves. And although they are intelligent enough to admit that we do not know what goes on in the child and therefore, from our adult standpoint, we cannot understand the child, yet they do not appear to ask themselves whence they know that their reformatory ideas are suited to the child and would be more acceptable to it than the prevailing methods. Experience teaches us that children love and
understand far less the books written for them by great poets, than the mediocre works manufactured by narrators of stories who are themselves already on a childish level, instead of first having to descend to it. The old methods of education starting from the primitives’ initiation rites of the boys, leading up to the austere system of the pedagogues before and since Rousseau were at least suited to a childish level. This cannot be said of the psychological interpretations in the modern child-guidance councils. By this I do not advocate a crudeness in education, but simplicity, indeed even primitiveness need not necessarily manifest itself in crude forms.

The second point concerns the essential content that modern psychology has to offer or at least has hitherto offered pedagogy, namely, the principle of love. But this only leads to a strengthening of the mechanism of identification, a danger that has not even been avoided in the psychoanalysis of adults undertaken as a “reeducation” (Freud). In education founded on the old style, the conscious application of this principle would possibly have been of use, but certainly would not have been harmful, as seems to be the case in our age of individualism. The difficulty lies in the fact that for the development and unfolding of individuality, we need love. But this love also leads to the love-identification, that again counteracts the development of individuality, because the individual by identification endeavours to become like the loved person. In order to exclude—or at least to restrict—this undesirable by-product of education based on the love principle, the psychoanalytic therapy has resorted to a technique that endeavours to achieve individualization without identification. This measure has also become of great significance to modern education and we shall discuss its pedagogic aspects in the following chapter. In brief, it is, apart from the conscious utilization of love as an educational means, also the simultaneous explanation to the pupil concerning the application and operation of this means itself. In the analytic situation we speak of revealing the “transference” and of explaining to the patient its nature and influence; in the pedagogic situation the same tendency is conspicuous as the demand for the sexual enlightenment of the child who in this way shall be educated not only by means of love but at the same time shall also be instructed scientifically concerning the nature of love. This love is made not only consciously a means of education, but it is likewise made the subject of education. The fundamental means of modern individualistic education thus consists of an elaboration of the old principle of love, the fundamental new content of psychological education is sexuality.
Chapter Two  Sexual Enlightenment and the Sexual Impulse

I consider it a most significant advance in the science of education, that in France, in place of the catechism, the State should have introduced a primer which gives the child the first instruction in his position as a citizen and in the ethical obligations which will be his in time to come. The elementary instruction provided there, however, is seriously deficient in that it includes no reference to sexual matters.

Freud

With regard to the much discussed problem of sexual education, we must first separate two aspects of it; the education of sexuality or the training of the sexual impulse, and the education through sexuality or by means of love. Although the two sides are practically inseparable, yet it seems to me necessary to separate them theoretically and to consider each in regard to its own significance before considering their mutual relationship. The educational systems of primitive peoples somehow seem to reconcile sexuality and education in that they defer the education of the boy to man’s estate, to the time of puberty. Whether it is only a matter of a forced sublimation of the sexual impulse (threat) as inferred by Psychoanalysis, or of a deeper mystical, symbolic act, we shall not discuss here. Obviously through the ceremonial of the boys’ initiation, as already mentioned, the second adult or mature phase of the individual is ushered in. This initiation withdraws the child from the influence of maternal training and "drums" into him (in the true sense of the word) the community ideology represented by the fathers (elders), not the father. I should like to formulate this process that is still operative in all our systems of education, thus: at a given period in individual development the role of educator is transferred from one person (mother) to the community; more precisely expressed, that in place of a human being as a pattern of education, a collective ideology appears as the educational ideal. One might almost say that instead of an education using emotional means (love) there appears the intellectual (compulsory) education, if one did not know to what extent all collective ideologies have to be emotionally based in order to be capable of becoming an educational ideal. The primitive initiation ceremonies of the boys show this quite
clearly, their emotional impetus being so much greater than their intellectual significance. Indeed it seems just as if these ceremonies had to remain unintelligible in order to exercise more surely their emotional and affective value.

There is no doubt that the intellectual part in education has continually increased in the course of time, yet it is also evident that there can be no effective education at all without strong emotional influences. Here is to be found another difficulty inherent in every system of education; a difficulty that we shall consider more closely in dealing with the emotional development, but perhaps also one that will throw a first ray of light on the significance of the sexual problem in the present psychological educational ideology. By increasingly intellectualizing education and making it more technical, new and stronger emotional forces had to be mobilized for its achievement, and also to give it balance. This emotional force Psychoanalysis believes it has found in its appeal to the strongest factor of the emotional life, namely, the sexual impulse. Whether we entirely approve this or not, it has been, perhaps, a necessary step in the utilization of the last emotional resources which an exaggerated rationalization of our education has left us. It is naturally always precarious to call to one’s aid the last relief-forces, above all, because only a desperate crisis compels one to such a step, on whose success life or death depends. But we can only

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take cognizance of the fact that this step is forced upon us, and try to understand what advantage and disadvantage may be derived from it.

If we compare this last phase of psychological sexual education, at the commencement of which we are now, with the earliest known to us, namely, that of the primitive initiation of boys, immediately two essential differences strike us. Psychoanalysis shifts the beginning of sexual education from puberty to childhood and makes the incision between family and community approximately there where it had already been made by the state (compulsory education). Secondly, Psychoanalysis raises this sexual education from the purely emotional sphere to the intellectual level of our community ideology, in that it proclaims sexuality—as mentioned—not only a means of education, but—in the form of sexual enlightenment—also the subject of education. But for both these a prerequisite—or rather a consequence—would be an earlier maturity, not to say prematurity, of the child in an emotional as well as in an intellectual respect. Again we may regret this, but we may perhaps have to be resigned to an earlier maturing of our children since they have to achieve a greater development to reach our present-day level of civilization. As life apparently cannot be prolonged at the one end, it must indeed commence earlier since we have more to assimilate. In so far as this is the case, it is valid only for the child of a definite cultural period,
namely, our present Western civilization, and it scarcely has the universal significance for mankind which Psychoanalysis would obviously like to claim for it.

However, we must investigate how far this is correct even for the present-day child, in other words, how far the psychoanalytic ideology which now exists, is an objective comprehension and correct description of existing conditions, and how far it comprises on the one hand an interpretation of the same and, on the other hand, an ideological preparation for new conditions. This is not meant to be critical, and could only be taken as criticism from one narrow viewpoint which would accept the whole Freudian ideology at its face value, as an objective description and explanation of facts. If the Freudian ideology were only that it would be nothing at all; but its influence alone proves that it is much more than that. It is what every influential ideology always was and, according to its nature, must be, namely, a genetic explanation of existing conditions, but at the same time a psychological interpretation of the same and an ideological indication as to their future reorganization.

In relation to the problem we are considering here, namely, that of modern sexual education, this would

1 Eduard Spranger finds the same factors at work in the far more objective science of history and estimates it from a philosophic point of view (“Das deutsche Bildungsideal der Gegenwart in geschichtsphilosophischer Beleuchtung” Leipzig, 1929, 2nd. Edition).

mean, speaking simply, is the present-day child already actually mature (or premature) for sexual enlightenment? If so to what extent and what are the reasons for it, and in what way shall sexual enlightenment take place? If the child is not ready, then it is a matter of an interpretation, which projects into the child our own problem, and hence it must at least throw some light on the psychology of the interpreters, that is, ourselves. Probably both possibilities are correct to a certain extent, and they suggest a third question, namely, to what extent is it a matter of a correct perception of a commencing process of development that Psychoanalysis has interpreted in the meaning of its scientific ideology and which will work itself out only in the near future? In the following pages we shall mainly consider the interpretative aspect, because it is by far the most interesting, the most important, and also the most characteristic for the psychoanalytic ideology. Psychology, and particularly Psychoanalysis, is a predominantly interpretative science, and what specifically concerns the problem of education, has been gained only indirectly through the analysis of adult neurotics. The actual observation of children was undertaken with the ideology already accepted and, according to the reaction of educators and experience hitherto, the future prospects of its universal application seem for the time being too few to be taken into consideration.

It is well known that Psychoanalysis became aware of
the educational problem when in the therapeutic influencing of adults, it was able to trace their difficulties back to early childhood. These difficulties seemed in the adult to be of a sexual nature, whereupon Freud drew the conclusion that they must also have been so in the child. This course of reasoning has already been manifoldly contested with reference to the fundamental difference between the child and the adult and also it has not been justified by the non-convincing psychoanalytic observations of children. But there are graver doubts than this purely methodological one, since it is recognized that also in the adult the difficulties are not always of a sexual nature. This became obvious through closer investigation on the one hand, and through the failure of a purely sexually oriented therapy on the other hand. The concept of the sexual aetiology of the neuroses thus proved to be an interpretation even with regard to adults. Not only was the child’s mental and emotional life interpreted in the meaning of the adult theory of neuroses, but the adult neurotic already had been interpreted according to an ideology that we here designate materialistic because it tried to explain all difficulties in biological terminology and tried to influence these therapeutically by means of practical measures. Indeed the whole concept of the reducibility of the adult’s difficulties to the faults and influences of education could only arise on the ground of a "behaviour-

istic" psychology such as would conform to the modern scientific world-concept. The interpretation of which we speak, thus consists not only of the application to the child of what has been observed in the adult, but also of a genetic connexion which states reversely, that the adult has difficulties (obviously of a sexual nature) because the child had the same difficulties which were not opportunely recognized and corrected by education. In other words, the adult neurotic is "infantile" also with regard to his sexual difficulties or indeed only in relation to these. The remedy that Psychoanalysis had to offer for this was twofold; therapeutically to make the infantile neurotic grow up, but prophylactically and pedagogically to liberate the child from this "infantility" because the danger seemed to be that it would be dragged along into later life. We already see here, that the child’s maturity of which we spoke earlier is really a "pre-maturity" artificially produced or hastened from the desire therapeutically and prophylactically better to prepare the individual for actual maturity. But we also recognize that the concept of maturity corresponds to a natural process of development which, when artificially produced or influenced, would be out of place in any kind of educational ideology. The sexual education and enlightenment of the child, as advocated by Psychoanalysis, might be considered with regard to its rational character a kind of immunization of the individual against later sexual difficulties by an early inoculation with a dangerous serum. Expressed in psychological terminology it would be a matter of the avoidance of a later sexual shock by a timely and gradual preparation.
So far this sounds quite plausible, but apart from the technical question of improving this prophylactic measure, there is the doubt as to whether and how far physiological viewpoints, especially of a medical nature, are applicable to the psychical sphere. Sexuality of course is without doubt a biological factor of first importance, but even Psychoanalysis could not overlook the psychical significance it has among individuals, and has taken this into account in its concept of "psychosexuality." But if the mental significance of sexuality for mankind could be questioned, yet the influencing of it educationally is a purely psychical affair and the anti-toxin of sexual enlightenment may have as its consequence undesirable reactions in the whole psychical establishment which may paralyse the desired effect in the purely sexual sphere. To this may be added further reflections if we follow the comparison to its final consequences. Serum therapy ought to prevent disease, sexual enlightenment ought to promote progress. We do not want to suppress the sexual impulse but only to emancipate it. This desired result, however, is supposed to take place only at a later period. The question, how is sexuality to be discussed and explained, and at the same time its activity restricted, seems to me not yet solved. The explanation, for example, concerning masturbation, treating it as something harmless and not dangerous, is supposed to have a calming effect and not a threatening one; but I should say there are few parents, even among the pioneers of modern education, who would be inclined to draw from this enlightenment the conclusion to let their children masturbate. But when they do not allow it, they place themselves in a new difficulty of having to give a reason for it. The whole movement of sexual enlightenment is doubtless praiseworthy in its tendency to consider sexuality as something harmless and not as something sinful and forbidden, an attitude which can only poison the entire later life of the individual. But this inoffensiveness tacitly comprises the release of sexual activity, for it cannot be comprehended—especially by the child—why one should not do something when it is not "bad." In its extreme consequences, then, sexual education would not result in an education of the sexual impulse (in the sense of training it), but in a release of it, and this would lead us back to the level of the primitives, who have no sexual problem and no sexual education because they give free rein to sexual expression at least up to the time of puberty (or marriage).

Fortunately the child himself vigorously upsets all our psychological calculations by carrying on his sexual activity independently of our attitude towards it.

But that means that the child not only gives in to his sexual impulse in spite of our prohibitions, but also that he experiences it as something forbidden, bad, and something to conceal even when we permit and release it. This is the first momentous discovery
we have made with our sexual propaganda for children. This experience points to the fact, that it is not the external prohibition or the influence of education that connects sexuality with the idea of sin and guilt, but something inherent in it which is experienced by the individual as dangerous and, perhaps, rightly so. But this also shows that the hitherto prevailing education of the child was not—as our radical psychologists maintain—false and unreasonable and based only on ignorance so that it needed merely the focussing of our better knowledge on it, in order to wipe out with one blow all evils of education1. Certainly the child has always asked questions, wanted explanations, and above all wanted to be understood. But the answers that religious education gave to these questions were not false but only adequate if we understand them correctly; as the child has in any case a guilt-feeling in reference to sexual matters, religion, then, has only sanctioned it for him, although sometimes in too drastic a manner.

1 Such naive radical tendencies appear in the symposium brought out by V. P. Calverton and Sam. Schmalhausen (New York, 1930), "The New Generation. The intimate Problems of Modern Parents and Children," although a minority of contributors (like Havelock Ellis, Bronislaw Malinowski) represent a sober and scientifically sound objectivity.

On the other hand however, also our sexual enlightenment does not have the desired effect of taking this guilt-feeling away from the child because the child then seeks elsewhere to have this guilt-feeling corroborated if the parents do not do it. Whether for this the child goes back to religious and mythological ideas, or gets false information from companions or unenlightened people is irrelevant in comparison to the undeniable fact that the child refuses the correct scientific explanation including the release of sex implicitly implied in it.

What is apparently manifest in the conflict between school and church is that sex education is on the point of replacing the religious training, and it is now also psychologically evident that the religious education has been a legitimate precursor of the psychological education and not merely a hindrance to it. This is clearly shown in the different answers given to the famous question of the child as to where we come from; the religious training answers it by pointing to God as the creator of mankind, modern education answers it by giving a biological explanation. But still no child has been satisfied with this sexual explanation, even not when the role of the father was explained with it. The statement of Psychoanalysis that most of the child’s questions really aim at something other than their pretext, would have been much more meritorious if it had not obstinately kept to the preconceived opinion that
that children are not satisfied with the biological answer to their sexual questions, seems strongly to contradict this assumption. I believe that most of the child’s questions concern philosophical and religious problems, that also occupy the minds of adults even today, and are still unsolved and perhaps even are insoluble. I am convinced, however, that particularly the sexual questions of children have this enigmatic background and that we answer these eternal problems of humanity concerning our origin, our future, and the meaning of our whole existence at the time only in the natural scientific terminology of our sexual-biology and materialistic psychology. But this answer does not satisfy the child in the least and if we want to be honest we have to admit also that it does not satisfy ourselves, and it only seems to satisfy because we know we have no other reply. Perhaps this explains why the adult seems to suffer from the sexual problem as much as the child; because the biological solution of the problem of humanity is also ungratifying and inadequate for the adult as for the child. The religious solution was and still is so much the more gratifying because it admits the Unknown, indeed, recognizes it as the chief factor instead of pretending an omniscience that we do not possess. Besides, religion is also more consoling, I should like to say more therapeutic because, with the admission of the unknown and unknowable it also leaves room for all kinds of hope that it still may not be so hopeless as it seems. The feeling of inferiority from which apparently our children now seem to suffer, is certainly increased by the impression they get of the godlike omniscience of their parents and their own ignorance in sexual matters. But the sexual instruction of children, that is, putting them on an equality with adults in this matter, does not help much if the parents’ valuation of the sexual problem excludes their religious belief, or in other words, if the parental knowledge of sexual matters has the appearance of being a knowledge of all the mysteries of life, a knowledge which the child does not and never will possess even as the adults do not possess it. Religion, from the very beginning, here places children and adults on one level in so far as their inability to know ultimate things is concerned.

If we compare the idea of sexual education with the religious education hitherto prevailing, we shall find that in sexual training there is an element of wishful thinking carried over by the adult into the childish ideology. It has indeed thus arisen that the therapeutist has wished that the adult neurotic might have been sufficiently experienced as a child to be able to avoid all later difficulties. It is a primitive wishful-thinking projected back in this form, and in this respect sexual education differs in no way from other ideologies of education that want to spare the child the adult's harmful experiences or at least to give the child a taste of them in the form of education. But since sexual education differs from other educational ideologies in early childhood
neither in this respect nor in relation to its disappointing answer to life’s riddle we must concentrate our attention on the one point in which it does clearly differ, and that is, its content. Before we go into the psychological significance of this difference of content, I should first like to emphasize its intellectual quality. This new content is not only different from earlier contents, but it differs in this respect, that it is supposed to be the "truth." This truth however is here confused with reality. We might give the correct biological answer to the child’s concrete question as to the arrival of a little brother or sister but we do not thereby touch the child’s fear of life that is behind this question and which cannot be explained causally because it is rooted in the fear of the Unknown and Unknowable. The new educational ideology thus seems to be enforced by a fanaticism for the truth, which has found its clearest expression in the demand for sexual enlightenment, but which extends beyond this to the whole attitude of the modern educator. This may be, among other things, also a protest against the existing opportunism in education which at the same time has not always coincided with the truth. But this craving for the truth is rather a fanaticism for reality than a real love of the truth and hence stops short before the admission of the truth concerning our lack of knowledge. This is predominantly expressed in education in a negative way, namely, by avoiding what we consider "untruth," the true value of which we no longer understand, such as for example, religion. Thus, also, this ideal of over-valuing reality, a characteristic of our natural scientific world-concept, originates from adults and is carried over into education by them. The child like primitive man tends more to the unreal, he does not want logical, causal explanations, but emotional consolation and he denies reality in favour of consoling illusions which therefore seem to him to be "truer." These are apparently necessary in order to live and the child has the right instinct for it just as did man of the primitive and religious ages.

But again, we must bear in mind that the presentday child sooner or later has to recognize these illusions as disappointing, and it might be better to prepare the child for this at an early age. But it seems that also adults still need illusions and always know how to create them anew as soon as earlier ones disappoint. Precisely the sphere of sexuality has formerly been an essential promoter of illusion and it has already been brought as an objection against sexual enlightenment, that by it, one might possibly be damning up this fertile source of illusion. It seems as if the child feels like the many disappointed adults who react to the first sexual experience with the exclamation "Is that all!"

for one actually has the impression that most children react in the same way to sexual enlightenment. And rightly so! For it is not all! But the rest, which is the most important
for so many, seems to be based on illusion, as, for example, the quite general idea of romantic love. The question, that we approach here, leads us back again to our starting-point, namely, education of sexuality or education by means of sexuality. From its own sphere, the therapeutic situation, where education through love besides being the greatest furtherance to education became also its greatest hindrance, Psychoanalysis has drawn the pedagogic conclusion that naturally the chief thing to do is to give sexual education or, more correctly, to train the sexual impulse. But at the same time it is believed that in the sexual impulse itself there is to be found the real agent of educational sublimation. Now perhaps one can use sexuality consciously as a means of education as it always has been used instinctively, and get good results from it; the question is only, what happens thereby to the sexual impulse itself? Might not the result be similar to that in our colleges where the students are compelled to study the Greek verbs in Homer? The student may indeed in this way learn the conjugations but his taste for the beauty of the poems is thereby spoiled.

Whatever one’s attitude to sex is, it cannot be denied that a great part of its attraction arises from curiosity,

from its being kept secret and forbidden. The purely physical sensations of pleasure would scarcely be strong enough alone to overcome the resistances which apparently oppose the sexual activity in the individual himself. This resistance to sexuality inherent in the individual, is the real problem therapeutically as well as pedagogically. The answer of Psychoanalysis to this question has proved to be inadequate, because it is only a rational paraphrase of the old Biblical explanation. We are supposed to have sexual difficulties because our religious education teaches that sexuality is "bad," that is, it has made it a moral problem whereas originally it was a natural source of pleasure. But, as the study of primitive races shows, this is not so obvious as it seems from purely biological considerations. Indeed, the primitives furnish us with a grand example of the fact that even unrestricted sexuality becomes a moral problem, exactly as we can observe it in our enlightened children. The primitives certainly do not separate, in our meaning, the function of pleasure and the function of procreation, but they act as if the latter did not exist at all for the individual, which is true to their group-ideology. This group-ideology arises, however, from the belief in the soul, according to the original concept of which the individual is immortal and hence procreation in one’s own children is looked upon as a danger that threatens personal immortality. I believe that the deepest resistance to sexuality arises from the

claim of the species that directly threatens individual integrity. The child, who, as it were, begins at birth to sunder itself from the species and to develop its individuality, feels sexuality first of all to be an inner claim of the species hostile to individuality and hence
resists it. This leads as I have already stated elsewhere1 to an inner strife in the individual against sexuality, a conflict which arises necessarily and independently of external influences. This strife within is carried out by the individual in the same manner as in external strife, namely, by means of the will. For the will represents the individual energetically, it is psychologically synonymous with individual will. Sexuality is a kind of racial will forced upon the individual, the final acceptance of which is made possible through the individual love choice, against which, however, the individual and the individual will are continually striving. In this strife between the individual will and the biologically given community ideology of the species we have before us the prototype of the educational problem with all its conflicts and difficulties.

This means to say that the sexual problem necessarily provokes in the child itself the conflict inherent in all education between the individual will and the community ideology, and indeed presents this conflict in its most human form, because the sexual conflict is uni-


versal and independent of the particular educational ideology characteristic of definite systems of civilization. Certainly also the specific ideology of any particular civilization is influenced by the attitude taken towards the sexual problem. This is not only on account of the fundamental significance of the sexual life in itself, but because in the individual’s attitude to it there is implied the mutual interplay of individual and collective ideology. In this sense the sexual education would be the educational problem par excellence. The application of this knowledge to pedagogic practice is, however, not so simple as it is imagined to be by the psychoanalytic educator, who has in mind chiefly the therapeutic and prophylactic effect of sexual enlightenment. In relation to the positive constructive side that forms the real task of education, the sexual education signifies a radical attack on the fundamentals of all pedagogy and this, not prudery, explains the resistance against it. But first we must be clear as to whence this "resistance" arises and for this we must understand what the very nature of sexual education signifies.

These considerations are necessary not only for practical reasons but so that we may be able to lay the foundation stone for a new educational ideology. This can only gradually be crystallized out of and following on the revolutionary advance of the psychoanalytic theory and its precipitate application to radical pedagogic reforms. For the construction of ideologies con-

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sists not in revolutionizing, but in the conscious elaboration of the dangerous as well as the useful elements, which latter are naturally over-rated by the radicals. So the idea of sexual education gives the appearance of emancipating the individual and his impulse life from the chains of a religious and conventional morality; whereas its practical application in educational reforms is in fact not at all radical but conservative because it is not individual but collective. In that sexuality is first consciously and then officially made the subject of education, the idea of sexual enlightenment loses its individual-revolutionary character and necessarily becomes—like every educational ideology—a representative of the collective community will. This regular and necessary transformation of an individual’s revolutionary ideas into the conservative ideology of the community encounters in the sexual problem quite peculiar difficulties. Not, perhaps, because sexuality is too individual, too personal, to be made into a community ideology, but just the reverse, because in essence sexuality is a collective phenomenon which the individual at all stages of civilization wants to individualize, that is, control. This explains all sexual conflicts in the individual, from masturbation to the most varied perversions and perversities, above all the keeping secret of everything sexual by individuals as an expression of a personal tendency to individualize as much as possible collective elements in it. On the other hand we see the community at all times and under all circumstances endeavouring to deprive the individual as far as possible through convention, law, and custom, of the arbitrary practice of sexuality. But the community’s every step in the direction of making the sexual life collective leads to new attempts at individualization which again bring forth community reactions. This everlasting armament of the individual against society, and vice versa, has hitherto been carried out chiefly in religious, social, economic, and lastly in educational ideologies. In other words it has been a fight for belief, for race, for class, a conflict between the older and younger generations, certainly also a fight of the sexes against one another, in which each group wants to assert its individuality as against a bigger or stronger group, ultimately against humanity. What is most characteristic of the present educational struggle is that it seems to concentrate more and more around the sexual problem which contains in it the two irreconcilable antitheses of individual and species. One might express this figuratively thus, formerly the solution of this difficult problem had been attempted in algebraic formula and now one attempts to solve it in terms of its real value. But it might easily happen that the calculation did not turn out as one expected because one cannot correctly estimate the value of sexuality. Psychoanalysis also is not free from this error, since from its medical standpoint and by reason of its therapeutic attitude it has over-estimated the individual pleasurable factor of sexuality rather than another more important factor. This other is the collective factor, which
Freud valued only as a social inhibition (moral training), not, however, as an element inherent in sexuality itself and characteristic for it. From this racial claim inherent in sexuality, arise all the individual’s, resistances which Psychoanalysis has simply understood as the result of intimidation.

However, if we consider the collective nature of sexuality and assign to it the position due, we recognize that the modern sexual education which seems to be so individualistic is really aspiring to exploit this collective character of sexuality in order to combat increasing individualization of it. Sex teaching as a subject of education with the admitted purpose of introducing sexual enlightenment into the curriculum of the schools would thus prove to be a grave interference with the individual’s personal freedom. As I have already stated in an earlier work,¹ there seems to be a peculiar inner connexion between the personality development and the development of sexuality, and indeed, I believe chiefly because the sexual sphere had hitherto been exempt from educational influences. It remained the only domain which was surrendered to the individual, as it were, for self-education and


self-development, and the child reacts with open protest or with secret resistance to insure that this remaining sphere shall not be withdrawn from self-administration and be “socialized” like everything else. In spite of all infantile sexual curiosity and incessant questions, we cannot overlook the fact that the child does not want sexual education—as it does not want any kind of education—and refuses sexual enlightenment as unsatisfying. The more positive the enlightenment, the more is the child compelled to create its own private sexual ideology and sexual sphere where it can do as it likes in individual freedom, unhindered and uninfluenced by adult educational tendencies.

Even if sexual education were necessary as the last resort of the community from increasing individualism, we should not pretend that it is in the child’s interest but in the interest of the community represented by the educator. It seems to me that this threatening socialization of sexuality, indeed one might say communization of sexuality as implied in modern enlightenment, is a necessary reaction of the community in its struggle for self-preservation against increasing individualization. On the other hand I believe that the individual’s stronger inclination for sexual freedom manifested in the increase of divorce, promiscuity, and perversions, is nothing but an individual reaction against the threatening invasion of the uprising sexual socialization which is implied in the modern ideology of
education. Another symptom of the same, deserves to be brought forward. Education actually begins at adolescence not only among the primitives, but also with the higher standing civilized races such as the Greeks and Romans, so that time and room are given for individual development and unfolding before the direct intervention of collective forces takes place. Modern psychologists would like education to begin as early as possible, which has been the case only in the religious systems of education of the Jews and Christians. In these systems the individual is trained from the beginning to carry on and transmit a religious ideology that had been created for a self-protection only at a definite period and can fulfil this aim also only temporarily. Since man always needs and wants collective ideologies, the possibility for creating new ones must be permitted him when previous ones wear out. The earlier they are inoculated in the individual, the earlier will they also lose their value, and the more difficult will it be for man to replace these deeply rooted ideas with others. The sexual ideology of education as it may appear from the therapeutic and prophylactic viewpoint, thus signifies, not only an enrichment and necessary improvement of the present system of education, but it contains at the same time a completely new ideology of education altogether, which is marked by the systematic communizing of the individual sex impulse. In this sense the modern sex education is conservative, that is, however, anti-individualistic, and hence it may provoke a revolutionary protest from the individual, a protest that one cannot explain as a moral resistance alone. The fact that the demand for sexual enlightenment appears to be revolutionary is to be explained from the emphasis laid on the individual aspect of the sexual impulse by Psychoanalysis, which valued it therapeutically only as the individual's source of pleasure. But the individual's struggle against the collective force of sexuality is as old as humanity and is repeated in every child in the well known sexual conflicts which can be avoided by no kind of education or explanation because they are inherent in the dualistic nature of the sexual impulse and of man himself as an ego and as part of the species. And the more parents and educators advocate from their collective attitude the sexual enlightenment of their children, the more (so experience has taught us) will the children themselves oppose this interference of society in their private lives.
Chapter Three  THE TRAINING OF THE WILL AND EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

To rear men is to lead them into the path of Recognition; where Will is evil.

Lao-tse

All education is fundamentally a training of the will. It is obviously so in the primitive systems of education, and, though less openly admitted, it is still so in all our modern methods of education. Indeed, all education is, in effect, a matter of somehow moulding the individual (whose most natural self-expression is the will) into a social and collective being. This is accomplished partly by rousing or strengthening in him that which is common to humanity, partly by toning down that which is too individual, and finally by applying to, and imprinting on him, the positive community ideals

1 This was given as a Lecture at the First International Congress for Mental Hygiene, Washington, May 1930, and at the Mid-West Conference on Character Development, Chicago, Feb. 1930; printed in their Proceedings entitled "The Child’s Emotions" (The University of Chicago Press, 1930).

and ideologies, such as religion, morality, knowledge, and technical skill, etc. In the primitive community the training of the will directly coincides with the ideologies, in that the initiation rites, to a certain extent break the individual will and consciously use for that purpose the ideologies expressed in the myths and rites. In modern education the same factors operate, but conforming to the changed cultural milieu they are valued differently, that is, pedagogically. The inculcation of the ideologies, the conscious intellectual acquisition of knowledge, is set up as the aim of education, and the training or breaking of the will is tolerated only as a means to this end. Hence also the two phases of education have become sharply separated; broadly speaking the training of the will takes place in the home, and the education of the intellect for which this home-training lays the foundation, takes place in the school. I need not here point out how extensively these two competing spheres, the home and the school, intersect and overlap each other in practical education and what difficulties arise for the child and for the educational aim from the necessarily imperfect co-operation of these two spheres. The school, with its colossal program for uniformity, naturally wants to receive the child as far as possible prepared for its task; on the other hand the parents, being pre-occupied with the training of the child’s will within the small family group, expect in their turn considerable help from the school in the
difficulties unavoidably arising in the home.

But education in the home not only differs from that in the school in relation to the ideology, in that the one is predominantly a negative form of will training, the other predominantly a positive group education; but in the conflicts and difficulties arising from this, there also come into play the emotional factors and affect-attitudes fundamental to these ideologies. For the parents, however much they may approve community or group education, yet emotionally want to transmit and immortalize their own individual self in their children. Whether this wish is manifestly egoistic or is rather in the nature of an ideal, it is in any case anti-social, although not necessarily in the bad sense of the word. In the school, there arises a twofold difficulty; not only does the community ideology represented by the school necessarily run counter to the parental wishes and leanings, but also this community ideology is unavoidably represented by an individual, the teacher, who again tries (although unconsciously) to imprint his or her own individual ideology—or, if one likes, his or her personality—on the child. The teachers as individuals have, so to say, their own "parental ideology," that is, they also want to make the child in their own image or according to their own ideal picture. Certainly the teacher is restricted in this tendency to a far greater degree than the real parents of the child, and indeed by two factors; first of all by the community ideology which he officially represents and which through his special training for the scholastic profession has partly become his own ideology (his professional ideology); and secondly, by the community ideology of the school itself, in which the child besides being influenced by the teacher, is also influenced by comrades of the same age and with the same interests and sympathies. This, together with the individual-ideology of the pupil and the community-ideology of the teacher is in the same way pitted against that of the parents, so to say, as a child's community ideology.

Without being able to enter here into a description or even estimation of all these various and unequal influences in the child's life, I should like only to mention one point that is important for an understanding of the fundamental will problem. One might say that the parents are the natural educators of the child's emotional life, and that the teacher is the educator ordained by the community for the systematic training of the child's understanding and intelligence. Since, however, these two spheres cannot in practice be separated at the school age, this view would scarcely have a pedagogic significance unless the parents realize this their task, and hence prepare themselves better for it. For the school in its age-long development of thousands of years, from the Rabbinical temple school to our modern school, has sprung up as a firmly erected system with conscious aims. The emotional training of
the will, on the other hand, was left to the parents’ arbitrary judgment, certainly supported by religious tradition reaching its climax in the intervention of the church in the field of education. This religious influence, in its systematic and purposeful aim, has eventually become equal to that of state education. The critical phase in which our education at present finds itself seems to be due to a slackening of the religious training of the will in favour of psychological training, which, according to its scientific nature, aspires to a similar systematic and conscious aim in the sphere of the parental training of the impulses, as the school has traditionally developed in relation to the intellectual training. Although, from the point of view of the school this could only be welcomed as an advance, since the school certainly could only gain if the child had gone through a period of systematic “discipline” of the impulse life before entering the real period of learning, yet from this new movement, new competitions and disputes have arisen between the home, the school, and above all the church, disputes which only gradually can be smoothed out and settled.

In one point certainly one must admit that the opponents of this new reform in parental education are right. Nevertheless, they overlook the fact that their chief objection applies only to the present situation, and not to the nature of the thing itself. They have behind them tradition, thousands of years old, and the experience gained from it; the spokesmen of the modern movement on the other hand, have at most a couple of decades of new psychological orientation, and can offer neither a satisfying theoretical system nor any kind of reliable practical method. Indeed this whole field of impulse education in early childhood is for the moment like an educational laboratory, in which educators are experimenting theoretically and practically in an aimless way that is certainly not always for the good of the child. Now one attempts to influence the child psychologically; again, to enlighten or to educate the parents; then again to reform the methods or to change the theories on which they are based. Even a combination of all these desperate attempts apparently does not lead to the desired result.1 The novelty of our modern viewpoint, the relative suddenness with which the psychological impulse education is demanded in place of the collapsing religious ideology, the inexperience of parents and psychologists in this new field, all this has obviously contributed to the confusion which for the moment reigns in the minds of the pedagogues and teachers of elementary classes, as well as in the nurseries at home.

If we are to have a systematic and consciously directed education of the child’s impulses, we must first know and understand the child’s impulse life. Psychol-

1 Thomas; The Child in America, Behaviour Problems and Programs, New York, 1928.
ogy has this as its aim, an aim we are yet far from reaching today, yet when attained it
will be the first real starting point of a new educational era. Psychoanalysis in this
respect has made the first promising advance, but it has remained at a point round
which an embittered and fruitless strife has been waging. From its study of the adult
neurotic, Psychoanalysis has postulated the sexual impulse as the nucleus of the
infantile impulse life, and hence declares sexual education to be the chief task of
pedagogy in early childhood. The resistances against this view among parents and
educators are, however, not only emotional and moral, but are supported by the
scientific arguments of other psychologists who have not approached the problem of the
child’s impulse life from the standpoint of the adult neurotic. The first and hitherto
strongest reaction against the Freudian "sexualization" of the child’s impulse life started
from Alfred Adler and his school of individual psychology. Adler emphasized the
significance of the will psychology in the child; this was not new but a profitable point of
departure. What was new was his concept of the will as an over compensatory
tendency for the adjustment of organic or psychical inferiority, which he assumes no
child can escape in our cultural milieu. Also his method of interpreting this manifestation
of will, though taken from Psychoanalysis, was new for educational ideology. He,
however, explained the manifestations of will not as a nat-

ural expression of the individuality but as an exaggerated expression of a neurotic need
for proving one’s superiority, and hence an obstacle in the path of social adjustment. His
psychology has in common with the Freudian, the interpretation of the will, and indeed
in the sense of a socially disturbing, and pedagogically undesirable manifestation of
individuality. He differs from Freud in that he recognizes and acknowledges the will as a
strong factor in the child’s impulse life, whereas Freud gives a sexual interpretation to
the manifestations of will without recognizing them for what they are. Adler follows
Freud, in that he sees it necessary to interpret the will, although in the form of an
ideology which originates from the sphere of will itself and thus specifies it as a will to
power or superiority.

The basis of the child’s psychical life, namely, the emotions, is badly accounted for by
both. For Freud, all emotions originate from the sexual sphere, an assumption that even
if it is proved to be genetically correct, leaves unexplained precisely the essential
characteristic of the emotional life, namely, its differentiations. For Adler, besides the so-
called "feeling of inferiority" there is no other feeling of essential importance, since all
other emotions can apparently just as easily be explained from the feeling of inferiority
as, according to Freud, they can be from the sexual impulse. Even granted that we
actually find explained in these two theories the source of our whole emotional life, I
main-
tain that we still need a theory of the emotional life itself in order to understand the manifold gradations of the emotions in the human psychical life. For both explanations, that of *Freud* and that of *Adler*, are causal, although the latter uses final explanations in order to interpret the phenomenon of will from the individual's point of view... It seems to me, however, that we need another point of view in order to understand such an eminently dynamic sphere as that of the emotional life with its constantly changing attitudes and moods.

Since we are not dealing here with a theory of the emotional life but with problems of education, on the ground of other experiences it may be stated that the therapeutic as well as the pedagogic experiments of the new generation of psychologists have taught us how inaccessible and difficult to influence the emotional sphere is. Just this very fact has led to the setting up of such simplifying theories, as those of *Freud* and *Adler*, with regard to the emotional life. Both theories are according to their own admission *practically* oriented; this was indeed an advantage over academic psychology, although it had considerable disadvantages. *Freud*’s psychology is primarily therapeutic, *Adler*’s doctrine, primarily pedagogic. In practice, however, every educator or therapeutist has finally to face the problem of the emotions, this the above mentioned theories have handled from the practical side, without having had at their disposal a satisfactory theory of the same. This necessity was proclaimed a virtue; but into this ideal picture of a scientific approach, there has crept unnoticed a blemish that has become disastrous to the whole. In order to be able somehow to approach the dynamics of the emotional life it was necessary to schematize, as *Freud* did in his sexual psychology and *Adler* in his theory of inferiority. That would have been justifiable at least as a beginning and as a rough working hypothesis, if it had not led underneath to a falsification of the whole picture and hence of the whole problem. For soon one had forgotten the purely practical need that had led to the simplification and a theory was evolved that postulated a similar simplicity of facts. This was possible, however, only by reason of a second and still more disastrous false conclusion; namely, one had obtained a simplification of the complicated state of affairs, not through pure observation of facts but already by means of interpreting them. In other words, at the root of the practical-scientific standpoint of Psychoanalysis and Individual Psychology, there lies a presupposition, not a theory, but an ideology, and this is in both cases the old pedagogic ideology, thus the very same that these theories pretend to reform.

The result was that the emotional life of the child, as of the adult, was not observed and hence remained no better understood than before: it was interpreted, and indeed for practical reasons which at the outset
were pedagogically and therapeutically justifiable. But the presupposition was that of the old pedagogic psychology which is primarily concerned not with understanding but with changing the individual or something in him because it is undesirable. Certainly we consider this as a part of the program of education, especially that part which concerns the early impulse life, yet it is no new factor, much less a modern factor in education. For early education, at least according to our present concept, ought first of all to develop the child’s given impulse disposition and not subject it to correction. Indeed, even when it appears to be in need of correction, we must ask ourselves the question whether we must not avoid too early an intervention just as much as too late. So the educational ideology of modern psychologists, proves to be as conventional as that of the old school of pedagogues; namely, it wants to guide, correct, and restrict the child’s early manifestations of will, and the rationalization of this bending of the will is now a psychological one, whereas the moral attitude has remained the same.

This is obvious in relation to the problem of will which Freud interprets as sexual striving, Adler as striving for recognition; both interpret it with the obvious pedagogic tendency to restrict and to adjust the expressions of the individual will in these two spheres, to an average normal standard. Only this moral tendency is at present not justified by religious dogmas, but is disguised in psychological terminology as therapeutic necessity and pedagogic expediency. This supposedly scientific ideology corresponds to the moralistic tendency in the parents, who consider the child’s emotional life, apart from the sphere in which it is manifested, as in itself undesirable and therefore not to be allowed expression. Had not a deeper study of the individual already taught us that the emotional life is extensively an expression of individual will, one could have drawn this conclusion from the affective repugnance that parents and educators feel towards all manifestations of emotion on the part of the child, as if they were obviously expressions of will. The psychoanalytic and the individual psychological formulation, that the sexual impulse or the striving for recognition is the source of the child’s emotional life, thus seems only a simplified psychological justification of the instinctive repugnance of parents and educators to the whole life of the emotions as a manifestation of the individual’s will.

Actually all educational difficulties seem to be traceable to a will conflict between child and educator, but this is not because the parents want to suppress the sexual impulse and the educator the child’s striving for power, but because such will conflicts are unavoidable where two people live together with one another. If one does not force the child’s will, one can observe that the child itself tries to provoke sexual prohibitions
from the parents and in the sphere of will shows an inclination to devotion, even
submission, which contradicts the theory of inferiority, as the desire for sexual
prohibition contradicts the Freudian libido theory. If Adler, for example, explains this
submission as merely a disguised method of achieving the will, yet in this finalistic
schematization which explains everything teleologically, he overlooks the diversity of
Nature, or at least one of the most important aspects of the human life that we
commonly call the emotional life in the narrower sense of the term. For even if his
explanation should be ultimately correct, yet it explains only what the child wants to
attain, but not how or by what means he hopes to attain it. Psychologically, we are
concerned with this feeling of surrender, of submission, of obsequiousness. Granted
that it stands in the service of the striving for recognition or of the sexual impulse, the
question still remains, what is it, whence comes it, what causes the individual to achieve
his sexual or self-seeking will tendency in this paradoxical way and what conditions and
processes in his psychical life enable him to do this? These are the questions that a
psychology of the emotions must first put to itself. Adler, however, has not even asked
them and Freud, on the other hand, has answered them far too schematically and
inadequately. Both were interested only in the tendency, the purpose, which the one
saw in the social striving for recognition, the other

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in the sexual striving for pleasure; but it has proved to be that there are not only
strivings for powerlessness and pain, paradoxical as this may sound, but there are also
emotional reactions which—indepenend of our own endeavours—are provoked in us
by other persons and hence cannot have a final explanation in the Adlerian sense. But
also Freud’s causal explanation, with its stressing of the genesis of the emotions, is
inadequate because ultimately it is again finalistic, that is, it is valued only with
reference to its pleasure or pain effect on the ego. However that may be, the emotions
are the medium, through which another human being is able to influence us. That
means that the essential factor in education is the emotional life, of which in essence we
know so little; and the little we do know is antipedagogic in implication since it indicates
that the emotional life is not to be explained in terms of cause and purpose and hence is
not to be controlled.

The former handling of the emotional life in education was relatively simple; one met the
child’s emotions with one’s own feelings, that is, emotionally, without bothering about
the origin and significance of the feeling itself, indeed without always accounting for its
purpose and aim. This primitive method has succeeded fairly well these thousands of
years, because feeling reacts most of all to feeling, and is influenced by it. For in the
moment when one wants to influence the child’s emotional development intelligently
and not temper-
mentally, there results for the educator not only the obvious demand to control his own affects, but also the impossible demand to be able to measure out his emotions in doses. This homeopathic dosing is, however, impossible in the emotional life and something foreign to its very nature, hence it would unfavourably influence the child’s emotional life, even if the educator could measure out his emotions. Generally the parents and educators give free rein to their emotional expressions towards the child, and this in and for itself would serve the purpose not only of unburdening their own but also of developing the child’s emotional life, if just as free an expression were allowed the child. The contrary however is the case, and this suppression of the emotions compels the child to seek other means of expression, which are then considered by adults as childish naughtiness or faults, since their real source, the emotional development itself, is not understood. Children thus brought up will, when adult, either continue to suppress their emotions and, on this account, will refuse to tolerate any expression of emotion in their children, much less arouse it; or as a reaction to this suppression in childhood they will later exceed all bounds in emotional outbursts, but will allow no direct emotional reaction in the child to these. But if emotional suppression in the educator himself is just as harmful as an excess of emotion, and if measuring out the emotions in doses is impossible, the question is, then, what shall the adult’s emotional life be in order to make possible a sound emotional training in the child?

This cardinal question of pedagogy seems to me answerable only in an unpedagogic way. Let the adult’s emotional life be what it will, his task as educator would be to accept the child’s emotional life as it develops from the individual and as a reaction to the parental emotional life. Certainly this does not mean that the child’s emotional life shall be completely free from control, but its true nature should be respected. The child cannot express affects of a definite kind and definite quantity at definite times, just to please the parents or educator, and these latter should know from their own experience how unreasonable such a demand would be. If it were not so, there would be no educational problem, just as there would be no adult neurotic problems such as have recently made the question of education so urgent. As long as the child’s emotional expressions are felt by adults as disturbances (of their own emotional life) or in so far as they are provoked in the child only for the gratification of adults, there can be no free unfolding or development of emotion in the child. The essence of emotion consists in its spontaneity, that is, however, in its qualitative, quantitative and temporal indeterminableness, and every educational attempt to influence it in one of these directions must fail, if its success is not to be at the cost of the whole emotional development. The emotions
cannot be educated, they can, however, be formed and influenced, but only by the model emotional life of the parents, using the term "model" not in the sense of an ideal but of an example. In other words, one ought not to pay too much attention to isolated emotions and their affective manifestation, which certainly cannot always be worthy of the child's imitation. But it is a question rather of the adult’s whole attitude to his emotional life as such, which the child senses and imitates in reacting to it. This attitude, evinced in a free expression of the emotions, should serve as a model irrespective of whether the emotional manifestations are quantitatively, qualitatively or temporally desirable or undesirable. In a word, a free natural expression of emotion in the educator will also most easily stimulate such emotions in the child. One ought not therefore to fear an occasional unpedagogic manifestation of affect, since with it one serves the higher educational aim—the formation of the human being. We cannot beget only good, beautiful, noble and moderate emotions in the child; if the child is to have a human emotional life, then it will always be capable also of the ugly, ignoble and immoderate affects, and even these will always be more valuable from a human standpoint, than complete suppression of the affect, which would then find some outlet in other, not always beautiful ways.

This leads us to the much discussed dictum that the educator shall be consistent, a dictum that we can only support from the psychological viewpoint. But this consistency, however good it may be as a principle of education, ought not to be artificially acquired if it is not to lose much of its pedagogic value. It should rather correspond to a spontaneous expression of one’s own personality which is consistent in being just that. If parents and educators are themselves as much as possible in general, and also towards the child, then this will better enable the child to accept, develop, and express its own self as it sees the parents also doing. This kind of personality-demonstration, however paradoxical it may sound, will be the least likely to rob the child of its individuality because it least of all forces on the child the individuality of the parents or educator. The parents need not learn much for this, at most only to become a little freer themselves in their own emotional expression, without fearing that this would set the child a bad example. We do not yet know very much about the inheritance of physical dispositions and peculiarities, and the inheritance of peculiarities of character in the child is still more problematical. Psychoanalysis has again clearly warned us that a large amount of compensation and counter-formation occurs in the building of the character, so that for example, a child may develop particularly well a peculiarity of character just because the father was weak in this respect, even though the child had inherited the disposition to...
this weakness but had been able to overcome it by compensation (Adler).

How important is the parents' whole attitude to the emotional life as such (above all to their own), apart from isolated displays, is clearly shown in the essential difficulties we encounter in the early training of infants. These begin with the physical training of the suckling in cleanliness and regularity in its physical functions, in a word, with impulse education, which soon passes over into the training of the will in the narrower sense. But we already know from little experience in sex education that it is not enough to be merely less prudish here, and not to suppress all manifestations of the sexual impulse, unless the educator's whole attitude to all the child’s impulse manifestations is a freer one. For we have learnt that the child so reacts to the suppression of an impulse in a particular sphere as if every kind of impulse manifestation were forbidden; so that, for example, the restrictions which may be necessary in relation to his physical functions can very easily be automatically transferred to manifestations of the sexual impulse; and indeed not merely because they are linked up with the same organ, but also because the child gets the impression that every kind of free impulse activity is forbidden or undesirable. A further difficulty arises in the fact that the child very soon identifies the manifestations of impulse and the suppression of impulse with manifesta-

...tions of the will and suppression of the will; as later on the child transfers the same conflict to the sphere of the emotions and there too allows only such manifestations as are pleasing to the parents, suppressing others. Certainly the suppression of feeling begins with the suppression of bad feelings, or such as are felt to be bad, and then encroaches upon the whole life of the emotions.

Since we have not yet a theory of the emotional life, without which any real understanding of educational problems is impossible, we can here only attempt to estimate the complicated relation between impulse, will, and feeling, in its significance for the understanding of early childhood's problems of education. In our cultural milieu the necessary regulation of childish impulse manifestations is a phase preceding education in the narrower sense, to be followed by the real training of the will as a direct groundwork for school or formal instruction. The emotional life finds no place at all in this educational scheme; perhaps rightly so, because the community is primarily not interested in the individual’s possibilities of happiness but is only interested in the individual’s usefulness and fitness for the community. If the individual, besides fulfilling his social functions, can still be personally happy, so much the better! But this possibility of happiness depends on his emotional life and like this, it is so to say, his private concern. Hence the natural educators of the emotional
life are the parents, as the emotional life in general is essentially a matter of the home, in a word, is a private concern. I believe it is this fact above all that parents should first comprehend and accept, rather than seek for specific advice in this or that difficult situation, which in turn may be more a matter for the professional educator, psychologist, and therapeutist. Even with this changed attitude on the part of the parents, which is the first step towards the improvement of conditions, the emotional education will always be difficult enough. It will be so primarily because the education of the emotions is not education in the real sense of the word, as for example is the training of the impulses and the will, which consists mainly of guiding and forming given forces. The child brings into the world relatively strong impulses and develops them in the course of its natural growth; these fundamentally need only to be tamed and domesticated. On the other hand there develops with the impulse life and from its restrictions, the child’s own will which later contributes to the formation of his personality. The parents are mainly occupied with the training of this automatically developing will which seems to afford them the greatest difficulties and hence they neglect the formation of the emotions. This however is fundamentally a new creation, for the child brings into the world a relatively rudimentary emotional life, which it cannot further develop alone, out of itself, but only in relation to the persons near to it.

There is a very close psychological relation between the manifestation of the will and the emotions, the complete understanding of which has not yet been made quite accessible to us. It seems to me, however, that the training of the will cannot alone result by means of the parental counter-will, but takes place also by means of the emotional life or formation of the emotions. The simplest and best known example for this is the overcoming of childish stubbornness through love. I do not mean that only feelings can and should be used for the training of the will, but that the child’s emotional life must be developed first from the sphere of will by influencing it in a certain way. As the love of the educator, for example, can overcome the child’s will, so the emotional life in the child itself must modify the too aggressive manifestations of its own will, or, as we say, the child overcomes its own will out of love for the educator and gives up its will of its own accord without first being compelled to it. The psychological understanding of this process was hidden as long as we had only in mind the relation of the child to the educator and the duel of wills between the two. A worse or better attitude of the child will depend, however, on its own ability to produce in itself an emotional manifestation instead of an expression of will. In the ideal case this is love, but also from reactions of regret, penitence, or guilt-feeling, good pedagogic effects may
be obtained.

As to how this conversion of will into feeling takes place in the child itself, we know very little; it seems only that the child strives against the formation of feeling because it prefers impulse and will reactions as the simpler and more pleasurable. That this conversion is stimulated in the child by the influence of the parental emotional life and by means of their emotional manifestations, seems to me beyond question, for the emotional life must, as we said, first be aroused, then developed. But it seems to me just as certain that sex is not the only source of the emotional life, as Freud has assumed, indeed in general it might be considered less as a source than as an outlet for emotions, but at least it has both functions. Sex can arouse feeling in an individual, as well as serve as a diversion and an outlet for feelings aroused in the individual from other sources. Only when it fulfils this latter function, namely that of discharging emotion, is it complete and satisfying also in the emotional sense, for the essence of feeling, as I have already elsewhere mentioned, consists of the union of the ego with the Thou, of the individual with his fellow men, in the broadest sense, with the community. But since in the child, sexual expression can naturally be only autoerotic, so in his case the sexual sphere is more favourable for the formation of emotion than for an outlet for emotion, because the sexual tension remains in the ego and is transformed there into emotion. Only in so far as the sexual impulse is an expression of will, can it be as such also a direct source of emotion, especially when this manifestation of will is inhibited.

We cannot here avoid touching upon the psychology of the emotions, without the understanding of which we cannot otherwise proceed. The primitive impulse life itself, according to its very nature, tends to motor discharge, which results in the feeling of gratification. Every impulse excitation naturally passes through the two phases of tension and discharge, which the ego on the whole experiences as pain and pleasure. But only at a further stage of development do we speak of the emotional life in the real sense of the word. Here again we find the two characteristics of pain-tension and pleasure-discharge, but yet the accentuation is different from that in the impulse life. Whereas the impulse according to its nature compels an outlet and passes through the stage of tension, so to say, only unwillingly, the essence of the emotion consists of just the reverse, namely, in wanting to preserve the tension, to prolong the pleasure phase, and hence emotion forces a relaxation of tension only as an expedient, when the tension becomes unbearable. Certainly this distinction concerns only the extreme types of impulsive and emotional individuals, whereas the degree in which they are
combined in the individual varies in different cases. There are people, the so-called impulsive types, whose emotional life is regulated according to the impulse life, that is, presses towards immediate discharge; whereas another type's reactions in his impulse manifestations will again be too emotional, that is, delayed. In any case from this theoretical discrimination we conclude that the emotional life corresponds, so to say, to an inhibited or dammed-up impulse life. The damming up, however, does not necessarily follow by reason of external inhibition of the impulse; it may also result from an inner pressure, since the blocking of the impulse into emotion under certain conditions is more pleasurable than motor discharge or at least is preferred by one part of the ego. The foundation for this experience may be laid in an external impulse-inhibition in childhood, but the individual soon learns to make use of this impulse inhibition for the ego, which leads to the formation of emotion.

The factor in our psychical life that makes this possible for the child is the will, which in this way turns the forced impulse inhibition into a willed formation of emotion and so out of pain gains pleasure. The real emotional life, as a subjective impulse life independent of external outlet, is thus possible only at the stage of the formation of will which we must now consider.

1 This viewpoint of inner impulse inhibition, I have already expressed in "Der Kunstler" (1905).
educator wants to attain, but certainly without wanting to accept the undesirable accompanying phenomena. These arise chiefly from the fact that the will, formed for the dominance and subjection of one’s own impulse life, turns not only inward but outward as well, and there becomes negative counter-will in the form of stubbornness and resistance, wilfulness and disobedience.

We can now turn back to our earlier statement, that there are two kinds of emotional formation from the sphere of the will. If the will itself is, so to say, broken and softened, there results real emotions which I have designated "uniting emotions," such as devotion, submission, repentance, guilt, all of which one might comprehend under the term love-emotions. On the other hand we have those feelings which do not result from a softening of the will, but from an inhibition of the will, thus do not weaken the will, but on the contrary, strengthen it; they are the separating reactions, such as stubbornness, rage, pride, fear, which one might best characterize collectively as hate-affects. These can easily be aroused in the child by the educator, if he forces the training of the will; moreover it seems that the child itself is more easily inclined to their production, because they permit of an outer discharge which is less possible and natural in the uniting feelings of love. For the feelings that unite arise, as we have already said, in the individual himself from a renunciation of the achievement of will; hence they presuppose on the whole a higher stage of ego and personality development than one generally finds in the child. One must, therefore, expect in the child more of the negative feelings (hate-affects) resulting from the inhibition of will than the feelings of love that follow from selfdiscipline, of which the adult as a rule is capable in varying high degree. The hate-affects mentioned are, however, not only negative feelings, but they prevent, in general, the formation of the positive love feelings or at least their expression if they arise.

Here comes into play a process highly important for the understanding of the emotional life, which I have described as denial of feeling. This takes place when a dawning feeling of love is not only not expressed, that is, is suppressed, but is actually denied, namely, it is feigned as not existing when the will opposes this emotional expression because it represents submission and surrender. This resistance generally manifests itself as pride or shame, ego-reactions that have to do with the nature of the feeling as something purely internal, which the individual wants to keep to himself. For the release of emotional tension must necessarily be physical and on the one hand presupposes willingness of the other person to serve as outlet, on the other hand, the willingness of one’s own ego to admit this dependence on the other. We first enter the sphere of the emotions proper only at the stage where the feeling and not the
impulse forms the motive of action. In the extreme case, this is the already mentioned impulsive type, who acts, however, not according to the need of the impulse but according to the need of the emotion, which he desires to gratify impulsively, that is, without delay. The community expects, however, that a well-adjusted adult will act neither purely impulsively nor purely emotionally, but intelligently. But since conduct or action must naturally make use of physical means of expression one might designate the desired result of will training which includes impulse domination and suppression of the emotions as a process opposed to the instinctive forces; the aim of education is thus opposed to the natural way of the individual’s action, in that it aims at the individual’s action being motivated by thought, which should first stimulate the will and then mobilize the impulse to carry it out. In this utilitarian method the emotional sphere seems almost excluded, whereas in the love life, on the other hand, we expect purely emotional behaviour and condemn both the utilitarian attitude and the purely impulsive action. Here again it is clearly evident, that the two spheres of the individual’s inner life, divided in childhood between the home and the school, are necessarily forced to remain more or less separated throughout the individual’s entire life. In the adult we see this resulting in the conflict popularly known as the struggle between love and career, which fundamentally is again the conflict between the im-

pulsive-emotional self and the moral-intellectual self, ordinarily represented in the family life and the work respectively.

But the love life with its mixture of impulsive, willed, emotional, and purposeful action, shows us only too clearly how impossible is the one-sided motivation of our actions, toward which all education fundamentally aims. We have also experienced how difficult it is to investigate the motives of a definite action, since the same action may spring from different kinds of stimuli and hence may also have the most varied psychical effects. Let us take for example the sex act itself; it may be a substitute for emotional expression as well as an expression of the same, just as it may serve the achievement of will or the submission of will (surrender). In the ideal case it signifies all these, but we know very well that the ideal case—here as elsewhere—is not the rule, and that the predominance of one or other component may lead to all kinds of difficulties and conflicts. This sufficiently complicated state of affairs becomes still more intricate when we consider that the human emotional life not only arises from the impulsive ego, but is fed also from another source which we might designate the moral ego. Psychoanalysis in its endeavour to derive all feelings from the sexual impulse, has neglected this source, although Freud was later on compelled to a partial recognition of it, whereas Adler now includes it in his concept of "social feeling." In the
morally educated and ethically adjusted human being, not only are individual impulses operative as motives of action, feeling and thought, but the collective element also is operative as manifested religiously or socially. This pedagogically important source of the emotional life has hitherto been studied still less than its impulse side, so that our educational understanding shows great gaps from the standpoint of collective psychology.

A greater pedagogic understanding cannot alone result from a deeper insight into the nature, abilities and needs of the child as an individual, but it must also lead to a clearer formulation of the real task of education and to a keener knowledge of its limitations. Often enough we find that a better understanding of the child or of a definite situation makes the task of the educator more difficult if not impossible; similarly as the criminologist is more confused than helped when he learns to understand the psychical motives in the criminal. For all understanding leads rather to tolerance than to action and without action we cannot proceed in the education of the child or in dealing with anti-social individuals. The new psychological understanding of the child’s emotional life presents the educator with new difficult tasks which formerly did not exist at all in pedagogy. The educator may have a very clear understanding of an undesirable action of the child’s and yet be obliged to act from a purely pedagogic point of view as if he understood nothing of the psychological motivation. In a certain sense this is only right; for the educator is not concerned with the psychological motivation of good or desirable actions. If he were, he would often find to his astonishment, that good actions arise from motives which he must condemn and on the other hand that an evil act can spring from very good, in themselves praiseworthy, motives. In a word, since pedagogy must have as its aim a definite mode of action, the motivation is left to the individual, and is questioned only in the case of an undesirable action. The motivation by the impulse, will, or emotion, that is behind the action is, so to say, the private concern of the individual, and the increasing separation of these two spheres has to a large extent also become the source of our conflicts. If modern psychology and especially Psychoanalysis, now investigates not only the mental attitude, as the church has done, but also the impulsive and emotional motivation (the so-called Unconscious), it will naturally incline to a radical revaluation of all educational values, which fundamentally is the same thing as substituting psychological understanding for education, instead of applying it within the confines of education. This use, however, can, after what we have said, be only a very limited one since a further application would necessarily lead to the psychology of motives which would be anti-pedagogic in effect.

Here we must allude to a general principle of cognition, which recently has become of great importance
in the whole field of mental science and in psychology in particular. This is the concept that a real understanding is possible only from a valuation of the total situation and not by observation of isolated phenomena, however correct they may be. This principle, however, does not seem to be valid for practical action, which is more likely to succeed when one restricts oneself to a detail. In any case we know also from the history of science, that technical inventions of great practical bearing have been made on the foundation of inadequate theories. However that may be, in the handling of people, especially in education, a total comprehension—in so far as it is possible for us today—can doubtless further understanding, but will necessarily inhibit the action of the pedagogues. This again should only emphasize the fundamental difference between the ideal of knowledge and that of practicability and warn us against applying a principle from one of these spheres to the other. This may sound pessimistic, if one expects from psychology a solution of all difficulties as one had hitherto expected from religion. Psychology, differing from religion, is individualistic, and hence can be of use only indirectly in all matters of social welfare, especially in education. We can apply psychology and psychological insight directly only to ourselves; this is difficult enough but it may become indirectly effective in our social life with others and in our relation to our nearest. But what we want to do, especially with

our children, is to apply our psychology directly to them instead of to ourselves. This fault of projection is inherent in education for in its striving to establish one uniform type alone it aims at immortality through the preservation of that type, but at the same time the educator involuntarily and unconsciously brings about an increasing individualization and idealization in the sense of his personal interests. So education will always remain training of the will, that is, restriction of the personal and individual in favour of the race with its unchanging collectivity and its changing ideals—irrespective of what community ideology is at the moment in power, or of the prevailing rationalization of this educational task, whether religious, as it formerly was, or psychological, as it is today.
Chapter Four  THE COMMUNITY IDEOLOGY AND INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

It is now our task to put the Community in place of the Deity. Durkheim 1

When we said that all education is fundamentally a training of the will, this obviously relates only to the purely psychological side of the problem such as we have just described. For the means that are used in this training of the will change according to the age and civilization, in other words, according to the prevailing ideologies at different times. At one time it may be a spiritual ideology as among the primitives, or a religious one as among the Eastern civilizations, or a humanistic, as among the Greeks, or a political ideology as most clearly represented by the Roman Empire, or finally, a mechanistic-economic ideology as that of our own age. Naturally, all these ideologies are more or less dependent on real factors as manifested in different forms of society determined by environment and historical development. How that which we call an ideology arises out of all these elements cannot be discussed here, although some light1 may be thrown on the problem in the course of the following discussions, but, briefly, we may say that an ideology arises from the absorption of all the given elements by the individuals living under their influence. Among these individuals there are some who elaborate and work up these factors enforced by the community into a freely accepted development. An ideology thus seems to arise from the combination and intermingling of a few natural collective elements with individually determined aspirations and ideals; it is, so to speak, the individual’s answer to that which is given, simultaneously admitted, accepted, modified and idealized. But it is not an answer that is given once and for ever, but one that has to be continually renewed and altered since the ideology in its practical effects, again in its turn, constantly influences and modifies that which is given. In spite of the significant individual influence on the development of the ideology, yet we may rightly speak of community ideologies, for it is only by taking over the collective elements—however primitive they may be—on the one hand, and only by the reciprocal absorption of the individually modified collectivity by society, on the other hand, that

1 Compare with this the thorough-going study of Karl Mannheim, "Ideologie und Utopie," Bonn, 1929.
constitutes the real essence of the ideological in the sense we are dealing with here.

In spite of the permeation of the collective and the individual in every ideology, yet there are ideologists who have more of the collective character and others in whom the individual element predominates. We can already see here in what decisive way the prevailing ideology must influence education, the very nature of which consists of inculcating the individual with collective ideas and values. This is best illustrated by taking the two extreme methods of education used by primitive and modern pedagogues and comparing them in relation to their respective ideologies. It would then seem that religion, the educational means of primitive civilization, is almost an entirely collective ideology, whereas the essential educational means of our time, psychology, is a fundamentally individual ideology. The two-sidedness of every ideology that mutually elaborates the collective and the individual, manifests itself in the predominance of the one or the other factor respectively. Religion, according to the agreement of recent investigators, having arisen fundamentally as a collective ideology, almost as a symbol of social structure, finally reaches its climax in the idea of God who in this sense becomes an individual representative of the community, so to speak, a personification of the same. On the other hand, psychology, the most individual ideology that we know, tends in our time more and more towards a "community-psychology" as manifested in the application of individual psychological viewpoints to collective phenomena like masses, groups and so forth (social psychology). Thus we see this process of the intermingling of the collective and the individual, not only co-operating in the origin of every ideology, but continuing in its development and indeed in such a way that the more collective ideologies, which characterize the more primitive ages, tend towards individualization, whereas the more individual ideologies of the higher civilizations tend to communization.

This balancing tendency, however, goes parallel to a phenomenon that relates to the abstract and concrete aspects of the ideology. The increasing individualization of the collective ideologies at the same time also corresponds to an increasing concretion of the original abstract ideology; whilst the increasing communization of an individual ideology inclines to abstraction. Again we see this most clearly in religion on the one hand, and in psychology on the other. Religion was originally collective and abstract, that is, purely spiritual. This is shown in the earliest stage of the totemistic belief in a soul-spirit, and only in its further development was God represented in concrete individual form in sculpture and carving, till finally it has become pictured in our children's idea of God as a humanized St. Nicholas. On the other hand, psychology which began as concrete natural science of the individual has today
again become entangled in philosophic speculation concerning the group soul and collective consciousness which is no less abstract than the primitives’ spiritualistic belief in the soul\(^1\). At the same time, however, the application of individual psychological viewpoints to ethno-psychological problems has thrown much new light on these, although sociologists and ethnologists have recently objected to seeing collective phenomena of social and racial psychology reduced to the psychology of the individual\(^2\). But also the psychology of the individual has been enriched by interest in collective viewpoints, and this has been the chief merit of the Zurich psychoanalytic school under the leadership of Jung. This phase of the mutual application of individual and collective psychology seems to give way today again to a more rigid separation of the two spheres, as precisely through their mutual influence on one another, also their differences have more sharply developed. For the collective is indeed more primitive than the individual, yet does not seem quite to coincide with the primitive \textit{in} the individual (as Le Bon and also Freud assume), but is essentially different from it as particularly Jung has recently maintained. Hence one cannot explain collective phenomena—as Freud

\(^1\) See the critical survey by Gerhard Lehmann. \textit{Das Kollektivbewusstsein} (Berlin, 1928).

\(^2\) The best critical survey of the present situation of this problem which is ripe for a new orientation of social psychology, is given by A. E. W. Burgess, Prof, of Sociology at the University of Chicago, in his article entitled “The Cultural Approach to the Study of Personality (Mental Hygiene. April 1930).

for example has attempted to do—from the primitive mind of the individual and causally trace them back only to reality; just as little as one can understand irrational characteristics in the individual of today simply as the remains of old collective ideologies, as Jung has done. In both cases there must appear in the place of a schematic application of the one principle to the other sphere, a consideration of the mutual permeation of the two spheres, of which now the one, now the other predominates and yet somehow fundamentally remain incompatible.

If we now return to our actual theme, namely the part which the ideology plays as means of education, we must first of all be aware of the fact that the different ideologies are of different value in relation to their pedagogic significance. Experience seems to give clear evidence of the fact that an ideology possesses greater pedagogic value the more collective qualities it contains. The paradox in this is only, that these collective ideologies are also more abstract and in spite of it seem to possess greater pedagogic value than the concrete individual ideologies. If we again compare the two extremes, religion and psychology, there is no doubt that religion for thousands of years has supplied the most powerful and effective, even at times the only means of education, although in its ideology it has been purely abstract, though in its rites rather concrete. On the other hand, at least according to experience

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hitherto, it seems certain that psychology has relatively little ideological value to offer as a means of education. This is not only a consequence of its relative newness (in contrast to religion), but is fundamental to its nature as a concrete individualistic ideology.

In discussing the educational problem, we have sharply defined its aim already dealt with, from the means given in its ideology and from the content of education itself. If we now turn to the content which is equally determined by the naturally given and ideologically created factors, we shall notice that a close, although diversified relationship exists between the ideology as a means of education and the content of education. Again it is the case, that the collective ideologies, the prototype for which we have taken to be religion, have supplied much more material for the content of education than the more individual ideologies like psychology which is essentially structural. Thus religion, as we have already shown in the primitive initiation rites of the boys, was not only the means of education but at the same time it supplied its most essential content. We already notice the same tendency today in regard to the psychological educational ideology, namely, that it is used not only as a means for education but gradually it is becoming the content of the same; not only in the particular form of sexual education whereby—as stated—the sexual instinct is trained and at the same time sexual instruction is given; but also with regard to the whole psychological ideology itself, that not only guides the educator but also is already given to the child as a subject to be learned. Thus psychology appears in the educational system in place of religion or must be made into an ideology of equal value with religion since the very essence of any effective ideology consists in being believed in by all.

Whereas at the beginning we asked ourselves from the therapeutic view-point what was wrong with education, now in view of the religious education which after all has created our civilization, we must ask how was this achievement possible? With regard to the above mentioned collective value of religion, we can answer this question satisfactorily. However strange it may sound to us today the child is fundamentally a collective being and indeed to a far greater degree than is the case with the adult who, in spite of social ties, strengthens his individuality in the course of his life and also protects himself against social influences. This individuality develops in the child partly by reason of his natural growth, partly as a reaction against the uniforming pressure of the community, whereas that which is collective in the child, or, better, the child as a collective being, would be stunted if collective ideolo-

1 The well known American child Psychiatrist Lawson G. Lowry describes as one of his most impressive experiences the participation in a meeting of 13-year old boys in a Viennese school. The boys explained their own behaviour and that of others in psychological terminology in order to find ways and means of making it socially acceptable and at the same time individually gratifying. (Mental Hygiene, July 1929).
gies were not given to him from without. This ideological nourishment is just as necessary for the construction and development of the collective element in the child as the physical nourishment is to the construction and development of the physical ego. This, and not religious dogmatism or fanaticism, is the reason why in civilizations with religious ideologies, the child’s nurturing in the faith begins so early. Certainly this is valid only for civilized races of a higher culture among whom this early religious training has to paralyse collectively precisely the later influence of the more individualistic professional training. In simple words, the Jew or the Christ had first to become Jew or Christ and also remain so, before he could be craftsman, farmer, civil-servant, or whatever else he was in his profession. In civilizations with more individualistic and concrete ideologies, as ours of the present day, it is seemingly the reverse; the individual’s social value is estimated above all according to his professional ability to achieve, although differences of creed or nationality, however, are now only used as a means of depreciating the value of professional competitors.

Also where religion coincided—as it did in all pre-Christian civilizations—with the nation and the state (or whatever else may have been the collective standard), yet the individual, through being received into the religious community, became a member of a bigger and higher union than just the purely social one.

Christianity for the first time materialized this hyper-collective character of the religious, in that it created a world religion which embraced many nationalities without demanding the renunciation of their characteristics. This was possible, however, only by straining the religious ideology beyond its capacity. For religion under primitive conditions, as also under national civilizations, had the one purpose of making the individual the soul-bearer to the community and thereby guaranteeing the immortality of the tribe or race and with it that of individuals as such. A world religion such as Christianity, is, however, not permanently able to fulfil the national ideal of religion, as shown in the religious wars of the Middle Ages, as well as in the World War also, where those professing the same creed fought against each other for their national preservation.

From this it follows that the individual is not only socially restricted, but that also the collective element has its limits beyond which it cannot be expanded without again provoking individual reactions against an exaggerated collectivity. These reactions may start from separate individuals or also from small groups which may be likened to individuals, in comparison to larger groups. Hence these reactions are also concrete—often enough too concrete—but this is quite comprehensible in view of their individual character on the one hand, and the all-embracing abstraction of
hyper-collectivity on the other hand. The religious ideology thus cannot be expanded beyond a certain limit, because then the abstraction becomes incomprehensible for individuals and hence insignificant. At this juncture, humanism springs up to replace the super-ideology of a world religion no longer equal to its task. Here lies the reason why the humanistic ideal of education could and must follow the religious, national ideal. But also this world ideology of Humanism that blossomed in the eighteenth century, was soon supplanted by smaller group interests that finally developed into a class war within the different nationalities, a state of affairs characteristic of the nineteenth century. The World War may be comprehended as a reaction to this, for at least it temporarily united the different nations—indeed even produced larger coalitions—and in its after effects there is even a tendency towards the humanistic ideal of the brotherhood of man. Besides, this International Struggle has highly intensified the previously existing individualism which had been submerged during the War. The result of this begins to be felt at the present time in the psychological educational ideology.

When we said before that the child is fundamentally a collective being, in so far as he is the representative of the species and guarantees its continuity, yet we see that modern education emphasizes in him more and more the personal, the individual—which, moreover,

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expands with growth and maturity—instead of cultivating the collective in him, as religious education in the best sense of the word had done. The psychological ideology of education more and more isolates the child first from his family, then from the group, in that it emphasizes the child’s own personality and considers and values his individual problems from his own point of view. One may, like Adler in his Individual Psychology, preach as the ideal, the adjustment to the community, yet one preaches to deaf ears, for according to its very nature the psychological ideology is individualistic, and cannot become collective by mere catch words. As already mentioned, the only collective force that I can see in the modern program of education is the sexual education, although paradoxically only its individualistic factor has been emphasized, and not the collective one. We now understand better how this might have happened, and why it had to happen. According to its very nature, the sexual ideology includes the two spheres of the individual and the collective, but its ideological development (presented by me elsewhere)1 leads away from the spiritual soul-belief of collective communities to the materialistic sensuality of the modern individual. Sexual education is now, as already stated, an attack of the community on the individual in the sense of utilizing the collective forces lying in sexuality, as

1 "Seelenglaube und Psychologie.”

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against the individual forces. Thus unfortunately, it turns out that the only collective factor in modern education is so conditioned that the individual has to defend himself to the utmost against the exploitation of sexuality for racial purposes by the community.

But here another point of view gains prevalence and one that concerns the gradual decay or dying away of ideologies, in a word, their destiny in the sense of their ascendency or descendancy, respectively. From the study of folklore and legends, the idea is familiar to us that the depreciated forms of religious belief and thought are gradually given up by adults and—like obsolete tools and weapons—are banished to the nurseries for playthings. Indeed the children get things that are also still in use for toys, but this forms a part of education as a preparation for actual life. But actual play and joy, psychologically speaking, emotional gratification, are given to the children by the old superstitious traditions and the objects that we call playthings associated with them. It seems perhaps to be the same with already stated ideologies, that is, they serve in the nurseries for educational purposes when they have lost their value for adults or at least when they can no longer be fully appreciated. The child’s systematic religious education seems historically to begin with the collapse of the Jewish state, where we see a wandering, homeless Nation compelled to preserve its ideology without the corresponding social structure. Since this collective ideology has nothing concrete on which it rests and in which the individuals can actually “feel” themselves members of a whole, the ideology itself has to be built up all the stronger in each individual. This process corresponds to an attempt to build up a collectivity from the individual whereas generally it is the reverse, the individuals objectify their own collectivity into ideologies and make them concrete. As a counter-balance to these lacking facts of a homeland and a national state, the Jews seem to be the first to produce a very concrete sexual ideology. With other civilized races the sexual ideology only gradually forced its way against the resistance to giving up the original abstract soul-ideology which never existed among the Jews. But at the same time for the purpose of the religious education of the individual who had to support the abstract collective ideology the Jews produced a very concrete institution, namely the school, which for them, so to say, replaced the state and not only, as among ourselves, prepared for it. And although our schools too have presumably sprung from the Jewish temple teaching and have got other functions, yet the essence of the school has remained fundamentally the same. It

1 Ernst Krieck has elaborated in a masterly way, in his profound work entitled "Die Bildungssysteme der Kultervolker" (Leipzig, 1927) (see especially Page 97 £f.), the idea of the development of schooling from the duty implied in Deuteronomy to teach. He traced the development of the elementary school from the old Rabbinal instruction in the synagogues, where elementary schools were formed as lower grades of the synagogues, to the first century b. c.
consists, namely, of the establishment—or rather reestablishment—of a small, easily surveyed community with a strong feeling of fellowship among the pupils, and a twofold attitude to the teacher corresponding to that of their loved and feared God.

If we compare this original function of the school with the change it has since undergone, it would appear as if the most important difference between the Jewish Temple school and our teaching is that the former was a substitute for a social ideology which in reality was missing, the latter is a preparation for the social ideology prevailing at the time. This also explains why the Jewish instruction was soon lost in abstract speculation, whereas our school education took on more and more concrete features and practical aims. But at the moment when we introduce the psychological ideology into our school system, the picture changes. For it is not a question of psychology being taught along with many other subjects, but rather of the psychological attitude of teachers and parents who are compelled to transmit this, their psychological attitude, to the child in order to inoculate him with their own psychological ideology. But at the same time we are confronted with the same difficulty that we have previously mentioned in reference to a too abstract religious ideology; only in the case of the psychological ideology this difficulty cannot be removed by the same means as with the religious ideology. First of all because, in religion it is a matter of a collective ideology, in Psychology it is a matter of an individual ideology. Hence, psychology, which has replaced religion individually, has proved to be unsuitable as a collective ideology, and the psychological program of education represents an attempt on the part of the community to make psychology a collective ideology, when it is an individual one. This attempt, however, cannot succeed here even as far as it did in religion. For the mere fact that each individual "learns" the psychological ideology which he can only absorb individually does not produce a collective ideology; this is something other than the sum total of individual ideologies, even when these are similar to one another; just as the individuals themselves remain different in spite of many similarities. But since the psycho-ideology according to its nature is individual, the individual differences can never disappear in it and consequently it can also never become a collective ideology in the sense of an educational ideal, even if every individual has to acquire it. Hence it is interesting to see how the psychological ideology of education must resort to sex education as to a concrete and collective ideology, in order to bring in the requisite educational value which is not in psychology as such. But also this does not prove to be a workable educational ideology, for the sexual enlightenment of the child seems rather a symptom of the decline of our whole sexual ideology.
just as the beginning of religious education in the child was shown above to be a
symptom of the decline of the religious ideology.

In the primitive age of the belief in the soul, the child was chiefly a collective being that
passed from the mother to the community and had little to do with individual sexuality.
The initiation rites made what little individuality the boy may have possessed again into
a collective part, as it had been previously when a little child. Among the primitives this
rudimentary individual development ceases just with puberty, whereas with us it begins
then; on the other hand with the primitives, sexual development begins much earlier and
indeed does not cease with puberty but is much restricted after the initiation rites,
whereas formerly it was free. All this is intelligible only from the belief in the soul which
separates sexuality and procreation in order to be able to preserve the individual belief
in immortality. With the recognition of the sexual ideology, that is, of the man’s role of
begetting in procreation, the individual ideology of immortality began to swerve, and
through the individual recognition of fatherhood is transferred from the ego to the race
whose representative the child is. At this stage of the sexual age, however, the child
must belong to the father and not to the community, for otherwise he would lose his
claim to immortality. So the child for thousands of years has been the last refuge of the
individually shattered belief in immortality. In the new age of individualism also this last
position of the belief in the soul seems to be endangered, in that the adult has to
renounce his individual immortality in accepting the sexual ideology. On the other hand,
not only does the state reclaim the child as a counter-possession but also the child
himself as he grows, does not want to fulfil either the father’s or the state’s idea of
immortality, but is mainly concerned in fulfilling his own individual immortality, in life and
work. Herewith, sexuality has again become individual for the adult, but he cannot
accept it as such since only its collective aspect guarantees immortality. And this
collective significance is supposed to be given to sexuality through the enlightenment of
the child, who in its turn must again rebel against it with his individualism. Here the
recently much discussed question of sexual repression, which has hitherto seemed
insoluble to Psychoanalysis, appears in a new light. One cannot understand it, if one
starts from the primitives’ free sexual life and the socially restricted sexuality of the
civilized being, for these are presuppositions that, moreover, are contradicted most
clearly by the facts themselves. In comparison to the sexual freedom of modern man
who can at least privately permit everything, the primitives’ sexual life seems like a
chain of restrictions which, however, he does not experience as such because they
support his ideology of immortality, this
being far more important to him. Moreover one can only speak of a sexual repression at
the stage of the sexual age, that is, after recognizing the man’s part in procreation
against which the father defends himself before and also after, by means of sexual
repression. This arises from within and serves the purpose of maintaining the ego’s
ideology of immortality and manifests itself only later in social restrictions which have to
justify the inner sexual resistance. *This sexual resistance, according to the social and
individual stage of development, is at one time directed against the collective side of
sexuality and at another against its individual side.* In our present cultural strife about
the sexual ideology, which operates in education, we see on the side of the adult the
resistance against the purely individual function of sexuality, the release of which we do
not want because it would rob us of the advantages of the collective ideology of
immortality (the possession of children). On the other hand the child resists the sexual
enlightenment that communizes sexuality, in his individualistic rebellion against the
collective control of this personal source of pleasure. The child's idea of sexuality is
different from that of the adult, and what the psychologist deduces from the latter’s
sexual ideology as desirable is not therefore necessarily good for the child. The concept
of sexual freedom in particular differs according to whether it is that of an adjusted
person of society or of the child who first

has to be adjusted. Whereas the educator might believe in giving sexual freedom as he
conceives it to the child, he does this in communizing sexuality, in making it a subject
for enlightenment, and precisely in this way he makes it unfree. The adult needs a
collective sexual ideology for the maintenance of the biological ego continuity, whereas
the growing child rightly insists on an individualistic sexual ideology.

This brings us back again to the question as to what effect our psychological ideology of
education may have on the child; that is, what sort of product of education might we
expect if we cannot give a more positive aim than the avoidance of neuroses, nor yet
provide a less dualistic ideology than sexuality is? This prematurely emphasizes for the
child the collective aspect of sexuality, whereas the psychological attitude on which the
whole of education rests, is too individualistic to serve as a pedagogic ideology. We
naturally cannot foretell the result of so extensive a revaluation of pedagogic values;
only so much is already evident today that the linking up of these new viewpoints with
the old pedagogy seems wellnigh impossible because they work with quite different
means and pursue opposed aims. For the new pedagogy has neither *a positive*
educational aim, nor a productive collective ideology corresponding to this, nor yet a
sufficiently developed method that would be suitable to the psychological pedagogy.
So the principal question is
whether an education with a psychological ideology is possible at all, since its collective
c Vitality, after all that has been said, seems doubtful.

For apart from the fact that the psychological world-concept according to its nature is
to individualistic to serve as a collective ideology of education, it had almost collapsed
before it could enter the realms of pedagogy. For with the appearance of the different
psychoanalytic schools, psychology seems exhausted, to have arrived at its end rather
than at the beginning of a new development. One might use this idea itself to support
the psychological educational ideology; for what could be better than that one should
first have a finished psychology, before it is applied to pedagogy! But this argument
does not hold good; first because if an ideology is to be effective, and particularly
effective educationally, it must be alive, indeed in its full prime of life, which is not so
with psychology in spite of appearances to the contrary. For the psychological ideology
has never been alive, it came into the world, so to say, with an old mind which at the
present time is almost senile. In so far as it still operates it is neurotic and not
educational, for it is an ideology that was produced from the neurotic type and
corresponds to it. Hence the psychological ideology in and for itself is destructive, is
besides too individualistic for an educational value; furthermore it cannot produce the
collective type of genius necessary for every individually

created ideology to become collective. For every individual has a psychology, indeed,
everyone a different consciousness, and so to a certain extent everyone becomes a
"genius" in his way, a development which is obstructive to the formation of collective
genius. To the communizing of an ideology which is achieved in the genius and indeed
in a process we know as hero formation, there is nothing more unfavourable than
psychology. For psychology reveals this very process in the individual, analyses it and
so prevents its actual realization. Whereas formerly the genius produced a new ideology
as a reaction to a positive, existing one, the individual now protests purely negatively
against the existing ideology, in that he brags about his individuality, reinforced by the
psychological ideology. Here would be the place to say something about art as one of
the highest forms of community ideology; yet I should like to reserve this for another
volume on account of the complicated intertwining of art with all spheres of civilization
engendering it. Generally speaking, one might say only that the creative artist unites in
his work both spheres, the individual and the collective, thereby producing something
beyond the two which in its turn influences the formation of new collective ideologies in
individuals. In his most pronounced character the artist is the type who almost absorbs
and formulates individually for the

1 See "Art and the Artist."
first time, the collectivity of the times, and so he has the most active share in the creation of the prevailing collective ideologies. Out of this rich problem sphere, I can here only touch upon the relation of art to one of the other collective ideologies, namely education, without taking in the much more interesting reference to religion. As I have already remarked it seems to me that the Greek artist type who in his art gave expression to those individual and collective aspirations for which the educational ideal left no room in daily life is a by-product of the Hellenic ideal of wisdom and virtue striven for at that time. Hence, what was characteristic to the Greek art was first of all a primitive realism, which was not only an expression of insufficient technique but rather a necessity in order to liberate the ideal aspirations (in the meaning of Nietzsche’s "Birth of Tragedy"). At its height the Greek art with its ideal of beauty was an expression of the victorious "Apollonian" tendencies that glorified the ideal of wisdom and virtue. So the style development within a definite cultural period reflects the educational ideal of the times and the gradual approach to it; but at the same time the finished works of art contribute to the education of the community and make this easier in that they individualize the collective through personal form1. In this sense the

1 It would be tempting to go into the psychology of aesthetics which I would like to consider as the collective ideology of the artist, because it gives him the present-day art is manifestly psychological, not only in literature but also in plastic art, in that its ideal is no longer adornment and refinement as it was among the Greeks, it is also no longer the ideal of truth-to-reality as in realism, but is an ideal of the inner truth of the artist himself rather than of the art he expresses1.

philosophic justification for his style of art, that springs from quite other demands of an individual and cultural kind (see my book about the relation of "Art and the Artist").

1 See "Art and the Artist."
Chapter Five THE ROLE OF THE LEADER AND THE ENVIRONMENT

My son could not replace me; I myself could not replace myself: I am the creature of circumstances. Napoleon

The individual ideology that now hinders, now hastens the collective ideas, seems at all times to be personified in the form of the leader. The question whether the idea of the leader is as old as that of the community cannot simply be answered in the affirmative. For the most primitive communities that we know, seem to be guided by a community spirit rather than by the ideal of an individual leader, as is the case in all our civilized organizations. Hence Freud came to his hypothesis of the human primal horde, that stood under the tyranny of the mightiest male by correlating two situations that are too far removed from one another to permit of a conclusion about the kind of primal society that existed between them. He did this, on the one hand, by projecting back the patriarchal family organization into a primeval period where it could not have existed at all, and on the other hand by adopting Darwin’s idea of a horde of apes which—even if their existence is not doubted yet proves nothing for a correspondingly primeval form of coexistence amongst human beings. But apart from such considerations, the little we do know about primitive forms of society indicates that in the original community the collective ideology had the leadership and not a single outstanding personality or a group of such personalities. Where guiding or leading groups are found it is a matter of an equality among groups which only oppose other similar groups within the same community. Hence the leading group does not consist of the strongest—of which there may be only a few or actually only one—but of the oldest, most experienced, the wise in ideologies, who are teachers rather than leaders.

This concept is supported by the discoveries of modern social psychology and individual psychology. The French school of modern sociologists starting from Durkheim and in the present day represented in particular by Levy-Bruhl, assumes that the spiritual collective phenomena, as manifested in the primitive com-

1 This doubt is expressed by Fr. Alverdes in his “Tiersozologie,” Leipzig, 1925.


3 Even in Rome, the age of 65 years, which is old according to our ideas, was the requirement for a seat in the Senate.
Community are not to be explained or understood from an individual psychological standpoint; they are different in kind and also older and more authentic. The individual psychological findings, especially in the child, seem to confirm that the individual—as represented by the personality of the leader—develops only later from collectivity. At the beginning of the human development—similarly as in the animal kingdom—there is a community, it may be biological-tribal, it may be ideological-racial, from which individuality gradually developed with its psychology, that is, simply psychology developed. The first psychology of man was a mass psychology, or better, group psychology; that is, however, no psychology in the meaning of our scientific individual psychology which naturally could develop only with and from the individual. Thus the leader coincides with individuality that has lifted itself from the community through some kind of particular talent, as even today he comes under this definition, the only difference being, that he possesses a more differentiated specialized talent. Only this original individuality is not an “originality” in its present-day meaning of the word, but rather a personification of collective ideas and ideals in one person, thus precisely that which still today marks out the leader from other individualities.

We already see here, similarly as in the collective ideologies, that also among the leader-individualities there are those with a greater or less amount of collective or individual qualities respectively; just as irrespective of the individual psychology of the personality, a preponderance of the collective elements are characteristic of the leader. But we shall have to pass through a long development, or at least survey one, starting from the extreme point of the collective individuality, as for example seems to be manifested in the hero, before we arrive at the other extreme of the individualistic personality, as for example represented in the present-day neurotic. Naturally any concrete sociological foundation is lacking as an historical manifestation of the beginning of this development, but for it we possess today living traditions that permit a conclusion as to the original conditions. This is an indirect method, however, not only a stop-gap, but it proves to be a better psychological entrance to the whole problem of the leader—and also to other problems—than a survey over concrete historical material. I mean religion, in the ethnological, not in the theological sense. In the forms of religion we have before us a truer because more spontaneous reflection of the
social and psychological development of mankind, than in the pictures of history distorted by the crude material of reality.

Now the earliest form of religion was no ideology of God but a soul-belief, that is, an ideology of immortality that touched the collective interest and not the individual who did not exist as such in primitive communities. Indeed the development of the individual himself proved to be a turning towards another kind of soul solace become necessary through the collapse of the collective ideology of immortality represented in the belief in the soul. This new soul solace from that time on has been sought for in ever increasing measure in the individual himself, because it could no longer be found in the community. How far the sexual ideology, that is, the recognition of the biological facts of procreation and death, entered into this I have dealt with in another connexion. Here I want only to bring up the religious aspect of this crisis, which made out of the collective soul-religion the individualistic religion of God. In other words, leadership became a possibility only with the development of the individual, and this is reflected religiously in the gradual change of the collective soul-belief into the belief in immortality with characteristics of the personal god-concept. Thus in God, collectivity seems personified individualistically as vice versa at the beginning of the development of the individual belief in immortality it became communized in the soul-belief.

The history of the leader thus psychologically begins with the creation of God, or more correctly, the emergence of the individualistic ideology of the leader is first reflected in and with the emergence and development of the idea of God. But this is more than a mere parallel; the leader, still understood today as the personification of an idea, was and is the humanized concrete god in whatever form and in whatever sphere he manifests himself. One should not argue that with such an assumption nothing could be gained for the understanding of the leader-psychology, for it would be a matter of changing one unknown factor for a still greater unknown. But the above mentioned advantage of the religious tradition here comes to our help as a relatively naive psychological projection, which—if we understand how to interpret it—affords us a deeper insight into the psychical structure and the spiritual significance of the phenomena in question than would a concrete analysis of the personality of a leader. Also a further objection that could be raised from our own argument, I will discuss presently. One might point out that Freud explained the concept of God as an exalted father image which he actually identified with the concept of leader-father. But a

1 "Seelenglaube und Psychologie," see especially Chapter II, "Sexualzeitalter und Psychologie."
deepened understanding has since led us beyond the father-son relationship that belongs to a relatively late development, to a purely psychological comprehension of the idea of God which lies beyond the sociological phase of family structure. It is first individuality, and later on, personality—as opposed to the community—which is personified in the idea of God, in the hero ideal and finally in the form of the leader. In all these personifications whether they appear unreal as the God, ideal as the hero or social as the leader, we find fundamentally the same *individualization* of the *collective*, whether it is a matter of a tribe with its god, or national hero, or of a king and his kingdom, or ultimately of a democratic state and its leader.

Thus the mere objection that the understanding of the history of religion or of the concept of god, reveals nothing of the psychology of the leader, can easily be disproved, and yet it is true in a deeper sense which we shall now consider. The fundamental problem here dealt with is, namely, not at all the individual psychology of the leader as a personality, but only his role, that is, his relationship to those who are led, the group, the mass, etc. In this sense, however, the leader has (at., least it seems so to us) the same part that has fallen to problem raised by me, which is still the clearest personification, not only of the leader concept, but also of the individualistic God, and cannot be explained from the father psychology but rather from that of the rebellious son.

the lot of God in religion. Only the traditional concept of God has, so to say, given us the ideal picture of the symbol of leadership, a picture darkened by no disturbing sense of reality, and one that is valid for a definite group under definite conditions. If there had been no concept of God and if in our investigation we were dependent on the historical leader personalities, then a psychological understanding of the part of the leader would have to begin with a reduction to the fundamental scheme common to all leadership, such as is actually presented to us in the concept of God. Before we descend from this abstract but psychologically pure symbol of God to all its worldly incarnations and manifestations, there comes to mind, as a byproduct of the above discussion, a general psychological problem which I will here formulate. When we said, that here we are not dealing with the psychology of the leader but only with his role, yet the problem still remains as to what the psychology of the leader himself is. From my own experience as well as from the literature dealing with the subject (which by the way is not voluminous), no light can be thrown on this purely psychological question. The idea presents itself that the problem may be falsely stated and that perhaps there is no psychology of the leader, that is, no other than that which is obvious in his role; at any rate it seems that there is no psychology to be deducted from his ego. Without fully elaborating the psychological sig-
nificance of this idea, I can only briefly elucidate what I mean. For it is not a matter, as one would think, of merely a change of viewpoint or of the way of consideration, but it is far more a matter of principle. I may for instance in analysis, understand the psychology of an individual genetically and dynamically, but that does not mean that any light is thrown on the question why he is a poet, or a leader, or a merchant. As a matter of fact all psychological, including psychoanalytic, biographies of creative personalities have made intelligible much in the individual as such, only not that which is specific to the personality. This is true not only for people of the past but also for the analysis of the living, a fact, the further discussion of which we must postpone for the chapter "Talent and Occupation." Also here it is naturally a question of the more or less, that is, of cases whose choice of occupation is clearly determined, or at least made explicable, through disposition, inclination and circumstances, of other cases in which we have to assign to chance a larger part than is agreeable to our scientific ambition. The leader seems to me to belong to that extreme boundary case, indeed to represent precisely the type of the same, in which there are almost no connecting lines to be seen or even to be drawn between the psychology of the individual and his role in society.

As a matter of fact the authors from Le Bon to

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Freud (whom Lehmann reviews critically1) have given no psychology of the leader, but only a description of his role from the viewpoint of the mass and in connexion to the same. Freud, who restricts himself to the psychology of the mass, defines the leader from the mass, which he characterizes as "a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego" (p. 80)2. In the leadership psychology proper, however, Freud does not go beyond the comparison with the infantile leader the father, which one might be able to accept if there was anything like a "father psychology." But this is just as impossible as a leadership psychology. For the individual is not only father to begin with, but this being father is nothing individually psychological in himself but is only something in relation to the child. One becomes a father by chance often as one becomes a leader, without having the corresponding father psychology which one either acquires or not. One becomes a leader also, first through the masses, as one becomes a father through the child; only the leader is in far greater degree the representative of the masses, of the collective whole and their


2 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.
ideology and this is precisely his very psychology though not individualistic.

In this sense God is the prototype of the leader created by the group, an ideal prototype whose materialization in reality is determined through the individual psychology of the personality of the leader apart from the cultural and social influences of the time. For the living and willing individual does not permit himself merely to be made into something, even if this aim seems to be desirable, but he himself also wants to be and to do something, and this will is just the expression of his individuality. But how the leader comes at all to take on the almost enforced role of a collective representative, is again to be explained only from the purely psychological understanding of the idea of God which however can be understood only from the psychology of the group, because God himself has no psychology, just as little as the leader has. The concept of God has proved sociologically to be the symbol of the individual representing the masses, and psychologically the expression of the will representing this individuality.1 When the worldly leader arises there is ascribed to him by the masses above everything these godly qualities of omnipotence or strength of will and this is the only psychical quality which the leader himself as an individual must possess if he is to play this godly role and it is by reason of this strong will that he can undertake and carry through this part. Thus the leader must be a strong-willed man, at least under given conditions he must be stronger than the average, but this does not say that all strong-willed men or stronger-willed than the average, will also be leaders. That will depend on conditions of time as well as on chance and finally on this will itself. For this self-will of a strong individuality can either seize upon the opportunity offered, can affirm, as it were, the part of leader, or can deny it within himself and refuse it. In a word, to disposition, conditions of time, and to chance, there is added the individual aim of the personality that finally decides not only over the acceptance or refusal of the part or task, but also over its better or worse achievement.

Thus we have found two characteristics that qualify the individual for the role of leader, although they do not necessarily lead to it. The first is a preponderance of the collective ideology, which seems, as it were, to be something beyond or above the individual; the second is a purely individual characteristic, namely, a strong will that is appropriate for the acceptance of the godlike role of leader; appropriate from the standpoint of the masses as well as from the standpoint of his own psychology. And this is in fact the only point in which the two spheres, the collective and the individual, come into contact. Indeed it almost has the appearance as if these two spheres coincided

1 "Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit" and "Seelenglaube und Psychologie"
in the role of the leader and took effect in a strong will. For the leader always personifies a strong will, just as God does, and in times when the people are looking for a leader the common ideology is concentrated in the desire for a strong will which precisely the leader has and by means of which he is able to personify the requisite collective ideology prevailing at the time. But the leader does not only represent a strong will that introduces the necessary energy in times of hardship, but just as much he is the bearer of responsibility involved in acting upon the will. This is the third and by no means least important characteristic of the role of leader. From this point of view one might say that the collective will of the people which at times becomes the need of the masses, and the individual will of the leader meet or coincide in the sense of responsibility. It is as if the masses needed someone to bear their responsibility, just as the individuality of the leader needs the mass as representative of his will. For the problem of responsibility is only the negative or moral side of the problem of will and only in this sense are the following arguments to be understood.

If we consider the three factors that characterize the leader we shall find that a difference in the distribution or mixture of collective ideology, individual will, and sense of responsibility can produce different types.

1 See "Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit."

which specify still more narrowly the role of leader without definitely determining it. The type of leader is characterized by a strong individual will that takes possession of and also represents the collective will-ideology of the group, whereby the crowd carries most of the responsibility. A strong individual will with a correspondingly strong individual ideology for which the personality alone is responsible, are characteristics that typify the artist. Finally a strong collective ideology that subjects the individual will to that of the community which carries the responsibility for it, is the characteristic that typifies the pedagogue or educator. In the leader and the pedagogue the material is the same, namely the human being or a group of persons, but the attitude or approach is different, in fact opposed. The leader himself either springs directly from the masses or is raised by the mass to the position of representative of its will, thus he can be understood only from the momentary or prevailing need of the mass. The educator on the other hand is superimposed on the group and with his personal need to help he approaches the group in the individuals. He has without doubt an individual psychology, that of the helper, the moulder. In the case of the artist the material is different, here it is a matter of inanimate material which he creates and gives life to according to his will manifested in his individual ideology formed from it. Hence the artist’s psychology in regard to strength of will is
that or the leader; in regard to creation it is similar to that of the educator although the educator creates in the name of the community, the artist autocratically in his own name. Thus in a certain sense the mass is only the chance material that the individual Will makes use of at one time, just as at another time paint or clay is used for the formation of men, a formation which fundamentally aims at immortalizing the self. Only the leader is much more the creature than creator, the artist is far more creator than creature, finally the educator is both equally as the official representative of the collective ideology which he then imprints on others. All these however are equally representatives of God on earth.

And yet they are not a complete representative of God on earth. For the roles of helper and ruler that are united in the God-concept are divided in his earthly representatives among different individuals who are then crystallized into types and are differentiated into occupations. The one, the type of ruler, as seen in chief, king, leader, raises himself as an individual above the others only through a particularly strong will; otherwise he is exclusively the representative of the group, advocate and executor of the politics of the community, essentially he is a war-leader who in times of peace develops into a state leader. The other, the type of helper known as the priest, teacher, doctor (therapeutist), is characterized in an individual by a definite drift or direction of will, namely, that of helping; the collective is inherent in him as an influential part of his personality without being a mere symbol of it as it is for instance in the king; he is fundamentally a leader of souls, ultimately developing into the therapeutist. The historical development of these attitudes of the individual to the community, into definite types and further into definite occupations or professions, depends naturally on social factors and is determined by psychical elements that are reflected in religion with its rites and myths. The first type, that we can characterize as leader in the narrower sense, has less individual talent and only the ability to represent the group or people’s will in his active manifestations. The second type, that might be considered as educator in the broadest sense of the word, presupposes a quite specific individual attitude that is expressed in a strong collective ideology and in an attitude of will that operates in its sense. Roughly stated one might formulate it thus: the first is more egoistic, the second more altruistic.

Ethnologically, chief and priest, king and teacher, leader and therapeutist, belong together as complements; the first pair correspond to the collective stage of the belief in the soul, the second to the social stage of the sex age (the patriarchy), the third to the individual stage of the psychological ideology. “We see here again from an entirely different angle that the teacher does
not fit into the psychological ideology, at the climax of which we are at present and the utilization of which makes such difficulties for us in education. The therapeutist, on the other hand, who organically belongs to this stage, hence even today performs better service in educational matters than the teacher. If we turn retrogressively to the earlier patriarchal stage, we see that the teacher has somehow grown up out of the father, who however did not exist as such at the first stage of the belief in soul. But even for the teacher of the patriarchal stage the simple Freudian formula that makes him of equal value with the father is not valid as it also places the king and God on a level with him. This is already shown in the old Jewish idea that represents the prototype of the patriarchal ideology and at the same time the prototype of the school. Krieck (Bildungssysteme der Kulturvolker, p. 96 f.), who indeed has penetrated deepest into the educational problem of peoples, says concerning this Jewish concept, "For the pupil, the teacher is superior to the father, although his authority rests on the transference of the paternal rights and duties of education; yet with his complete knowledge of the law he offers higher things to the pupil than the father can give, hence his authority is correspondingly greater." "He who instructs his neighbour in the Mischna is credited by God as if he had reared him, formed him and brought him into the world!" "The teacher’s activity thus approaches that of the creator of men, and his authority shall correspond to that." Thus the teacher in the creative sense is put much more on a level with God, than for example is the king who serves only as God’s earthly governor. Therefore the helper type himself has, so to say, godly qualities, whereas the leader type symbolizes them only externally. Hence the leadership, particularly in its purest patriarchal manifestation as kingship, is inheritable, which cannot hold good for a specific talent of whatever kind of special qualities. So even at the earliest stage in pre-patriarchal times, the chief or captain is chosen, the priest (Schamana, medicine man) is born.

Here we are again faced with the problem as to what is talent and what is heritage, not in the medical sense, but in the social psychological sense. Kingship was not only inheritable because it represented the symbol of the patriarchal power, but it could also be inherited because power can be inherited, at least in external symbols, although not power of will which as a rule is lacking in the one who inherits a kingdom. Talent is something individual, at least acquired and developed (even when it is inherited), and cannot be transferred to a definite successor. It is possible only with the development of the individual which was a rarity in primitive times and hence was valued so much more highly than later on where it was manifested in widely differentiated occupations of life each with its
own competitors. Personal talents and inherited power also have a purely spiritual aspect, that is related to the belief in immortality. The essence of the patriarchal ideology, as I have stated in "Seelenglaube und Psychologie," is the acceptance of the personal mortality of the ego and the acceptance of the son as the individual bearer of collective immortality. Hence kingship must be inheritable in order to fulfil the meaning of the patriarchal ideology, that is, to guarantee to the father who is mortal, a continuance of life in the children. Talent, on the other hand, is again opposed to this, for it guarantees immortality in achievement and not in the child.

Now there is in the human development a phase of deification and of perpetuating the individual striving for immortality, which according to its highly individualistic prerequisite occurs relatively late, although naturally, like everything else, it has its precursor. One might call it the age of the genius, because it is most closely connected with the appearance and the development of the concept of genius. For also genius, or, better, the concept of genius, has a history. Lange-Eichbaum says in a recent thoroughgoing study of the problem of genius and insanity1, "The idea of genius clearly arises from mythological, religious experience, and indeed, as the word indicates, from antiquity. The word genius is traced by some scholars back to 'ingenium' (gignere, to beget), by others to guardian spirit, genius. The two do not necessarily contradict each other. For in the old Italic religion genius was the godly personification of the masculine procreative power. . . . 'Generally, genius was a supernatural being that stood half way between the deity and men, who had an influence on the life of men; a kind of half deity, restricted in godly power but possessing superhuman power. . . . This belief naturally was not restricted to the Greek and Roman antiquity; it is to be found over the whole globe and in nearly all religions. . . . The concept of genius as half-god accordingly has its root in the general religious consciousness of mankind. . . . In late antiquity and in the Middle Ages there was everywhere an abundance of such 'half-way beings' . . . as inheritors of the ancient genii that had died off. . . . These celebrated their resurrection at the time of the Renaissance . . . genius was thus a personification of spiritual and ethical values, forces and attributes form-

1Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum: "Genie, Irrsin, und Ruhm" (Miinchen 1928). Cahan in a work entitled "Zur Kritik des Geniebegriffes" (Studien zur Philos. und ihrer Geschichte, Vol. 73, 1911) was the first to carry into effect this idea and then E. Zilsel elaborated the same more thoroughly "with regard to the influence of circumstances: "Die Geniereligion. Ein kritischer Versuch über das moderne Personlichkeitsideal mit einer historischen Begrundung. Vol. I Kritik des Genieeegriffes (Wien 1918).—The same, "Die Entstehung des Geniebegriffes. Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der Antike und des Frühkapitalismus (Tubingen 1926).—Whilst writing this work, I read the announcement of a book by E. Kretschmer, "Geniale Menschen" (Verlag Springer, Berlin), which I was unable then to obtain.
ing at the same time a kind of religious cult. This is the first clearly visible root of our present-day concept of genius. No longer is it genius as guardian spirit of the whole of mankind, but is more specific in its qualifications particularly of the spiritual. Later it became a personification of the intellectual creative power of a man. But not even in the Renaissance does the idea of genius lose the aspect of the religious, of the godly1.

The assumption of a godly creative force in the poets (such as for instance Scaliger teaches in his "Poetics," 1561) is, however, in no way of equal significance with our present-day demand for originality. For the Middle Ages and early Renaissance yet cling to the ideal of imitation, for even in it the creative force could manifest itself. Only quite gradually in the sixteenth century, as Zilsel shows in particular, the imitation ideal of the humanistic writers came into conflict with the independence ideal of the painter (engineers). The ideal of the Renaissance was much more that of the fame or glory of individuals than of surpassing talent (ingenium). First "in Scaliger does the God, who inspires the superior man with his inborn not acquirable characteristics, pass over into the concept of genius. ... So our concept of genius has

1 This latter idea, according to Herm Wolf; Versuch einer Geschichte des Geniebegriffs in der deutschen Aesthetik des 18. Jahrhunderts. Vol. I (Heidelberg, 1923). What follows is again a quotation from Lange-Eichbaum, pp. 27 ff.

two parents; the doctrine of the one possessed with God (enthusiasm) and that of the inborn talent (ingenium). . . . Only quite slowly does the concept genius, as the personification of individual peculiarity, pass into the use of language (around 1550). . . . The Baroque period around 1650 first coins the concept and the word in the present-day meaning, namely, a human being with an incomprehensible, mystic, godly creative power. . . . Previously the ideal of personality had been, in antiquity, the wise man, in the Middle Ages, the holy man, in the Renaissance the courtier, the statesman, the bel esprit. Now as Zilsel formulates, the personality-ideal of the literary middleclass stratum came to be the genius having originated in the world of literary people and of the fine arts in Italy, France and Spain.”

But to this religious ideal of the divinely inspired creator, was added, as Zilsel has shown, the ideal of originality, which sprung up from the circles of the inventors, discoverers, organizers, engineers, like Leonardo, Vasari, Aretino, and implied a striving after material aims (knowledge, art, human culture). Yet in the eighteenth century, the real florescence period of genius, with its culmination in the period of stress and storm, we see again forcefully breaking through by the side of the advancing aestheticism of the "overrated genius," its original religious power. Into the darkness of Rationalism "the concept of genius taken
from ancient art, spread in its entire splendour and power of deliverance and became
the consoling, guiding-star of the time” (Cahan), the genius-movement here became,
"so to say, a religion of the emancipated, free spirits" (Lange-Eichbaum). From the
rationalistic, materialistic and medical endeavours to deprive the genius of his godly
attributes, that began in the eighteenth century ending in modern Psychiatry, I should
like here to mention for later discussion, the concept of genius as a result of self-
education as represented by Helvetius, who made ready for the so called milieu-
thorists for whom the genius is simply the result of the social constellation, a chance
point of juncture in which the inventor and the needs of the masses meet.

In postponing for the next chapter this fundamental educational problem of the
reciprocal influence of milieu and talent, I should like only to emphasize here the
significance of the collective ideology for the training and development of the individual
in order to supplement from the ideological side the milieu-theory which hitherto has
been considered purely sociologically. Although there have been at all times specially
gifted men, yet the genius age which introduced modern times, can be comprehended
only from the great collapse of religious belief occurring at the end of the Middle Ages;
and demanding something else as a substitute for this loss. This substitute in the

worldly age of the Renaissance with its fever for invention and discovery, that is, the
seeking after new earthly sources of deliverance became the genius, whose mythical
forerunner had been the national hero of antiquity. Only the hero was much more the
man of action, the leader-type, in the sense of a group’s ideal of will, whereas the
genius with his worldwide universality aspires far beyond the national interests towards
a general education of mankind. Yet the genius is differentiated from ancient heroes
and all other earthly representatives of God by yet one other characteristic that Zilsel
has clearly brought out. This characteristic of the genius, however paradoxical it may
sound, is a bourgeois trait, that makes him the "personality-ideal of the literary, middle-
class stratum." The distance that exists between all humanized gods (such as heroes,
priests, king) and the ordinary "mortals" exists for the genius in much less degree. He
frequently is descended from middle-class circles but seldom remains bound by them;
he can however be reclaimed by them as one of their kind and so can become their
personality ideal on the one hand, and an object of criticism on the other hand1. One
knew him, so to say, when he was still small, and hence one

1 The instructive history of this critical depreciation of the plebeian god, from the time of the
French Materialist Helvetius, and Lombroso’s theory of insanity to the psychoanalysis of the
genius in the Freudian school, has been lucidly surveyed by Lange-Eichbaum (i.e.). Its most
recent phase is the kind of biography that has become popular in America under the slogan
"debunking."
does not allow him to become a "prophet" in his own fatherland, so that he has to resort to the world at large. The significant and consequential part of this plebeian aspect of the genius is, however, his increasing tendency towards democracy which today in the age of individualism, where there are numbers of discovered and undiscovered geniuses, has reached its climax, but also shows clearly the dark side of it.

For the manifest neurotic age in which we live today is only the consistent result of this thousands of years’ long development beginning with the religious concept of God, passing through stages where it gradually became humanized, concrete and democratic in earthly representatives, up to its absolute counterpart in the neurotic type. This neurotic type is not to be understood as a medical case, but is democratized genius, that is, the same leader type without the collective ideology supporting him and hence also without the belief in himself. But if one takes away these two factors there remains nothing but the feeling of inferiority; of his own human littleness and weakness, from which today not only the manifest neurotic suffers, but also the artist or creative individual in any sphere. The neurotic, who destroys his own life and that of his circle, is in this sense no more ill than the Renaissance genius who sacrificed all life’s happiness to his work or the war leaders in the Middle Ages who ruined all their land and people.

The neurotic

is only less creative,—not in disposition, but in action —and hence society values him less, a valuation that conforms to a purely social, not individual concept of illness. The neurotic himself also suffers, but this suffering is a suffering from his type, from the lack of an ideology that might give him a belief in himself or might replace it. Thus the neurotic type who is also more or less aware of his inner deficiencies, is a living example of the disintegration of the genius and God concept which with the cessation of constructive collective ideology is reduced to the natural feeling of human insufficiency. The neurotic is, so to say, the first human type who lacks the support of an ideology of God of whatever kind, and is thrown entirely on his human qualities on which he tries to live and cannot. He may be designated as the man simply thrown on himself, whereas the men of earlier epochs were the real "supermen"; that is, individuals raised above themselves and living beyond their psychical capacity by virtue of their heavenly or earthly ideology of God. Nietzsche who projected the supermen into the future was rather the last of the superman type who, however, had to perish neurotically from his "human-all too-human" qualities.

This explains why the human type of our generation whom we call "neurotic" on account of his sub-humanity in comparison to the earlier super-humanity, had to create the therapeutist of any kind. For only by

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living in close union with a god-ideal that has been erected outside one’s own ego is one able to live at all. When I say therapeutists of any kind, I mean at least psychotherapeutists in the proper sense, although these are characteristic of our time and are, so to say, the neurotic’s product due to his illness. Above all I mean the spiritual and moral dependence which has developed in the love life and in marriage, whereby the partner becomes God, but just as easily may also become the devil, on earth because these ideologies no longer exist outside of ourselves and yet are apparently needed just because they do exist within us. But I also mean the narrower educational problem as such into which we have brought the same yearning for the helper that has made the pedagogue almost a therapeutist. Almost, I say, for it cannot be completely so, not only on account of the practical impossibility but also because the specialization, that we saw as a consequence of the first humanization of the God idea (chief, priests), has in the meantime increased beyond bounds. Hence we see the cooperation of teacher, psychiatrist, psychologist and social worker puzzling over the psychological problems of one single child. But even if they should succeed in solving them, not much will have been gained. For we must make it quite clear to ourselves that it is impossible to attain the aim of our modern educational program, which is, namely, to avoid neurotics, as long as the collective ideology is a "neurotic" one. That means, as long as the type which has remained since the downfall of every ideology of God (not only of the religious) still exists, indeed is constantly increasing. But the idea of bringing to extinction this neurotic type through a better education of our children leads still deeper in the vicious circle. For a positive, constructive ideology must be brought into education from an austere collective tradition and cannot be developed as a result of education.

In the neurotic in whom one sees the collapse of the whole human ideology of God it has also become obvious what this signifies psychologically. This was not explained by Freud’s Psychoanalysis which only comprehended the destructive process in the patient from his personal history without considering the cultural development which bred this type. Probably this type has always existed just as some kind of genius did; and yet there is a special genius-period in which this type flourished whereas our age seems to culminate in the neurotic type. This type is characterized by a negative attitude of will that one might designate fear of responsibility or as guilt-feeling, according to whether the reaction sets in before or after action; at the same time the neurotic type shows a hyper-consciousness which as self-consciousness interferes with the spontaneous course of all psychical processes, especially the sphere of the emotions and the will. But this state of affairs proves to be the negative of that which dis-
tiguishes every type of leader personality, namely strength of will and spontaneity. Thus in the case of the neurotic it is a matter of hyper-individualization, of the extreme manifestation of the process of individualization, the commencement of which brought about the creation of the concept of God. The energetic and creative individuals on earth have always lived in one way or another on this primal source of personified force of will, and only through participation in this collective will, have been capable and efficient. Now in the neurotic we see the individual weak and helpless when deprived of this nourishment, whilst the shreds of worn-out collective ideologies only scantily protect him. This seems to be the so-called collective element that Jung found in the analyses of neurotics and particularly of the psychotics, but which we are gradually losing more and more. But the psychotic no longer succeeds, and the neurotic only seldom, in compensating his individual feeling of inferiority by super-achievement, with the aim of reestablishing in himself a belief corresponding to a belief in God. Hence, how futile to treat this intricate problem pedagogically in Adler's sense as "masculine protest" against childish inferiority.

But to trace in the child this feeling of inferiority—from which we all suffer in consequence of the collapse of the collective ideology and of the impossibility to set up a sound individual ideology—in order where possible to prevent its being there "already" in childhood, or to correct it, is foolish as long as the child lives in a neurotic atmosphere. One can easily understand that we want to save our children suffering from what we ourselves suffer, but in all these pedagogic prophylactic ideals is too much of the longing for deliverance that refers more to ourselves than to our children. In other words, we want not only to prevent our malady in them, but also to cure our own evil, and thereby we inflict on the child not only more therapy than he can bear, but perhaps also more ills than he anyway has. In leaving the further discussion of this "magical" method of education for the final chapter, let us turn here in concluding our exposition of the role of leader, to the positive significance that the child has for us in our time. For also the role of the child has gone through different stages of development, and without understanding them we cannot approach the present problems of education. When we look at earlier epochs, still not far remote, then the term "idolization" suggests itself for our present-day valuation of the child. This age of the child, such as the present epoch has been called, began however much earlier, although there seems now to be again a culmination of this process of development.

Christianity, as the first religion of the individual, introduced the worship of the Son as God, whereas the preceding hero-age of the ancients persecuted the son,
because the father resisted giving up his individual immortality. Christianity, indeed one of the most revolutionary of reactions against the patriarchal sexual-age, had to compromise with its still powerful influence, by idolizing the son, as the bearer of the collective soul-ideology. But in recent times, the son-age has developed into the child-age. One connects its emergence with Rousseau's name, although only the Revolution actually overthrowing the Patriarchate was the first to establish the recognition of equality for all. This idea of equality, tacitly included in it the equality of the sexes, shown by the role of the women in the French Revolution (as in the Russian revolution). With this idea of equality of all human beings and with Rousseau's ideas of education, the child-age was made possible. In it the two sexes are equally valued at least pedagogically, and hence authority is again granted to the woman, the mother, in questions of education, an authority that originally she naturally possessed but had lost in the hypertrophied development of the patriarchal ideology. The recognition of the pedagogic equality of children meant however, at first, that both sexes were equally badly treated by education. Only in recent times can one speak of idolizing the child, since the child has become not only the centre of the family, but also education is beginning to be focussed on the child, as in progressive schools which adjust themselves to the child, whereas formerly the child had to adjust itself to the collective ideology.

Thus it almost seems in the meaning of our pedagogic ideas of reform, that the child itself must be left to construct a new educational ideology, must be forced, so to say, into the role of leader, which has been already implied in the deification of the child. Certainly this role of the child as leader, would again have its specific characteristics, the elaboration of which may help us to understand the present pedagogic situation. The idolization of the child does not go much further back than to Christianity, in which we have to recognize the commencement of the individualization of the son. Before that, the worship of the child had a collective significance as already it had in the totemistic belief in the soul; there the child was the manifestation of the collective spirit, indeed the only true revelation of the same, if one takes no account of the totem animals that only symbolize the unity of the tribe, but do not make it concrete. Thus here as also in the later distinct monotheism, the child came from God, now the child is God. In other words the ideology of the child as leader, was collective, now it is individualistic, just as we showed to be the case with all other ideologies. The child in the age of the

1 "The Myth of the Birth of the Hero," also its supplement "Seelenglaube und Psychologie"
belief in the Soul and in a still narrower sense in the patriarchal sex-age, was important as the one who continues our life, now he is the leader to a better life. This is indicated by the fact that formerly the child was referred to and prepared for the adult life, for being grown up, as to a Paradise, whereas we today are inclined to see in childhood our lost Paradise. Although with a certain justification we prize in the child the ideal of unimpaired forces, yet on the other hand, influenced by the psychoanalytic ideology, we endeavour to overcome what is termed "infantile" not only in ourselves, but to uproot it already in the child.

Not only does a conservative majority of educators oppose this eccentricity of prophylactic ambition, but first among them stand the parents themselves, from whom indeed proceeds the deification of the child and precisely of the childish in the child. In the new formation of modern educational ideology, there seems to fall to the mother an important role. She owes this influence, however, not to a better pedagogic understanding but to her natural attitude towards the child who today plays in her personal life certainly a much more important part than ever before. We have already hinted how the woman, borne upward by the waves of equal right, of the great revolutions, profited not only socially and politically but also in the family in her position as mother. The patriarchal ownership of the children had already previously been undermined by the growing power of the state-ideology, so that the way was paved for the mother to regain her position in education which she had already had in smaller units with collective ideologies of the child (for example, among the primitives). The woman again begins to assume her natural educational rights within the family but also actively to take part (especially in America) in social problems of education to an extent hitherto undreamt of. By bearing in mind the psychological motivation, one might see in this, a parallel, if one likes, a direct continuance of her fight for political equality for which today she no longer has to fight. But this fight for the child, namely, who shall educate it, almost one might say in whose name shall it be educated, is much more radical in its vital effects for the community-ideology of the future generation. What Freud has designated as neurotic "mother complex" seems to me to be a symptom of the present-day sex war in which Psychoanalysis itself is ensnared. I see in this famous "mother complex" not so much the fixation of the child on the mother but rather a sign of the growing influence of the mother ideology in the education of the child.

Just at this point where it is more a matter of the ideological than of the natural influence of the mother on the child, the battle now seems to be raging. Simultaneously with the growing influence of the mother on later education, the man reaches back to an ever
earlier stage in the child’s life to exert his pedagogic influence in order to regain his lost ground in the later phase of education. He does this not necessarily as father, but as psychiatrist, psychologist, educational counsellor. But the woman fights for more. Whilst the man tries to save at any price the collapsed patriarchal ideology, for the woman it is a question of gaining a new sphere of life, in which the child is no longer temporarily left to her influence but becomes the vital interest, almost, the occupation of her whole life. For this purpose however, she must step out of her narrow milieu of family, that is, she must exchange her maternal vocation for that of the educator, just as the man has exchanged his paternal vocation for that of pedagogic therapeutist. In a word the paternal struggle for the child within the family seems to be projected into and magnified in the social strife for the pedagogic ideology of the future.
Chapter Six  VOCATION AND TALENT

Whether his work prospers does not depend on the good or bad character of the one producing it, but on whether he is in a position to be faithful to the work.

Joseph Breuer

In the arguments of the previous chapter we have repeatedly emphasized the problem of the so-called “choice of vocation” and finally have approached this theme from an angle that seems most easily accessible, but yet proved to be insufficient as a solution of the problem. We have comprehended the educational fever that has spread in our civilization as a symptom of a conflict brought into the community from the family; a conflict between the matriarchal and patriarchal ideologies. With this explanation we have also accounted for the general war-cry of the professional pedagogues, who have sent out the warning that education is something that not everyone can do, particularly not every parent, but that it is a profession that must be learnt like any other. With this password the educators only seem to cover up a similar state of affairs to that which we found in the leader, in whose psychological structure we could find no special talent or gift. For his psychology solely consists of his relation to the masses, that is, in his identification with the collective ideology which with regard to the leader is a matter of strength of will. And although we could verify in the educator at least one other psychologically less simple attitude of will, namely that of helper, yet beyond this there seems to exist, even in the educator, no special talent or gift. The pedagogues are, so to say, officially authorized, that is, are collective or communized parents, from whose hands education has been taken because the parents not only lack certain specialized knowledge, but because they would make education too individualistic, which would not be useful for the community. But simply to deny that the parents have the capacity to bring up their children as most pedagogues do today, can only be understood either as a weapon used in the struggle for the child’s soul, or—in so far as it holds good—it must be considered a symptom of a degenerate type of human being whose natural instinct has been spoilt by psychological ideologies. For not only are the parents in the animal kingdom qualified to rear their young till they are self-sufficient, but even among the primitives neither the mother’s ability to educate the child up to puberty is doubted, nor is the father’s competency.
doubted to initiate the youth afterwards into the secrets of maturity. With them actually every mother and every father is at the same time the naturally born educator of the children who in his or her turn moulds the child by example and trains him by instruction.

Certainly with the primitives it is a matter of relatively simple conditions with a homogeneous social and religious structure in which the natural collective ideology also rears collective human beings and does not produce individuals with specialized talents. But there has been a long process of development from the time of the natural educators and teachers such as are given in the groups of men and women among the primitives, to the time of the specialized teacher such as master of handcraft, of technical, artistic, or scientific skill. The parents in the meaning of our family organization form the connecting link in this process of development if we here disregard all wider social influences. But the role of the parents has in the course of time changed so much that they become, in different epochs, representatives of different ideologies, which more or less opposed the prevailing collective ideologies. All these changing attitudes of the parents towards the children are only to be understood in the light of the prevailing soul-ideology, the development of which is reflected in the changing systems of religion. The primitives’ division of sexuality and procreation that ascribed one function to the man, another to the woman, is also reflected in primitive education where the child up to the time of puberty remains in the care of the women, and only later on becomes of value to the men. This primitive educational system thus stands, as might be expected, in complete harmony with their whole world-concept, that is, with their social and religious organization. For both the educational system and the religious organization value the individual only as the bearer of the collective soul and hence recognize the child only at puberty, when he is no longer a child. Then he is, so to speak, taken away by force from the women, who have treated him still as an individual, and in the initiation rites he is, as it were, made a collective being. We cannot here pursue the gradual change of this educational ideology from the phase of the matriarchal to the patriarchal family organization of the sexual age: but it might be remarked that originally the women (mother) represented the individual educational ideology and the men, the collective ideology. At a later stage of the family organization, when the man acknowledged the individual paternal role, he then also represented the same or even a stronger individual ideology than the mother. Finally the collective forces that became more and more concrete in state and religion oppose the individual ideology of both parents united in marriage. Today, where the general educa-

1 See "Seelenglaube und Psychologie"
tion tends towards individualization, the parents still involved in religious belief, representing the foundering collective ideology, yet cling to it because this is the one sphere of influence which the specialized system of education has left them. In this sense the parents are still the representatives of an ideology suitable for a general education although their function in the course of time has changed.

Special talent for a definite vocation is however not only bound up with the existence of specialized teachers, but also depends on a special gift in the child. But we must first separate this individual talent from certain social and ideological factors in order to get back to the problem of the individual and his education. First, let us go back to our arguments in the previous chapter, that have shown that there are certain epochs that are favourable to definite professions or, more correctly, definite activities. Generally we can see that in times of hardship and confusion such as characterize the revolutionary epochs, there will be a greater need for leaders of the people, of the army, leaders who in more peaceful times have to seek other activities. More specifically, we recognized in the Renaissance the age of the genius, that owes its origin to two needs, the one collective and the other individual; the collective, was the need to find for the collapsing religious ideology an earthly substitute for God; the other was the individual's need to help himself and others by creating newer ideologies. But the leader type assumes different forms corresponding to the prevailing ideological constellation; in the Renaissance he becomes the discoverer, inventor, creator of new values, a type which first springs up sporadically from the concurrence of social and individual needs and, if he holds good, develops into a profession or professional class, among artists called "schools." In this way the creator of the type, the master, seeks to immortalize himself not only ideally in the work, but also materially in his pupils. A comparison between the genius type of the Renaissance and the pedagogue type in the present time, leads to the same conclusion reached in the previous chapter with regard to the leader role. It is, namely, that in the community there is always a number of gifted individuals who are distinguished just through the lack of any special gift. Hence their talent essentially consists of "sensing" the prevailing collective needs and tendencies, comprehending them through the mobilization of their own collective self and finally, through the activation of their own individual power, materializing them in a new ideological type. Thus their special gift consists in their ability to utilize their latent leadership talent for the solution of the crisis in the prevailing ideology. That means, in other words, their ability lies in their power to produce the priest type, the king, the artist, or the pedagogue type according to whatever type is most in demand at the time.
If one such temporary solution of the collective crisis is initiated by the individuality of the leader, then the necessary stabilization of the same is achieved through the breeding of a more or less large number of types as much as possible like the leader, for the professional development and maintenance of this new ideology. These miniature leaders are naturally no longer such strong individualities, also they do not have to be, since they no longer function creatively but only didactically. One might describe this process also as a renewed communization of the individual ideology, since the professional class arises in such a way that the master educates disciples and these train an increasing number of pupils. This process embraces today in our modern democracies all intellectual and free professions of the so-called intellectual worker. On the other hand, the second large mass of handcraftsmen (mechanics, manufacturers, day-labourers) likewise presupposes no special talent but is governed by purely economic conditions. Above all, this class of men is educated into good citizens with national and religious ideals and they gratify their ideological needs also in this sphere (politics, class war, etc.). In the third large group of the population, namely, the peasants, there is also no particular specialized talent noticeable. Indeed the peasants of all classes seem to have best preserved the collective traditions manifested in patriarchal family organization. The modern farmer,

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however, with machinery and speculation in crops, has to a large extent already become industrialized and commercialized.

All these considerations, however interesting they may be, yet do not answer the burning question of parents and pedagogues concerning the specialized talent of their children and the pedagogic methods necessary for its promotion and development in the interest of the individual as well as for the good of the community. This practical demand is intelligible from the human and pedagogic point of view, and I only wanted to indicate that one must not over-simplify the problem. Without considering the collective ideologies and their social crises, one can never answer the purely pedagogic question of the development of childish talents. Therefore it is good, although not always easy, to bear in mind the influence of the age on the professional opportunities and needs. This means we have not only to consider the particular disposition that the child is born with or early develops, but we must also consider in what special line the individual must be trained in order to fit into the varying demands of the community at different times. In the present-day necessity for mass production and quick progress there is in the ordinary business life only seldom a similar concurrence of talent and activity such as we had to assume for the development of the leader. The present-day type of man, in the psycho-
logical and sociological analysis of his personality turns out to be a highly complicated being, who not only unites, as does primitive man, individual and collective characteristics, but also possesses within himself several layers of more subtle differentiations; otherwise how could he bear the burden of all the demands put on him by family, occupation, state, religion, society, etc.? As the situation demands, he has to place in the foreground one or other ego side almost to such exclusiveness that the other sides necessarily become stunted. His talent should lie in the ease with which he adjusts to various situations brought about not only by the social life in itself but also by its critical changes and emotional upheavals. A special talent, if such is present, plays a relatively small part in this entire picture. The individualistic type of man of the democratic age again must be almost a universal genius since democracy in principle opens up all possibilities for anybody. How this inner conflict of the individualistic man must lead to neurosis, when he also has to be a collective normal type, we have already indicated at the conclusion of the previous chapter.

If we now turn to the child himself with his individual disposition and gifts, we have a similar impression; namely,—leaving out of consideration the exceptional cases—that in the complexity which is already shown in infancy it is pretty difficult to determine wherein his special gift lies and it is still more difficult to judge whether it will continue in later life and whether it can be utilized professionally. If we have previously emphasized how difficult it is for parents and educators to recognize the drift of the times, yet here we face the complementary difficulty of determining in the individual the obvious talent and making use of it pedagogically. Already here one might draw the practical conclusion from this state of affairs, that it will be necessary to take a certain risk in education and also to admit to chance (which we seem to fear like the devil) a part in the choice of occupation, which as a matter of fact is no choice at all. With this I do not mean to say that we have already reached the point in our discussion of the factors determining the choice of occupation, where our scientific ambition has to yield to the recognition of indeterminable factors. On the contrary, precisely now after having discussed the educational influence of the social milieu and of the collective ideologies, we should like to turn our attention to those individual factors in the choice of occupation and in the development of talents that are psychologically determinable. The different psychoanalytic schools have been able to shed some new light on this problem from the dynamic viewpoint held in common. The essential advance in this direction beyond the purely descriptive psychology is characterized by the Freudian concepts of "fate of an instinct" (Triebschicksal), "sublimation" and "identification."
Hermann, who has made a special study of the question of talent, and has shrewdly seen many connexions1, yet remains dispassionate enough to admit the inadequacy of these concepts for the satisfactory explanation of the development of a definite talent and its occupational utilization. But he constantly refers back to the principle of psychical economy, that is, to the factors of intensity and volume of displacement, quantitative factors which even post festum would be immeasurable, much less predeterminable. Such qualifications, however, are indispensable to any effective education.

Modern psychologists first had to encounter the problem of talent in the fully developed adult, and inferred from the study of neurotically inhibited ability, its genesis in the child; their motivating interest was a therapeutic one which led them retrospectively from the study of the causes of inhibition to the origin of the talent. But also in this particular problem, analysis has not been able to avoid the same methodological faults that characterize its attitude towards the whole problem of education which it ought to understand and to solve from its apparent failures in the neurosis. But the recognition of the cause why, for instance, an artist cannot produce, throws no light on the problem how he came to be able to produce or

1 "Organlibido und Begabung" (Internat. Zeitschr. £. Psa, IX, 1923) and "Beitrage zur Psychogenese der zeichnerischen Begabung" (Imago, VIII, 1922).

what enabled him to do so. For this simple reason, because life—and particularly its disturbances, illness—can sometimes be explained causally; for causality is a category of thought or thinking and hence every explanation contains a causal understanding. But life does not permit of being built up causally, neither therapeutically, nor even educationally, because the individual’s willed aspirations stand outside the explicable range of causality. We have however, besides this, the other principle of finality for the explanation of the individual’s aspirations; but this is only valid post festum, that is, for the understanding of the aspirations already in force, thus it is only another kind of causal explanation of effects that have already occurred. On this account it is so difficult to apply the causally traceable connections in psychical mechanisms to education, in which it is precisely a matter of foreseeing and predetermining the individual reactions, the essential factors of which, the willed aims and aspirations according to their very nature, are indeterminable. Hence when ambitious educators boast of being able to foretell the reaction of a child to some pedagogic measure or in some general situation, it signifies little; for first of all it would be a matter of a chance guess and not of scientific knowledge; secondly, the child coming under a prolonged pedagogic influence such as education signifies, will continually change his tactics just in order to escape from prede-
termination, and so maintain his individuality.

If then it is difficult to foretell the individual’s reaction in an isolated situation it becomes impossible where it is a matter of the whole personality or at least of so integral a part of the same such as a special talent is. Hence dynamic psychology leaves out of the question the assumption of inborn special dispositions and as an ultimate principle of explanation refers to the economic-dynamic factors in the psychical establishment of the whole personality. In the beginning one indeed looked for a specific disposition, which however in most cases is only demonstrable post festum. But scarcely is this achieved by the Freudian theory of organ-libido or the Adlerian theory of organ inferiority, both fundamentally representing the same principle. The actual artistic sublimation (Freud) or the successful over-compensation (Adler), cannot be understood unless one also takes into consideration besides the organ and the impulse force (whether in a positive or negative sense) the whole individual and his prevailing attitude to this organ in question. To all this there is added a social and ideological viewpoint that leaves further scope for the choice of occupation. Even supposing the psychology of a surgeon is to be comprehended causally from a sublimation of sadism

1 In this respect the Adlerian school omitted applying their psychological viewpoints to their own methods of education. Hence in his practical instruction in therapy and education, Adler speaks of the "Art of reading a Life’s history" (1st Part of a Technik der Individual Psychologie, Munchen, 1928).

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(the hand) in the first place, this does not explain why the same hand sadism does not express itself, as clearly it does at other times, in a gift for drawing or for sculpture. Secondly, it certainly does not explain the profession of surgery that first must exist ideologically and be socially accepted before the individual can use it as a "sublimation" for his sadistic disposition or inclination. The same holds good for the over-compensation of an inferior eye (in Adler’s sense) in the profession of painter or marksman. In other words, sublimation itself may take place in the individual, but its constructive utilization no longer depends on the individual alone, but on collective factors of a social and ideological kind that we have already mentioned and of whose determining influence we want again to remind ourselves.

If we now turn to the inner process of sublimation or of over-compensation in the individual, it must be said that here Adler has not seen more than Freud but only differently. For Freud, sublimation resulted in a kind of negative way from inhibited impulse, hence appeared to him as something weakened, diluted, faded, in comparison to the original impulse. Adler on the other hand starts from a weak inferior fundamental attitude and finds the powerful, overwrought exaggeration in the compensation tendency. But both concepts have in common the dynamic viewpoint, which comprehends talent proper not as a given dispo-
sition but as dynamic expression. This in turn results from the dynamic interaction between factors of quantity and intensity, that one describes either as sublimation (weakening) or as over-compensation (strengthening). But the course and result of this process in every case will depend on a further factor that one might designate as the attitude of the individual to himself. That means, it depends on what extent and whether or not the individual utilizes a given talent for himself in the meaning of his own willed aspiration. Indeed, is it not likely that the individual first develops his talent for a definite purpose, whereby this purpose is the decisive factor? The mechanisms thereby coming into play would be only the means for attaining the individual's purpose and the social ideology would be the justification for it. Furthermore we must remember that apparently there are different means of accomplishment, or, better, different types of ability to achieve, that arise sometimes from a superfluity of energy by means of sublimation, sometimes from a feeling of inferiority by means of compensation and sometimes from a need for justification by means of identification. Also we shall have to acknowledge different mixtures of motive, mechanism, and aspiration. Sometimes sexuality (Freud's libido) will be the effective impulse force, another time it will be the striving for power (Adler), yet another the so-called guilt-feeling (that I have described as the creative guilt) or again it will be a mixture of all of these. But also achievement itself, creation, can have as its effect the same reactions that we have just described as the cause; productivity may lead to sexual stimulation, can give to the individual a feeling of power, but also can evoke a feeling of inferiority or guilt.

All these various aspects of productivity into which the problem of talent has been resolved for us can, however, be considered from a broader viewpoint if one has learnt to understand that the feeling of inferiority is as little an ultimate fact as is the sense of guilt. I have tried to show that these latter arise as a reaction to the fact of being different, psychologically expressed, from being individual, and that the individual feels blameworthy towards the species and inferior towards the community, because and in so far as he is different from the others. So the pedagogic question of talent proves to be a psychologically inadequate objective, the history of which is characteristic for the complexity of the problem here dealt with. The tracing and constructive furthering of talent was postulated as an educational aspiration derived from the therapeutic study of the individual incapable of achievement. Then came descriptive psychology that determined certain inherited dispositions.

1 See the chapter "Schaffen und Schuld" in "Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit" (1929).
of a physical and psychical nature, that should be cultivated and developed or at least not inhibited by education, in order to yield the desired result of a specific surplus of achievement. Finally from the standpoint of dynamic psychology, all these factors of inherited disposition, of prevailing ideology, and of social milieu prove to us to be of a secondary nature in so far as ultimately it depends on the attitude of the individual to himself and to the surrounding world. These are the two fundamental factors that certainly influence the ego, but also from which the ego makes something. This latter conclusion which we can draw from the dynamic psychology of personality does away with the educational significance of the concept of talent and the idea of pedagogically influencing it. What we see before us is the fact that the individual has to vindicate his separate existence in the community through achievement, super-achievement, or special achievement, according to whether the individual is different from the other, feels himself to be so and accepts it or not.

This tendency on the part of the individual to justify himself has become a strong motive for productivity only at particular times such as ours when increasing individualization or individualism is rampant. The present-day education which is individualistically inclined, goes back to the concept of talent inferred post festum, in order to find in the child itself an in-

individual aim of education which shall then justify the individualistic ideology of education. In other words, since the child cannot be trained to be a mere individual, which is the tendency of modern ideology, one wants at least to train it to be a specially gifted individual. From this the newer ideology of talent has arisen which rationalizes pedagogically the parental wish for the preservation of the individuality of their child. But the practical results do not go beyond an occasional production of a prodigy. For the child’s wish as a rule is not for the development of a special talent but for the expansion and enforcement of his whole individuality, an aspiration that from the very beginning certainly encounters the most varied outer and inner obstacles. The search for, and the cultivation of, a special talent in the child by parents and educators may be accepted by the child as a means to individualization but it may just as often be felt as an obstacle to the same, like anything imposed on the child from without. For the child not only needs external influences for the utilization of its aptitudes but he also requires inner motives and these emerge from a dynamic interplay of forces. Their productive operation indeed may be provoked but cannot be forced, may be prepared for but cannot be artificially initiated at a definite time nor arbitrarily placed in the service of super-individual purposes.

Vocation is a product of the collective ideology, that
which the community needs and values; talent is a symbol of an individual ideology, that which the individual knows and wills; and in the ideal case, these two tendencies coincide in the choice of occupation. The choice of vocation, determined by social and collective ideological factors, faces the individual at a time when often enough he is forced to decide from practical reasons and not from inner necessity. One often discovers one’s real vocation very late, although it can in favourable circumstances lie within the already chosen circle of interests; just as one can later fall in love with the woman whom one married for other reasons. But in general the present-day occupations are too widely differentiated for the individual to determine beforehand his choice; on the other hand, they are again so specialized that one must begin in them early in order to master them. Hence, the ever increasing tendency of the schools, even the higher ones, to prepare for everything only in a general and more theoretic way; the practical side must be gradually acquired through experience as in every profession. In this sense, the vocational education, particularly that of the so-called free lance, really never ends; indeed it begins only with the entrance into the professional life. If one can really make any child into anything, as the present-day psychology supposes, and modern education would like to believe, so much the worse; for what we lack is precisely the goal. If we are not satis-

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fied with the negative aim of education, namely, to prevent neurotics, the question then is for what purpose shall the child be educated after the religious ideology has made room for the humanistic, but this again is restricted by national and democratic (individualistic) ideologies. We have already seen how in this difficulty the cultivation and development of talent has followed as an educational aim gained from the individual himself, an aim that in the most favourable case coincides with the collective claims of the choice of occupation. The occupation or profession is then a kind of preservation of the individual elements in the form of a miniature collectivity as represented by the professional classes.

On the other hand the vocational psychology forms an essential part of the character in man, in being accepted by the individual, and in the course of time being made a part of his own Self. It is not only that we thus preserve our Ego in the occupation, but through the occupation we also first unfold and develop our individual ego, our whole personality. Hence Psychoanalysis with its return to the impulse and instincts has given no consideration to vocational psychology and has contributed little to the understanding of the choice of occupation. And yet in certain cases the whole psychology of the individual can be contained in and completely absorbed by the vocation. Naturally there are different types and degrees of pro-
essional men; from the artist whose ego has, as it were, been absorbed one hundred per cent by his work, up to the manual worker or clerk whose vocation plays practically no role in his psychology. These two extreme cases also show how, with the significance of the vocational psychology, the significance of the personal or private life changes. The artist type lives for his work, namely in the sense of self-development and self-expression, and his personal relations must be subordinate to his work, often enough to the detriment of the purely human side of life. The other type has to find all his gratification and happiness in life and experience, for which he exists, whilst he considers work as a necessary evil.

But there is yet another type of person besides these, the understanding of whom leads us deeper into the problem of vocational psychology; this is the typical average woman, the wife of her husband and the mother of her children. If one comprehends this as her vocation, as she herself does, then one can say also with her as with the artist that the psychology of vocation and of the ego coincide, become one. Only she creates concretely and really, whereas the artist type creates ideally and abstractly. The man must first create work and occupation ideologically; and often enough the justification for it, because it is no longer a natural expression. On the success of this justification—no matter what his occupation may be—depends his future success or failure. Whether by achievement, further achievement, and higher achievement, he succeeds in proving to himself that he is good and not bad, or whether from his biological guilt he has to prove that he is bad (and not good), can never be explained causally and predicted, because it depends on the finalistic attitude of the individual to himself. The woman thus naturally fulfils two professions as wife and mother, namely, that of the educator (of her children) and that of the helper (therapeutist) of her husband. For she "helps" him to fulfil his vocation, that is, to develop his ego in the sense of the occupational psychology, because she supplies or supplements through her unprofessional ego the human part that he renounces. Here may be included everything that one comprehends as the woman’s understanding of and her ability to "manage" the man. And the misunderstood woman is in many cases the one whose therapeutic helpful role is not acknowledged and valued by the man; just as the misunderstood man is he whom the woman does not help in this sense. But the woman in her role as natural therapist and educator throws decisive light on vocational psychology. As we have stated in this and the previous chapter, in the occupation of the average professional man, not only does his (impulse) ego find expression but also his collective nature is asserted. Whereas in the woman this collective self is still very closely bound up with the species
ego, in the man a part of this racial self has to find expression in his occupation which is also collective. Normally this is scarcely noticeable, but in neurotic situations we see the individual ego seeking in work a refuge from the racial coercion of the sexual life and the social coercion of the emotional life; hence the partner in marriage can be just as jealous of the vocational work as if it were a third person. Yet this is only the simplest case of conflict between the ego and the species which one tries to settle by substituting the collective vocational life for that of the race (sexual and emotional life). There are still more complicated and psychologically more interesting situations when the one is played off against the other. As for example where the love life is used as a protection against work and occupation, that is, as the only contribution of the collective ego to which the individual ego reacts with guilt feeling.

Still more interesting is the artist type, by which I do not mean here artist in the narrow sense of productive artist, but rather the free-lance type who not only demands special individuality but also permits it. This type throws a more significant light on the intertwining of the vocational and love life which in the creative artist type turns absolutely one on the other. Whereas the creative artist in his work changes the world and people according to his will, the artistically gifted average type is in danger of exerting his creative instinct on his family and friends, when his occupation does not provide him with any outlet for it. The analysis of such mixed types (a good example is the artistically gifted architect) again raises the whole problematic of human psychology beyond Psychoanalysis; for one has to ask oneself how far does the occupational psychology of these people influence their individual psychology, indeed, even produce it. Certainly this type has often chosen his occupation from some strong impulse disposition and its "sublimation"; but the choice itself (for instance, of surgeon or architect) is collectively and socially determined, which again affects the original impulse disposition and the whole personality. The individual then either does in his occupation what he cannot do in life, or he would be happy only if he could do the same in his life as in his occupation. In other words he reacts to life, not with his individual psychology but with his vocational psychology. This leads to conflicts, although it seems to be for him the only way of gratification. In this respect it is easier for the artist for he can materialize his ideal in his work, whereas the material is given to the creative business man, and he can only impress his individuality on reality by making a compromise with it. We shall try to show in the last chapter, which is dedicated to self-education, how far this whole creative tendency in the individual arises from a non-acceptance of his own Self. This, his own Self, he
then wants to alter by projecting it, as it were, into the other or into the world at large.

In conclusion of our discussion of the choice of vocation, I should only like to say that the present-day man in spite of—or on account of—the increasing individualization again becomes more collective particularly in his business. Indeed, I believe that in the vocational life of today there is to be found the strongest, perhaps even the only collective force which directly influences the individual ego. It does not seem to me even improbable that the present high wave of individualism is at least in part also a reaction against the increasing occupational communization. However that may be, at any rate I see in the constantly growing interest for psychology, which is occupied more and more with our individual ego, an obvious attempt to rescue this Self from collective absorption. One of the dangers that threaten our individual ego is, however, the one springing from vocation, or, better, from vocational psychology. As a protection against this danger the theory of talent has been again introduced into pedagogy, which shall give the individual the psychological upperhand over the vocation. Whether and how far this can actually succeed we have shown above and will return to the question in the last chapter. But first, however, we must discuss one other collective ideology that threatens the individual in his personal claims even before the choice of occupation, and this

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is the family that sees in the child only the vocation of the son or daughter, that is, a role of the species with which the childish ego very soon comes into conflict.

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Chapter Seven  FORMS OF KINSHIP AND THE INDIVIDUAL’S ROLE IN THE FAMILY

Education is love to the Offspring.

Nietzsche

In the course of our discussion we have repeatedly touched upon the child’s attitude to the parents and to the family, but now we must discuss in greater detail the different relationships within the family. For as long as childhood lasts, the child is very closely, in part exclusively, attached to the house and modern education has again placed the chief accent on the education of the child in the family. And rightly so! The child is indeed brought into a family of already educated—or in so far as brothers or sisters are concerned—of partly educated individuals, who also have a psychology, whereas the child brings with it neither education nor psychology, and somehow gets both from adults or develops both through them.

In the analysis of adult neurotics Trend, above all, has studied the influence that the parents exercise on the child partly through their mere existence, partly through their particular psychology or characterology. Under the concept of the "Œdipus Complex" he has described the effects engendered by the parents in the child in the form of love, anxiety, hatred, jealousy, obstinacy, etc. But these effects are of different values, that is, they are partly unavoidable, partly avoidable, partly bring out of the child only what is latent; on the other hand, they partly provoke new reactions to these unfamiliar stimulations. A closer study has at any rate taught us to understand that the parents cannot be made responsible for many of the child’s reactions, because the child possesses them potentially when it is born into the world. This is particularly so with anxiety, which has not the same significance for the child as it has, according to the psychoanalytic theory, for the adult neurotic. The child, at the birth process, seems to bring into the world anxiety, which is then attached to the parents; on the other hand, this anxiety determines from the beginning the dependency of the child on the parents (especially on the mother) and often extends far beyond the time of the child’s physical helplessness. The adult may have fear of death or fear of sex, the child has a fear of life

1 The Trauma of Birth (1929).
itself, which it changes forthwith, even when there is no objective reason for it, into fear or anxiety of certain people or things.

Let us now return to the Oedipus complex with which a definite phase of the child’s relation to the parents, or better, one aspect of this relationship, is circumscribed. The sexual element in it emphasized by Freud, as the attraction to the parent of the opposite sex and the jealousy of the parent of the same sex, is not so clearly to be found in practice as mythology represents it and as Freud first believed. This purely biological scheme may indeed exist in the human child to a certain extent; but it is permeated, indeed, even sometimes completely dominated by other tendencies emerging from the unfolding ego, so that it was difficult even for Psychoanalysis to maintain the original Oedipus concept. They speak of a reversed Oedipus relationship, of a rudimentary, even negative one, which at least devalues, not to say contradicts, the purely biological viewpoint. I myself have on one occasion referred to the fact that besides the reverse of the Oedipus complex which contains a greater love to the parent of the same sex, there is also in the child a tendency that one might designate "anti-OEdipoean" be-

1 See the third Volume of my "Technik," Die Analyse der Analytikers und seiner Rolle in der Gesamtsituation (Wien and Leipzig, 1931).

2 The Relation of parental Attitudes to Success and Failure: a Lecture given at the One Day’s Conference on Parental Education in New York, Nov. 2, 1927.

cause in contrast to the Oedipus complex it aims at a bringing together of the parents instead of a separation of them. Certainly this occurs because the child also expects some kind of advantages for itself from it, that is, it gratifies egoistic motives, but this shows that these often enough far outweigh the biological tendencies. The child reacts not only with the innate biological impulses, but it also reacts according to the given situation. I found these tendencies of the child to bring the parents together or to hold them together particularly in those marital situations, the instability of which the child experiences as a dangerous threat to his well-being. This attitude of the child which can easily be noticed in situations of that kind, was overlooked by Psychoanalysis because the attitude mostly does not manifest itself in altruistic ways, but in neurotic reactions, with which the child wants to attain the same result1.

1 I wrote in the lecture mentioned, "I surmise that in Freud’s ‘Analysis of a Phobia of a five-year-old Boy’ (1909) the fact of the parental disharmony played a similar part as in those cases observed by me. I do not know whether the obvious conflicts of his parents, who later separated, go back so far into his childhood. But I should suppose from similar experiences that the father’s excessive interest in the boy’s problems was already an expression of his marital guilt consciousness, to which the children as we know so react as if they understood it."

The parents had moreover "agreed," as Freud remarks in the Introduction to the Case History, "to educate their first child with as little compulsion as would be requisite for the maintenance of good manners."
Thus they had apparently also projected the "freedom" which they wished for themselves, on to
the child, nevertheless without success as his neurosis shows, a neurosis which also arose from
a wish for his absent father and not only as a reaction against his father.

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But if in a situation where the child experiences the conflicts of the parents with one
another as a danger to itself, he can react in a way contrary to the biological
presuppositions, then we may assume that he perhaps also reacts with the real Œdipus
Complex (where this is to be found) only to a situation of better understanding between
the parents and not with his biological innate impulses. Actually not only critics of
analysis, such as Malinowski by reason of ethnological material1, but also practising
child analysts who, contrary to Freud, worked with the child itself2 have leaned towards
this same viewpoint; namely that the Œdipus Complex may be a reaction acquired by
the child in our family organization, and not a biological inheritance brought with it into
the world. If this were confirmed, the paradox would follow that Freud would have
considered the anxiety present at birth as acquired through later influences (threat) and
the Œdipus attitude acquired in the family situation as innate3. However that may be,
we cannot here go further into this problem and can only refer readers to the
psychoanalytic literature4 which moreover has dealt with the influence of the parents on
the child


2 Mary Chadwick: "Difficulties in Child Development" (London, 1929) especially Chap. XII,
"Both Sides of the Œdipus Complex."

3 There are still other fundamental paradoxes in Psychoanalysis. See concerning these
especially my work entitled "Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit" (Leipzig and Vienna 1929).


almost exhaustively although one-sidedly and uncritically. At any rate the therapeutic or
psychological aspects of the family situation do not interest us here but only the
pedagogical, and for this, one other side of the problem seems to me of greater
significance.

The question is, what does the child signify for the parents ideologically? In other words,
in what light do the parents see the child, and what do they want the child to be and for
what do they want to use it? But since the ideological attitude of the parents to the child
changes in different times and under different conditions, a cultural psychological study
of the theme "child" would be necessary for this, similar to that given by Ploss from the
ethnological standpoint1. But this task would go far beyond the realm of this work
where we are interested from pedagogic reasons only in the *present* parental ideology. Furthermore, the ethnological material is so manifold and so contradictory—especially the more that is collected—that one has to bring into it psychological viewpoints obtained from other sources in order to shape it into something more than a mere collection of material. I have already elaborated elsewhere\(^1\) the essential viewpoint that considers the child as the collective soul-bearer and it can


2 "Seelenglaube und Psychologie,” 1930.

be well brought into harmony with the ethnological material. The collective significance of the child is expressed in the custom of "child community” preserved relatively late (Ploss, Chap. L.) in which the children belong in common to all the mothers and sometimes—not always—when they are bigger are assigned to a father of choice (according to similarity). This primeval custom has practically nothing at all of the fatherhood-ideology, but gives rather the impression of a tutorship, in which the child participates at a definite age for the purpose of further training. This naturally is far from being an education in our sense even today among most primitives. The child among them has not only more collective significance but with it goes also more religious significance, that is, the child guarantees the continuation of existence to the community, not only in the social sense, but also in the meaning of the original belief in immortality.

The primal family, according to the newer views of sociology, was a kind of herd or group formation, that did not embrace a monogamous form of marriage in our meaning (although it did not make it impossible), nor did it include “promiscuity” in the meaning that we today attach to that concept. For there were definite restrictions (exogamous and others) which were very strictly adhered to. One might designate this primal family best, as a kind of "group marriage" in the broadest sense of the word, "in which
whole generations of each half of the race lived in community marriage.” 1 The regulation of the sexual life is closely connected with the religious ideas (belief in the soul) and these also determine the prevailing attitude to the child. This development cannot here be followed in detail, but only the most important transitional stage to our present ideology of the family can be revealed. The transition from the primitive groupfamily (kinsfolk) to our present-day small family is characterized by the acceptance of the father’s individual role of begetter of his children; this role was formerly denied from religious reasons of the belief in immortality. This turn of development changed the child from a collective being into a personal representative of the patriarchal individual-ideology. The transition phase was the Matriarchy, with the “heritance from the uncle” (avunculus), that is, the mother’s brother who was the male head of the family in place of the father; this seems to correspond to a relic of the old group marriage between brothers and sisters. Today with the enfeeblement of the patris potestas and the strengthening of the individualistic tendency, the child is an individual for himself although he is lawfully the father’s successor and is claimed as a collective being by the State. Thus the three chief stages in the ideological development of the

child are: a collective being (mother), heir (of the father), private being (Self).

We have now to investigate the different ideologies in relation to the child, how they have on the one hand, influenced the educational systems, on the other hand influenced the child itself, and, finally, how the child as an individual has reacted to these at different times. For this we shall have to bear in mind the existing antitheses, between the ideology of the parents (family), that of the teacher (community), and that of the child (individual). From the history of the family we know that earlier forms of kinship survive even when the actually existing family organization no longer shows this, indeed even when their origin is no longer understood. But this does not seem to be merely a useless survival as Morgan, its discoverer, thought, but these earlier forms of wider kinship obviously remain because they correspond to the spiritual need to preserve collective elements which become more and more individualized with the advancing family organization. But with the small family and its lawful ideology, all earlier forms of kinship finally fall apart. Hence the school replaces within the clan this earlier collective unity in the child community. So the actual school education springs up from the original childcommunity not to replace "the family" but to preserve the old group community (clan) in process of disappearing.

Here we already see, how the school plays a double role towards the parents; it replaces for them the lost collective ideology of the belief in the soul, but robs them at a later stage of the individual claim in the child. So the parents have really never fully possessed the child, because originally they willingly surrender the child to the clan or tribe for the belief in the soul, but later on they can no longer snatch the child away from the collective claims of the group. The mother alone in the primitive time of her natural supremacy had real possession of the child (Bachofen’s “Mother Right”), and later on the father alone in the period of the lawfully and religiously supported patriarchal ideology of the family. In our small family (of marriage) the parents possess the child in common only in so far as the mother trains it in the early period and the father claims it later, when, however, he has to compete for it with the community (the State). Here the child, especially the son, was trained exclusively in the paternal ideology, as the father’s heir and successor who also had to care for the religious cult of the ancestors. This paternal tendency was, however, not only opposed by the son through his natural attachment to the mother (the psychoanalytic Œdipus Complex) but also by his individuality, a double conflict, the climax of which we find presented in Hamlet.

1 The concept and the word “family” is related to the Latin “formulus,” that is, servant, slave.


Here is established the third, and for the time being last phase of the parental ideology which, however, springs up neither from the collectivity nor from the paternal need for immortality. But on the contrary, it has been forced, through the child’s own individual development, first on the parents, and finally on the community. Today the child is made not only a social but also an individual vindication of marriage, whereas formerly as long as he was a collective being, he made marriage unnecessary. With this is connected the fact that today many marital conflicts are projected on to the child, a fact which detrimentally influences the collective education, as also the individual development, of the child. But one must not forget that this is nothing new, but only one other manifestation of the age-old fact that the child has always been used for something, at times by the community, at times by the parents, or one of the parents. At any rate the primitive civilizations are much more sincere in this utilization of the child than we. For we today psychically misuse and exploit the children under the mask of individualistic education. Indeed, perhaps the acceptance of children as independent individuals, which completely contradicts the whole parental ideology, is a kind of guilt reaction on the part of the parents towards exploiting the child on the other hand. At any rate we can observe that many children are more or less conscious of this guilt feeling of their parents.
towards themselves, and take advantage of this situation for themselves. A difficult marriage situation may be in this sense a good school for the child to early develop individuality and self-reliance, or it may also be the beginning of a lifelong neurosis, according to the child's disposition and reactions. Experience shows both possibilities, although analysts from their study of the neurotic drew the premature conclusion that it could have only harmful effects, because they never see those children who benefited from a maladjustment between the parents. Such a situation can be for the child not only a stimulus for thinking and so promote his intellectual development, but it also develops his emotional life and his will and he can in this way, if he does not find sufficient security in the family, become prematurely self-reliant just as he can become completely dependent (neurotic).

At any rate it seems that much more depends on what family situation the child finds and how it reacts to it than on the inherited biological elements such as are given in the libido tendencies and in the manifestations of anxiety. Analysis has indeed shown in the neurotic, the harmful after-effects of the parental influence in childhood, but likewise has taught us to see in the analytic situation not only (with Freud) a repetition of the infantile but also a new creation of the ego. The analytic situation makes it obvious that the individual can so easily recreate every situation in his meaning because fundamentally he always finds only himself, or better, a part of himself in the other, or creates it by means of projection. Simultaneously there is also the opposite process of identification, that is, the individual also tries to be like the other and to a certain extent actually becomes like him (psychologically or characterologically). This tendency to "imitate" is so preponderant that the other side has hitherto been neglected. Certainly it must be admitted that in the infantile situation at first the child identifies more than projects, but at least in the analytic situation projection should have been more valued (by Freud). I have already elsewhere1 comprehended the so-called Òedipus situation, which is supposed to repeat itself in the analysis, as the child's first clear achievement of projection, in which he recreates a given situation in the meaning of his needs and wishes. The relation to the parents—as we better call the Òedipus situation—is thus in a varying degree a creation of the child's, as the transference situation is clearly a creation of the patient's. This creation, however, does not only correspond to the biological tendencies in the meaning of the Òedipus complex but to the whole characterological development of the child, who can only identify itself with the parents, in that it simultaneously recreates them in a varying degree according to its own will.

1 "Gestaltung und Ausdruck der Personlichkeit," 1928, pp. 64 ff., 2nd Vol. of Genetische Psychologie (the whole chapter "Erziehen und Beherrschen").
or ego ideal. Paradoxically, one might say, the child has to discover or create the parents as he needs them, which indeed is actually realized in the idea of God, who hence betrays rather our own self than the actual parental characteristics.

But the parents project on to the child as much or even more, that is, they try to recreate the child according to their own wishes. We have briefly described the different stages of this parental ideology and have designated the employment of the child as "heir" as the decisive turning point from the original concept of the child as a collective being, to its present position as an individual. At this stage of the patriarchal ideology the child is no longer important as the bearer of the collective soul of the race in the meaning of the original belief in the soul, but as the individual successor of the personal immortality of the father. Here, the child is no longer exclusively a collective being, yet is less of an individual being than at the primitive stage, because he has a quite definite and narrowly restricted task to fulfil. Against this designation of being only a son, which is the same as being robbed of one's own individuality, the child has rebelled from the moment when the man accepted fatherhood—although unwillingly—as a means of salvation for his soul. From then on, we see in the history of mankind the imposing duel of these two principles, which is manifested in folklore, myths, and poetic traditions as the duel between father and son. In the strife between Christianity and ancient Rome, it has clearly become a conflict between two ideological principles, the patriarchal and the filial. This conflict continues through the whole of the Middle Ages in the strife between the worldly and the spiritual spheres (Emperor and Pope) apparently as a strife for authority, but in truth as a battle for the soul. But modern times alone have brought a temporary solution of this conflict with the discovery of America which became a new land of democracy formed by the fugitives driven from Europe through religious intolerance. In this way they got rid of both the Emperor and Pope although they were gradually forced into an inner bondage. In Europe itself it needed the World War to overthrow the last external representatives of the father dominance, who sought, and also for the moment found in Psychoanalysis, appearing at the same time, an ideological solace. But this could be neither lasting nor of constructive value although it has a transitory therapeutic effect in that it replaces for a while the dying father ideology that mankind still needs. In this sense Psychoanalysis is as conservative as it appeared revolutionary; for its founder is a rebellious son who defends the paternal authority, a revolutionary who, from fear of his own rebellious son-ego, took refuge in the security

1 "Das Inzest Motiv in Dichtung und Sage," 2nd Edition, 1926, especially Chapter V.
of the father position, which however was already ideologically disintegrated.

Having briefly surveyed the collapse of the father ideology under the increasing pressure of the individual claims of the son, from the time of the world dominance of patriarchal Rome to the last ideological attempt to save it in Psychoanalysis, we must remind ourselves of the difficulties that had preceded the erection of the father dominance. These were not of an external but of an inner nature. As I have elsewhere stated the patriarchal ideology was preceded by a long period of development in which the personal fatherhood was not only unknown but was denied, in order to maintain the individual ideology of immortality. Following the primitive systems of religion and social organizations which seemed to be created as a protection to individual immortality, we see the strife of man against the role of father enforced on him, at its highest in the Greek hero mythology1. Indeed the Ædipus Saga itself, which Freud would like to understand simply as an expression of the individual psychology of the son, proves to be from a sociological viewpoint a heroic defence of the man against the role of father. The father of Ædipus, Laïos, represents the type of man rejecting

1 The love adventures of Jove in his various animalistic disguises (snake, swan, bull) correspond to the last traces of the totemistic impregnation of the soul, which the father god of the sexual age had taken over, till gradually he accepted the form of the purely human husband (Amphytrion Saga).

the sexual ideology, as I have described him in "Seelenglaube und Psychologie" On account of the prophecy that the son would be his successor, he abstains for years from sexual intercourse with his wife, with whom he cohabited only once in drunkenness or when seduced by her and so accidentally begot Ædipus. The boy was immediately exposed after birth, because the father wanted no successor, but wanted to be his own immortal successor, a desire which the myth presents in the incest of Ædipus with his mother. This concept makes Ædipus himself a representative of the father who wants to have no children, yet tries to preserve himself indefinitely. The incest with the mother from which also children sprang up, proves to be, as I stated elsewhere, a compromise between the wish to have no children at all (Laïos) and the necessity to renounce one’s own immortality in favour of the children. This compromise to beget oneself as the mother’s son and to be reborn from her, must naturally fail tragically. This is the veritable guilt of Ædipus, not that he slew the father and took his place with the mother. For as little as the father wants to continue to exist only in his sons, just as little has the son an inclination to play only the part of a successor to the father. In this sense Ædipus rebels likewise against the role of son as against that of father and not as son against his father. This double conflict in the individual himself who wants
to be neither father nor son, but simply Self, is portrayed in the myth in all its features which one cannot understand from the individual psychological viewpoint but only when one regards it as a sediment of sociological development. In this sense the resistance against the begetting of a son signifies also one’s own resistance to come into the world as son; the exposure signifies the son’s wish not to be brought up in the parental home as son but to grow up a free man in the wilderness. In this sense finally the fate or destiny that compels him to slay the father and to marry the mother signifies not only the son’s individual wish as Freud has it, but also the coercion of the species that prescribes marriage and fatherhood against the individual’s will.

Thus in the Œdipus myth we see the struggle of the individual represented as a strife between the ego believing itself immortal and the racial ego manifested in the sexual ideology (marriage, children). This inner resistance of the man against any kind of a racial role, whether that of the father or that of the son, is presented in the Œdipus Saga as an external strife between father and son. We now also understand why this conflict emerged so relatively late in history; first, the full development of individuality as Hellenism represented it was necessary in order to permit the ego to revolt against every kind of racial compulsion. Hence we shall not concern ourselves with the historical analysis of the Œdipus tradition and the various interpretations based on the same, since we are here interested just in the most recent traditions as portrayed in literature, because only they can show us what the myth signifies to fully developed Hellenism. Now we find the material in its complete human elaboration first among the tragic poets, at its climax in Sophocles’ presentation. There the hero is married a long time, according to other sources 19 years, before he discovers that he is the husband of his mother. This and similar characteristics do not permit of being disposed of simply as late unessential elaborations, as it may seem from purely psychological interpretations. But for a sociological understanding of the Saga one must equally evaluate all the manifest details of the whole tradition since the end-product tells more than does its genesis. This statement still holds good for the poetic creation of Sophocles, who perhaps had an Œdipus complex himself, but in his presentation of the same he was just as much influenced by the old traditions as by the contemporary attitude to it.

With these reservations I am inclined to recognize in the ultimate form of the saga as it appears in the Greek tragic poets, one other application of the


Œdipus material. Although this corresponds to the mythological significance set forth yet it is altered in the meaning of a later stage of development. "Whereas the mythical Œdipus, as Homer still pictures him, continues to rule in Thebes after the death of his mother-spouse and so—although blinded—somehow saves himself from the catastrophe, yet in the poetic presentation the hero tragically collapses as soon as his deed is revealed. But he provokes this revelation himself in the play the essential characteristic of which lies just in the obstinate insistence of Œdipus to reveal his crime. Even if this is to be understood as the result of his bad conscience—now spoken of as "selfpunishment"—yet we must ask ourselves why this awakened only after so many years and why just at that particular moment. We cannot be content with the explanation that may be derived from the tradition itself, namely, that originally the discovery directly followed the deed and hence the dramatic author placed the revelation into a later age of the hero for a mere sensational effect. For as we said we are not interested here in establishing the original form of the tradition, but only in understanding the formation it has assumed in the poem. And since the revelation in the drama would be just as thrilling if it followed the unconsciously begun deed, the poet could scarcely have had technical reasons for presupposing Œdipus had been long and happily married and that the mar-

riage had also been blessed by now grown-up children. The age of the Sophoclean hero and the tragic fate of his sons described in "Œdipus at Kolonnos" suggests that the reason for the displacement of the revelation originally following the deed, to the hero’s old age, is connected with the growing up of his sons.

In other words, Œdipus of the tragic poets no longer represents the ego defending its individual immortality against the racial role (as father and son), but he represents the man already forced into the part of father and into matrimonial laws. In fact the man at a critical age which is nearer to death than to life, the man who is reminded of his mortal ego and in a crisis that one might call neurotic today, revolts against the sexual immortality in the children. In this racial tragedy of the individual we see a man who is forced into the acceptance of the role of father and the matrimonial law through the destiny of development. Deprived of his individual immortality, and with the approach of age and of death he tries to abandon his fatherhood in order to regain his individual immortality. In the play the hero does this in a "neurotic" way not only by recalling his own childhood (mother) but also the mythical hero Œdipus, whose successful incest with the mother he wants to imitate. Only in

1 In the ancient epic, the marriage with the mother was childless and the children were ascribed to the second marriage with Euryganeia.

2 Œdipus expresses the wish (curse) that they might kill one another.
this moment when the hero tries to justify his break with the prevailing sexual ideology by reference to the old myth\textsuperscript{1} he then becomes an \OE dipus, not the \OE dipus of the tradition, whereas before he was anyone, that is, the Greek father wrestling with his conflict\textsuperscript{2}. Here also the poet’s individual psychology may be called in; because Sophocles was supposed to have written this play when he was an old man pursued by his sons, indeed according to one tradition, when he had to defend himself against the accusation of his sons that he was senile. He read his play before the tribunal, thus proving his superiority, and was acquitted. But this strife between the generations was no rarity even in ancient Greece, and Sophocles in the cursing of the sons by \OE dipus has described only a general motive of the above mentioned conflict; in the father who will not be replaced by his son and in the son who will not be the father’s successor.

This concept of the tragic \OE dipus tradition first explains why the hero insists on the discovery, had, so to say, set himself the task (like an analyst) of proving that he has slain his father and married his mother. He needs this motivation—not the deed itself—for the

\textsuperscript{1} See Jocasta’s justification in Sophocles that many men in their dreams cohabit with the mother; she could almost recall here the old mythical hero \OE dipus whom her husband the king of Thebes would like to imitate.

\textsuperscript{2} In this sense is to be understood J. Burckhardt’s famous quotation: ”Corresponding to the \OE dipus saga, every Greek had an \OE dipus fibre which was capable of being directly touched and vibrated.”

overthrowing of the undesirable patriarchal ideology, thus is not a son who wants to replace the father, but the man who will not accept the role of father. Thus the hero, so to say, accuses himself of \OE dipus’ crime in order thereby to gain the latter’s immortality in being reborn by the mother. This understanding of the Saga is however not to be obtained from its psychoanalytic interpretation (in Freud’s meaning) but only from the sociological significance. To the extent that our present-day child is still an \OE dipus, yet it is only an \OE dipus in the meaning of our interpretation of the hero; that is, the individual who does not want to be only a child. But the fact that Freud, in order to understand this childish reaction, had to recur to the \OE dipus Saga shows that it was not explicable from a purely psychological viewpoint. Freud—like the hero of the drama itself—recalled opportunely this old tradition which he now interprets as the son’s wish, whereas formerly it had signified exactly the opposite, namely, the conflict of the individual ego with the racial ego, that is, in the meaning of a resistance against the \OE dipus complex. Through the dominance for centuries, of the father principle and the family organization, there exists in the individual a desire for the same, which perhaps may already be latent in the child; but it has nothing to do with the old \OE dipus tradition, which represents the opposite, namely the resistance against the foundation and continuance of the family organi-
zation. In this sense also the Œdipus complex of the present-day child, no matter in what form it manifests itself, may ultimately be a protest of the individual ego against every kind of the collective family role (son, daughter, etc.). When, therefore, analysts emphasize the biological strength of the Œdipus wish in the present-day child, this seems to me, however, only therapeutically justifiable as a strengthening of the patient’s individual ego. But this is not their intention for the patient is simultaneously led on to overcome this attitude conceived of as "primitive” by the patriarchal ideology of the Freudian theory.

It would seem then, that the incest motive had originally served the purpose of an attempt to achieve one’s own immortality in the sense of the sexual ideology and indeed in the transitional period from the collective belief in the soul to belief in immortality in the children. The father principle was not yet fully accepted by the man, he was only father of the son begotten of the mother, thus he was father of himself, who wanted to continue to exist in the son. This also shows that incest as such was no primitive form of the sexual life or of marriage, moreover was not at all valid as an institution but was only a favour granted to exceptional individuals, who had made themselves immortal in their work (heroes). At the stage of the sexual ideology enforced on the man and its social materialization in the family organization, we see the rebelling father enviously grasping back at the successful Œdipus of the ancient myth, in order himself to become such an Œdipus, which at this stage of development naturally can no longer succeed and hence must end tragically. For the collective ideology has already given place to the family organization with immortality in the children and the individual ego can no longer free itself from this racial fetter. Finally, in the present-day individual who with his victorious individualism has precipitated the downfall of the father’s rule and of the family organization, we find the same motive interpreted as a wish for the father role, a motive which originally gave expression to the horror of it. Thus the Freudian theory does not prove to be a psychological explanation of the Œdipus motive, which it pretends to be, but only a new interpretation of the same in the meaning of the present-day individual and his present collective ideology. So the poet proves to be the successor of the hero, in that he narrates the heroic deed as a recollection of the good old times; and the psychologist proves to be the poet’s successor in that he interprets it anew for us today.

But these three stages of the heroic, poetic, and psychological presentation correspond not only to the historical stages of development but also to the individual. Thus a young poet is likely to be heroic, the ageing writer more psychological, the one represents the attitude of the independent ego, the other ac-
knowledges the necessary adjustment and submission to law. So for example the young Schiller wrote the revolutionary "Robbers" and the ageing poet "William Tell," who no longer turns against every kind of dominance, but only more against the arrogance of tyranny. Likewise the Oedipus complex in the average individual will also have another significance in childhood as in puberty or in maturity, for the artist another significance than for the neurotic. Besides, one must still separate the incest wish as such from the father ideology, for the relation between the two is not so simple as it seems from the individual psychological standpoint of the son; namely, that he will kill the father in order to possess the mother. The incest desire is a symbol of individual immortality to which the ego clings in order to escape the compulsion of the racial immortality in sex. Simultaneously the individual in the meaning of the old belief in the soul defends itself against the acceptance of the new father role. So actually the mother incest and the slaying of the father are not at all individual expressions of biological tendencies, but typify the individual's racial conflicts. The hero does not kill his father but the father as representative of the new sexual ideology; he does not marry his mother, but he makes the woman into the mother of his children whom he thus accepts. Hence the two aspects of the Oedipus complex express the same resistance of the individual against the new

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family ideology; the mother relationship expresses it from the standpoint of the racial sexual ego, the father relationship from the standpoint of the individual self. But the Oedipus complex also has a different meaning according to whether it is simply considered from the standpoint of the individual or from the standpoint of the son or from that of the father. As an individual one does not want to put oneself in the father's place and to become father, that is, the husband of the mother. As son, one may desire it but only to deny with it the role of the son; that is to say, if one must have a racial function then at least to have that of the father. Finally with the complete acceptance of the father role, the man will naturally love the son more (and not according to the Oedipus scheme, the daughter) because he sees in him his direct successor and heir. If the father prefers the daughter, it shows less willingness to accept the role of father, as particularly shown in the incest motive between father and daughter1. For this represents on the father's part a similar desire to be reborn now in the daughter, instead of in the mother. The biological Oedipus tendency is thus complemented by a psychical one of the ego which feels attracted to the child of the same sex and not to that of the opposite sex. The child reacts to this double-sided family constellation also in ambivalent, conflicting ways. The

1 See Incest Motive, Chap. XI, and its supplement "Seelenglaube und Psychologie," pp. 54 S.
son takes refuge in the mother not only from fear of the father but just as much from a fear of too great a love from the father, he develops a "mother fixation" in order not to be made completely into the son by the father and not to be engulfed as an individual. For the same reason the girl often leans to the father in order to withdraw from the mother's influence, for whom she is only daughter, that is, a continuation of the ego. That means the child is forced through ego motives to protect his individuality against parental egoism, and hence is pushed into another collective dependency, namely, the biological. The parents fight openly or tacitly for the child's soul, whether in the biological (opposite sex) or in the egoistic sense (the same sex), and the child uses the parents correspondingly, and plays them one against the other, in order to save his own individuality.

At any rate we see that the purely egoistic standpoint of the child does not only aim at the disintegration of the family, in that the child eliminates the rival and wants to replace him with himself, but the already mentioned anti-OEdipoean tendency is operative to keep the parents together, because this guarantees to the child a protection against the all-devouring claim of one of the parents. So the child appears as a representative of the family ideology when it needs it for a protection. The same tendency we already see however in the ancient ÒEdipus Saga if we understand it in

its ethnological significance. ÒEdipus acquires his "complex" outside the family since he is exposed directly after his birth; rather he founds his own family on the basis of the ÒEdipus complex, that is, after the completed deed. But this is not an expression of an eternal human longing, but it reflects only a definite historical transition of the family organization from the father rebellion to the acceptance of marriage. ÒEdipus, in contrast to his father, acknowledges his sons, he wants to be the father of a family, but the old Adam springs up towards the end of his life and urges him to seek his own immortality as once the mythical hero ÒEdipus had sought it in the incest with the mother and had found it in his heroic destiny. The ÒEdipus of the poet being sacrificed to the family ideology finally finds consolation in his daughters after he had cast out the wife and cursed the sons, a destiny that is similarly repeated in Shakespeare and other great men, who, so to say, need no sons in order to be immortal and so in age, turn to the daughter who symbolizes for them a less hazardous youth.
Chapter Eight  SELF DISCIPLINE AND SELF GUIDANCE

There is a luxury in self-reproach. When we blame ourselves we feel that no one else has a right to blame us. It is the confession, not the priest, that gives us absolution.

Oscar Wilde

I speak here of Self discipline not in the sense of a pedagogic ideal, or even of a therapeutic hope, but in the meaning of a tendency inherent in the individual, the origin and significance of which we shall investigate. Psychoanalysis has described one aspect of this attitude of the individual to himself (in the adult neurotic) as "self-punishment," and has then also found it operative in the child. But in order to understand this tendency in its full significance we must compare this self-criticism (which can sometimes go to the length of self-punishment) with a second tendency operative in every individual and this is "self-

over-estimation" (or idealization). We then recognize that both these attitudes arise from a non-acceptance of one’s own self, that originally seems mostly to relate to the impulse ego and later extends to its derivatives the life of the will and of the emotions. Before we go closer into the origin of this division of ego and its causes, I should like to point out that the emphasis on the need for punishment stressed by the Freudian school concerns the therapeutic aspect of this ego conflict; whereas the emphasis on the over-estimation (particularly stressed by Adler) takes into account, rather, the educational aspect. The concept of self punishment presupposes a kind of subjective continuance of the punishment, threatened or accomplished from without, whereas the concept of self-idealization contains rather an inner striving for improvement or perfection.

But the real question is, whence arise these tendencies such as we see not only in the adult but also find preformed in the child? The analysis of the neurotic suggested that both tendencies, that of self-criticism and that of self-improvement, have been awakened in the individual through training and education and then have been adopted by him through identification. Freud, from his ideology, has actually wanted to ascribe this educational influence, in so far as it existed, only to the father and has also theoretically formulated it in his concept of the "castration threat" as "super-
ego formation." Now we know, however, that this influence starts not only earlier, but also in a much greater extent from the mother in the first training of the instincts. Actually child analysts (like Melanie Klein and others) have been able to verify the appearance of reactions of that kind, in an early phase of the child’s development, where there could be no talk of a super-ego formation (in Freud’s sense). But irrespective of the question from whom does this influence on the child emanate, there are two other problems of greater importance, that arise from it. First, the purely pedagogic question as to whether this influence is good or bad. That is, by reducing the claims on the child, could we not and should we not decrease its tendency to self-criticism, which can lead to all kinds of inhibitions? This is a question that cannot be affirmed offhand, because it seems that this self-criticism also occasions self-idealization in the sense of self-improvement, which from an educational point of view we cannot dispense with. Secondly there is the purely psychological question, what moves the child to adopt as his own even very strict demands; a question which has been answered by referring to the child’s fear (of punishment) and to the child’s love (of the person with whom he identifies himself).

Elsewhere, I have added to these two motives, a third and as I think decisive factor which we recognize in the individual himself as independent of ex-

ternal influences; this is one’s own will which uses the conventional moral standards in order to control one’s inner instincts, especially the sexual instinct1. Having achieved this inner victory the individual thus becomes able to make punishment and praise independent of the approval and disapproval of others. In this, in my opinion, we see before us the beginning of and the motive for self-discipline. This, namely, self-discipline first turns against the impulsive Self not only because this has been restricted by the early training, but also because this inner compulsion opposes the growing will-ego as a compulsion of the species. Especially in the strife against the powerful sexual impulse, this part of the ego is then considered as "bad" and as a consequence a personal ideal with a personal morality is built up. This, one’s own moral code and ethical ideal, may or may not agree with that of the prevailing education; but at any rate the ego must individualize it and subsequently projects it on to the parents and educator. Thus, we recognize in this attitude to one’s own self a method by which the individual makes a compromise with the collective ideologies as manifested in morality and ideal formation. The individual makes them his own and in this way becomes his own educator.

Here we do not have to occupy ourselves with the question whence do these tendencies originally arise?

1 See "Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit" (1929), p. 63.
I have in earlier works dealing with the psychology of civilization1 attempted to show
that the history of the development of the inner life suggests the greater probability of a
purely inner origin of these tendencies in the individual himself than one is likely to
believe from the analysis of the present-day child. In the modern child, however, these
tendencies manifest themselves at such an early stage and in such forms that there can
be no doubt of their inner pre-existence. In this sense an early impulse training of the
child has become almost superfluous today, since the child seems to bring with it into
the world a strong inclination to repression, and one has rather to help him to decrease
this. This is actually the constructive aspect of the psychological education (including
sexual enlightenment); only hitherto it had the one disadvantage of making the child’s
world-picture incoherent. Formerly, at least, the external demand for repression
corresponded to the child’s inner inclination to repress, whereas now an insuperable
contradiction exists between the latter and educational freedom, a state of affairs which
constitutes a new source of conflict in the child. Indeed this whole concept of an inner
compulsion to repress has become possible on the ground of experiments (certainly not
very numerous, though highly instructive) made by applying the modern principles of
education to the child. Thereby one found

1 Der Kunstler (1907). "Seelenglaube und Psychologie" (1930).

that the child often criticizes and encourages itself more than the parents could do;
similarly as the artist also frequently judges himself much more harshly than do his
critics, and from this he gets the incentive to newer and better creative work.

Only one ought not to apply directly to the child what has been found in the productive
type (artist) and unproductive type (neurotic). For although the constructive kind of self-
education is the ideal aim of pedagogy, yet one ought not to forget that the child is
occupied first with the building up of his will-ego, which the artist can already place in
the service of his self-control, and which the neurotic misuses for self-inhibition. On the
other hand, the child cannot yet accept himself as can the normal average person,
because he is in a process of continual development and still does not possess any
formed or polished attitudes, much less a complete personality which he could accept or
reject. Certainly even in the adult the acceptance or rejection of one’s own self will
always be only temporary; but certainly in the child it can be only momentary according
to his very nature, and hence the educator should not expect it to be permanent. The
child finds itself here to a certain extent in the position of the primitive who first has to
project his inner conflicts, and so creates religion and morality, society and law. Only at
a certain stage of cultural, as of individual, development this process reverses, in
turning the con-
flict again within. The civilized adult finally is faced with a double task in that he has to solve his inner problem by partly objectifying it, on the other hand he struggles constantly against the outer world created by himself.

Whereas the analytic therapy, as I understand it has the task of throwing all the patient’s externalized conflicts back on to himself, a psychologically oriented education has the opposite task of procuring for the child external possibilities for projection and unburdening. In this sense the parents ought to consider themselves much more as objects of the child’s selfeducational tendency and—to a certain extent—let themselves be used as such by the child. Instead of wanting to change the child according to their own ideal, they should let themselves—within certain limits —be idealized and criticized by the child (the acceptance by the child of their own ideal formation follows automatically, by way of identification). In this way the child’s self-criticism and idealization are first diverted towards external objects (to the parents) and, on the one hand, prevent a premature feeling of inferiority, on the other hand, give to the creative idealizing tendency arising from a desire to be better, a temporary object. But if the child is thrown back on itself with these tendencies, there must necessarily follow a disappointment in the self-idealization which subsequently brings with it increased self-criticism.

And since the child cannot make himself better than he is, he will then have to justify this by proving himself to be as bad as he is. Here is to be sought the origin of the anti-social tendencies, such as lying, stealing, etc., which may plant the seed of later criminal tendencies, but need not necessarily, because here also the result cannot be causally predicted but will depend on the dynamic action on the ideological superstructure, and vice versa.

From wherever this tendency to self-criticism may arise, the most important question for the individual’s destiny, a problem in which alone education should be interested, is how the individual Self reacts to his inner needs. If self-criticism remains in the ego, then also the tendency for improvement following from it will be applied only to one’s self and must—since hyperimprovement is unattainable—lead to the strengthening of self-criticism in the form of the feeling of inferiority and in the tendency to self-punishment. Self-idealization in that it can be only measured according to the given self, thus necessarily leads to the feeling of inferiority or of guilt, whereas in the form of idealization of objects it will lead to creative achievement (art) or to the love completion. Naturally this can also be exaggerated and will lead sooner or later to disappointment when, or to the extent that, the hyperidealization is sensed or seen through.

Before we discuss further this fundamental problem
of all education on which the individual’s character formation, ethics, and ability to
achieve, seem to rest, we should like to remind ourselves of our description of the type
of educator. In him we see the ideal case materialized, where the individual projects on
to the other, namely, the pupil, in a constructive way, selfcriticism and the tendency to
self-improvement. In that, from purely psychological reasons, we have reclaimed a
certain amount of this projection for the child himself, we have already characterized it
in a certain sense as educator, which implies the concept of self-discipline. The
difference between the child projecting on to the parents, and the educator projecting on
to the pupil, is to be found in the educator’s social function. For him who has developed
with a certain maturity, a definite attitude, it is a matter of a stabilization of this projection
which has become permanent, that is, has been justified professionally. For the child,
on the other hand, it is a matter of only a temporary and, so to say, secret unburdening
of inner conflict in order to get a necessary diversion of these tendencies endangering
his weak ego. Hence in the teacher this process occurs more or less voluntarily, for the
child it is quite automatic. Also we must not forget that the above described type of
educator who criticizes and wants to improve (idealize) himself in the pupil, represents
the formerly existing pedagogue whom Psychoanalysis charges to a great extent with
the short-

comings of present-day education and its failure.

But precisely in order to avoid these projections which somehow seem to be part of the
educator’s nature, psychoanalytic pedagogy proposes the analysis of the educator.
What happens now with these tendencies to project when the teacher is analysed?
Much certainly will depend upon how he is analysed; almost upon whether he is treated
as an individual or as a pedagogue. Now the individually oriented technique of
Psychoanalysis can hardly treat him other than an individual, that is, with the purpose of
freeing him from self-criticism, self-punishment tendencies, feelings of inferiority and
guilt. But what happens with his tendencies to self-idealization and self-improvement?
The justified doubt arises as to whether these tendencies can be further applied to
others in creative educational ways if their presupposition, the self-criticism, ”is analysed
away” or is decreased. Indeed the further question arises whether even under these
conditions they remain in the ego at all? For the analytic task which coincides with the
therapeutic, must be considered as achieved when the individual is in the position to
accept himself. And this acceptance of one’s own self follows in the analysis not through
a change of the individual in the sense of his own criticism and idealization, but just
beyond that, through an acceptance of the Self as it is, which brings about the greatest
possible change in his whole attitude.

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If the psychoanalytic result of a better education of the teacher for the task of pedagogy seems at least problematical, we must consider the second means of help which Psychoanalysis has to offer the educator. This is the expectation that through the investigation of his own childhood in the analysis he will gain a better understanding of the psychical life of the pupils entrusted to him. From theoretical reasons as well as also from reasons of the analytic technique one may doubt whether this will prove correct in the specific sense in which it is meant. He may indeed obtain a better understanding of his present psychical life and to a certain degree, also, of the general psychology of his fellow men; but for his own childhood this can no longer prove correct, since he can interpret and understand it only indirectly, that is, through the medium of the analysis on the one hand, through the medium of his adult personality on the other hand. But even if he could obtain from the analysis, an objective picture of his childhood's development, this would mean anything but an understanding of the childish psychical life in itself, which remains inaccessible and incomprehensible for the adult. One has ironically charged the parents with the fact that they obviously feel themselves fitted for the education of their children because they themselves were once children; the same objection is right however for the teacher who would imagine he could better understand the chil-

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dren entrusted to him because he understands his own childhood better or at least believes he does.

This leads us to the last means which analysis has to offer the educator, and that is the psychological handling of the child itself. This is one of the most disputed claims of Psychoanalysis which is resisted even by those parents and teachers who are not unfriendly towards the analysis of pedagogues for the purpose of their better instruction. Also here one must first ask oneself in what way is this child analysis accomplished? It is characteristic that within the orthodox school of analysts there exist already just as many differences of opinion with regard to child analysis as there are different opinions in Psychoanalysis itself. Without being able to enter here into the details of these differences of opinion, yet it must be said that they have one point of view in common and that is the psychological in the broadest sense of the word. But according to its nature this contains just the opposite of what we have found as the projective unburdening necessary for the development of the child. In whatever way the educator may gain the child's confidence and give him moral support yet the fundamental attitude in the "transference situation" always remains, namely to lead the child himself to recognize the motives for his action or faulty action. If one does not do that or if one denies that this is the case, then one has left the psychoanalytic ground and has repaired to a purely pedagogic
position which comes very close to the one we found before desirable for the parents. For then one would allow the child to project much more than the parents would normally allow, but one must also be ready to ascribe the final therapeutic success to this projective unburdening and not to the psychological insight.

Every psychological explanation, analytically speaking, every showing up of the motives in the ego—however much one may coat them over with love—comes to the same thing as a demand for improvement for alteration, is the same as a reproach and blame. In this sense it is the exact opposite of an unburdening which every child needs very much and the neurotic still more. Hence if the child turns openly or in secret against the psychological explanation, that is, frankly refuses it or accepts it only apparently, this cannot be understood merely as "resistance" but as an expression of a correct instinct which resists a further burden. Even if there could be no doubt that the child himself were to blame for all his difficulties, then a therapy resting on psychological understanding must aim at freeing the child from this blame in that it creates for him possibilities for projection. Humanity, in so far as we can survey its development, has done this at all times in its systems of religion and it does not seem to me justified to demand of the child that degree of selfresponsibility which hitherto every adult human being could not live up to. Here we see a projection of such enormous dimensions on the part of the adults, that one can only meet all these attempts with the greatest scepticism no matter how progressive and idealistic they may be presented. Such an exaggerated demand seems however all the less appropriate since we know that the child cannot be to blame at all, hence pointing out his motives within him puts on him blame for which he cannot be held responsible at all. Here is again an unburdening attempt on the part of the adult of such enormous bearing that one is forced to the conclusion—although unwillingly—that the modern psychological ideology is to be suspected at least as much as the former pedagogic ideology. In this latter the pedagogue has been accused of projecting his selfcriticism and his self-correction on to the pupil. In the psychological ideology the teacher runs the other risk of burdening the child with his own new ideal of self-responsibility and thus unburdens himself exactly as the teacher of old style did in his way.

After having shown in what form self-criticism and idealization is expressed by the psychologically oriented educator we shall now give an account of what this signifies ideologically. When criticism and idealization are recognized by the modern educator as tendencies inherent in himself which he tries to project on to the child, then this implies a tendency on the part of the educator to lead the child to the recognition of these motives dwelling in itself instead of offering it
the possibility of disposing of and objectifying them. In a word, from being the ideal of projection the educator has become an ideal of introspection, from representing reality he has become a symbol of the ideology of truth. For the whole therapeutic and pedagogic ideology of Psychoanalysis rests on the presupposition that truth (about one's own self) makes one free. Now this, as I have already elsewhere stated1, is an ideal of cognition which need not necessarily have a therapeutic emancipating effect. For it very easily tends to "Know thyself" instead of "Be thyself" and not to a "Know thyself" in order that "Thou can'st be what Thou art" (in the sense of the Kantian ethic). I believe that the (psychological) truth is as little therapeutically effective as it is pedagogically as the basis of education; for it depends on what is believed to be the truth at a certain time and not on an eternal concept of truth such as psychology pretends to possess or to have found. In therapy and still more in education, it does not depend on scientific truth but on reality of life. Where do we now find this reality of life?

In seeking for it we must give a new turn to the problem. What we can learn from Psychoanalysis that is positive and constructive for education is to be found neither in the personal analysis of the educator nor in the analysis of the child, but simply by using the under-

1 Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit.

standing gained from the analysis of the analytic situation as such. Its essence is briefly a relationship between two human beings, in which the one learns, receives, accepts from the other. Here it is a matter of a part of reality and indeed of the essential part of reality, namely, the relation to one's fellow men, whereas everything else is only subjective, that is, represents individual psychological knowledge. From the analytic situation one can gain a deeper understanding of every educational, indeed of every human, relationship, if one rightly understands it and does not narrow it down simply to a "transference situation" in the Freudian sense. We can study in the analytic situation the entire mechanism of projection and unburdening that not only is fundamental to the love relationship in the narrower sense, but also to every religious, moral and social attachment, and valuation. But we also recognize the will-guilt problem lying at the base of these phenomena as the central problem of every human relationship, the foundation stone of which is laid in and through education.

What does the analytic situation now teach us in regard to the educational task? In order to be able to define this more precisely I should like first briefly to recapitulate the differences discussed elsewhere1. "We immediately see the fundamental difference between the infantile situation, the symbol of which is the

1 "Gestaltung und Ausdruck der Persönlichkeit," 1928, pp. 64 ff.
Œdipus complex, the pedagogic situation as whose symbol we have introduced the Prometheus complex, and the analytic situation, which should represent a combination of both, and at the same time a something beyond. The fundamental difference is briefly the following: in the infantile situation the child identifies, and the parents predominantly project on to the child. In the analytic situation we allow the patients to project in order to let them find and recognize themselves, whereas the analyst has to restrict himself to a degree of identification necessary for understanding. The pedagogic situation as mentioned is as a rule a continuance of the infantile situation, only that instead of the parents, the teacher appears who plays or should play more the role of leader. What we can learn pedagogically from the analytic situation which, as one easily sees, should be rather a correction than a repetition of the infantile situation, is the following. In the pedagogic situation the pupil should be educated from the Œdipus complex, by way of the Prometheus complex, to self-guidance. I should like to discuss this purely psychological and schematic formulation more closely. The Prometheus complex is an emotional reaction to the Œdipus situation, by means of which the individual attempts to transfer the same force which was meted out to him by his parents, to his children, his creations, his subordinates. Perhaps it is necessary that the individual has to go through this phase of exerting power at which most people remain even if they ever get beyond the Œdipus complex. The ideal aim of education such as we can deduce from the constructive understanding of the analytic situation, includes not only the overcoming of the Œdipus complex in the Prometheus complex, but also the overcoming of the Prometheus complex in that of the formation of one’s own personality which we might designate as self-guidance.

This brings us back again to the theme of self-education, on which the later self-guidance of the individual is based. If the self-education tendency is the inherent inclination of the individual automatically to improve and perfect himself by reason of self-criticism, then the self-guidance tendency can be understood as an ideal result of education. This means it can be conceived as the conscious and willend further guidance and elaboration of this process in the sense of its constructive evaluation. Thus the self-education tendency such as we can observe in the child, is more of a negative critical attitude towards its own weaknesses, whereas self-guidance relates more to a positive idealizing aspect of personality-formation. Furthermore this latter constructive tendency develops in the child automatically as a reaction to the external influence of education, from which it tries to make itself independent through self-discipline. On the other hand, the willend self-guidance makes use of external
prototypes or symbols in order to further its own idealformation and justify its elaboration in the personality. Between the automatic self-discipline of the child and the conscious self-guidance of the personality there is the individual's whole will-formation. His later attitude to himself as sponsor of his conscious Will, depends on how this whole process is carried out. We have already spoken of the formation of will and the guilt reactions accompanying it in an earlier chapter, and I should like here further to refer to what I have stated elsewhere concerning it\(^1\). Briefly stated it might be defined as a training of the will through content. These contents, which are determined by the prevailing ideology of the time, the child has to accept, but not merely as something forced on him from without, but he must find means and ways of making the varying and given collective contents, actually his own. This should be achieved not so much by the pedagogic system but by the personality of the pedagogue who has to show the child the ways and means of doing this, or rather has to avoid any interference with the child's own doing it. For the child will make these ideologies which give his will purpose and content automatically his own if one will allow him to do this in the way alone possible for him. But this is not achieved by mere identification, against which no teacher could object; but in

\(^1\) Die analytische Reaktion in ihren Konstruktiven Elementen (Technik II, 1929). pp- 84 f. 120.

so far as the will is in question, the acceptance of the community ideology will be accomplished by the child under constant protest which should be used by the teacher in its constructive significance and not be interpreted as an obstinate resistance. If parents and pedagogues have the right attitude, then the child will of itself be eager for these ideologies (which one tries to force on him in vain) because supplying the will with universally acknowledged ideologies is the greatest unburdening of responsibility, attainable for the individual.

In this respect the teacher has the advantage over the parents at the very outset because he is the authorized representative of the collective ideology, whereas the parents are inclined to present to their child these general claims in a more personal form. The way in which this happens and how the child reacts to it, will—as may be easily seen—decisively influence his later private life, whereas the general influence of education will make itself felt more in his occupational and social life. The personal way in which the parents have instilled in the child the conventional ideologies, can be more easily comprehended as criticism than the demands of the teacher supported by the community. The parents' advantage over the teacher, on the other hand, consists of the fact that the purely personal contact makes it possible to influence the child more easily; thus it gives to the child the possibility for identification.
based on a close emotional relationship which the child needs especially in its younger years for the foundation of the collective ideologies before he can make them his own. If the parents could put their demands to the child less personally and more generally, and if the educators and teachers could allow the personal element to appear by the side of the general in relation to the pupil, then not only the tension—which today exists between the school and the home—would be essentially reduced, but the whole pedagogic situation would be improved! Both parties, however, parents and educators, could better and more easily fulfil their task, if they would draw conclusions from the observation and study of the child and apply them to their own behaviour to the child, instead of wanting coercively to change the child’s behaviour to fit their own personal needs. As the child takes the adult for his pattern, to form his own ego ideal, this task would succeed much better for the child’s development if the parents and teachers would adjust themselves more to the ego ideal arising in the child itself. Such an attitude would closely correspond to the role of leader which the child plays in the formation of present-day ideologies of education.

It is much the same here as with the analytic situation in which the therapeutist whether he likes or not must allow the patient the leadership even when the analyst imagines that he is directing the whole situation.

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The same holds good for all psychological understanding of the child, by means of which the adults are enabled to adjust themselves better to the child, whereas they think they have forced on the child their gospel of psychology. But as little as the neurotic patient has to be trained to be an analyst, the child also need as little be made a psychologist. Certainly this “magical” method of education is easier than the elaboration of a constructive ideology and technique, but it is in any case destructive whether we cure our own evils in the child or want to force on it our own wisdom; for he has no use for either! On the other hand one must give the child certain ideologies not only because he needs them in later life but because he needs them for growth. Just as the child eats because he is hungry and does not take his meals to please the parents, so he will instinctively grasp the collective ideologies offered him, because he needs them as props, for the unfolding and justification of his individual ego. It is not only ineffectual when the parents enforce on him these ideologies as their own, but it is also untrue that the child has to accept them to please the parents. The child accepts them in his own interest, and should also have them offered on that basis. Naturally much depends on what kind of ideologies one offers him and also to what extent the adults themselves are impregnated by these ideologies, so to say, represent them and not only teach them.

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In this respect our present epoch is doubtless inferior to the earlier epochs in pedagogic fitness. We no longer believe sufficiently in the old ideologies and not yet enough in the new ideas to present them to the child with sufficient conviction, or even to live according to them. So the child himself has to bear much more responsibility which in other ages was taken over effectively by the collective ideologies and their representatives. Hence the modern child is so much more insecure and self-critical, in psychological terms, he has feelings of inferiority and of guilt which one cannot so easily take away from him later even though one offers him the new psychoideology. For he grows up in a neurotic atmosphere and so manifoldly forms his ideal of being grown up according to neurotic patterns. In this category belongs the not uncommon type of neurotic who is in no way ill but suffers only from the fact that he is dissatisfied with himself and would like to be different. If one investigates this desire for self idealization more closely, it frequently turns out to be the reaction to a non-acceptance of one’s own self, for the compensation of which the individual has chosen a neurotic pattern. These types would be much better to accept themselves than to attain their self-ideal which only seems more desirable because they see it in the majority of others. In other words the more the neuroses increase within a certain stratum of society the more will the neurotic become an ideal within that stratum, because the healthier type would feel isolated in it and hence he would endeavour to gratify his collective needs by becoming like the majority. Hence also the ungratifying results which could not be avoided in applying modern methods of education to small groups of children because the child then felt himself to be the undesirable exception compared to the majority of children brought up differently.

Unfortunately one cannot even train the child to accept his own Self although this would—as pointed out—protect him from false attitudes and faulty ideal formations. For in the first place the child has no pronounced personality that he can accept, and secondly, he needs for any kind of self acceptance precisely collective ideologies in order to justify it. It almost seems as if the child had first to become guilty, and experience suffering, as for instance the Fall of Man implies. This means to say, that, as neither the collective education provides sufficiently powerful ideologies nor is self-education in the child possible in the sense of an adult self-discipline, the child has to pass through a much more critical childhood than perhaps has ever before been the case in the history of man. This seems also to be generally shown in that modern man is altogether less stable than the average type of former epochs. Previously man remained more or less the same type in his development from childhood, through puberty to maturity, than does the human being of our
epoch who so quickly, and apparently also more easily, changes, although at the same time these increased demands of adjustment lead more frequently to neurosis. Perhaps the stronger fixation tendencies that one has found in the neurotic are only reactions to the quickly changing conditions of life and ideologies and are not due to a fundamental lack in man, who has been accustomed to a slower tempo of development. However that may be, all the general conclusions drawn from the study of the present-day type of neurotic must be received with great caution, for under other conditions man reacts differently, has formerly reacted differently and reacts today differently. The primitive man was no child and our present-day child cannot be compared with primitive man. Therefore it is perhaps better that we should not desire for the present-day child too definite an education, because the individual at maturity and in age will possibly have to adjust himself to quite different conditions, for which a too narrow and one-sided education may be only a hindrance. In established civilizations with austere ideologies, this danger is much less, in any case, was not so obvious as it is today. Perhaps the present-day crisis in civilization teaches us to think as little in terms of eternal values in pedagogy as in any other sphere, but to keep before our eyes only the immediate and relative values. This, however, presupposes a constant vigilance which is less comforting than the feeling of security that emanates from lasting values. Indeed, we now possess the self-consciousness necessary for the becoming aware of momentary needs, but the psychological ideology which is a consequence of it easily misleads us into the belief that it may give us eternal values and indeed to a far greater extent than earlier ideologies because it has for itself today the appearance of the truth. And yet this truth is exactly as relative as all former truths; in certain respects still more relative (if one may say so), because it is much more individual. Concerning pedagogy in particular, we know already that we have arrived at the present-day therapeutic ideology of education (the prevention of neuroses) from the neurotic type, which certainly is a product determined by present civilization.

The most general therapeutic idea of education derived from the psychological ideology of the neurotic can be summed up as follows:—the general result should be that the individual is able to accept himself as such, that is, as being different from others, in other words can affirm himself constructively. Hitherto this was not possible purely individualistically, but the individual needed for this the corresponding collective ideologies such as the child still needs today. What is the matter with the psychological (including the sexual) ideologies offered the child today, we have already discussed in detail. For the adult, acceptance of his own Self follows today by reason of acceptance.
through the other, characterized by the modern love experience and marriage relationship. This moral dependence on another, is, however, not—as Freud thinks—a consequence of the parental relationship, but both are a result of the loss of spiritual ideologies (especially of religion) which have been gradually replaced first by the parents, and finally by the love partner. Today we seem to stand on the threshold of the collapse also of this moral vindication in the other, which already must be substituted in numerous cases through the therapeutic transference situation. All these different relations of the ego that must be justified by the “thou” (whether the parents, or spouse, or therapeutist) already signify, however, the replacement of the collective ideology by an individual one. Whether the individual is at all in a position to grow beyond that and to affirm and accept himself from himself cannot be said. Only in the creative type does this seem possible to some extent, when and in so far as he is able to make use of his own work as a justification for his individual existence. The average human being wrestles for the moment desperately with this task set before him, which since the collapse of the collective as of the individual ideologies of justification, has become his vital problem and that of the civilization in which we live.

The majority of individuals today are not able to

1 See "Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit" as well as "Die analytische Reaktion" (both 1929).

solve this problem of self-responsibility, indeed they are scarcely able to recognize and to bear it. We have learnt this from the psychological study of the type whose neurosis signifies failure in this task. In him, self-criticism which refers to his individual difference, remains in the ego and leads to the denial of his own Self that can neither be accepted nor changed. The more successful type who can still find in love the justification of his Self with simultaneous tribute to the species, is fortunate in being able to project on to the other both self-criticism and also a part of self-idealization. The third most successful type is a mixture of the first two, in that he projects self-criticism creatively on to the outer world (not on his fellow men) and so in work creates, reforms, and newly creates not only reality, but also himself, according to his wish. Thus he projects self-criticism creatively into his work, the neurotic projects self-criticism destructively on to his own ego, and the average type projects self-criticism complementarily on to the love object. The result of this dynamic conflict depends on whether and how self-criticism and self-idealization, the emotional life and the impulse life, the will and the intellect are distributed between the personal and vocational life. The necessary tendency to self-improvement growing up from self-criticism should not be restricted to one’s own ego, nor spend itself on the environment but should be expressed in work. Here we refer back to
what in an earlier chapter we have described as vocational psychology, which naturally in its turn will again influence the personal life. The final result will here again depend on how the idealization is accomplished in relation to the will, emotion, and sexuality.

We can here only briefly review the different possibilities resulting from the dynamic interplay of the above mentioned forces. We must find out whether and to what extent self-criticism following from individualization, that is, from diversity, unlikeness, operates neurotically as criticism in one’s own ego with the tendency to change one’s Self; or whether and to what extent self-criticism is projected on the other as criticism or punishment. Finally it may lead to idealization of the Self or the other or to self-improvement in work. According to these varying issues there will be different types of personality and corresponding vocational types: namely, the educator, who improves himself but will also criticize and punish himself in the other; the therapeutist who will help himself in the other; the lover, who will idealize himself in the other, or the artist who does all this symbolically in work. The foundation for the later distribution of the different dynamic aspects of personality will be laid only to a certain extent in childhood and in the first discipline of the impulses, and in any case should leave room for a later transformation and reorganization. For whereas the child’s psychology is built up on the impulse life and should aim rather at an acceptance of it, the adult life as a rule—the more so, the more successful he is socially—must be built up on the vocational life. Education or re-education, in both stages, has to take more care that this does not result one-sidedly, that is, that already in childhood there will be granted to the forces of the will the emotions and the intellect, a corresponding share in the construction of personality, whereas for the adult professional man, there must be room made for the impulse forces and emotions apart from his occupational life. However that may be, in the course of life there is at least one—often more than one—reorganization of the total adjustment, which early childhood’s education can only comply with in a negative way, that is, by not endeavouring to give lasting ideologies or any of eternal value, but to leave room for a certain laxity and slackness in the individual personality for later experience. We are not surprised when the child outgrows his shoes and clothes, we have even already accustomed ourselves to the fact that he loses his childish beliefs; and so perhaps we shall also have to get used to the fact that he develops his character and his personality, that is, however, that he exchanges the educational ideologies which we have given him in childhood for other collective or individual ideologies, which mostly do not agree with the earlier ones especially if it is a matter of such tempestuous times as our own.
One of the typical crises in the development and in the reconstruction of personality is the love experience which is so much the more momentous the more individualization advances. Here there is always a trenchant, sometimes radical new construction of the whole personality on a basis hitherto not in existence. To the formerly mentioned distribution of the dynamic factors of personality in the vocational and private life there is another distribution in a different dimension, namely, the distribution on to the other sex, in which it is of decisive importance what tendencies are left in one’s own self and what are transformed to the love partner. The task of the normal average woman is in this respect simpler; she has marriage as a vocation and the child as work, the husband as ideal, and so she finds her Self justified. Here the later vocational and social life is constructed on the personal impulse forces, whereas in the man as a rule it is the reverse and he finds in the woman the impetus and emotional supplement to his personality focussed more on the will and the intellect. The difficulties, as presented by the neurotic type, spring from the endeavours of the ego, which, however, are not "infantile" but correspond to a resistance of the developed personality to its new orientation and reconstruction. Instead of finding in one another the described psychological, characterological, and moral supplement, the neurotic type of man or woman tends either to

make the other like him or herself or to become like the other. Which kind of assimilation the individual chooses will depend on whether he is more the type that projects or that which identifies;1 that is, whether he possesses more will or more guilt. But in each case it is a matter of a tendency to equalize the difference in the psychological moral sense instead of making it supplementary in the biological sense. This indeed looks as if a too strong acceptance of one’s own Self cannot accept at all the foreign, contrary, complementary self. But actually it is only another attempt to accept one’s own rejected Self in the other, by making him just that. For the real acceptance of one’s own Self, includes also the acceptance of one’s lacks, imperfections and limitations, and hence is at the same time an acceptance of the other, whom one needs as a supplement and on whom one is dependent. The resistance of the ego against admitting this dependence tacitly presupposes a perfection of one’s own Self, against the untruthfulness of which sooner or later one’s own conscience will rebel in the form of self-criticism. Whether one wants to recreate the other in one’s own image or whether one wants to make oneself like him, in either case it is a denial of the difference or unlikeness, that is, however, a denial of the complementary dependence in which the two sexes stand one to another and

1 See the corresponding arguments in "Genetische Psychologie," Parts I and II (1927-1928).
not only biologically. Therefore it is ethically justified when two people are happy and efficient only with one another, that is, if they are of social value and morally good; and it is not necessarily a sign of weakness when the one without the other is not only unhappy but also inefficient and morally bad. From the standpoint of a high ethical ideal we might wish that such utter dependence on one’s nearest might be less vital, but this high ethical ideal is perhaps also strongly coloured by the resistance of the ego to admit such a dependence, even to allow it, although in our civilization it is the order of the day.

We even see numerous cases where the one directly uses the other as a moral support, with the cessation of which the whole personality collapses and becomes unsocial whether in the sense of inefficiency or in the sense of evil-doing, or even as suicide. But such cases also show how wholesome an opportune admission of this dependence can be, although it does not always paralyse the rebellion against it. But the study of such cases likewise teaches us that the anti-social type (the criminal) does not only result from lack of control due to insufficiently developed inhibitions; but we can detect in him just as strongly developed moral, indeed hyper-moral tendencies with the decisive difference that they are with him personified in the other. In case this other tries to withdraw from the role imposed on him, then there follows a moral collapse which only

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demonstrates the earlier denied dependence on him. In this sense, the moral support granted by another person can become the worst tyranny since one cannot live without it and hence must purchase it by all kinds of permanent sacrifice. These cases naturally go beyond the relation of the sexes, although they frequently are to be found within a sexual relationship, most frequently within marriage. Where it is a matter of dependence on the same sex the conflict is not as one would think simpler, but only complicated in another way. For here, there exists from the beginning the element of similarity to a far greater extent than in the sexual relationship, thus it leads to still closer identifications and idealizations, but with it also still stronger disappointments and still keener condemnations and persecutions which can increase to the idea of persecution. This always relates to an outer projection of the moral part of the ego, that can appear as father figure or as homosexual object (Freud), but fundamentally represents an ego conflict. Sexuality then appears here as elsewhere as a symbol of the rejected ego, as the scapegoat of self-criticism; but not because education in childhood has made it that, but because it represents that part of our personality which obviously makes us dependent on another and threatens also to *subjugate* our personal will. Education has hitherto only supported the child in this critical attitude towards sexuality, but has not

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made it a scapegoat. It has been falsely assumed that with the cessation of the educational condemnation of sex, the child will have no conflict with sexuality, but will accept it as something natural. But sexuality is not natural to the child, it might rather be conceived of as the individual's natural enemy, against which he defends himself from the beginning and with his whole personality. If one does not recognize this fact which modern experiments of education have proved, then one makes education the scapegoat for the moral sexual conflict in the individual, as one formerly made sexuality itself the scapegoat for the moral conflict. The only thing that an education founded on the understanding of this state of affairs can do for the child seems to me to be an absolute diversity of education for both sexes. But that does not mean a one-sided emphasis of the difference between the sexes from the man's point of view, whereby the girl from the beginning is made to feel inferior. But each sex should be educated more for him or herself and for the acceptance of his or her own Self with its privileges and shortcomings. Thus the completion by the other sex will seem to be something natural and necessary and not as is so often the case today a sign of weakness and imperfection. This mutual supplement, that is, making oneself complete through the other, will also contribute much more to the necessary de-moralization of the sexual life than any full life of pleasure however free,

which often signifies only a replacement of the moral dependence by a sexual one and so leaves the individual just as unfree. Up till now marriage has been the only form of the sexual relationship which to a great extent provided for all these psychological conditions. Marriage signifies a public admission of sexual dependence and of the moral completion brought about through the other, whereby the justification is collective as also the responsibility is borne by the institution of marriage (society) and not by the individual alone. Naturally with increasing individualization these collective qualities of marriage lose significance and hence it comes about that today so many marriages are conducted like free unions whereas the free unions continually take on the form of marriage.

But this is also connected with the change of the marriage ideology, which at the climax of the development of our small family was essentially based on the child. The matrimonial community, the family, served as a protection to the child and since the child represented the racial immortality it indirectly served as a protection to the parents, to their individuality. Today the child who must early be treated as an independent autonomous individual has lost this collective significance for the parents, who therefore seek their individual justification and continuance in personal happiness and work in this world. Besides the collective educational ideologies this parental educational ide-
ology, which at least tried to mould the child in their image, also threatens to collapse. The psychological insight into their own inferiority is not favourable to the parental educational ideology of training the child to be like them, whereas formerly the children were always referred to the unattainable example of the parental superiority. Curiously enough this had a stimulating rather than a paralysing effect on the child, who nowadays takes its parents afflicted with the feeling of inferiority as an example, and hence also feels itself inferior. As the significance of the child has changed with the meaning of marriage, so with it the parental educational ideology has suffered a change which more or less equally concerns all parents of one and the same social stratum. It is, that along with this general change of the marital ideology and also in the course of individual marriages, the relation between man and woman has changed particularly with and through the child. The parents themselves are decisively influenced and changed by the child in their personality and in their relationship one to another. They themselves, as it were, experience with the growth of the child, a new orientation and a new education which in turn works itself out in the kind of education they give to their child. Here we find ourselves directly face to face with experience, which is neither scientifically nor technically controllable, indeed hardly comprehensible while it is being enacted. What the peda-

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gogue and the psychological adviser in education see, are mostly fairly late after-effects of an already past phase of life, the correction of which mostly takes more time than the child in its quick development has at its disposal. Thus all education is ultimately post festum approbation or reprimand or understanding of what has already happened and indeed of something that perhaps never appears a second time in the same way.

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FOREWORD

In response to an increasing demand, Rank’s Will Therapy, which has been out of print for over a year, is now offered in combination with Truth and Reality, formerly published separately. It is important that these two books which are basic to an understanding of Rank’s psychology and therapeutic method should remain available to students in schools of psychiatry and social work. Beyond Psychology, Rank’s final work and his first in English, which was printed and circulated privately after his death in 1939, presents his ultimate philosophy and world view, but it does not include a statement of his unique contribution to psychological therapy. It is for those who would understand the meaning and value of Rank’s departure from traditional psychoanalysis, that this authorized translation is here reprinted without alteration.

Jessie Taft

Pennsylvania School of Social Work Philadelphia, January 1945
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Will Therapy, a title selected with the help of the author, is based on my own literal translations from the German of three volumes of a so-called “Technique of Psychoanalysis.” Volume one, entitled “The Analytic Situation Illustrated from the Technique of Dream Interpretation” appeared early in 1926, Volume two, “The Analytic Reaction in its Constructive Aspects” was published in 1929 and the third volume, “The Analysis of the Analyst and his Role in the Total Situation” in 1931. The general title of these three volumes was chosen and agreed upon with the publisher before Rank had become fully conscious of the underlying difference in his own technique and philosophy which was leading to a fundamental divergence from Freudian psychoanalysis. The first volume, therefore, despite its startling technical discoveries, was written from the Freudian viewpoint, as was “The Trauma of Birth,” its theoretical parallel. It was preceded by a preliminary sketch in collaboration with S. Ferenczi, “The Development of Psychoanalysis.” which was later repudiated by Ferenczi as soon as he perceived its theoretical implications. By 1929 the split initiated in 1924 and sharpened by Freud’s critical reaction to the “Trauma of Birth” originated dedicated to him, had eventuated in a new psychology and a new technique which Rank presented first in Volume II of this series as a critique instead of a description of the technique of psychoanalysis. At the same time he wrote a theoretical statement of his viewpoint entitled “Truth and Reality, an Outline of a Philosophy of the Psychic.” With the appearance of the third volume in 1931
Rank no longer considered himself a psychoanalyst in the Freudian sense and retained the word “psychoanalysis” in the title only because of his agreement with the publisher.

The present book, “Will Therapy,” a combination of Volumes II and III of the original “Technique of Psychoanalysis” is intended primarily as a presentation of Rank’s unique contribution to modern psychology in its therapeutic application. It represents a criticism of Freudian doctrine and method only because Rank himself necessarily arrived at his own position, not merely in reaction against Freudianism, but also by the positive utilization of its material for a new development. To avoid the confusion which would result from combining the first volume with its Freudian orientation and the second and third which are based entirely on the will psychology as Rank has developed it theoretically in “Truth and Reality” I have written an introductory chapter to cover material in Volume I that is essential for understanding Rank’s present viewpoint in its practical application. My acquaintance with the material dates from 1926 when I began a translation of Volume I. Since that time I have worked more or less steadily on these three volumes, as well as on “Truth and Reality” not only in terms of translation, but through a slow process of assimilation which has finally enabled me to offer this volume together with a translation of “Truth and Reality” for publication. The translation, on the whole, is faithful to the original, but I have not hesitated when it seemed better in the interest of clarity and good form, to eliminate or re-order certain portions of the text and occasionally to insert explanatory phrases and sentences.

In the translator’s introduction, I have retained the terms psychoanalysis, analyst, analytic situation and the like because they are used in Volume I of the Technique by a writer who still considers himself Freudian. In Volumes II and III, I have tried to differentiate as sharply as possible, substituting therapy and therapeutic for analysis and analytic where the reference is to Rank’s position as against Freudian psychoanalysis.

Truth and Reality is the third volume of Rank’s “Grundzüge einer genetischen Psychologie auf Grund der Psychoanalyse der Ichstruktur” (Outlines of a Genetic Psychology on the basis of the Psychoanalysis of the Ego Structure). The first volume, published in 1927, is concerned with the biological development of the ego, including the genesis of genituality, the origin of guilt feeling, and the genesis of the object relation, and discusses the psychic mechanisms such as projection, identification, and denial, an important concept which Rank introduces as more basic than repression. It has never been published in English but was delivered in lecture form under the auspices of the New York School of Social Work in 1926, before it appeared in German.

Volume Two, “Gestaltung und Ausdruck der Persönlichkeit” (The Development of Personality), published in 1928, goes beyond the biological level to the essentially human development of man as an emotional,
social and ethical being. It contains discussions of character formation as contrasted with something we call personality, the development of the emotional life, education, social adaptation, creativity, and the helping function. Like the first volume, this book also was presented first in the United States as a lecture course for the New York School of Social Work and for the Pennsylvania School of Social Work in 1927, although it has not appeared in an English translation.

“Truth and Reality,” the third volume, like the other two, was offered first in English in lecture form, in this case for the Pennsylvania School of Social Work alone, just before its publication in German in 1929. While it forms the conclusion of the two volumes just described, it presents in clear, integrated form an original point of view representing Rank’s unique contribution to psychology and philosophy, which had not come through into

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TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE

full consciousness until this final book was written. Although “The Trauma of Birth,” published in German in 1924, marks the beginning of Rank’s development beyond Freudian psychoanalysis, the first two volumes of “Genetische Psychologie,” while they differ radically from the orthodox psychoanalytic approach, are not yet clearly differentiated from Freudian psychology. Before the third volume was written Rank had found the key to his own theoretical organization in a sudden realization of the role of the will in the analytic situation.

Under the illumination of that discovery he wrote simultaneously the second volume of his “Technik der Psychoanalyse” showing the relation of will to the therapeutic process and repudiating completely the Freudian psychoanalytic method, and this third volume of “Genetische Psychologie,” “Truth and Reality,” in which he develops the psychological and philosophic implications underlying his new vision of the therapeutic process.

In “Truth and Reality” Rank offers not one more psychology of the individual in the interest of therapy, but a philosophy of man’s willing, an historical sketch of the evolution of will itself with its inexhaustible creativity, its dynamic of projection and denial and its ever increasing burden of fear and guilt.

My thanks are due first to Dr. Rank himself who has helped in settling points of fact as well as difficult problems of translation and has eliminated actual errors in translation, second to my friend Edith M. Everett, who has given the manuscript its preliminary critical reading and finally to the unfailing stenographic skill of Mrs. Aida Naabe who put the manuscript into its final form.

J.T.

Philadelphia December 1933
1 This volume appears as Part One of “Will Therapy.”
If one were to pick out the particular attitude which finally led Rank to a new comprehension of the therapeutic task on which he had worked in association with Freud for so many years, one might well select his complete respect for the personality of the neurotic patient, combined with the absence of medical presupposition which freed him from the tendency to regard the neurosis as illness, with an external cause and cure to be discovered. That it was his keen realization of the force and quality of the supposedly weak neurotic as well as his clear comprehension of the effect of the analyst’s conflicting aims that led Rank to protest against the use of every analysis as an opportunity for furthering psychoanalytic investigation, I have no doubt. At all events in 1923 in “Entwicklungsziele der Psychoanalyse” the book written in collaboration with Ferenczi, we find him insisting that experiment in the interest of psychoanalytic theory is fundamentally antagonistic to therapy which must needs concern the welfare of the patient only.

No member of the Freudian group at that time had a keener theoretical interest or a more scholarly equipment than Rank. His contributions to psychoanalytic research as evidenced by the long list of published works\(^1\) appearing before “The Trauma of Birth” and “Development of Psychoanalysis” were equaled only by his well-known therapeutic skill and achievement. It is not improbable that it was his effort to reconcile these conflicting interests in his own practice that brought him to this frank facing of their incompatibility. Be that as it may, the far reaching effect of bringing every analytic procedure to the test of therapeutic rather than scientific justification may easily be imagined.

This voluntary functional limitation in the interest of therapy

\(^1\) See complete list, pp. 98, 99 of Rank’s *Truth and Reality.*

for the patient, had been brought to a focus by the results of an experiment in setting a definite time limit in advance for the termination of all his analyses during a given period, a procedure which Freud had followed with a certain type of case only. To his heightened awareness of the momentary reactions of the patient to this consciously directed activity of the analyst, was added the discovery that every patient without exception responded in terms of birth symbolism and apparently experienced an affective reliving of the birth trauma. In this unvarying response which, with his new insight, he was then
able to detect in earlier cases also, Rank finally grasped the unconscious meaning for the patient of separation from the analysis as a birth process and the so-called transference to the analyst of either sex as equivalent to the child’s relation to the mother on its deepest biological level.

The technical innovations which this new vision permitted, in terms of a drastically shortened period of treatment, and a greatly facilitated handling of resistance on the basis of this deeper-than-sex comprehension of the transference made startling inroads upon the classical Freudian technique and aroused much opposition from orthodox analysts who were quick to resist the threat of change. Rank himself, however, in working through the theoretical implications of his discovery in the “Trauma of Birth” was as yet unconscious of the underlying threat to Freudian psychology, as such. In his own thinking, he was only carrying through Freud’s historical and biological explanations of the neuroses to their logical or rather their biological conclusions. Birth replaces castration as the ultimate and original trauma and the breast takes precedence over the penis as the first libido object. The approach seems to be unchanged except that the lack of a specific cause for neurosis in the common human experiences of birth and weaning, survived by the majority without mishap, became ever more apparent. Fear, also, the basic factor of neurotic psychology, Rank saw as present from the beginning before sex or any life experience other than birth could possibly take effect. The only aspect of this earliest common biology which might serve as a differentiating basis of neurotic development seemed to him to be the inevitable variation in

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quantitative terms of the degree or amount of fear experienced in birth by the particular individual. Thus, despite his assumption that he was operating on a Freudian basis, it is evident that he had already introduced the entering wedge of ultimate divergence.

As his awareness of the patient’s reactions to ending had opened his eyes to the technical utilization of the whole analytic experience in its immediate and present meaning, so his theoretical reflections on the birth trauma revealed the causal impotence of biological crises, environmental forces and sex repression to account for the neuroses and confirmed his belief in a new and present experience as the unrecognized therapeutic factor in the analysis of the neurotic individual. In Volume I of the Technique of Psychoanalysis, Rank undertook to present the first complete statement regarding his three new tools in their technical application; the use of the analytic situation as a present experience rather than a reliving of the past, the recognition of the transference as fundamentally not sexual but a re-establishment of the biological tie to the mother, and the setting of an ending to treatment as the key to the therapeutic control of the entire process. He added to this abstract presentation a series of dreams which he analyzed in terms of their reference to the analyst and the analytic process to illustrate the technical use of his conceptions and to show the relation of the dream material to birth symbolism and
pre-Œdipean experiences. The book is difficult to follow because Rank’s own views develop so rapidly that while he writes as a Freudian in the first part, by the time he has reached the last chapter, he is on the point of discovering the basic difference that makes of the second volume a new and anti-Freudian psychology.

One or two quotations at this point will indicate Rank’s first conceptions of his new contributions and give the basis for comparison with the will psychology as it finally came to birth in Volume II and in “Truth and Reality.”

“As I came to new cases with the understanding that the end phase of the analysis is actually a reproduction of birth, I noticed that patients of both sexes see in the analyst from the very beginning a mother substitute in the libidinal sense. Whereupon it followed that the severance from this mother substitute

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was typified in the form of reproduction of birth because of the nature of the analytic situation and not just as a consequence of setting a time limit. From this point of view the psychoanalytic treatment is a process in which are experienced again in a shortened period of time both the primal libidinal bond to the mother, represented in the biological relation of the child to the mother and in the natural processes of care and nourishment and the severance of this primal bond in birth or weaning. From the painfulness of these typical birth reactions under which this severance in the last phase of my analyses at that time took place, I inferred a trauma of birth. Since recognizing the importance of the birth trauma in the analysis of all cases irrespective of sex, I proceed regularly from the very beginning and continue throughout to reveal the strong mother attachment expressed in the transference relation in order to prevent the patient from getting an insoluble fixation on the one hand and from reproducing the birth trauma in leaving the analyst on the other. Naturally it is not to be avoided entirely, but the reactions are milder and give the patient an easier separation from the analyst, if one analyzes the mother-fixation from the beginning and thus constantly prepares the patient for the setting of the time limit and the leaving, instead of springing it on him suddenly. Thus, one gets in the last phase of the analysis, instead of the unconscious reliving of the birth trauma, the patient’s actual conflicts relatively free from the early infantile fixations. By this procedure the analysis divides itself into two tasks, namely, the severing of the actual libidinal bond to the mother and the utilization of the libido thus gained and at one’s free disposal partly for the formation of a new ego-ideal by means of identification with the analyst and partly for a normal adult sex adjustment in the choice of an object. In this second part of the analysis, in patients of either sex there comes into the foreground quite by itself the part played by the analyst as father substitute in his role of builder of ideals (educator) or love object. But with the most important difference that this follows relatively undisturbed by the mother regression now already
overcome by analysis. Thus, the whole analysis proves actually to be the subsequent repetition of a part of the work of adaptation, or education, which has

previously been omitted or has failed. And this adjustment has to be accomplished by every child in an affective freeing from the mother (pleasure-principle) and in the partial transference to the father (reality principle).” This quotation gives a clear picture of Rank’s viewpoint and technique at the peak of its application of biological content. He had pursued the Freudian path to its inevitable conclusion and after trying out the final biological bases theoretically and practically, was finally able to abandon content as in itself unimportant and devote himself to the technical utilization of the dynamics of the therapeutic process, with the patient’s will as the central force.

The increased control over his technique and the new clarity regarding the nature of the analytic situation, which his sudden access of insight had granted, gave Rank an authority and responsibility almost medical in character and caused him to revolt against the orthodox passive technique, the scientific tentativeness, the endless pursuit of infantile memories, the detailed interpretation of dreams and the wearisome prolongation of the treatment. For one who knows his present theory and practice, it is hard to believe that he ever wrote the following apparently autocratic, and from the orthodox view, over-confident paragraphs: “From this point of view then, a quite definite course can be given for the completion of the clearly defined task which I see in analysis and also after a relatively short period of observation an approximate time stated within which the process must be concluded. Naturally the analyst must not allow himself to be led either by the more passive method of investigation or by the intellectual technique of interpretation, by which means he could easily get into side-paths unprofitable to therapy and give cause to the patient for insuperable resistances. On the contrary, being conscious of his aim and sure of his purpose, the analyst must keep before his eyes his task which is to allow the patient to experience and to understand something quite definite in the treatment. This he must often do also contrary to the patient’s associations and intentions. The analyst in this way makes bold to deprive the patient entirely of the management of the analysis. . . . Thus, the analytic treatment gets not only a quite precise, sharply defined form and content, but also a definite period of time, which certainly varies according to the difficulty
of the case. . . . The turning of my technical viewpoint into therapeutic power might perhaps be called ‘activity,’ if one does not understand by that the giving of prohibitions and commands to the patient (in Ferenczi’s sense) which is a course I have never taken systematically. I mean only a courageous application of our knowledge especially that of the deepest psychical layers to which access by the patient is forever closed. Also I believe that our knowledge today is already extensive and definite enough to allow us a direct conversion of our experience into therapeutic power. One need not fear suggesting something positive to the patient for if we could not help with the consciously aimed application of our experiences, we should remain face to face with the patient’s suffering as helplessly as he himself. ... It is well known that the long drawn out analyses generally end with an unresolved transference, not in spite of, but because of their long duration. Analysis is to be compared much less to a process of healing or restoration than to an operative intervention which is to be carried through as quickly as possible so that the patient does not suffer more from the operation than from the illness.”

This apparently high-handed relation to the patient represents the climax of Rank’s revolt against a kind of therapeutic irresponsibility and vagueness which arises when the plea of scientific open-mindedness is used to justify ignorance of therapeutic effect and the patient is left to bear the analyst’s failure to take upon himself the full responsibility for his role in the therapeutic relationship. The discovery of the rights of the patient in the therapeutic process has led Rank to the discovery of the obligation of the therapist also. Only later does he come to see fully the limitations of the therapist’s role when the center of the analytic stage is finally yielded to the chief actor, the patient, not in ignorance, but in full knowledge of the use he must make of it dynamically.

The final and crucial illumination, culminating in Volume II in a comprehension of the purely immediate dynamic nature of the therapeutic process which makes it independent of any particular content, is almost at the point of conscious realization in the last chapter of Volume I, where Rank presents his thinking on the relation of the analytic situation in its immediate present

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reality to the material presented by the patient, including dreams, infantile memories and “all attempts at reconstruction or interpretation of the actual past however correct psychoanalytically.” He says: “In the material produced by the patient in and during the analysis, there are things which are not to be understood and derived from the patient’s past, neither from his immediate past nor from his historic past, but only from the present artificially created analytic situation. ... In the wholesale interest in phylogenesis there exists the same danger of a projection from the present into the past as in the case of the historical explanation, though with its remoteness and the greater difficulty of control the danger is perhaps still greater. (The reference is to Jung.) In attempting to place the actual conflict (Steckel) in the center of the analysis, one remains on the ground of psychotherapy but one may still run the danger of confusing the analytic situation with the actual conflict. . . . The content of the unconscious so far as
set forth by analysis, might be conceived as a portrayal of what takes place in the analytic situation between analyst and patient projected into the individual’s historical past. . . . The position on the sofa with the analyst at the back produces not only the desire to see the analyst, even when this desire does not predominate in the patient’s impulsive expression, but also the narcissistic desire to show himself (to be seen by the analyst). The first desire is frequently determined by the patient’s anxiety at having behind him someone whom, at least at the beginning, he does not know and at being ignorant of what he is doing. Indeed, often enough one has the impression that just this analytic arrangement puts the patient into a state of anxiety, makes him more fearful than perhaps he is in life, exactly as if he were in an operating room. As long as one behaves purely passively in the analytic situation, one does not notice one’s constant and decisive influence and indeed the less so, the more passive one is. But one can notice, just experimentally by slight alterations of the hour, of the position of one’s chair, even of one’s clothes, or the like, what influence the analytic situation has on the patient, perhaps the greater the less attention one pays to it. On the other hand, there is no therapeutic meaning in leaving the patient purposely ignorant concerning things, the

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presence of which influences him in every case whether he knows it or merely imagines it, guesses it or is aware of it from another source. Besides it is well known how much the analytic situation influences the patient’s real behavior outside during the analysis, indeed determines it, then why should one not be willing or able to see also to what a far-reaching extent it determines his utterances and reactions in the analytic hour itself. . . . The patient brings up from his past life material suitable to the situation but this is fitted and adapted to the present and thus distorted. Its reconstruction is possible only if one considers the influence of the analytic situation instead of depreciating what is produced in it as ‘phantasy.’ I will not deny that the interpretation on the infantile level has therapeutic value insofar as it makes acceptable to the patient’s ego from a higher level his a-social impulses. But theoretically the question for the present remains open as to how far it really is infantile (or rather how far it became pathogenic at the infantile period) and how far it is only a therapeutically helpful construction which permits the patient to play a definite role in the analysis, just as the analyst plays a role, whether he wills it or not. . . . It is a grave fallacy to believe that what is not obvious must be something infantile. That may indeed be true also, but it is certain, and experimentally demonstrable, that as a rule neither the analyst nor the patient sees the influence of the analytic situation that the patient himself neither recognizes nor wishes to recognize it, is only too comprehensible. Yet he has the tendency to mould the analytic situation into an ideal situation of gratification. That the analyst does not recognize this, or did not, has its cause in his own affective attitude. For the analyst too there is an ‘analytic situation,’ the analysis of which is a part of our most difficult and thankless task, which yet we ought not on that account forever to evade.”
Once Rank had recognized completely and in the slightest details the patient's sensitivity to the immediate reality of the analytic set-up, he was able to free himself from over emphasis upon these contents as well as from historical and biological material. One content is as good as another from the standpoint of dynamics. Which content one chooses to point out or interpret depends on the patient, the point reached in the whole analysis and the probable next movement. But for the therapist, certainly, it is necessary to see at once the value of any particular content for the momentary situation as well as the underlying interplay of forces which utilize it, and to make his own decision therapeutically, as to what needs emphasis and what will further the process most.

True to his insight into the present meaning of the analytic relationship, Rank introduced in Volume I a revolutionary handling of dream material which, however, as he specifically states, presupposes a “complete understanding of the Freudian dream interpretation.”

“The dream analysis of which we make use in practical work deviates to a considerable degree from the classical technique of dream interpretation first of all because we pursue other aims. Here it is not a matter of the psychological understanding of dream work, nor of the discovery of types of dreams . . . nor of universally human typical dreams and symbols and their relation to other products of human phantasy production, rather it is a question in practical analysis of just the individual peculiarities and deviations from the typical, of the distortions and displacements of the universal forms. . . . Moreover from the dreams occurring in the analysis and interpreted in terms of practical need, we must not aim at wanting to experience something characteristic for the nature of the dream; on the other hand we find in them very much, often indeed everything significant for the analytic situation and thus for the progress of the analysis for the patient and his relation to it. Mostly we need not give at all the translation of the single dream elements, but only to anticipate the interpretation especially in typical situations in cases of transparent symbolism or well-known complexes, in order to concern ourselves with the meaning of the dream in connection with the whole analysis. Yet the dream in the analysis does not stand only under the tendencies of the infantile wish fulfilments in terms of the repetition compulsion, it stands also in the service of the resistance and of the transference, thus of quite peculiar and exceptional conditions created artificially during the analysis and which clearly influence its form and presentation.
Naturally this is made subservient to our therapeutic purpose. Everything essential is made accessible to us if we apply the most general formula which Freud has given for the dream form to the analytic situation. He says: ‘The dream is the substitute form of infantile scenes changed through the transference to recent ones.’ Now in analysis, the ‘recent’ is the analytic situation and that is not only the current material of the analysis, but also the situation at the time and the patient’s relation to both.” Thus, without awareness of his almost completed separation from Freudian psychology and practice Rank has invaded technically every field of classical psychoanalysis, its free association, its scientific assumptions, historical sources, infantile memories, the transference, the Ὑdipus complex as nuclear, and finally the sacred dream material. Only one thing is lacking and that is the sudden revelation of the human being as a center of organized forces, not primarily an effect of any external influence but himself a moving effective cause, reacting upon parental pressures and social environment as truly as he is acted upon by them. In other words reality is as real within as without and just as capable of being causal if a cause one must find. For this integration of the impulsive life of the individual which represents his dynamic organization as a force among other forces, Rank uses the term “will” despite its association with the old and condemned faculty psychology and its utilization by quacks and charlatans. Once this step has been taken, all the material which he has been collecting in twenty years of analytic practice, all the new discoveries he has tried to see in Freudian terms are thrown into sudden illumination and take their places with startling consistency in an orientation that is basic not only for therapy but for a living psychology of human beings. He has the key now to a final and convincing critique of Freudian doctrine and method, but what is more important, he has the basis for his own philosophic development. No longer is it a question of mother rather than father, of breast over penis, of birth above castration, of any content over any other. Instead we have a dynamic of the individual in relation to birth, parents, sex and society as opposite poles necessary for biological development and psychic balancing. Every human being must needs represent in

his internal organization not only the effect of these external influences, but a partial cause, a unique source of new energy which utilizes the outer for its own creative needs. Freud has remained identified with the destructive overwhelming aspects of environmental influences, as we see clearly in his recent books, and has put such creative energy into an effort to save the individual victims of life forces by means of a therapy of adaptation and adjustment that he has influenced the psychology of a whole world. Rank, with no minimizing of the environmental, has chosen instead to make a virtue of relativity and movement and to assign to the individual his full share in the dynamic. Instead of trying to escape
human inconsistency and weakness, he has accepted creatively the ambivalent character of all livingness and has found that when one has the courage to build upon this shifting, moving foundation, the result is a psychology that works. In the following pages is presented not an abstract unsubstantiated theory, but an organization of thinking about the way in which human beings can take help, or if you like, can accept life, that has been wrested out of the finest detail of a deep and extensive therapeutic experience devoted to an understanding of the individual in his uniqueness and difference.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE THERAPEUTIC PROCESS IN TERMS OF RELATIONSHIP

PART ONE: THE PATIENT’S REACTION TO THE THERAPEUTIC SITUATION


“From the crooked wood of which man is made, nothing quite straight can be built. Only an approximation to this goal is expected of us by nature.” — Kant
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“Sie werden bei mir nicht Philosophie lemen aber — philosophieren, nicht Gedanken blosz zum Nachsprechen, sondern Denken.”

“You will learn from me not philosophy but to philosophize, not thoughts to be imitated but to think.”

-Kant

Of a technique of psychotherapy one expects a presentation of the ways and means by which the nervous patient can be helped that is as comprehensible and applicable as possible. Nothing simpler than this definition, nothing more difficult to carry out than this demand! When I say nothing more difficult, I really mean that it is almost impossible, especially when one no longer approaches the problem of the neurotic purely medically. The essential contribution of the psychoanalytic investigation of neurotics is just this, that even if they show quite marked disturbances of functioning in their so-called “symptoms,” they are not sick in the medical sense. Their sufferings are emotional. The causes are rooted in human development and human adjustment. Consequently, there is no radical cure for their pain, no generally effective means for its alleviation, nor any universally applicable technique of psychotherapy which can be described in detail. To this difficulty based on the nature of neurotic suffering is added the fact that the only means of healing which psychotherapy has learned to use is itself a human being, the therapist, whose own psychology also must have a decided influence upon the treatment and its outcome.

If this negative statement is all that one can offer to an expectant humanity seeking help, is it not then useless from the beginning to undertake such a work or to trouble one’s self about the therapy of the neuroses beyond the purely practical aspect? This book shows that I do not think so. My introductory remarks merely attempt to limit the expectations of the too zealous therapist, or rather to guide them in another direction, the only direction in which I see the possibility of coming nearer to the problem of the neuroses practically. In view of the complications just mentioned, I have attempted to write in place of a technique of

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psychotherapy, a “Philosophy of Helping,” without which an understanding of any kind of psychotherapy or technique seems to me to be impossible.

Psychoanalysis itself has finally come up against the clearly insurmountable guilt problem which rules the analytic situation in such a central fashion because it represents not only the nuclear problem of the neurosis, but also of the formation of personality in general. Guilt is an ethical problem, which is found in every human relationship. In the relation of the seeker for help to the helper it manifests itself with peculiar conflict. This point of view extends the problem beyond the analytic situation to a common human source of conflict, which psychologically speaking we can designate as a therapeutic experience, regardless of whether the helper appears in the role of parent, physician or priest. It is well known that one can conduct an analysis technically correctly and still have no result if the sufferer cannot accept the help which he sought; just as a “wild analysis” may be successful if the personal relationship is such or succeeds in becoming such that it is possible for the sufferer to take from the other what he needs emotionally without getting guilt feeling. For the understanding of this reaction of the patient, knowledge of the essence of the therapeutic situation in general, which means knowledge of the ethical problem, is just as indispensable as psychological understanding. The patient reacts, it is true with his old typical patterns, as psychological theory in part commonly presents them, but he reacts to a new situation which in its ethical aspects constitutes the peculiarly constructive therapeutic agent. His reaction to this unique experience is in a certain sense new also and this in my

1 “Ethical” as used by Rank in contrast to “moral” refers to the inherent and inevitable relation of the self to the other. Ethics, unlike morality, is not man made but the result of an inescapable reciprocal relationship beginning with the biological tie to the mother.

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opinion is the only therapeutic value of psychoanalysis. For upon the understanding and constructive use of his reaction patterns, lying beyond transference, beyond any repetition, depend not only the practical results of the treatment, but also the entire future fate of the human being, who is at the moment a patient, but who ought not to remain one.

This new and unique element in the reactions of the seeker for help from its very nature does not lend itself to description, since it appears unpredictably and but once and accordingly, even if it could be described, would be worthless for generalization. On the other hand, the universal, to the description and proof of which psychoanalytic theory and therapy has hitherto devoted itself, in the individual case is therapeutically worthless just because of its generality. Freud has disclosed certain universal human reaction patterns by means of historical analysis whose reappearance in the analysis of the individual is probable and has described them technically as transference. From certain phenomena of transference he has deduced theoretically the so-called repetition compulsion, but in relation to both he neglects, if
he does not deny, the new which alone is constructive. It is characteristic that Freud’s own theory formation as it appears in the works of his later period always grew out of practical difficulties and sought to explain them, that is, to justify their insolubility, but he himself never undertook to present a technique of psychoanalysis. If the universal is ineffective in the particular case just because of its universality and the individual nature of the single case, because of its particularity therapeutically, cannot be presented, taught or applied in general terms then there remains only one solution of the problem which has come to me from purely practical experiences in the overcoming of therapeutic difficulties. In each separate case it is necessary to create, as it were, a theory and technique made for the occasion without trying to carry over this individual solution to the next case. Probably there will crystallize therefrom certain experiences regarding the therapist’s method of observation and relationship applicable to the next case, but the essential factor remains always the capacity to understand the individual from himself, in which process the common human element, certainly not to be denied, can constitute only the hypothesis,

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not the content of the understanding. In other words, one must learn the speech of the other, and not force upon him the current idiom. Likewise, one must understand how to recognize in the mixture of universal and individual, the essence of his personality and to use it constructively in a therapeutic experience. It is this which Adler’s individual psychology rightly strives for in contrast to the Freudian uniform therapy, but with Adler there comes the unavoidable element of leveling in his pedagogic social concept of value. Only on the basis of the will psychology shall we be able to understand this paradox, that the Freudian uniform technique has the therapeutic effect of strengthening the individualistic in the particular case, while the Adlerian method which emphasizes the individual, educates the person to social consciousness.

The presentation of a psychotherapeutic technique, as I understand it, comprises, then, neither the general norm-setting theory formation, no matter from where it comes or of what kind it is, nor yet the enumeration of a set of practical rules and prescriptions such as Freud attempted bit by bit. One can modify these rules or turn them into the opposite or entirely ignore them and still get results; just as one can fail while observing them strictly. Everything depends on the understanding and correct management of the therapeutic situation and this lies in the essential understanding and guiding of the individual reactions of the patient. These reactions depend not only on the patterns which he brings with him in terms of unconscious complexes or conscious goals, but also on the effect, in part new, of the therapeutic situation and of the personality of the analyst. Moreover not only what he does or leaves undone is important, but also how he does it, that is, whether it be with or without understanding of the reactions which follow; in other words, with what degree of conscious ascendancy over the situation and intuitive seizing of its opportunities he works. From this viewpoint, however, the
new reactions of the individual are not so entirely unpredictable, if the therapist, besides knowing 
theory and technique, knows himself and the unavoidable personal influence on the actual therapeutic 
situation and understands how to make use of it. What he has to learn and moreover what alone is 
teachable must contain over and above self-knowledge

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the understanding of the therapeutic situation as such and its influence on the reactions of the patient. 
The therapist should learn therefore, not definite rules and prescriptions, tricks and catches, general 
theories and typical interpretations, no definite theory and technique of psychoanalysis but to analyze, 
which means, in my opinion, the understanding and handling of the therapeutic situation. However, in 
order to translate this bit of psychology into therapeutically effective action, he must also have a 
personality which approximates as far as possible to the ideal therapeutic type, which we will describe 
later.

This conception of the technique implies a new conception of the therapeutic task also and a new 
attitude toward the patient. It is noteworthy that the absence of hypothesis in this kind of 
psychotherapy more nearly approximates the magic arts of healing used of old than all the detailed 
technical precepts of today. The sick person actually does not need to be initiated into all the theoretical 
presuppositions and consequences which do not help him therapeutically and may easily lead him to the 
idea that he himself might become a therapist. Not only less theory but less “art of interpretation” is 
necessary since what is essential is the production and solution of reactions in the therapeutic situation, 
but not without bringing in by way of comparison similar past or present reactions outside of the 
therapeutic situation. In a word the therapeutic process is lifted from an intellectual training which 
every kind of “making conscious” in whatever terminology implies, to the sphere of experience. It is 
neither the infantile (Freud), nor the guiding purpose (Adler), nor the unconscious made conscious 
(Jung) that counts, but the therapeutic experience itself. Naturally the factors just named play their 
parts, but they are subordinated to the actual moment of experience. For the feeling of experience, 
purposefully and with intent, is made the central factor in the therapeutic task, not merely endured as 
the troublesome if unavoidable phenomenon of resistance. The value of the therapeutic experience like 
that of every real experience lies in its spontaneity and uniqueness, with an important difference to be 
sure, which constitutes the essence of the whole therapeutic technique. This experience serves primarily 
only one end, an end which ordinary experience affords only in rare cases, namely assistance in the
unfolding and enrichment of the self, the personality. It must, therefore, be intensified consciously and with art into an ego experience in a more far reaching fashion than is usually the case. This value made effective by the one-sidedness of the transference relationship has been, in my opinion, the only spontaneously effective therapeutic element in the analytic situation. However, it has not been utilized constructively, nor has the origin of the guilt feeling necessarily following from the ego enrichment in the experience been understood.

The reason for this failure is that in the classical analytic situation in spite of the famed passivity of the analyst, the person of the therapist stood in the center, while I unmask all the reactions of the patient even if they apparently refer to the analyst, as projections of his own inner conflict and bring them back to his own ego. Apparently the narcissism of the analyst has compensated for his passivity, so that he has related all reactions of the patient as far as they do not permit of being put back on an infantile pattern, to his own person. My technique on the contrary sees the reactions as arising immediately from the therapeutic experience and explains them as projections and attempts at solution of the particular ego conflicts of the patient, which puts the patient himself as chief actor in the center of the situation set up by the analyst, a situation which he creates and re-creates according to his own psychic needs. The so-called transference which for Freud represents nothing but a reproduction of the infantile, becomes a creative expression of the growth and development of the personality in the therapeutic experience, while the critical phases, labeled resistance by Freud and masculine protest by Adler, I value and utilize constructively as a proof, however negative, of the strength of will on which therapeutic success ultimately depends.
II

THE BASIS OF A WILL THERAPY

“Es gibt kein Hindernis, das man nicht zerbren ken kann, denn das Hindernis tst nur des Willens wegen da, und in Wahrheit sind keine Hindernisse als nur im Geist.”

“There are no obstacles that one cannot overcome, for the obstacle is only there on account of the will and in truth there are no obstacles but psychic ones.”

—Rabbi Nachman

Psychoanalysis in its mingling of theory and therapy has failed to detect the actually effective therapeutic agent and psychological understanding of which alone can furnish the basis for theoretical generalization. First it was the making conscious of the unconscious (association) which we know today is not itself therapeutic. Then it was the abreaction of the affects, a kind of psychic emptying (catharsis) which at best means only a temporary relief, nothing lasting or constructively effective. Finally it was the transference relationship which forms a kind of synthesis of these two psychological factors. Transference not only contains something passive, temporary, derived, but actually represents that aspect of the relationship to the analyst. But passivity, dependence, or weakness of will in any form is just the difficulty on account of which the neurotic comes for treatment, therefore transference cannot be the therapy to which we attach the idea of something positive.

What is naturally and spontaneously effective in the transference situation and, rightly understood and handled, is also effective therapeutically is the same thing that is potent in every relationship between two human beings, namely the will. Two wills clash, either the one overthrows the other or both struggle with and against one another for supremacy. Adler has seen this battle for supremacy in analysis, “the will to be on top” (Obensein wollen), as he calls it, at least he has not denied it, for it is so clear that only the wish not to see it can explain its neglect by Freud. However, Adler has apparently not been able to see that the phenomena described by him represent only the form in which the will manifests itself in the analytic situation as in similar life situations. In other words, he takes this will to superiority as an ultimate psychological fact, but gives no psychology of will in general, which alone would make these phenomena intelligible. In contrast to this social pedagogical
presentation of Adler, Freud’s whole life work is nothing but a continued attempt to interpret what Adler naively takes for what it seems, and to explain it by tracing it back to primitive biological roots. The peculiarly psychological problem seems to me to lie exactly between the two. Whence comes the will, and why psychologically must we interpret this will not understood in its origin, now as will to power and again as sex drive, and more than that, why must we interpret it at all, instead of being able to recognize its true psychological nature? This problem includes in itself as we see, epistemological and ethical questions the answers to which belong to a philosophy of the psychic. It seems, therefore, to be no accident that Adler’s “attempt to dominate” (Herrschsucht) represents an ultimate fact, just as the will to power does for Nietzsche, and that Freud’s libido concept and death instinct show a like relation to Schopenhauer’s blind will and the denial of it in the Nirvana wish.

In every case, however, they arrived at no will psychology because (with Nietzsche on the whole excepted) they brought in moral or social values which are probably justified therapeutically or pedagogically, yes, might even be necessary, but stand in the way of a purely psychological understanding. For Adler’s “will to power” is at bottom exactly as “bad” as Freud’s instinct, which he euphemistically calls the infantile wish, and with both, the therapy consists in freeing from, rooting out, mastering or sublimating. Where Freud met the will of the other he called it “resistance” (to his will), and where Adler came upon this counter-will he called it masculine protest in the light of his conscious psychology, or obstinacy in the pedagogical meaning. At the basis of both presentations lies a moral evaluation;

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it is “bad.” Resistance one must overcome or break like obstinacy. Perhaps such evaluation is unavoidable in therapy and education for they must apparently be governed by some such norms. But one must know this and allow for it instead of first creating for their apparent grounding a psychology that is oriented to these very same norms. A purely scientific psychology must guard itself against including moralistic values of any kind. It must first of all be purely psychological, apart from values—in a word must describe what is, not what should be, and explain why it is so or must be so. The fact that self-assertion, protest and obstinacy are pedagogically undesirable is another thing, just as will, insistence on freedom, and assertion of personality are socially frowned upon. But you will find no strong-willed man and likewise no great leadership as an expression of this strong will, without its seeming to the individual who comes up against it, to be self-will, obstinacy, or contrariness.¹ What Adler wishes apparently is the pedagogical ideal of the super-result without that burdensome accessory phenomenon. What such a pedagogical method can achieve is no super-result, but only an average, just as Freud’s medically oriented therapy for the neurotic strives for an ideal of normality.
In relation to the problem of a constructive individual therapy then, this is to be noted, that first of all in opposition to pedagogy and pedagogically oriented psychoanalysis with its father complex, it must refrain from moral evaluation of every kind. It is important that the neurotic above all learn to will, discover that he can will without getting guilt feeling on account of willing. The danger which one might see in this does not exist in reality, for there remain always many regulating factors (repressions and ideals) which restrain him from converting this will of his into action. One can see such a danger in therapy only if like Freud he conceives of morality in general as externally determined. Purely psychological consideration would show that it is his own inner inhibitions that make the individual not only moral but even hyper-ethical. In this will psychology I shall show

\[1\] In this sense the clever American is right in his ironical version of the Adlerian inferiority complex, which he, with reference to the compensatory benefits, designated as the golden complex. (Lee Wilson Dodd: “The Golden Complex. A defence of Inferiority.” N.Y. 1927.)

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how the rehabilitation of will solves many problems at one stroke; in therapy, will has always played a great role, but it has lacked its own psychology which would have made it scientifically acceptable as a therapeutic agent and therefore also therapeutically effective. Instead it has been given over to fakirs, hypnotists, and charlatans of every kind. With what contempt we still look down upon all methods of strengthening and training the will, even to Coué, although they have helped many human beings. Not that I myself believe that a neurotic can be healed, because he daily declares that things are better with him, but what is manifested in all these teachings and the experiences by which they are supported, is the fact of the will, not merely the belief in its power, the feeble wish that it be so strong and mighty. The very suggestion that the will be strong, is itself an expression of the strength of the will, for which apparently we are obliged to seek a justification, or cover, as Freud did in the romantic garb of the “wish.” The power of will is so great and its expressions in the individual as in humanity so notorious, that one could fill volumes and libraries with the description of human acts of will and their beneficial and destructive effects, not only could fill, but has filled, in the writing of the history of humanity history of every form and kind, especially the kind that is known under the name of Psychology.

The psychological problem par excellence makes its first appearance with this question, why must we always deny the will, call it now God, now Fate, or attribute to it an “id.” In other words, the essential problem of psychology is our abolition of the fact of will, the explanation of the manifold types of abolition of will and its varying interpretation at different times. This psychological problem, actually the problem of psychology, as it meets us in psychoanalysis, is therefore a universal problem, which psychoanalysis did not recognize because as therapeutic, i.e. as a morally oriented psychology, it could not. We seem to have here a kind of universal guilt feeling as far as will is concerned. Human willing is
the root of the peculiar guilt problem which psychoanalysis could not explain because it had fallen into it therapeutically itself. Psychotherapy must make the person not only well but also good, yet the bad, the arch evil, is the will, no matter whether one interprets it biologically like Freud as sex drive (libido), or like Adler sociologically as will to power, or pedagogically as obstinacy. For an understanding of the motives which lead universally to the necessity of an interpretation of will, of one kind or another, we have first to comprehend fully the psychological evaluation of human nature as well as the modern psychology of the individual.

After this necessary digression into will psychology, we now turn back to will therapy and shall describe how the will is denied in the analytic situation before we present the positive side, that is, how the will expresses itself in a therapeutic experience and how it can and must be constructively used. In Freud’s analysis, the will apparently plays no particular part, either on the side of the patient or on the side of the analyst. The basic analytic rule of “free association” specifically states, eliminate entirely the little bit of will which your neurotic weakness has perhaps not yet undermined and resign yourself to the guidance of the unconscious, to the id, also taking pains to eliminate the ethical inhibitions of the censor, the super-ego. Likewise the analyst, according to the rule which holds for him also, must guard against forcing his will upon the patient, either by prohibitions or commands, or even by premature or enforced interpretations. We know that on both sides this is possible only to a certain degree, and that is lucky, for the impossibility of carrying through this Buddhistic will-less-ness provides the therapeutic foundation of the analytic situation. With reference to later deductions, it would not be paradoxical to say that psychoanalysis, in its therapeutic consequences, is an involuntary proof of the existence and strength of the will, and this was and also is its only therapeutic value.

When I say that the mutual exclusion of will in the analytic situation is possible to a limited degree only, I describe an ideal situation whose therapeutic value however is always arrived at by its miscarriage. Actually, the analytic situation shows not merely that exclusion of will is possible only to a degree but that as a fact it is impossible and every attempt to exclude it only strengthens the will reactions. In this continuous conflict of wills which analysis presents it is then of minor importance whose will reactions are stronger, or to use the well-known question, who began it. Usually it is the analyst with his fundamental rule
who at once sets up a will conflict which is not concluded to the very end of the analysis and often beyond it. I say usually it is the analyst who begins, that is true only if one is not willing to understand the coming of the patient for help as a disguised challenge to a duel, in reality, however, a manifestation of his own inner conflict of will. The physician advises his patient and the patient by accepting this advice makes this his own will regardless of whether it has to do with taking a medicine, depriving of an indulgence, seeking of a watering place, or the deciding upon an operation. The analyst to whom the patient turns for help, cannot advise him, avoids carefully everything which approaches that, in order thus to find and permit the patient to find what he himself actually wants. The analyst insists only on this one strict rule, which actually dictates to the patient, what he shall do in the analysis, which is, psychologically speaking, not to will; a rule which the patient does not and cannot understand, which one cannot even explain to him, and which he accordingly cannot make his own will even if he follows it. This situation presents factually and psychologically therefore nothing other than the opening of a great duel of wills, in which this first easy victory over the apparently weak-willed patient is bitterly avenged many times. Be that as it may, always his downfall, in the true sense of the word, is only external, for the chief rule of free association the patient cannot follow even if he would. From this fact one may explain the two typical reaction patterns which always rule the analytic picture, resistance and guilt feeling. It is evident already that in the analytic situation and because of it every expression of the will of the patient can only manifest itself as resistance, even though he must react to it with guilt feeling because he ought not to have any resistance, that is, ought to abolish his will. We know that the honest assurance that resistance is unavoidable, nay is even necessary, helps not at all, because it only means that the will cannot be exterminated, while one’s intention is to abolish it practically, as one has denied it theoretically. Whether this resistance manifests itself as the father complex of the man, or the masculine protest of the woman, or desire to dominate in general, is unimportant as compared to the psychological understanding of the situation. One must recognize

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that the individual suffers not necessarily from a father complex or a masculine protest, but from a situation in which a strange will is forced on him and makes him react with accentuation of his own will. This counter-will takes for its content at times a varying ideology, in terms of which the psychoanalyst habitually interprets it, and inevitably, as a voluntarily accepted representative of authority at the same time evaluates it morally. It is more important, however, to recognize that this negative reaction of the patient represents the actual therapeutic value, the expression of will as such, which in the analytic situation can only manifest itself as resistance, as protest, —that is, only as counter-will.
With this initial will conflict of the analytic situation, the struggle is naturally not settled. There come sooner or later strong phases of resistance or guilt reactions, which are insurmountable for the classical analytic technique and they forced Freud to the construction of new theories, which led him even further away from the will problem. Even when one knows how to avoid such dangerous obstacles by patience or guidance, every analysis necessarily comes at last to a point in which the will conflict, however neglected, breaks out openly, without one’s having recognized it before, much less having made it useful therapeutically. The ending of the analysis is crucial even when one sets no definite limit, when as the classical analysis maintains, the whole analytic release depends on the acceptance of a definite content. For the most part, this content presents itself in the reconstruction of early history, which therapeutically has no other value than that of a “bone,” over which both parties struggle to the utmost. That this struggle is carried out around a spying upon coitus, in and for itself most uninteresting, or about a castration threat in childhood, lends to the patient the affective emphasis which he needs to bear it and for the analyst on his side it has value because of his interest in the confirmation of his theory. The essential point, however, is that this bone of contention is usually tied up with the problem of the ending of the analysis, which leads to that final struggle characteristic of analytic therapy, an unheard of phenomenon in the whole field of the healing art. The patient against the assertion of the analyst that the analysis is at an end, that he is cured, reacts

with a protest, which can be explained not simply as transference resistance, but psychologically must be comprehended as a will protest, as a contradiction. It is well known that one cannot release these final struggles successfully, at most only increase them, if one treats them as resistances. And also even where such an analysis is ending well, it is only after the patient succeeds in putting over his own will in some way or other, whether it be in the form of a love demand or whether it be more open resistance, thus for example, when he afterwards submits to an operation, only to prove that he was right and the other wrong about his illness.

I, myself, grasped relatively early the therapeutic meaning of the will problem, but only now am able to formulate it clearly. I soon realized that all the active measures which could not be entirely avoided even by Freud and whose specific use as prohibitions by Ferenczi naturally could only lead to an increase of the resistances, at bottom mean nothing except challenges of will, and that it would make no difference therefore, whether one forbade to the patient smoking or sex activity or certain foods. So I very early limited myself to one active measure, which relates to the analytic situation itself and in its very nature is unavoidable, that is, the end setting; naturally, as I have always emphasized, not in the sense of an arbitrary act on the part of the analyst, but as it seemed certain that the ending of the analysis represents a will conflict, and as there is no doubt that it must be ended sometime (although there are endless analyses) it appeared to me logical as well as psychological to allow the patient to carry out the
unavoidable will conflict in the problem of ending. When I introduced end setting into analysis, therefore, I did it with the full knowledge of the meaning of active measures in general and tried not to make it an apple of discord through force, but to let it be carried through by choice as a purely inner conflict of will. I looked also for criteria in the patient’s own expressions of will even if not always obvious, in order to discover when he himself should be ripe for the definite time of termination. It was then evident that the patient, even with his own will directed to ending the analysis, reacted to the fixing of an ending with resistance. However, these reactions were so evidently contrariness that the patient could hardly deny in them his own will conflict. Specifically they moved in two extreme directions, indifferently, either of which revealed itself as an expression of counter-will. They would demand either the continuation of the analysis with the rationalization that the ending as determined could not possibly allow sufficient time or an immediate breaking off, because in so short a period nothing more was to be accomplished. These demands only mean therefore “No—otherwise!” One need not trouble to search for a particular reason for this will reaction.

The technical superiority of this ending technique is as great as its therapeutic advantage, provided, of course, it is applied in the right spirit, that is, with the understanding of the will psychology, which shows that the will under the pressure of the strange will can only manifest itself as counter-will in the analytic situation. This automatic reaction, which the therapeutic situation with its apparent disadvantage to the patient regularly produces, governs the entire analytic situation from the beginning; it only needed an exact study of the will reactions of the patient in the open struggle of the ending to recognize and understand this in its full significance. This showed that one was dealing essentially neither with father-resistance, masculine protest, nor yet with mother fixation, but purely with an inner conflict of will which manifests itself externally according to the situation. In the final struggle, this inner conflict becomes evident through the fact that the patient, as we have seen, wants two different things at the same time, both the end and the continuation of the analysis. Incidentally this throws a light on the nature of so-called ambivalence, as a conflict of will, or better said, as the human capacity for mobilizing will and counter-will at one time. The technique of end setting used by me brings into relief the whole will problem in its double-sided aspect (ambivalence), and correctly handled carries it to a solution. The analyst yields to the growing will of the patient to end the analysis, while at the same time through fixing a definite time, which is necessary for the solution of this will conflict, he contradicts the patient, inhibits his will. This situation provokes the whole ambivalent conflict of the patient, because it corresponds to it so perfectly. When one gives in, he doesn’t want his own way anymore and when one does not yield, he wants it again. The
essential point is that one can easily show him in these final reactions that this will conflict has to do with an internal, not an external struggle, and represents the fundamental conflict of his whole psychic life.

Why and how this is so, belongs to a presentation of will psychology which I shall give elsewhere simultaneously. Here we shall examine further the therapeutic aspects of such a conception of the will problem. Having pointed out how this fundamental will conflict manifests itself in the analytic final struggle, we go back to the moment in which the patient sought analysis. We said before that, with reference to the later course of the therapeutic process, one could consider the appearance (in the office) of the patient seeking help as a challenge to a battle of wills. This is doubtless correct, but the patient shows at the same time another will, that is, to yield, to submit himself, which is what brings him as a seeker for help to the therapist. Yes, we can and must go even further and say that when the patient appears he has already gone through a will conflict usually of quite long duration, which we designate as neurosis, in which at the time of his coming the will to submit has the upper hand. In other words, the help-seeking patient brings his whole neurotic conflict, which at bottom is a will conflict, to the analytic situation, to which he wishes to submit himself but which at the same time he resists. On this very conflict the inability to submit and the inability to put over his own will positively, his whole neurosis depends. In the analytic situation he seeks to solve externally this inner will conflict, since he puts a strange will over his own, but soon feels this will as forced on him. Accordingly the task of the therapist is not to act as will, which the patient would like, but only to function as counter-will in such a way that the will of the patient shall not be broken, but strengthened. If for any reason the therapist does not understand this dynamics of will, then he plays the role of “divine will” temporarily put on him by the patient while the patient acts out the counter-will, the resistance, the negative lead, but all only in the terms of the old neurotic reaction pattern. One could formulate the whole antithesis by expressing the Freudian compulsory rule in terms of the will psychology, “Say whatever you wish, for it is all one

what you say.” It is essential how you say it (or do not say it) and when. What the patient needs is the positive expression of his will without the inhibiting guilt feeling, a goal which is to be attained only by the actual overcoming of the therapist and complete ruling of the analytic moment of experience.

This conception of the will conflict and its therapeutic value in the analytic experience throws a light also upon one of the most important of its manifestations, which, without reference to the will psychology, remains unintelligible. It is the problem of the so-called will-to-health. Evidently the patient must have in addition to his neurosis something like a will-to-health also, when he gives himself over to treatment. It seems to me equally certain that this will-to-health becomes less as soon as the treatment has begun and continues to decrease, the further it advances, if one does not understand how to comprehend it psychologically and use it therapeutically. For the first thing the patient does when he begins treatment, is to project his will-to-health onto the analyst who represents it as it were, just by virtue of his profession. That is, the patient himself no longer needs to will to become well, as the analyst must and will make him sound. This is an example of the tendency of the patient just described to make the therapist represent positive will, and to keep for himself the negative role, a tendency on whose correct understanding the whole psychotherapeutic process stands or falls. Its success depends on just this, the ability to allow this will-to-health to be preserved and strengthened in the patient himself, instead of permitting it to be projected upon the analyst. This is possible only when the whole therapeutic situation in all its manifestations is evaluated constructively in terms of the will problem. The positive strengthening of the will-to-health to the level of an actual becoming well and remaining well depends completely and entirely upon the will of the patient which even for the period of this treatment must take over the capacity for becoming well and later for remaining well. The imperfect comprehension of this problem explains a typical tendency to interpretation which reveals the whole controversy between psychoanalysis and will psychology. We shall again confine ourselves to the purely therapeutic aspect of this problem, which at the same time throws a light on its general meaning. We can best illustrate it by an objection which was raised against end setting, and the criteria which I have applied to determine it. When the patient, let us say for example in dreams, betrays signs that he wants to leave the analysis and I interpret it not only as resistance but also as progress, the objection is made that it might be merely a “wish” of the patient. This objection is easy as it rests on the wish-fulfilment theory of dreams, without questioning its psychological foundation. Where, however, the patient expresses this tendency toward freeing himself, not in a dream, but in other forms of emotional reaction, then the analyst will rather tend to speak of “resistance.” In both cases he overlooks, in my opinion which I will establish elsewhere theoretically, the positive expression of will appearing in these reactions, which manifests itself now as resistance, again disguises itself as wish.1
To the difficulty of recognizing the expression of will as such and also why it manifests itself in the patient now as wish and another time as resistance is added the psychology of the analyst. If, specifically, the reaction of the patient is one an analyst has in mind, then the suspicion of suggestion occurs and this leads to the interpretation of will expression as “wish”; if the reaction of the patient is not in the analyst’s mind, then it must be interpreted as resistance. Here again we see how the correct understanding of the reactions of the patient depends on the

1 The dream work which Freud emphasizes, is just the dynamic guided by the dreamer within himself, whose consequence the therapist can determine only after the fact. With reference to affects worked out in the dream, Freud’s wish-fulfilment theory proves to be too narrow, rather one could speak of an unburdening function of the dream. As to the dreams produced in analysis and particularly in the last phase, they show clearly that they have to do with an attempt by the will to control the situation. The dream is here no wish-fulfilment, but a will accomplishment, a distinction which is meaningful as the distinction between wish and will, for it says that the patient wants to accomplish the whole task within himself and will find release only in his own autonomous self. This explains moreover the appearance of dreams soon after the beginning of the analysis in persons who usually do not dream at all or very seldom. That, in addition, the dream can also have during the treatment the reversed meaning of a present, a gift to the analyst, proves nothing against its autonomous tendency, which it has naturally. For the dream is not destined usually for sharing and yet certainly has an auto-therapeutic effect. In the production of dreams, especially in the end phase of treatment, the patient seizes only upon the natural function of the dream, as a psychic self-regulator in order thus to make himself independent of the analyst once more, that is of the therapeutic situation.

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general attitude of the analyst to the whole therapeutic experience, and not merely to details of the analytic situation. If the will of the patient from the beginning is systematically and purposefully made to be the bearer of the whole therapeutic process, then there can be no question practically whether his tendency toward freeing himself is only a wish or merely resistance. For in both cases it concerns one of the numerous will expressions of the patient, all of which he seeks to deny; in one case directly since he says, that is not my will but only the expression of my counter-will, my spirit of opposition, another time indirectly, when he says this is not my will but only a wish. In other words, the explanation of expressions of will on the basis of psychoanalytic theory strengthens the patient in his tendency to deny all will expressions, which is just the essence of his neurosis.

That the will in the therapeutic experience can only manifest itself as resistance or as a timid wish, lies in the pedagogic setting of the analytic situation. The difference, therefore, between the analytic therapy and the will therapy is, as has already been said, that analysis is pedagogically oriented, while will therapy works purely psychologically. The one wants to work educationally, the other constructively, that is, in a self-determining way. In analysis, resistance stands in the center, the goal is to conquer it,
which in my opinion can never happen either in pedagogy or in pedagogically oriented therapy. The goal of constructive therapy is not the overcoming of resistance, but the transformation of the negative will expression (counter-will) underlying them into positive and eventually creative expression.
“A man is least himself when he speaks as himself. Give him a mask and he will speak the truth.” - Oscar Wilde

After this introductory sketch of the actual therapeutic problem, we now have to study in detail the ways and means which permit us to translate will psychology into therapeutic skill of a constructive kind. We might say the seeker for help suffers only temporarily or apparently from weakness of will, in reality from a too strong will which he must constantly deny, rationalize, project and even occasionally break as is the case in the neurosis. The means of cure, we said, is the therapist, that is, the counter-will on which the positive will of the patient is strengthened and in relation to which he may again will. How does this happen, or how is it effected in spite of the opposing difficulties, or is it to be effected therapeutically at all?

Psychoanalysis, as far as it has been able to discuss the what and how of therapy as such, has answered that psychotherapy is at bottom a love therapy, that is, that it works on the basis of the transference relationship, which is a revival of the parental relationship. As this is founded on love and fear, so analysis would be nothing but an improved edition of child rearing, a reeducation as Freud himself called it, but it works with more love and less fear. We shall see later how far this is therapeutically effective, or is possible at all; there is no doubt, however, that Freudian analysis works purely educationally. Yes, the educational aspect is in my opinion the only therapeutic agent it provides, but it is just on that account that it has finally failed as a constructive therapy for the individual. As far as it is a love therapy it fails, first, because the majority of patients have already attempted this cure in real life and have come to grief,

hence they seek the help of the therapist; in the second place, education on a love basis, as is well known, “spoils” the individual and makes him even more dependent than he was before. This is the famous libido fixation in the transference, which however is not “pure love,” but rather a phenomenon of resistance. As such it is nothing more than a disguised will assertion of the patient, who wishes to have that which is denied him just because it is denied. If, on the other hand, one applies the educational measure of fear, which often happens, in order to loose this libido fixation, then one gets
reactions of counter-will (resistances) instead of positive assertion of will, and thus has failed again of the therapeutic goal.

Here it becomes clear that a constructive psychotherapy for the adult cannot be in any way education, nor re-education either, by means of love or fear, but must be something else suited to the grown person, who cannot be “brought up” any more, but can only be understood, that is, accepted as he is. One is reminded here of the paradox that Freud, on the basis of his father attitude, saw in the patient only the child and the childish (infantile). His educational therapy founded on this attitude, however, is not applicable to the child itself. Adler, on the other hand, applied the undeveloped educational potentialities of Freudian analysis consciously and systematically to the child where it essentially belongs. His mistake lay again in the fact that he wanted also to apply his pedagogic therapy to the grown person, where it is just as inappropriate as Freud’s “infantile” therapy with the child. We have just said that the adult cannot be brought up or re-educated any more, but must be understood, that is, accepted. In the love therapy, it is only the wish to be understood (corresponding to the wish to be loved) that makes the situation “infantile.” The perfect understanding of the analyst is like an all-pardoning of the parents; constructive understanding on the contrary is a self-accusation in Ibsen’s meaning, a “holding court” over one’s own ego. The understanding by the other rests on a love identification: therefore in the understanding of the analyst we have a phenomenon of identification, a proof of love as the patient seeks it from the other. He may arrive finally at self-understanding, which is the true therapeutic goal only by identification with the analyst who under-

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stands him. Identification, however, is essentially conforming, a yielding of one’s will, like the love feeling itself, yes, like feeling itself, as I conceive it, and this weakness of will is denied by the individual who says, as soon as he feels it, “I will not be so weak!” This identification with the understanding analyst itself leads to resistance to the acceptance of any analysis that is based on the identification like the Freudian re-education in terms of the parent complex.

In the foregoing we have actually outlined the whole theme of this chapter. Understanding, which in the love therapy is a “being understood,” is transformed by the patient into a real understanding only by means of identification. This identification then, while it lasts, either makes him in some way dependent on the analyst, or he denies his weakness of will and refuses to accept either the identification or the understanding resting on it. A constructive therapy must lead the patient to an actual self-understanding which need not first make the educational circuit via the analyst, who at best cannot explain “understanding” to the patient, but may if he is skillful, guide him to self-understanding. Self-understanding, however, is far from being a purely intellectual process, although it plays itself out in consciousness, and comes about on the basis of conscious verbal formulation. I had originally intended
to call this chapter “Understanding and Misunderstanding,” but then chose the broader concept of “Denial,” as not only opposite, but itself actually the cause of the misunderstanding, particularly of the misunderstanding of self which one calls rationalization. It is the denial arising in emotional life, a form of negative will assertion, which leads to the necessity for interpretation of psychic phenomena and remains “misunderstanding” as long as emotional denial is not removed, or at least recognized as such. Also all interpretation on the part of the analyst is worthless as long as it does not lead to the understanding of this denial mechanism itself and its relation to the yielding of the will under emotion.

We have just differentiated between wishing to be understood and self-understanding, now we must discriminate between “making conscious” which is actually an interpreting, or an explaining and “becoming conscious,” a process coming to completion

1 See “Genetische Psychologie”—II Tell—S. 33.

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in the individual himself by means of verbalization. The verbalizing itself, not the explanation or interpretation, is the specifically therapeutic agent in the sphere of consciousness, just as the removal of denial is the therapeutic agent in the sphere of will. Both of these therapeutic agents were given in embryo in the original therapy of Breuer, in the catharsis, the release of feeling at least temporarily; in hypnosis, the becoming conscious. There was no interpretation because the analyst fortunately had no theory at his disposal, and so had to let the patient do everything himself. With the patient even at that time it was an actual “becoming conscious,” since he produced through his own efforts certain connections in his psychic life which he himself had previously destroyed. The analyst only helped, as it were, to put together into a meaningful whole the fragments produced by the patient. Both valuable parts of this original technique called by Breuer’s patient “the talking cure,” are still retained in analysis today, on the one side, in the unavoidable transference experience, on the other, in the accompanying conscious processes, especially in the verbalizing, but not as one might suppose, in the so-called free associations, which are not free at all, influenced as they must be by the analytic situation.

The therapeutic factor lies in the verbalizing of the conscious emotions, while the so-called “making conscious of the unconscious,” always remains an interpretation of very doubtful value, a substitution of one rationalization for another if it does not actually deteriorate into a duel of wills with the analyst. The verbalizing is important because it represents first of all a self-guidance of the individual, an act of will, in which will and consciousness, these two fundamental factors of our psychic life, come together. It is different from confession, which means avowal or submission to another, just as it is different from making conscious through another, which usually means compulsion. It is a kind of confession to one’s self, a voluntary subjection of one’s own will under the compulsion of emotion, and is accordingly less in
danger of leading to misunderstanding of one’s self than the intellectual interpretation which is always based on the denial of emotion, whether it manifests itself as rationalization or as interpretation.

I stress the significance of the verbalization of conscious emotion which has hitherto not been understood, because only in the terms of my constructive will therapy can it be estimated and valued. Again the emphasis is placed on consciousness and will, that is, on conscious willing, for psychological understanding and therapy. As for the will, I have already pointed out how it governs the whole analytic situation and the therapeutic process. This is true for consciousness to just as great a degree. It is astonishing how much the patient knows and how relatively little is unconscious if one does not give him this convenient excuse for refusing responsibility. Even Freud’s first experiences with the patient hypnotized by Bernheim taught him that if one only presses him, the patient actually knows everything that he pretends not to know. This still has value today, perhaps in an even greater degree, as most patients have already worked over in consciousness a large part of common analytic knowledge. Furthermore, one often finds in the analysis of complicated dreams or symptomatic acts, that all associations and interpretations finally lead to a result which was conscious with the patient anyway. Perhaps it was therapeutically necessary for him to make this circuit, but the question remains open, how far the analytic situation had forced him to it. In any case it is certain that it was already conscious before so that it is not a matter of making conscious the unconscious, but of being willing to verbalize the conscious. Yes, one would even be tempted to say as Freud once did in jest, that actually the conscious is always put aside only for a moment, in order to bring it to light again by a circuitous route tending to distort it. It is certainly not the content of the previously conscious that is the psychological problem, but the necessity for the circuit, and this brings us back again to the subject of emotional denial.

We occupied ourselves in the preceding chapter only with the denial of will or willing, here we come upon the denial of “knowing,” which does not correspond exactly to the Freudian repression. The former as we saw signified “I do not will anything; I have no will of my own,” here it means “I know nothing, I am innocent.” In both cases it is the same unburdening and vindication tendency that characterizes the conscious willing of the individual. At one time it appears more in terms of will, at another in terms of consciousness. A further confirmation of this
fact we find in the frequent analytic experience that the patient gees and understands a complicated connection relatively easily, where one would expect difficulties. This actually means that he knows it anyway and only waits for our assent (even if he himself does not say so expressly) in order to confess this knowledge just as at another time he needs our backing to confess his will. The same thing holds in relation to analysis as a whole in that most patients experience almost nothing new factually, nothing of which they have not already been conscious. As I know that this sentence may easily be turned into an argument against my technique. I shall explain more exactly what I mean by it. First of all, this assertion applies to associations in the patient’s psychic life which he has at some time or other broken, which were, however, previously conscious, even the early infantile. I refer therefore to the original Freudian unconscious, which is not only capable of becoming conscious, but once was so. Everything else is unconscious in the Jungian sense. It was Jung who first distinguished between the “collective” and the “infantile” unconscious, and Freud himself later recognized this differentiation by introducing the biological concept of the “id.” This has never been conscious and if we impart it to the patient as far as we ourselves understand it, it is not received by him therapeutically as a making conscious of his unconscious, but rather permits him a kind of religious projection of his responsibility upon a superior power, and is, therefore, in terms of my constructive conception anti-therapeutic, even if it was commonly effective for many centuries as spontaneous projection therapy. A further difference in my therapy is that I accept for each individual only a limited capacity for consciousness, while Freud because he considers it possible and necessary with every patient, attempts to reach all the memories and impressions that were once conscious particularly those designated by him as typical. I try to go to the essential and to see why the one individual remembers so much, the other so little, also to emphasize the dynamic understanding and not the historical content of analysis.

This leads of itself to the central problem of the whole neurosis and of psychology in general. What is it that the patient does not know or will not know and why? This is no problem of content, but a dynamic problem. As consciousness is not a state

but a function, a quality, so there must always be myriads of things for the moment not conscious which can be brought into consciousness again more or less easily because they were once there; that is what we call “capable of becoming conscious.” What the individual does not know and will not know, is never the past but the present, the momentary emotional matrix which is perceived by the will as weakness and is denied accordingly. We see this best in the analytic situation in which the patient constantly tries to deny his emotion and the consciousness related to it. On that is based my interpretation and use of the analysis of the analytic situation. One can understand no reaction of the patient if one does not see
the denial of the actual emotional relation to the analyst and that includes the original expression of the counter-will behind it. With patients who maintain that they experience no transference or actually show little of it, this mechanism of emotional denial becomes clear. However the patients with over-strong, positive transference only deny their strong resistances which I interpret as the will to freedom, to self-dependence; but this will can only express itself here in terms of denial, “Since I come so gladly, it must be I want never to go away.”

Historical interpretation of the transference on the infantile level only supports the denial tendency of the patient in the actual therapeutic situation instead of obliging him to recognize it. Very often the usual analytic displacement to the infantile does not satisfy the patient and then as we know he creates difficult extra-analytic situations and conflicts which are only for the purpose of denying the emotional reaction in the analysis, the understanding of which alone makes any difference. We must again refer to the process of becoming conscious, in contrast to interpretation or explanation. As long as one makes the feeling experience as such, in which the whole individuality is revealed, the sole object of the explanation and understanding, one finds one’s self on sure ground, and also, in my opinion, insures the only therapeutic value, that is, to allow the patient to understand himself in an immediate experience which, as I strive for it in the therapeutic process, permits living and understanding to become one. As far as I know, this is the first time in the history of mankind, where we find a striving for an immediate understanding of experience, consciously, in the very act of experiencing.

We have next to consider the relation of this immediate understanding, which is the actual psychological understanding, to historical understanding of every kind, especially the so-called causal understanding in scientific psychology. Whenever we explain causally, we explain historically, and when we explain historically, we interpret, because we can examine our own development, our motives and impulses in the past, only in the light of our present momentary willing and state of consciousness. In terms of this psychic theory of relativity there arises an endless chain of possibilities of interpretation, which not only differ with psychological schools and theories, but just as much, or even more with the different attitudes of the individual which we can designate briefly as moods. In the light of these manifold opportunities for variation, we must discuss the reliability of the historic-causal principle which psychoanalysis has held to be the only and unerring path to psychological truth. According to this teaching until I trace a psychic phenomenon back to the past (to the infantile) I have not explained it causally, therefore I have not explained it really. An historical accounting, it seems, must be correct, and no mere interpretation, because it was true or merely because it was. The past is thus held to be safer, more reliable, more capable of being understood than the present. This causal principle, whose general scientific meaning we will not discuss here, shows itself in the psychological field, where it appears as
historical interpretation, to be riddled by so many sources of error and false inferences that in the next chapter we shall undertake a thorough-going discussion. Here we can only examine one aspect, and that is the interpretative with reference to the use of the past for the denial of the present, whether it be in relation to will or the emotions, to knowledge or understanding.

The neurotic lives too much in the past anyway, that is, to that extent he actually does not live. He suffers, as Freud himself has said, from reminiscence, not because through his libidinal id he is fixated on the past, but because he clings to it, wants to cling to it in order to protect himself from experience, the emotional surrender to the present. This touches on the important

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problem as to how much of the past is still effective in the present, or, as Freud expresses it, is living on in the unconscious. At first Freud maintained that all experiences are thus retained, then only certain traumatic ones and finally that the individual only regresses temporarily to certain experiences. The next step he did not trust himself to make, although he comes close to it in certain of his conceptions, possibly because the results would have overthrown the whole theory of repression into the unconscious, this literal picture of a heap of unreleased or traumatic experiences. In this sense there certainly are no unconscious complexes, nor even an unconscious in the topical sense of the word. The undischarged, unreleased, or traumatic experiences are not repressed into the unconscious and there preserved, but rather are continued permanently in actual living, resisted, carried through to an ending or worked over into entirely new experiences. Here in actual experience, as in the therapeutic process, is contained not only the whole present but also the whole past, and only here in the present are psychological understanding and therapeutic effect to be attained.

The unconscious, just as the original meaning of the word shows, is a purely negative concept, which designates something momentarily not conscious, while Freud’s theory has lifted it to the most powerful factor in psychic life. The basis for this, however, is not given in any psychological experience but in a moral necessity, that is, to find an acceptable substitute for the concept of God, who frees the individual from responsibility. The power that rules over the past and determines the attitude of the individual to it is the will, which defends itself against actual subjection to emotion, and denies it by putting it back on something earlier, or something that is over. The denial lies even in the “making past” itself, which actually intends an unmaking of the present, to which the will says, “It is already gone!” In this sense, the individual every time can seize upon that earlier experience and so create the impression that this experience hitherto unreleased, had been repressed in the unconscious. It can easily be seen that in will psychology the emphasis on content is transferred to the understanding of the necessity for displacement and denial. This is extraordinarily important therapeutically because it enables us to value one typical analytic
reaction constructively, the misunderstanding of which has led to bad blunders. In critical phases of the analytic situation, but especially toward the end, the patient suddenly seizes upon an apparently solved problem from any part of his life and presents it as unsolved. This occurs not only with the idea of lengthening the analysis, but just as much to disclaim its actual emotional meaning. This really means that the present (therapeutic) experience is still not solved, but he wishes that it were, like the earlier one. One easily sees whither it must lead, if one prolongs the analysis in order to solve this and that experience coming up from the past without releasing the conflict in the analytic situation as the only important factor because it is the only experience actually taking place.

There is also a kind of historic-causal explanation which is nothing but a denial of the real psychological understanding of the emotional experience, and psychoanalysis abets this denial tendency in the individual patient as in the general consciousness of society. With this assertion we touch upon a field which in the second part of my genetic psychology I have called meta-psychoanalysis, because it concerns the content of the analytic theory itself as part of the content of consciousness of the patient and of a certain social level. This analytic ideology which is placed at the disposal of the patient from the outside, usually even before he seeks analysis, can be used by him at every moment of analysis like every kind of historical or infantile material for the denial, disguising and displacement of the actual emotional reactions.\(^1\) The Ædipus complex, for example, like most analytic concepts is in the service of the denial tendency on both sides, as it affords the patient displacement of the actual emotional reaction to an infantile past situation. The patient suffers not from the fact that he wants to destroy his father and marry his mother, but much more because he cannot, that is, because he is not able to will at all without getting guilt feeling which is the real psychological problem. It is, however, not only extremely naïve to teach him this willing in the indestructible Ædipus picture book, but also impossible because he never can be allowed to want that. In this sense, therefore, Freudian analysis continues the pedagogic subjection of will instead of leading out and beyond it. The latter can happen only as the negative counter-will of the patient is turned into positive will which the individual affirms instead of denying. To accomplish this is the essential task of

\(^1\) See Genetische Psychologie, II Teil, Einleitung.
the therapeutic experience, which, itself, affords the example by which the patient again learns to will. In a certain sense this therapeutic experience has exactly as much symbolic value as the infantile reliving of the Œdipus complex. The important difference lies only in this, that the symbolic value of the therapeutic experience is conceded while Freudian analysis forces the patient to take as real the Œdipus complex which may have been true for the patient once, but certainly no longer is. For if one translates the Œdipus complex into homely, that is, human language, it becomes banal, for it insists that the patient suffers because he had parents. However, the moment one utilizes the mythological tale as such, one brings in a moral evaluation and moral which not only will not work educationally, but must work repressively. The moral value, which the myth brings into psychology is an excuse (alibi) which Œdipus himself comprehends in these words: “For many men have seen themselves joined to the mother in dreams.” This reference to the generality of the forbidden willing, or rather to the general prohibition on willing, naturally helps the particular individual not at all. On the contrary the moral which the myth teaches, helps still less because it is equivalent to a reinforcement and strengthening of the will prohibition; “You see, therefore, it is better if you do not carry through your will at that price.” This moral however, is not valid for all individuals, at least not for the strong-willed, to whom the neurotic as well as the therapist type belongs. It is only valid for those who have it anyway and accordingly do not appear as patients.

In psychic life, there is no one stable viewpoint, as such, and can be none that would enable us to explain all phenomena on a single basis, and to understand or correct all reactions after a universal scheme. This is valid not only for every therapy and theory, no matter how well grounded on earlier experience, but also in relation to any kind of fixed standpoint in the individual himself. For whatever manifests itself in consciousness is never the correct, the actual, and true, not even the content of analytic

theory in its therapeutic application. Although the individual always uses something for the denial of the momentarily actual, it is not the unconscious as past, but always the immediately repressed, that which is denied now. On that account it makes no difference whether it is the past which is used for the veiling of the present, or the theory and terminology offered to the patient at the moment in the analysis itself. When the patient interprets a reaction analytically for himself, one may be sure that he disguises at the same time something more important in the actual feeling relationship. Psychic phenomena present themselves always otherwise than they are in the actual living experience of the present. Psychoanalysis therefore can only claim a generally valid interpretation, true once and for all, as long as it seeks truth in the past, in the analytic unconscious, and not in the immediate psychic experiencing. In a recalled past, however, there is no fixed criterion in terms of content for the real and unreal, the true and the false,
because in and with the present experiencing, the historical content is subordinated to the immediate tendencies of the will and colored by the immediate emotions.

Psychological truth, therefore, cannot coincide with the historical, that is, with the authentic reality. Not only does reflection say this, but a deepened experience teaches that the historically real fact can never be the psychologically true because the actually present is never perceived psychologically, but is denied, which accounts for our need of historical interpretation of the present. Therapeutically, therefore, there is no use in searching out past events and experiences for the understanding of the present. Rather the past could be understood from the present, but while that has no value at all therapeutically, it would be theoretically unobjectionable if we tried to understand the present first in and of itself, and not the reverse as Freud does. Truth is not historical fact, but a psychological concept. The only point on which therapy can fasten and where it can accomplish anything at all, is in showing the individual the urgency of the denial displacement and rationalization tendency coming from the counter-will in relation to the momentary, present, feeling experience. This is possible only in a present experience and as such I utilize the therapeutic process so that for once experience and pure psychological understanding are simultaneous.

The key to these phenomena is found in the will psychology. For at bottom we deal always with the denial, rationalization or justification of willing which apparently cannot be admitted without too much guilt feeling. Furthermore, willing itself is originally of a negative character, a “not wanting to” of the counter-will, which itself contains a denial. From this original denial are derived all later secondary denials which we know in general as thinking and in particular as attempts to explain and understand. The originally negative character of will is seen clearly in the fact that most men are disappointed in the fulfilment even of their dearest wish, which shows that will is only so strong or is willing as such, when it is used to assail outer and inner resistances. The best example of this is again the Oedipus complex. If we take for granted that the incest taboo does not exist, we will be astonished to find how little men have actually wanted to possess their parents sexually. With the death wish it is somewhat different for this contains in itself something negative, destructive, and presupposes therefore the activity of the counter-will. We can see here that will phenomena as we have just described them, afford an exact parallel to the phenomena of consciousness. Just as things always are something other than that which they appear to be to our consciousness, so will always longs for something other than it actually has or can have because it is originally of a negative character. However we cannot admit that to ourselves, but interpret and perceive the will as something positive, a state or fact, and this leads always to justification or rationalization. Our problem, therefore, concerns this primary phenomenon of the negative origin of will as counter-will against the will of the other or against reality in general, and the
necessity of denying this negative nature of will so that we may be able to perceive it positively and thus reverse it into effective action.
IV

PAST AND PRESENT

“Be what you are!” — Pindar

We have met the problem of the past, or rather of the psychological meaning of the past, in the critical discussion of the concept of the unconscious and of the historic-causal method of interpretation. We said that the causal explanation was always at the same time historical and that the historical explanation could of necessity only be interpretative as we are able to see the past only in the light of the present. This not too simple theoretical fact is complicated in psychoanalysis still more by the practical aspect since psychoanalysis insists upon the therapeutic effect of the causal explanation. If we examine the therapeutic process as it unrolls and plays itself out before our eyes, there can be no doubt that in itself it represents a highly meaningful immediate experience. Here we come upon a great contradiction which apparently goes through all psychoanalysis insofar as it tries to be both scientific psychology and therapy at the same time, although they are evidently two quite different things. The therapeutic experience, which perhaps is concentrated in the actual present situation even more than ordinary experience, is still explained historically in every single reaction and as a whole by Freudian analysis, and is constantly related to the past.

Certainly the patient was neurotic before he undertook the treatment, as a rule from childhood; therefore his neurosis must have to do with the past, must be rooted in the past. This is probably incontestable, just as incontestable as his biological origin or the banal fact that he was conceived, was born and was a child. But the psychological problem is, how far he is all this still, that is, how far the past is still living, is still effective. Psychoanalysis maintains that this is true to a great extent and accordingly designates the neurotic as infantile: wherewith not only is his historical character established, but at the same time it is evaluated as pathological. He is, as it were, too much past, suffers from reminiscence, is himself a reminiscence, if you will. This characterization of the neurosis leads to two sets of problems, a theoretical and a practical or therapeutic one. First, how does psychoanalysis know this? In other words, is his historical character (his infantilism) a fact or a kind of interpretation of the neurotic which permits other possibilities of interpretation? Secondly, even if the neurotic were
actually infantile, that is, were too much oriented in the past, is psychoanalysis which shows him this, the effective therapy? Or if not, what would be effective therapy?

In answering these questions which include a whole series of problems, we shall do well to confine ourselves first of all to the purely psychological aspect of the problem of the past and postpone the factual biological aspect temporarily instead of mixing them as psychoanalysis does. Speaking purely psychologically, the problem of the past is a problem of memory, that is, of remembering and forgetting, and therefore a problem of consciousness. At the same time, however, the dynamic factor which controls admission to consciousness demands consideration, and that factor is the will. In this sense all is gone which I do not wish to remember and what I will to call back into memory becomes present in the psychic act of conscious recall. We recognize here that forgetting is a mechanism which has the tendency to free us from the past, so that we can live in the present. What I do not remember does not exist, moreover has not existed as long as I do not call it back from the forgotten as past into the present remembering. If. the neurotic is a man who has need to forget more, or to repress more intensely, then it follows not only that he is more fixated in the past, but also that he struggles more actively to get free from it. If one emphasizes the former tendency more, then one accepts the infantile character; if, on the contrary, one emphasizes the latter aspect, then one recognizes therein the constructive striving of the individual to loosen himself from the past in order to be able to live independently of it in the present. That the neurotic comes to grief in this is no proof that he lacks this tendency,

rather the opposite, for only he can wreck himself who attempts something. The failure lies in the way in which he does it, which again is based on his predominantly negative will psychology. He tries to free himself through denial of the past, of the dependence, by the destruction of the associations in his thinking and feeling. His forgetting is a powerful denial and as such an expression of counter-will, which says “I will not have it true that it ever existed or still exists.” His remembering is no voluntary recall, but a forcible coming back, which brings to consciousness again in the most painful way the dependence on the past.

What does psychoanalytic therapy do to help him? It forces him to remember all the past which he wants to deny and therefore to restore the associations which he had destroyed in his emotional and intellectual life. This connecting, no matter in what sphere it takes place, is in and for itself a reconnecting of the individual with a past which he wanted to deny in an over-strong drive to independence. It not only affects him psychologically in terms of the causal-historical method, but also forms the content of the interpretation of the therapeutic experience itself which in reference to the transference is led back to the Œdipus complex and is accordingly made infantile. It is paradoxical that the analytic therapy which is finally to free the individual from the fixation on the past, in its whole
method and theory should strive for the opposite, namely in every single psychic act and in the entire experience not only to bind the individual to the past but, as it were, to make him past, by interpreting him on the historical level of the infantile Œdipus complex. One could reply that it might perhaps be therapeutically necessary for the individual to put an end to the false efforts at freeing which deny the past before he can really become free of the infantile fixation. Certainly this is correct! The question is only whether the Freudian therapy enables the individual to take this second step, or whether it does not, as I think, obstruct it by the infantilization of the actual therapeutic situation. In my opinion Freudian analysis in its association technique and the conscious reinstating of destroyed psychic relationships connects the individual psychologically with his own past which works releasingly, as it removes the denial of the past in the

individual. At the same time, however, through the interpretation of the actual experience as repetition of the infantile, it forces the individual back literally into a past situation. In other words, instead of relating the patient to the past psychically, that is, enough to remove the inner blocking, the whole therapeutic effect of the inner removal of repression is again annulled externally, through the infantile interpretation of the transference which connects the patient really with the past. Here again we meet with the pedagogic moral tendency of the Œdipus complex in the terms of the fourth commandment. It is not only shown to the individual that he cannot wholly free himself from the past but that he really ought not to be freed from it, because the moral, in the myth teaches how badly it goes with those who attempt it.

To this moral snare of the therapist is added the natural science ideology which Freud tried to use theoretically in his desire to create a purely causal psychology. Thereby he confused the psychological meaning of the past as a memory problem with the real meaning of the past as historical material. Psychic causality is evidently different from natural science causality, as different as the psychic past from the historical. Freud, however, identified the two since he attempted to infer or, as he said, to reconstruct the actual historical past from the recollection of it as it manifests itself psychically. It remains to be seen how far this is technically justified; yes, whether it is possible at all. However, even if it were possible, it is psychologically uninteresting and therapeutically worthless if one does not recognize as the actual therapeutic agent the will conflict which plays itself out in the reconstructing of the past. It is psychologically uninteresting because reconstruction of the past depends not on the facts but on the attitude or reaction of the individual to them. For all the historical interpretations of psychoanalysis from the infantile traumata to the Œdipus and castration complexes do not explain the actual problem at all, namely, why all these traumatic experiences work pathologically at one time and not at another.
The methodological error lay in the fact that the historically real was identified with, or more correctly, was interchanged with the psychologically true. The psychological truth of

psychic phenomenon for the individual lies not in its real, but in its symbolic meaning, which is always emotional, as is all the unconscious as such. This emotional attitude, however, is not constant and accordingly the psychic value of an experience changes, takes on different meanings in the course of time, only to be further altered finally under the influence of the analytic situation. The psychic meaning of the past separates itself, as it were, ever farther from its original actual meaning when it was present. Also we see this process going on before our eye in the therapeutic process as the patient continually alters his attitude toward the analytic experience as soon as it becomes past.

In the therapeutic situation are given therefore all the elements for the understanding of this whole process, that is, the basis for letting it be lived consciously and thus used therapeutically. The therapeutic relationship represents an actual feeling experience to which the patient reacts in any case with his own pattern. We do not need to go back into the past to understand his manner of reaction. If we did what the Freudian technique prescribes, then we should only understand the reaction of the individual in the past, not his reaction today. In the present experience we have, on the contrary, his whole reaction pattern, all his earlier ways of reacting plus the present. If the individual represses and denies more or less strongly in the neurotic fashion, then he does this also in the therapeutic experience and here is the place to show him how he tries to destroy the connections with this experience just as he does with the past. So we work with this psychic denial tendency in the actual experience and not on historic grounds where we must grope in uncertainty because we have to decipher not the reaction pattern, but a hundredfold and already hundredfold interpreted content.

If we look more closely at the method of historical interpretation used by psychoanalysis, we find that it consists of several pasts, none of which is technically free from objection. First arises the question raised earlier, whether it is possible at all to reconstruct reality from an experience already interpreted hundreds of times, and secondly what value this has psychologically and therapeutically when the result of an analysis of several years may be nothing but the still doubtful fact of coitus.
witnessed in childhood. Even if one could grant such psychological efforts a therapeutic value, the systematic application of this method as a principle of interpretation in every instance would still be open to question. As we examine the causal principle of interpretation more closely, it rests not only on the associations of the individual, but on the interpretations of them by the analyst in terms of the historical, the infantile. This itself is arrived at on the basis of the interpretation of the immediate present in terms of the infantile. In other words, the present therapeutic experience is interpreted as infantile and the history obtained in this way is then re-applied by means of theory formation to the interpretation of this same therapeutic experience. We now return to the final problem and answer in the affirmative the question as to whether the historical conception of the neurotic character and hence of the individual himself represents merely one possibility of interpretation. The therapeutic value of this interpretation we have just discussed and have concluded that it is meaningful insofar as it connects the individual with his own past on a purely psychic basis; but that the real connecting with the past in terms of the interpretation of the analytic situation as infantile only annuls the therapeutic effect. We have also tried to show how this making historical of the individual has happened and how the powerful forces of moral and natural science ideology by which Freud was influenced are answerable for this therapeutic misconception. The psychic is so much a phenomenon of the present that the individual actually can think and perceive all the past only as present, as the dream teaches so clearly. Thinking and feeling, consciousness and willing can always be only in the present. All remembering and forgetting depends on this, whether the will at the present moment affirms or negates the past, denies or accepts it. And here alone is the point on which a constructive therapy can establish itself, since only in the present experience, in the therapeutic process itself can its goal be attained.

This is extremely important therapeutically as well as theoretically because it leads to the constructive evaluation of the analytic situation. The patient, while we work against his denial of the present becomes related deeply in the inmost self to his own past, that is, learns to accept instead of criticizing himself.

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Freud apparently had this in mind in his release of repression, but he made the repression historical, that is, misplaced it into the childhood of the individual and then wanted to release it from there, while as a matter of fact the same tendency is working here and now. The tracing back of all reactions, including the present ones, to the past, however distant, tries to relate the patient historically and really with the past which as such is thought to be operating again, almost independently of the individual. Some kind of real tying up in addition to the purely psychological relating is naturally necessary for the neurotic, with his hostility to life. In my method this happens not historically, but in the present. Because I work against the denial tendency in the immediate experience, the individual experiences for once a relationship to present reality. This alone has therapeutic value, because it touches the denial
mechanism as such, while the historical tie-up only makes the individual dependent morally, relieves him of responsibility and so inhibits his development.

Therapeutic work in terms of actual experiencing which is far more difficult than historic-causal explanation, has the effect therefore of again relating the individual in his inner life with his own psychic past which he tries to deny, and so organically that he can throw his complete undivided personality into this new experience, that is, can actually experience for the first time. Here it becomes clear that the so-called fixation on the past, the living in reminiscence, is only a protection from experiencing, from the surrender to the present. It is not a fixation forced by the traumatic strength of the past which is a purely physical spatial conception, but a psychic refuge in the present, willed by the individual. This conception, depreciating the actual past, agrees with common observation that it needs no traumatic experience to effect this fixation on the past if the individual wants and needs it to protect himself from the present experience. It is well known that any experience however banal is sufficient, while on the other hand there are individuals who know how to overcome the hardest, most traumatic experiences with a new experiencing. Such a new experiencing and not merely a repetition of the infantile, represents the therapeutic process and its value in my conception. The constructive utilization of this experience consists in releasing the immediate emotional denial and thus making possible a connection with the reality of the moment. This convinces the patient, as it were, against his will-to-illness, that he can live in the present, if only he will, if only he dares to will, without getting guilt feeling. This guilt feeling, as it necessarily occurs in every therapeutic situation because the individual takes something from another in order to help himself, is always a consequence of the denial of gratitude, of dependence, in a word of the past. This is true, however, not only of the historical past, insofar as it is represented by family and friendly relationships, but also of one’s own past, from whose several developmental phases we are constantly obliged to free ourselves, in order to be able to live in our own present.¹

We will examine this subject later in the problem of the separation of the individual from a part of his past in the therapeutic process. Here I should like only to bring out what relates to the historic interpretation. When the patient, as is especially the case in the final phase, turns more to the past, let us say to the childhood’s situation especially in dreams, it only means that he begins to perceive the analysis itself as now already past, in a constructive way too, since he is ready to free himself from it. One must support him in accepting this individual freeing, instead of drawing the conclusion, in terms of the historical interpretation, that the bits of the past now appearing have not yet been resolved. Certainly the tendency here is to hold onto the past but this past is in the therapeutic process, the analysis itself, which is only symbolized by one of the numerous historical contents that is like it in
feeling. Again the authentic psychological problem lies not in the content whether it be historical or actual (the analysis itself) but in the question why the individual needs an already past situation to represent the passing of the present.

Psychoanalytic theory explains this fact as the effect of regressive tendencies, that is, of libidinal longings in the individual. In other words, he wants to go back because it was so pleasant, good, or satisfying there. This, however, very often contradicts

1 On the mechanism of projection of these overcome developmental phases upon the love object, see “Genetische Psychologie” 1. Teil, especially the chapter “Projektion und Objekt-beziehung.”

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not only the facts, but also another part of psychoanalytic doctrine, which has in truth destroyed the illusion of the childhood paradise, in showing that the child in the adjustment processes of growing up and organizing his personality suffers probably even more than the grown-up ever does later. The individual does not really want to go back because the past was at that time any better or even less painful, but only because it was “then,” because it is already past.¹ The present is always more painful, because it is present; that is, actual willing and feeling for the neurotic type just increases the tormenting self-consciousness. Accordingly, we flee so gladly in phantasy to the past or future, which, once they are present, work just as painfully and unsatisfyingly as the present from which we wish to escape. On that account every wish-fulfilment brings with it also a disillusionment because it is only willing itself that gives more pleasure than pain, while fulfilment usually brings more disillusion than satisfaction.

All psychic life is anchored in the present, the regressive as well as the progressive tendencies of the individual, both respond to the pressure to get loose from the present which with its willing and knowing is so painful. This is the authentic psychological side of the so-called “reality problem,” which is nothing but the problem of the present, in other words, the consciousness of living. The tendency to get free of it is perhaps the strongest psychic force in the individual, as it manifests itself in striving after happiness and salvation.² Psychoanalysis with its causal-historical method of interpretation supports the regressive side of this tendency instead of working against it constructively with the recognition of the therapeutic moment of experience. Psychoanalytic theory explains that the individual wants to return to the past because it was so good, not because it is so bad now, but at the same time removes this whole mechanism from the sphere of will in maintaining that the individual himself does not want to go back because he has no will as such, but he is drawn back by the lure of the past, that is, the memory of it, because it was
1 This explains the so-called “punishment dreams” of a painful nature, in which the individual goes back even to a painful past, just because it is past, not merely because it was painful.

2 See the corresponding chapter, “Happiness and Redemption,” in “Truth and Reality.”

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positively more pleasurable. Psychoanalysis therefore seeks to remove a real fixation on a pleasurable past, where on the contrary I emphasize an emotional denial of the present experience. Repression as I conceive it concerns not historical facts but remembering, that is, thinking and feeling, which in and of themselves are painful no matter whether the content be of today or of yesterday.

In this sense there exists psychologically nothing historical as such, but only the present, that is, willing and feeling, thinking and consciousness. From which it follows that psychology itself, a pure psychology, cannot be historically oriented, cannot be static but only dynamic. In this sense pre-analytic psychology which occupied itself with the processes of feeling, willing, perception, thinking, was more psychological than psychoanalysis, just as are the newer movements of “Gestalt,” functional or behavioristic psychology, in contrast to interpreting. Certainly these newer movements have remained largely descriptive and too formal, but the view of the whole, which differentiates them from the old academic psychology, points to the necessity of recognizing the dynamic factor controlling everything. Here will psychology comes in and tries to work out the dynamic point of view already emphasized by analysis, but tries to do it purely psychologically. Instead of clinging to a universally valid classification of will contents which at best can supply moral, never psychological meaning, it has seized upon the why and how of the will itself as the psychological problem par excellence. This conception not only gives to will content and all possibilities of interpretation of it a secondary role psychologically, but takes a most important new step beyond this negative result in establishing the actual task of all psychology by admitting that all interpretations of willing in terms of content are made for the sake of research, not therapy.

Content, therefore, cannot be the subject of pure psychology as it alters its nature according to the individual or general ideology of the moment and this itself depends on the development and attitude of our consciousness toward will. These psychic will phenomena and functions of consciousness are themselves the subject of pure psychology, all else is “applied” psychology, which in the Freudian theory plays so predominant a role. What
Freud calls metapsychology is alone psychological, all the rest is biological, pedagogical, or mythological. Content, no matter whether it manifests itself in religious, ethical, social or natural science forms, belongs to another kind of consideration, which I designate as philosophy of the psychic. In other words, I separate psychic contents from psychological forms and dynamics, at least I try to do this methodologically even though I am conscious that it is practically possible only to a certain extent. In one single field, which therefore is not only the most difficult but the most interesting, these two aspects melt into an indissoluble unity, that is in the sphere of epistemological thinking where the formal psychological phenomena and functions themselves constitute the content of our thinking and at the same time represent psychic material. Apart from this sphere however, one cannot see why, in the explanation of psychological phenomena in the contentual historical sense, any one content or any one ideology should claim an absolute or lasting domination, least of all why the relatively young and, as it were anti-psychic ideology of modern natural science should enjoy a preference over other, perhaps religious, interpretations of content. In fact there is no reason and we find not only that Freud’s natural science analysis works with all possible mythical; moral and social interpretations, but that the individual whom we analyze thinks and feels in terms of these psychic contents symbolically. In this tendency to make the last ruling ideology into an exclusive content of the psychic, the present, denied in the causality principle seems to avenge itself.

In this form the psychic present of experiencing, denied in causal analysis bursts through powerfully as the contentual overvaluation of the current ideology. It seems impossible even to supplant the contents inherent in the psychic as such by the momentary last content, or to retrieve it. It is here in the contentual therefore that the power of the past is preserved, not in the regressive sense of a fixation, but in the freedom of the individual to choose from these manifold contents that which corresponds to his individuality in the momentary present experience and transform them symbolically. The psychoanalytic striving to educate the individual exclusively in natural science, causal thinking, which Freud advocates in his last writing (“Die Zukunft einer Illusion” 1927) is fortunately not possible, but betrays his whole moralistic pedagogical attitude, the very opposite of the attitude necessary for a constructive therapy of the individual.

Natural science ideology which itself represents only one, and not even a generally disseminated psychic content, can neither be valid as a criterion of truth for all other contents, nor be applied as the only principle of interpretation to the psychic processes themselves. The causality principle is historical, the psychic is present, is actual. In its application to the psychic, therefore, the causality principle means a
denial of the will principle since it makes the thinking, feeling, and acting of the individual dependent on forces outside of himself and thus frees him from responsibility and guilt. This, however, is an ethical problem, not a psychological one, or rather creates a new ethical problem. For this denial of responsibility itself causes guilt reactions, first, because the individual becomes more and more conscious of this rationalizing and second, because he defends himself against such a limitation or annihilation of his own autonomy, is ashamed as it were that he always needs excuses.

Psychic causality differs from the natural science kind in the fact that with the latter we have an endless chain of causes, which one must close sometime by setting up a primary cause. In any case, therefore, it leads to faith and in the last analysis is based on faith whether we have to do with the naive release of religion which places the individual will in Almighty God as primary cause or with any kind of primary force, in which we may still recognize the denied individual will. Only in the individual act of will do we have the unique phenomenon of spontaneity, the establishing of a new primary cause. In this sense, not only the will, but the individual as bearer of it, represents a psychologically new fact, which does not arbitrarily interrupt the causal chain with any kind of final assumption of free will but actually sets in motion a new causal chain. This is the meaning of the myth of the first man, that is, of man as the beginning of a new series of causes—as it is represented not only in the biblical Adam but in all heroes who have willed to be free of the past in order to begin a new species like Adam, a new generation like Prometheus, or a new age like Christ. Besides his will, the individual introduces

another new and unheard of cause in the natural science causality series, in terms of consciousness, especially in the form of self-consciousness on the one hand and his need to justify his will ideologically on the other, in other words, man is not only psychological but ethical. So one sees why a natural science psychology denies will and consciousness and in their place must introduce the unconscious Id as a causal factor which morally does not differ at all from the idea of God, just as sexuality as a scapegoat is not different from the idea of the devil. In other words, scientific psychoanalysis gives the individual only a new kind of excuse for his willing and a release from the responsibility of consciousness. The task of a constructive therapy on the contrary is to lead the individual who already suffers from the loss of his illusions and begins to destroy even natural science, beyond these justification tendencies to the voluntary acceptance of himself and his own responsibility.
“What you strive for is within you, seek it not without.” — Persius

The discussion of the past and the present in its purely psychological aspects, as we have tried to work them out in the preceding chapter, leads us more deeply into the problematic field of personality development and its miscarriage in the neurosis. The desire to be rid of the present, which forces a flight into past or future by means of thinking or day-dreaming, rests actually on the process of comparing, which plays the greatest role in psychic life. From whatever motive we may desire to flee from the present, the tendency is always in consequence of a comparison and a conclusion that something else would be better, even if we deceive ourselves therein. The past and in a certain sense the future also, as we will see later, are means of representation. Evidently we cannot represent, perhaps cannot think at all without comparing, without having a unit of measure, a frame, a foil. We must have something in contrast to which or against which we think, and in this sense intellectual representation in the last analysis is negative also like the expression of will, to which it probably owes its origin. This leads to the problem of likeness and difference, which contains the whole problem of individuality, of which we apparently become conscious only by comparison, and chiefly by comparison with other persons. The neurotic frequently introduces his story with the remark that he has felt himself different from others from childhood, although he refers perhaps only to brothers and sisters, or to his playmates. Regardless of how far this feeling is correct historically in terms of actual content, at all events it is psychologically true insofar as the individual traces his difficulties, his suffering, back to his difference. Whether this difference has belonged to the individual from childhood, whether it first appeared through painful experiences of later life, or whether it does not come to full consciousness at all, it exists, is given in the very fact of his individuality, which he apparently can neither accept nor affirm, but must deny. The reaction to this perception includes not only a painful feeling, but also a judgment of value, for it says, “I should not be different, but like.” Accordingly the individual suffers from his difference, from his individuality. This psychological fact could not possibly escape observation because it hardly escapes self-observation and certainly not with the hyperconscious neurotic type.
Psychoanalysis, true to its causal principle, has tried to explain the existence of this feeling historically. In Freud’s theory this explanation appears late and consists of the so-called castration complex as perception of sex difference. This painful feeling of difference, according to Freud, goes back to the perception of sex difference, actually to the fact of sex difference and the reactions of the ego to it, with the assertion ever after of “That I will be,” or “That I will not be (I fear).” This explanation by content is refuted in my opinion, by common experience and a deepened comprehension of it. It makes a great difference, in fact, whether the feeling of difference is caused by the perceiving of sex difference as Freud has it, or rather is an expression of individual difference and merely utilizes sex to explain and justify the feeling as psychoanalytic theory seems to me to do.

While in Freudian theory this feeling of difference as such is not named and the phenomenon itself is concealed, as it were, by the explanation of it, Adler has taken one step further in giving a name to it, or more correctly to one side of it, in his inferiority feeling. This, at bottom, is only a description of the phenomenon as it presents itself to the consciousness of the neurotic, “I should not be different but like others, therefore my difference is bad and I am inferior.” Although Adler recognizes the presence of inferiority feeling in the individual, his explanation of it is technically just as open to attack as Freud’s castration theory. The inferiority feeling in its psychic aspects Adler explains from the fact that the child, in contrast to the adults and older siblings in his milieu, must necessarily feel inferior. In other words, this inferiority feeling is explained by a real fact,

in Adler’s ideology by a social fact, in Freud’s castration theory by a biological one. As I have just said, Adler’s description of the feeling of inferiority only concerns one side of it, that is, the neurotic denial of the individual, who cannot affirm his difference, the fact of his individuality. The motivation of the inferiority, therefore, Adler has to explain from the milieu in the fact that other individuals affirm their individuality, feel themselves superior as a compensation for the original inferiority feeling. Accordingly he conceives of superiority as a reaction phenomenon, and designates it as “masculine protest.” This seems to me to contradict our feeling as well as our experience for there exists a positive as well as a compensatory acceptance of one’s own individuality as we see it in the personality feeling of the active and creative individual. The consciousness of difference which characterizes such persons in peculiarly high degree, leads even with them to painful reactions but they can be better designated as guilt than inferiority, since they arise not from a denial of individuality, but from its over-emphasis.

Like the Adlerian doctrine of inferiority, so the Freudian castration theory attempts not only a causal explanation of the feeling of difference, but contains an evaluation with social, biological and moral aspects. Both assume that the masculine represents the superior or desired, the feminine, the inferior or feared. The fact that at the root of this evaluation there lies a common feeling, only broadens our
problem beyond the theory formation in question to a common human problem. The question remains whether this contentual motivation of our common consciousness, no matter whether it emphasizes biological or social aspects, is psychologically true or only a result of the necessity to interpret will. If we look at these two theories which would explain the feeling of individual difference on the basis of a sexual or social inferiority, in the light of will psychology, we recognize that the inferiority in both, factually and psychologically, is a will inferiority. The child feels himself inferior in contrast to a stronger will, and the woman feels herself inferior in contrast to the stronger sexual will of the man. The grown man, on this basis, would not dare to feel inferior but the whole psychology of the neuroses and the history of civilization teach that that is exactly what he does feel because, as I maintain,

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individuality manifests itself most strongly in him (the grown man). In other words, the problem as such is not external but a purely inner affair. Outer motivations of every kind represent only a projection, an attempt at discharge of the inner will conflict on the basis of a denial or release of the will itself. For Adler, who finally generalizes the sexualized masculine protest into a will-to-power working out beyond the sexual, this positive will is exactly as reprehensible as the sex instinct for Freud which has to bear the blame for everything. But these are social and pedagogical or moral and educational values while psychologically the problem presents itself just the other way.

The will, as I have shown elsewhere, has a negative origin, it arises as counter force against an outer or an inner compulsion. The moral-pedagogical standpoint condemns this, as one should not will (against the other will) but this view is un-psychological because exactly that kind of action constitutes the essence of will. Freud’s designation of counter will as resistance (corresponding to Adler’s “protest”) is in truth psychologically more correct but leads therapeutically to a blind alley because the constructive side of resistance is not recognized and so cannot be utilized any more than Adler’s obstinate protest or anti-social will to power. Thus the moral-pedagogical ideology of Freud like that of Adler leads only to a strengthening of the will denial of the patient and does not allow the problem of the neurosis to be recognized in its deeper meaning as a problem of individuality. Psychologically, the problem of individuality is a will problem and a consciousness problem, that is, it concerns our conscious willing which we, because of the negative nature of the will itself, must constantly deny. Thus the neurotic character represents not illness but a developmental phase of the individuality problem, a personality denying its own will, not accepting itself as an individual. This denial manifests itself not only in the sphere of will, but in that of consciousness, and from this viewpoint the neurotic type represents the individual knowing about himself and his willing, but repressing this knowledge, not wanting to be conscious of himself. According to whether this conflict proceeds more from a denial of the individual’s willing or of his knowing, it manifests itself as guilt feeling or as inferiority feeling,
but in the last analysis goes back to the consciousness of individual difference.

In the inferiority feeling then the neurosis meets us as a problem of consciousness, while from the standpoint of guilt we recognize it as will problem. It is certainly both, for without consciousness there is no will in the psychological sense and without will no consciousness, but it seems that the forms of neurosis in the history of their development tend to center more and more in the field of consciousness. Accordingly one can understand a modern neurosis neither historically nor individually from the past. Freud made this error of projection because he wanted to understand and explain the actual neurosis from the infantile, and also in the theory formation he erred in trying to understand and explain the modern individual, laden and burdened with all knowledge, from an earlier developmental level. The exclusion of the whole developed content of consciousness is certainly to be questioned, whether it has to do with understanding the individual from his childhood, or explaining modern man on any kind of mythological level of the primitive.

In place of drawing examples from the psychology of the neuroses, I will discuss this error of projection and its misleading consequences in terms of the Ædipus complex which, in psychoanalysis, serves as the prototype of the infantile as well as of the mythological and primitive. Freud’s appeal to the Greek Ædipus story was to make plausible the assumption of these primitive wishes in the child. But the Greek Ædipus himself appealed to many predecessors in order to justify the sex relation with the mother and failed. Guilt is not created from the outer world, because it springs from our own willing, which does not stop at the death blow to the father and the sexual conquest of the mother. But this is not at all the meaning of the Greek saga which in truth does use these symbols to picture the will conflict, but only takes them figuratively in order to deduce a quite different moral. This moral, as the irony of fate will have it, is exactly anti-analytic. The Greek Ædipus saga is to be understood as a reaction to that intellectual hybrid, the first occidental thinker, the ironic philosopher, who wanted to solve speculatively the riddle of human nature. The wise Ædipus of the Greek story
is himself just such an over-weening riddle solver, an intellectualist who fails to explain the deepest problems of men rationally in not recognizing the primary phenomena underlying them. This is the Greek meaning of the saga. Its moral is not that of the fourth commandment according to the Decalogue, but a warning against intellectual pride which is condemned as much as pride of will as long as one cannot accept both as expressions of personality. The Ὄδιπος saga explains, therefore, that it is not good to seek behind appearances for the true being of things, for the more one experiences of truth, the more one knows, the unluckier one becomes.

Why the Ὄδιπος myth uses the parent-child relationship to demonstrate this anti-conscious tendency characteristic of the time is a religious-moral and not a psychological problem. The individual in the discovery of his true parents is reminded of his human origin; by his acknowledgment of his parents, the individual who feels and acts heroically is put back within his human limitations, which he has overstepped both in the sphere of will and of consciousness. But the Greek Ὄδιπος myth already refers to the too much knowing as well as to willing. Therefore, these acts of will of Ὄδιπος ensue without the knowledge of the individual who must deny his conscious will in order to be able to put it into action. In the Ὄδιπος saga all evil arises not from doing, but from knowing or wanting to know, for which one must finally take over responsibility oneself instead of putting it on fate, or the Gods, or the unconscious.

That the scientific investigator of the present, who prizes conscious knowledge as a means of cure, has not recognized this meaning of the Greek saga is the best proof that neither the meaning nor the moral of the Ὄδιπος saga corresponds to the consciousness of modern man. As a condemnation or damning of will which we share with men of earlier epochs, one may appeal to it or just as well to the Decalogue. To point out the content of human willing, however, is neither the meaning of the Ὄδιπος saga nor the task of psychology. The only thing it shows is the changing attitude of the individual at different periods in history and of individual living in relation to will in general as it is reflected in our consciousness. In regard to the cultural historic phenomena

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of mythology and poetry I have already shown this connection many years ago in a voluminous work where I emphasized not so much the ever recurring parent motif as the changing attitude of different individuals and ages to it. In the introductory chapter which was written in 1905, in addition to Freud’s interpretation I pointed out that the same parent complex which figured in the Ὄδιπος drama as a symbol of the forbidden act of will, in Shakespeare’s Hamlet is conscious even before the deed, instead of afterwards, and thus cripples the will of the hero neurotically.
Since I have discussed these broader deductions elsewhere, I now turn back to the neurotic type of our age which is what concerns us. The modern neurotic has in common with Oedipus and Hamlet, it is true, the fact of parents, that is, psychologically speaking, the conflict between own will and the restraining counter-will, but he has not the same content of consciousness. It would be an interesting project to take up from a psychological standpoint, the historical development of neurotic suffering. One would find that the share of consciousness, as I have already pointed out, has become ever greater in the course of time. The fact is that already there is a class of neurotics, or better said, of people, who essentially suffer from consciousness in that they are too conscious of themselves. To burden them with still more consciousness as the purely analytic therapy does, means to make their condition worse. What they need is an emotional experience which is intense enough to lighten the tormenting self-consciousness. The compulsion neurotics who increase in the same proportion as the hysterics decrease, illustrate this point. As Freud himself noted, he had not seen classical hysteria for many years and he ascribed this to the unmasking of hysteria by analysis. In fact psychoanalysis itself is only a great manifestation of this general process of becoming conscious, as I have described it in “Der Kunstler” (1905). It is in this sense neither paradoxical nor disparaging if one conceives of psychoanalytic theory itself as an immense scientific system formation of the compulsion neurotic type, since it has the same tendency to interpret freedom of will intellectually as compulsion, in order to justify it.

In contra-distinction to the compulsion neurosis, which

1 “Das Inzest-Motiv in Dichtung und Sage.”

appears as prototype of the modern neurosis of consciousness, the old hysteria exemplifies the will neurosis par excellence. In antiquity it was considered still as entirely organically conditioned (uterus) and expressed itself also in actions (epileptic fits) whose volitional nature was denied by the loss of consciousness. In the middle-ages we see a religious content of consciousness appear in the witch ideology. It was no more the holy illness sent by the Gods as a temporary release from consciousness, but an inner demonic suggestion of the own wicked will and was punished accordingly. In the major hysteria of the French school of psychiatry, it became a dramatic performance in which one patient sought to outdo the other, in order to appear interesting in the eyes of the great physicians. Freud saw in this the tendency to identification, to become like the others but failed to see the competition, the wish to surpass the others, to be different. Freud made another important discovery regarding the French hysterias before the end of the century, namely that the patients if one pressed them, could impart everything that they pretended not to know when one simply asked them. He did not draw the conclusion that these dramatic hysterias corresponded to an attitude of consciousness quite different from that of the hysterias that had been common previously and from the hysterias that he himself saw
later at the beginning of his own practice. These, according to the description in the “Studien über Hysterie” (1895) were quite different consisting far more of guilt reactions than of wish formations, that is, they were more consciousness than will neuroses. Today one sees such hystrias hardly at all, at least not in analytic private practice, but many compulsion neurotics, women as well as men and even more, individuals who, without representing a clinical type, suffer simply from self-consciousness, from a too extreme introspectiveness.

We can hardly consider this an individual illness any longer, but rather a developmental phase of increasing self-consciousness whose broadening and deepening we cannot check but can perhaps guide to recognition of the real problem as it manifests itself in the modern individual. In no case, however, must we apply explanations of earlier forms of neurosis, even if they tally with them, to the understanding of the modern neurotic type, just as it would be fruitless to apply our understanding of

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the latter to the explanation of earlier neuroses. We must guard ourselves as much against modernizing the old as from making the present historical. For the value of knowledge in the field of the psychic is not only transient like knowledge in general, but becomes obsolete much more quickly because it depends on the alteration of consciousness itself and is influenced by it immediately. In this sense the constantly necessary new orientation of our knowledge with and by the change of consciousness implies not so much a better knowledge as a different knowledge, another kind or way of knowing. The hysteria of antiquity was explained by the physicians of the time organically not only because they overlooked the share of consciousness, but because it was not present. On the same ground we emphasize the psychic part, not because we are better psychologists than the ancients, but because now consciousness predominates. The modern neurotic of the conscious type can renounce bodily symptoms almost entirely, because with him the will conflict has been displaced to the sphere of consciousness. But even where hysterical symptoms or attacks are found today, they are motivated from consciousness in much greater degree than one might think, and also are accessible therapeutically only from the point of view of conscious conflict. I have only recently seen hysterical seizures in a highly intelligent woman patient which were undoubtedly produced by the conscious will of the patient and if she willed it could also be consciously controlled. In her childhood she had tic like symptoms which she still uses in her minor attacks while she loses consciousness in her major attacks but only so far that she can still control her actions.

It follows from these observations that in therapy, corresponding to the predominance of conflicts of will or consciousness, different procedures must be used. This is valid for the individual case as well as for the historical forms of neurosis. As long as these manifest themselves predominantly in the sphere of will and the individual accordingly uses unconsciousness in some form or other for the denial of the will
in his behavior, this psychological fact, not the content of the will which the patient usually knows anyhow, must be brought to consciousness. That means this type needs not to learn to will but to be able to accept his willing consciously without using the unconscious as refuge. If

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the conflict manifests itself predominantly in the sphere of consciousness, will conflict is changed into thought conflict, so the patient must learn to will in place of thinking, instead of compensating for his refusal to will through intellectual work and in the content of thinking, either by denying or justifying it. At bottom, both types of modern neurotic really know about their will and their own responsibility. Only the one doesn’t want to know anything about it, represses it; and the other keeps wanting to know more, is an introspectionist. Becoming conscious helps the one, while the other is helped by becoming unconscious, that is, by the emotional experience. The one suffers from knowing too little, the other from knowing too much. This knowing, however, is not general psychological knowledge nor knowledge of psychoanalytic theory, but it is an immediate knowing about himself, awareness of his own psychic processes. The one suffers in that he continually deceives himself and yet becomes aware of this inner deception chiefly as consciousness of guilt, that is, guilt to himself, the other suffers because he can no longer deceive himself, chiefly in the form of doubt concerning himself which manifests itself as inferiority feeling. The one suffers from the deception which he constantly wants to make truth, the other goes to destruction in too much truth about himself which he cannot shake through doubt. One must feed the former with truth, the latter with illusions, that is, help to heal his too complete and final disillusionment with self and life. The tragedy is that neither can bear truth or illusion anymore because he cannot bear himself as an individual different from others.

Let us picture to ourselves once more how this neurotic character type, which one might perhaps best designate as schizoid, occurs. First, comes the perception of difference from others as a consequence of becoming conscious of self will, then interpretation of this difference as inferiority and its resultant moral depreciation of willing, finally association of this psychological conflict with the biological sexual problem, the difference of the sexes, in which the man as the active will is esteemed more highly, the woman as the passive, receiving person, less so. This whole outer conflict in which apparently the strength of the one will is lost in the power of the other is nothing in reality but a comparison of one will with the other, with the discovery thereby

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that it is different. The mere fact of difference, in other words, the existence of our own will as opposite, unlike, is the basis for the moral condemnation which manifests itself as inferiority or guilt feeling. Here again we come up against a moral problem, which obstructs insight into psychological processes. Ideas of good and bad are not imparted to the child through external criticism or punishment, but only serve to make him conscious that he has a self, a counter-will, and this rather than the content of his will is now felt as evil. With this displacement of criticism from the content of will, to will itself, which penetrates to the core of the individual, the moral valuation, which is outer and depends on praise and blame, becomes inner and creates the truly ethical problem which at bottom remains insoluble and must remain so because it arises from the negative antagonistic nature of will itself. This ethical problem can only be solved therapeutically, not psychologically, that is not in and by the individual himself, but only in relation to a second person, who justifies our will, makes it good, since he voluntarily submits himself to it and so brings it to suspension.

This is the psychological meaning of sexuality, as we recognize and understand it in modern love life. We shall occupy ourselves further in the next chapter with this feeling relation as it manifests itself in the therapeutic experience. Here let it be noted only that this making good of our will through the other, works thus freely and releasingly because it solves momentarily the inescapable and insoluble ethical will conflict, transforms our difference at least temporarily into likeness and mutual striving, that is, removes the too extreme individualism. Sexuality shows itself not only guiltless of causing the painful feeling of difference, but in its psychic and bodily manifestations is the only natural method of healing or at least of alleviation for this primal ethical conflict which we are never able to solve alone. Sexuality constitutes the most powerful removal of the denial of will because it transforms the negative will finally into the strongest positive expression of will, which we can accept because it is not only not opposed by the other will but is called good, is affirmed, and so is led to its own self-affirmation.

The sexual problem as we understand it today reveals itself

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to us therefore as a special instance of the universal will problem which arises independently, from individualization and normally finds its greatest possibility of solution in sex life. On the other hand, the neurotic sex conflicts of marriage and love life can be understood only as manifestation of the primary will conflict, and not the reverse as Freud thought. These conflicts it is true look as if they arose within the sexual sphere but this is only because, with the miscarriage of the releasing function of the sexual life, the ethical will conflict at the root is obscured in this most powerful content of willing. To this will conflict in sex terms belongs everything that we designate as the struggle of the sexes, from the acts of
wooing to the sado-masochistic domination and breaking of the will, with jealousy as the peak of the negativistic expression of sex will. Here belong also the masculine complex of the woman and the castration anxiety of the man, as we many times find them in neurotic types. Normally the man, corresponding to his active sexual will, is also the more positive and creatively effective in other ways, while the woman in sex life and elsewhere represents the more negative, reactive person in her willing. In the neurotic type we see in the sphere of will and accordingly also in the sexual sphere the negative, denying, passive resistant behavior in the man and the active, aggressive (masculine) behavior in the woman. Accordingly it is the task of therapy to make “giving” possible to the woman and “taking” to the man. In the light of the will psychology the so-called masculinity complex of the woman shows itself to be not a refusal of her own feminine role, but a refusal of the man, that is, of the stronger, alien will, which manifests itself in the sex relation as sexual will. Here we have again one of the numerous paradoxes of the Freudian theory which explains almost everything externally and historically except here, where there really is an external factor, namely, the strange sexual will of the man, and at this Point a purely internal explanation, the refusal of the feminine sexual role is given. Just the reverse is maintained concerning the so-called castration complex of the man, which Freud explains externally as fear of the father, while actually here we meet with an internal necessity, the need to deny this “center of active willing” (in the Schopenhauerian sense), to deny or

actually to eradicate as is the case in psychotic self castration. In this sense the masculinity wish of the woman and the castration wish of the man are an expression of tendency to likeness as it manifests itself in homosexuality which in the neurotic also is only an expression of self-consciousness extended to the sexual sphere, that is, of individual difference in the biological sense.

On the other hand the healing nature of the love relation rests partly on a far-reaching identification, which, it is true, is not physical but removes difference emotionally, partly on an affirmation and increase of difference which works happily because of the voluntary submission of the will. This submission concerns not only the woman, but the man even more, since his will is more positive and accordingly is less inclined to submission. Thus sexuality is the most universal symbol for fulfilment of will as well as for the submission of will and accordingly leads to happiness and release. The will expression relates to the powerful overcoming of difference and enjoys a brief happiness with a subsequent reaction to the renewed perception of difference, of the strange will, while the subjection of the own will to the other emphasizes the similarity, particularly in the emotional sphere which binds and identifies. The first is more physical, the second is more lasting, more psychic, and leads to the release from difference, to the feeling of unity with the self, with the other, with the cosmos.
The neurotic individual of either sex is incapable of surrender to the other, or to unity with himself, because in him the inner will conflict with its predominantly negative character is so intense that neither outer good fortune nor inner release can protect him from his own destructive reactions. He is incapable of surrender and unity because he cannot get free from the consciousness of himself. Will conflict and the torment of consciousness are only the two sides of one and the same problem, the inner and the outer side, if you will. The therapeutic solution of this problem is so difficult because it has to meet both aspects of the problem at once, although according to their very nature, they are antagonistic. If constructive therapy culminates

1 Compare with my general remarks on Eradication Therapy in Part II of “Genetische Psychologie.”

2 See “Genetische Psychologie” Part II—p. 46.

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in the fact that the individual can now accept himself as different, a personality with a unique will, or even can affirm instead of having to deny it, then there ensue two opposing consequences. The acceptance of difference in a social sense means that the individual dare feel himself as different from other individuals. The acceptance of difference in the sex field means the acceptance of the sex role, that the individual in the biological sense is like the other individuals of his own sex. Here we meet one of the strongest resistances to the acceptance of the own sex role, not merely resistance to individual will but in terms of the conflict of individual being versus generic being, and this constitutes one of the greatest difficulties of therapy. The individual cannot accept his sexual role as such because it would rob him once more of his individuality, would make him into a generic being. Only in the individual love experience are we able to accept the sex role as individual, as it were, personally. Here in the love claim lies the greatest victory of the conscious individual will over the instinctive generic will, which is denied if it does not subordinate itself to the will of the individual. In analytic therapy, this manifests itself in the will struggle which Freud has described as the transference phenomenon. The individual although he needs the other for the solution of his ethical conflict, for the making-good of his will, has not willed to accept this justification on the basis of a general explanation, whether it be moral or psychological. The making-good must be individual, personal, from the analyst as a person to the patient as a person, but only to justify his own individual will, not in psychological fashion to make willing itself understandable and thus acceptable.
“A man has two soul-sides; One, to face the world with; One, to tell a woman when he loves her.” — Browning

In the so-called transference situation we find the will and consciousness conflict, the love claim and the ethical guilt following it, in short all problems united in one focus. I attack the problem at a point beyond the Ædipus situation, up to which I had brought it in my genetic and technical works of recent years. I consider the transference and the “being in love” which lies at its root as a projection phenomenon,¹ that is, in the language of will psychology an attempt of the individual to personify his own will in the other and so to justify it instead of denying it. In this sense the love emotion, historically considered also, is a continuation of the religious emotion, with which it often blends most clearly in the mystics. “Being in love” is the continuation of the unreal will justification in God, through the earthly deification of a real person whose will must be as like ours as possible and always remain different. In this voluntary dependence and subjection of the individual who makes a god for himself as he yields himself to the deified loved one, we see before us the releasing side of the will problem which in contrast to the compulsion (force) of the denying counter will, I designate as love, that is, as approbation and justification of the own will through another.

All the positive and negative transference phenomena which psychoanalysis has sought to describe and explain from the content can be understood from the point of view of will conflict

¹ See “Genetische Psychologie,” II, Abschnitt: “Projektion und Verliebheit.”

and its different attempts at solution. The broken willed neurotic tries first of all to set up for himself in the therapist a strong god who permits and forbids, that is, takes over the moral responsibility for the ethical will conflict of the patient. Since the analyst does not yield to this attempt, he becomes a loving god who apparently supports, understands and pardons everything. Now instead of understanding and utilizing this in terms of the will conflict constructively, the Freudian method not only does not perceive the therapeutic advantage lying in the situation itself, but loses ground in giving the patient a new contentual justification ideology, in the theory of the unconscious and the Ædipus complex. But even as justification, this ideology suits only the creative type, in this case the therapist, who must unburden
himself of his own creative guilt, not the neurotic whom it makes still more unfree. The resistance is explained as essentially defiance and resistance to the father, therefore historically, and not even that is always correct. Just so the love fixation is explained historically, this time from the double sided sexual aspect of the Œdipus situation. Both “being in love” and “resistance,” however, are ego problems, that is, expressions of the present analytic will conflict; the one, an attempt to justify the own will through the other, the other, an expression of counter-will, that is an attempt to deny positive will.

The patient himself tries to unburden the therapeutic will conflict by content, but he can only be released dynamically. The analyst who explains the reactions of the patient historically only replaces the actual present content by an earlier content which corresponds to a religious justification, but does not bring out the real nature of the difficulty. For the will conflict lying at the root of all content situations can only be recognized and understood in actual experience. The patient seeks to make the will conflict a matter of content, chiefly because he wants to know the analyst who is forbidden and wants to know him really instead of his symbolic value. This, however, does not mean parent authority or an earlier love object which, although historical, has become real again in the analytic situation. The analyst as an object of admiration, adoration, or veneration, symbolizes the own ego personified, just like God except that God remains unreal; as the object of the love need the analyst represents the

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ethical demand, which is to approve and justify the will just like the partner in the real love relationship. The essence of the therapeutic situation consists however exactly in the transposition of this psychic value; the feeling relation corresponding to the real love relation is made unreal by the physical deprivation, while the formerly unreal God image is here realized; that is, is represented in an actual person who corresponds to this divine ideal of self much more than do the parents. These are the two sides of the will conflict as it manifests itself in the therapeutic situation with an intensity like that of real experience but at the same time in opposite form. This eternal human conflict between the personification of the will in another (God) and the personification of the ethical ideal justifying one’s will through the other (love), between religious emotion and erotic emotion, unrolls itself before our eyes in the therapeutic situation and in both spheres appears as a struggle between the tendency to materialization, to realization and the wish for unreality, which in terms of constructive therapy only indicates a sense of self, a desire for self dependence. The personification of the God creation must remain unreal if it is to fulfil its end of representing the individual will; that the God does not really exist gives him his psychic value, for all his greatness and power fall back upon the individual. Just reversed, the love creation must be realized if it is to reach its goal, the positive will fulfilment through the approval of the other. The analytic situation, which reverses both phenomena psychically in making God real and the love object unreal, releases in the patient the whole will conflict which manifests itself as resistance and love claim. Both these expressions of will and counter-will appear only because the
reversal of the unreal God projection into a real situation of help sets up an external resistance, in the true sense of the word, which otherwise would not exist; as does the transformation of the real love feeling into an unreal relation. God as our own creation and representation of our own will does not resist us except when we ourselves want it, and just as little does the lover resist us who, in yielding, subjects himself to our will. The analyst resists in both roles; as God he is too real hence the tendency to see in him more the father than the creative ego-will

and as love object he is too unreal, hence the tendency to love in him narcissistically, the mother, as part of the ego.

This psychological state of the analytic situation with its expressions of resistance and its demands for love, the Freudian method wishes to explain causally by content through tracing it back to parallel historical situations. But this the patient himself tries to do, when he strives to repeat earlier unfortunate attempts at the solving of the will conflict in this new content of the analytic situation, which affords symbolic expression to both sides of the struggle. The new content, however, is the person of the therapist who must be in a position to loose this content which he himself forms from the dynamic factors underlying it and thus reach the will conflict in the patient himself. He must be able to throw this externalized conflict back into the ego of the patient instead of giving him in the historical material only another real content, which denies the present instead of explaining it. The difficulty of this task lies not only in the fact that the therapist himself has become the content of the actual will and won’t of the patient, but also in the fact that he finds himself here beyond all explanation and theory, facing immediate experience itself. For the content of this experience cannot be “interpreted” either by means of past or of present reality, it can only be understood as such psychologically in terms of the will conflict. The therapeutic problem, therefore, is to overcome the personal element more inherent in the analytic situation than in any other experience by leading back to the will conflict at least far enough so that the patient is in a position to separate his inner conflict from the present content, the therapist, and thereby also to separate from earlier contents.

Here we strike a fundamental life principle, at least in our modern type of man, which we have already described previously as the individual love claim which even beyond the erotic will projection includes also the moral justification of will. This deep footed love need of our modern human being which we have characterized as a real continuation of the unreal need of God on Earth forms the greatest obstacle to a constructive therapy whose task it is to allow the individual to understand these relationships in the therapeutic experience itself. If one succeeds in
this, the excess of neurotic self-condemnation manifested in guilt and inferiority feeling leads to a self-acceptance of the own individuality, which thus becomes more independent of real as well as unreal external forces. The longing for release from self responsibility through the other springs finally from a conflict between ethics and morality, between the ethical reaction to the will as such and the moral reaction to the momentary content or to certain typical contents. Evidently we have to have contents and hence the moral values which we attach to them; in the same way we have ethical values which relate to willing itself or the counter-will. The conflict ensues of necessity when although the content is good, the will itself is always perceived as bad, unethical. The more this is the case the more will the individual strive to justify the wickedness of the will quantitatively and qualitatively through the goodness of the content without succeeding. Here the other can many times help temporarily and partially since he, as in the love relation, approves the will itself and makes it good, in contrast to education which can make the content good but does not help if the will itself cannot be accepted by the individual.

We recognize here the two great principles which oppose each other in every kind of emotional relation, and in every educational situation, including the therapeutic, namely love and force. In love and through love, whether it be divine or human, the individual can accept himself, his own will because the other does, an other does. Every kind of education seeks, on the contrary, to alter the individual in terms of a definite norm, that is to determine the content of his will through compulsion. Accordingly education is based on morality, love on ethics, as it can only exist permanently when it is ethical, that is, when it works as will justification and not as will compulsion. Accordingly love as we know, cannot be forced because force is exactly opposed to it and education cannot rest exclusively on love because otherwise it would not reach its goal, no matter whether we consider the goal desirable or not. A constructive therapy should avoid both principles as far as possible in favor of ethical self-determination, but in psychoanalytic therapy they are hopelessly mixed. Educational compulsion is used, since the patient is to be changed in terms of an immediate ruling moral ideology, but
pedagogical parent relations nor in the ethical self-justifying love relations; namely, that he does not need to change himself in terms of any kind of universal or alien ideal so that others may accept him, but that he alone can and must do both, that is, develop in terms of his own ideal and at the same time on the basis of this ideal also accept himself ethically.

We note here that the father and mother symbols as such, purely psychologically also represent only the two great principles, love and force, corresponding to different attempts to solve the individual will conflict in reality. The love principle, the maternal, operates as a means of justification and approval of the own will through the other to whom one accordingly subjects one’s self willingly; the force principle, the paternal, as a means of assertion of the own will against the other, whom one fights as the own counter-will. Both ways lead unavoidably to the guilt problem; the second to that consciousness of guilt following from the forbidden assertion which says that one should not have this wicked (counter) will, the first to the guilt of creation, the need of the other, which even the love relation represents in the last analysis. Guilt consciousness works repressively, destructively, but the guilt following creation operates progressively, constructively, because it spurs on to newer and higher achievements of will.¹

The guilt problem in both forms, therefore, arises in and from the therapeutic situation itself, insofar as it represents in part, will assertion in the ego projection on the therapist, and in part, forbidden love demand in relation to his person. Here the therapeutic situation is revealed as the ethical problem, as we have represented it in the introduction, which, in the last analysis, actually characterizes the whole neurosis itself. But this conflict expresses itself here in terms of the previously described psychic

¹ See the chapter “Creation and Guilt” in “Truth and Reality.”

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transposition in a paradoxical way, which again is to be understood only from the actual will conflict and its denial. The love demand which often appears with the strongest real claims is not only an expression of positive will appearing here as sex will, but manifests itself at the same time as a wish for giving and subordination, as an expression of gratitude, of guilt (not consciousness of guilt). This guilt manifests itself not only as capacity for love in the constructive way, but appears also in the form of neurotic consciousness of guilt, which fastens itself upon the forbidden content of will. The paradox consists in the fact that the love emotion appears as an expression of real guilt (for the will itself), while the guilt feeling represents the reaction to the forbidden love claim.

The love demand is first of all only an expression of counter-will, which wants the forbidden and indeed the more intensely, the more strongly the prohibition is maintained; here is a parallel with the Oedipus situation, but nothing more than a parallel, which always presents itself in similar deprivation situations from the very nature of the will conflict. Later there is added the willingness to give, to subject oneself
to the love demand, but always in its service, that is, seeking the fulfilment of will through yielding. This yielding, however, is not merely a maneuver (in Adler’s sense) but indicates psychically a colossal stride toward the capacity for giving as such, which can be constructively Utilized, and must not as Adler says, be “unmasked.” For this self subjection even in order to receive something contains the germ of the ethical solution of the will conflict, as it includes in itself the readiness to give where one receives. But this problem must be worked out again ethically, that is, must be led back from the forbidden content to the dynamic of will underlying it, as otherwise the moralistic consciousness of guilt enters in place of the ethical guilt, and leads the patient to the third level of the love conflict, on which he will only give in order to unburden his guilt consciousness for the forbidden taking (will). This appears if one allows him to deny his growing gratitude constantly so that he must pay only with love and finally with himself in order to be able to get loose at all.

We must now consider the development of the guilt problem in the therapeutic situation which, from the very nature of the

relationship presents itself just as immediately and really as the love problem. The first level of the guilt problem arises as a reaction to the love demand as an expression of will assertion and is, therefore, ethical guilt relating to the counter-will. The second level of the guilt problem ensues as a reaction to the willingness to yield in the service of will assertion, is therefore moral guilt feeling relating to the forbidden content (sexual). The third and final level of the guilt problem is a reaction to the wish to give, to cancel the guilt through love, and represents psychological guilt consciousness because it denies gratitude and dependence and aims at getting loose through emotional payment in full. We see, therefore, a contrasting development of love and of guilt feeling take root in the therapeutic situation. The love feeling becomes, as it were, more ethical, developing from a mere demand of will (counter-will) into an almost selfless capacity for giving; the guilt feeling on the contrary becomes, as it were, ever more neurotic as it leads from an ethical guilt which belongs to the will to an almost complete denial of gratitude and so to consciousness of guilt. This defense against gratitude, which makes the love fixation so strong without removing guilt, is not only the best proof against the Oedipus interpretation of the analytic situation, but is also the essentially constructive element of the therapeutic situation as I understand it. The individual is trying to say not merely in terms of the wish fulfilment theory, that he wants to create himself and therefore will be independent, but actually that he has created himself and is or can be independent if one only allows it, instead of interpreting his defense as resistance against the acceptance of parental authority.

The only therapeutic escape from this guilt conflict is therefore to let the individual create for himself his own development and his own freeing which he does anyway but must deny as an expression of his own
will as long as the other remains a symbol of love or force (authority). The Freudian method ensnares the individual still more in the guilt problem since it interprets his works for independence in terms of these two symbols of authority as resistance, and his submission to them as the cure.

When the analyst himself becomes the parental love and force authority, who pretends to remodel the patient in terms of the

educational morality, and the patient accepts these pretensions when he raises the analyst to a god and claims him as love object. This leads to all the guilt reactions we have just described and increases the guilt consciousness ensuing from this pretension itself, which, moreover, the analyst shares with the patient. For the whole moral honesty that the analytic situation pretends to with its free associations is worthless and fruitless as long as it is not true in the ethical sense. This it can only be if the whole conflict, which Freud explains as transference and resistance, is freed from all contentual justification and psychological denial tendencies, and is treated as a purely inner will conflict of the individual himself. In other words, one may not make the conflict actually effective through historical interpretation, but must allow it to become psychically true, which is only possible in the therapeutic experience. This alone makes a great deal of guilt reaction avoidable, which for the Freudian technique remains insoluble, and lets the patient either go away in resistance or remain fixed in the transference.

The therapist must not take the part of authority of any kind, but must be satisfied with the role of an ego helper (assistant ego).¹ This does not happen because he keeps himself passive according to the Freudian precept but depends rather on his theoretical ideology which must be oriented not morally and pedagogically on the content of the will but ethically, that is, on the dynamic of will itself. Thus not only is the whole problem, freed from all past and present contents, placed in the individual himself, but also the only freeing and salvation are found by and in the individual himself. In this sense also the therapeutically effective making conscious consists not in a reconstruction of infantile dreams, the uncovering of the Oedipus situation or of later repressed experiences, all of which are only justification displacements, but in allowing the therapeutic experience itself to become conscious as a complete manifestation of the inner will conflict in all its aspects in relation to love and guilt feeling.

This will conflict in principle is the same for both sexes insofar as it concerns individualization and the guilt and inferiority feelings following from it, but it manifests itself differently according to the biological differences and the moralistic ideology tied

¹ See Genetische Psychologie II. S. 39.
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up in them. The patient seeks not only to make the will conflict real, but also to fashion it individually, as we pointed out in a previous chapter. This individual mold, however, as also in life, is influenced by the biological sex role, an influence which we will evaluate more closely in the next chapter. Here we will only point out as a general reaction that men like women, react to the therapist of the opposite sex more with the positive sexual will corresponding to the love claim, while they react to the therapist of the same sex more with the negative counter-will. Sexual will and counter-will in man and woman, however, are differently accentuated. Biologically the positive sexual will appears more strongly emphasized in the man, in the woman, the counter-will. In the therapeutic situation through the love deprivation on the side of the therapist of opposite sex the sexual will is strengthened in the woman, the counter-will in the man. It follows, therefore, that the woman reacts in a more masculine fashion in the therapeutic experience than otherwise in life and the man in a more feminine way, if one can apply these crude sexual concepts to the common will and guilt problems of both sexes. For one easily falls into the convenient fashion of attempting to explain these reactions as homosexual, if not even “unconscious homosexual,” instead of understanding them stripped of their sexual content, dynamically as will reactions of different sexes to the love denial and the guilt conflict of the therapeutic situation. With the individualistic human being of our time, sexuality is placed exactly as much in the service of the will and its positive or negative expressions as any other real content. So it comes about that the woman first tries to assert her positive will in the love claim, that is, in the sexual conquest of the therapist, while finally she wishes to make up for the guilt with physical giving, in order to free herself. The child as content plays a similar double role, as on the one side it realizes the wish to possess the man or something from him (similar to him); on the other hand it is the woman’s present to the man, in order to buy herself free of guilt. Here is shown the most fundamental difference perhaps, hi the general structure of man and woman. For the woman even in the negative will conflict of getting free, remains much more constructive than the man whose will to create manifests itself more spiritually in projections and unreal ego maximations.

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(expansions). The woman, on the other hand, is in general much more really oriented and in this sense conserving, where the man must be destructive in the struggle of the counter-will as it meets him in reality. So the woman conquers still in giving, because she overcomes the counter-will and releases it, while the man even in the victory of will, must succumb to his own counter-will.
VII

SEPARATION AND GUILT

"Der Ursprung der Dinge is das Grenzenlose. Woraus sie entstehen, darein vergehen sie auch mit Notwendigkeit. Der sie leisten einander Busze und Vergeltung für ihr Unrecht nach der Ordnung der Zeit."

"The source of things is the boundless. From whence they arise, thence they must also of necessity return. For they do penance and make compensation to one another for their injustice in the order of time." —Anaximander

We have shown that the feeling relation presenting itself in the therapeutic situation, which Freud explained historically as a repetition of infantile reactions, actually develops from the will-guilt problem, first as personification of the own will in the other with simultaneous moral justification through deification of the other, then as direct assertion of will in the love demand with simultaneous ethical justification through the other, that is, being in love; in other words, through personification of both great principles, love and force. We have also shown how the guilt problem evolves in this process in connection with the will problem. The deification of the own will in the other unburdens first of all from the guilt of the will, as the religious creation of God does also, while the love claim creates a new guilt consciousness which relates to the present forbidden content. Finally, we have pointed out how, from the realization of the created God and the love object in one person who justifies the will, calls it good and saves it, the specific guilt feeling of gratitude grows up manifesting itself in the capacity and willingness to (give) surrender. This readiness to surrender, however, is not merely an expression of gratitude, but finally becomes the price which

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the individual wishes to pay for getting free, for independence whether it be the woman who tries to free herself from the man at the price of physical surrender and the child, or the man who with achievement, with his work, the symbol of his creative power will buy himself free of the guilt. But what he perceives as the guilt of gratitude is also the guilt of wanting to be free, of separation. This whole development, from neurotic consciousness of guilt as consequence of will conflict and its denial, to the creative guilt of the freeing experience, culminates in the last phase of the therapeutic process and is
brought to release and solution through the setting of an ending which is suitable for the particular person both as to time and meaning.

Certainly this is not the individual’s first attempt to free himself but it is one which should succeed. It can only succeed, however, if one lets him accomplish his freeing himself so that he has no debt of gratitude to pay. However this is possible only in the actual therapeutic experience and not historically no matter whether the individual feels gratitude toward his parents (and other objects) or not. In analytic material these objects only appear as biological symbols of dependence or psychological symbols of gratitude, in other words, as symbols of guilt which now attach themselves to the helping therapist. This guilt arises from the ego development of the individual and with each new attempt at release is always fastened to that past in which the individual sees himself personified so that he is not able to free himself of it. This release from an overcome piece of one’s own past, no matter in what content it is incorporated, represents the authentic therapeutic task and the meaning of every experience. Thus analytic separation becomes the symbol of separation in general, which is one of the fundamental life principles. All organic evolution itself rests upon separation, but only the conscious knowledge of this life principle on the part of man who can preserve or call back the past in his memory, or can imagine the future in his phantasy, gives to the concept and the feeling of separation the fundamental psychic meaning. This explains why the first biological separation of the individual from the mother can acquire the psychic meaning that I ascribed to it in the “Trauma of Birth,” likewise why all further steps on the way to self-dependence, such as weaning, walking, and especially the

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development of the will are conceived always as continuous separations, in which the individual even as in the last separation, death, must leave behind, must resign developmental phases of his own ego.

In the therapeutic experience we deal with a very special separation, to which all previous ones are parallel to a degree but do not underlie it causally in the sense of a compulsion to repetition. On the level of development on which we usually see the adult neurotic, it has to do as I have already pointed out elsewhere (see the statement on the ego crisis in “Genetische Psychologie” II, S. 58) with a last attempt at freeing the patient from his whole past as lived hitherto and manifested in the personality, a past on which he is fixated by guilt feeling. This past is symbolized in an actual love, friendship or marriage relation, from which he wishes to free himself without being able to do so, or perhaps in the parent relation if no other experiences are avail’ able. In every case, however, the therapeutic experience soon goes beyond all earlier ones in meaning and so becomes a symbol of his whole past, therefore of himself. His holding fast to these objects and feeling relations, including the therapeutic, is not libidinally forced, but individually willed and has only taken on the form of love and gratitude fixation in compensation. For here too the love emotion, as was shown in the preceding chapter,
appears in terms of moralistic ideology, as the first guilt reaction to the wish to be free, that is, one should have no will of his own, but should be thankful and love. These moralistic reactions must not be misunderstood in the therapeutic situation as historical or libidinal, any more than the ethical guilt which comes from the ego development should be conceived of as moral, if the therapeutic experience is to lead to the constructive freeing of the individual.

From this viewpoint the problem of the neurosis itself is a separation problem and as such a blocking of the human life principle, the conscious ability to endure release and separation, first from the biological power represented by parents, and finally from the lived out parts of the self which this power represents, and which obstruct the development of the individual personality. It is at this point that the neurotic comes to grief, where, instead of living, of overcoming the past through the present, he becomes conscious that he dare not, cannot, loose himself because he is bound by guilt. Here, as it were, the human being’s recognition of his biological and cosmic dependence revenges itself since as love duty and debt of gratitude it opposes his own microcosmic self dependence. In these guilt reactions the problem of separation shows itself as related to the problem of difference even though it is more general and inclusive. For separation is already possible, yes, necessary, on a purely biological level and takes place without consciousness of it, in birth, growth and death. The guilt consciousness coming from difference is the conscious awareness of separation and the individual reaction to it, whether it has to do with separation in the biological sense of procreation, birth, age and death, or in the psychological sense of overcoming gratitude, or finally in the ethical sense in the affirmation of the own individuality as isolated, separated, different from others.

At this point the sexual problem as a problem of difference and separation enters the problem of the neurosis as a problem of form, not in the concrete terms of the Freudian castration complex, but in a broader biological and at the same time more highly ethical sense. For the therapeutic situation shows that man and woman react to separation in a different form. This difference of reaction is characteristic for the whole psychic difference of the two sexes and of the differing manifestations of the will and guilt conflict, which both have in common. To the separation, which symbolizes a constantly unwinding life process, the woman reacts more conservingly and constructively, the man more rebelliously and destructively. This naturally refers only to extreme types for as a rule separation, no matter of what kind or on what level, is reached as a compromise between both tendencies, while from partial destruction a new life grows. In general, however, the woman appears to represent the conserving element of this biological life principle, the man the creative element, who can become destructive much more easily when an inner or outer resistance is opposed to his will. For the will tends to create negatively, that is,
expresses itself as destroying counter-will and this destructiveness we easily recognize as a denial of obstacle transformed into action.

This difference of reaction pattern in man and woman

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extends to the life principle of separation from the biological level to the highest ethical manifestations of the will conflict. For the man creates even on the biological level of procreation through separation, through letting go a part of his physical ego, as the biblical creation of the woman from the rib of the man signifies. The woman, on the other hand, on this biological level of procreation, creates through the removal of separation, through union, therefore conservingly. But even on the next level on which the woman alone creates, namely in the act of birth, the separation is only a physical separation which is immediately paralyzed by the emotional binding to the child, often more than that, is over compensated. The woman creates biologically and really, while the man creates spiritually in unreality and in this creative producing releases continuously bits of his own ego, which he must project, personify, objectify, while the woman can do it really in the child and eventually in the man. Accordingly also the God creation comes from the man as a splitting off of a part of his ego will, just as in work of every kind he releases himself constantly from a part of his own past; yes, in love life itself, continues this process (see “Genetische Psychologie II, ‘Verliebheit und Projektion’”) where again the woman is generally much more conservative. Even in the creation of the neurosis the man tends more to destructive compulsive thinking, the woman more to physical symptoms which in any case are more real and correspond to a part of reality, while the man goes to the intellectual realm of truth. Certainly we do not overlook the fact that the feminine neurosis is destructive also and aims at self-destruction like the masculine. This new point of view which is valid for both, sexes, and all forms of neurosis, sees in the neurosis not only destruction, but also an attempt at separation, a step toward the development to self-dependence for which the individual must pay with suffering, with illness, with giving up a part of his past ego. The man, in harmony with his more aggressive will to free and develop himself attempts this forcibly through the destruction of the past, while the woman pays off the guilt really with her physical suffering and with the child as a creation, in order thus to preserve herself.

In the therapeutic experience of separation which represents the psychic life principle of individual self-reliance, we find these

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biological differences of reaction in the man and woman in the ethical sphere also, where the sexual content is applied only symbolically to carry the will and guilt conflict. For when the woman in separating sees in the man the child which she will bear, that is, has to let go and still wishes to preserve, she is presenting thereby only the will-guilt conflict in material wish symbols. She does not want to give up or lose the man, who, like the child, has become a part of herself psychically. This she attains psychically if she phantasies him as her child. This phantasy she will then realize in wanting a child from the man, in whom she preserves at the same time the man himself. On the other hand, she can buy herself off with the child whom she presents to the man, therefore can pay and be paid at the same time. Freud interprets this desire for a child by the therapist as the infantile wish for a real child by the father thereby failing to see that now as in childhood, this wanting to give the father another child is a way of freeing oneself from him, a wish which many patients seek to realize by sending back for treatment when they are about to leave, the partner in marriage, a child or a friend. In every parting the man sees in the other the mother who bears him, that is who deserts him, and whom he will destroy in order to be able to free himself without having to resign her to another. As far as the man wants to conserve, he also does it in symbols of the child whom he identifies with his work, just as the woman can symbolize the actual freeing only in the maternal symbolism of being born, not of bearing.

We can understand the psychic separation experience as it manifests itself in the therapeutic situation, only if we go beyond the sexual contents which only figure as symbols of the ethical problem of giving and taking, creating and being created, separation and guilt. The child symbolizes the will to preservation, and represents at the same time the real paying off of guilt in the biological and in the ethical sense. Parents represent on the contrary symbols of separation and at the same time of gratitude, of guilt, with the roles divided so that the mother in spite of the physical separation from the child, binds it psychically; while the father represents separation in itself, the abandoning of the mother, the past, and the development to self-dependence. These ethical meanings which the primary biological and later sociological

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concepts of mother, father and child have taken on with the modern man, are accordingly independent of the sex role as we see in the therapeutic experience. Not only does the male therapist in suitable situations become the mother and the feminine patient the creator which usually only the man is, but both become creators, or become the child (identification of the analyst with siblings) if the therapeutic emotional experience demands it. These identifications are not to be understood really as bits of life history, but ethically and symbolically. They change and transform themselves according to the specific situation and the individual problem, in terms of the immediate will and guilt conflict.
The forms of the neuroses or neurotic reactions show themselves to be determined by the will conflict which the individual naturally wishes to solve in terms of his sex character, but with the neurotic human type, release is possible in the constructive sense only if one goes beyond this to the non-sexual problem of the ethical will conflict. In this sphere, neurotic repression shows itself as an expression of will conflict, just as suppression or displacement is an expression of the conflict of consciousness. The symptom is an expression of will conflict, increased by the consciousness conflict which constitutes the guilt feeling. The fear appearing with it is related to the conscious perception of the will inhibition, whether it has to do with a real or a purely internal fear. We designate as reality all that opposes our will inhibitingly; above all the strange counter-will, which remains the prototype of reality, although we extend it later to our own counter-will and all its conscious manifestations, yes, to consciousness itself. This then, is the schema of the will-guilt conflict independent of sex, as it manifests itself particularly clearly in the neurotic type.

The sex problem is prominent in neuroses because it offers natural forms of release, which work therapeutically as long as they remain predominantly biological and are not applied by consciousness symbolically in the ethical sphere, in other words, as long as individuation has not yet advanced so far that the individual wishes to subject sexuality itself to his ego will, and so to make it the content of his will conflict. In both will and guilt problems this universal human conflict is denied and made concrete and moralized through the sexual content. Sex life can

normally release the will-guilt conflict because it has already been made concrete and moralistic through the conventional precepts and customs of married life. Its materialization in terms of the individual sexual will and guilt problem on the other hand, must miscarry, and this miscarriage it is which we designate as neurosis. But at bottom it has nothing to do with sex as such, is only the guilt resulting from individualization, the difference from others and separation from the nearest. Normally sexual life suffices to heal this split, as it binds the individual biologically to the species, and psychically to the assistant ego. The man finds union in the woman (mother), the woman in the child. With the neurotic and also the creative type, both of whom suffer from a too strong individualization of will and corresponding guilt reaction, this paying off is denied, not because sexuality makes them guilty in the sense of the Ædipus complex, but because this common form of adjustment does not suffice to compensate for the guilt. The creative person, like the neurotic, must accordingly find other more individual means of payment and this has only very limited possibilities of creativity like love, however, releasing; or it has the universal, as it were intersexual value of work, which instead of releasing the individual, only lets him become guilty again for creating. Love as a means of payment, like paper money, is accepted as long as the individual has credit, that is, is capable of loving, but finally, sometime, it must be recognized as unredeemed, as only a delayed guilt, and be taken up, as it is in the neurosis.
Therefore, after the rejection of the biological guilt compensation, and the refusal of justification attempts as we see them in religious and love experiences, in the neurotic type the original guilt finally appears which he must accept and honor. Thus sexuality, religion and love, at least for the neurotic type of today, are only general and individual denying attempts to get rid of the guilt springing from the individualization, which does not, as Freud thinks, spring from the sexual and love life, but is probably increased by them. The only way whereby the highly individualized personality with its strong ego will, which subjects even sexuality to itself, can redeem its individual guilt and thus at the same time justify itself and its own will is in creative work. In this he gives a part of himself back to the whole, as in the biological guilt.

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redemption, while simultaneously he asserts and maintains his will in such a way as suits his individual personality.

All the reactions and connections which the therapeutic experience teaches us to understand, therefore, express only universal human problems and their attempts at solution. The denial of the ethical will conflict leads to its incorporation in the sexual conflict; the insufficiency of this biological guilt redemption, leads to individual love compensation with its subjection and surrender of will, and this in turn brings guilt consciousness because it implies a using of the other which finally aims at the elimination of difference, the subjection of his will to ours. Thus, ultimately behind the sexual and love problem there appears the original guilt problem whose solution beyond biological content and erotic emotions, is the aim of constructive therapy. The whole technique therefore is based on understanding the problem of the neurosis and this again rests on knowledge of the problem of humanity, manifesting itself therein. If one has recognized the ethical will and guilt conflict going beyond the sex problem, then one is in a position to let the person who has been wrecked on it go through the therapeutic experience in such a way that he is enabled to solve his will conflict ethically in himself, instead of wanting to buy himself free of guilt by moral or emotional subjection of the will, which he will always resist.

The actual therapeutic release is consummated in the experience of separation, which stands symbolically for the whole problem of past and difference, in other words, of the individual development and the guilt problem coming from it. Accordingly it also can only be understood and released beyond the sex problem, although it takes on sexual forms and content, in terms of which the patient too tries to solve it. The whole therapeutic process up to the separation phase consists in the various attempts of the patient to institute a oneness with the therapist by means of projection and identification as he seeks to remould him in terms of his own will, and also as he tries to adjust or subject his will to him. Both attempts bring new guilt reactions which can only be overcome in the
experience of separation which throws back projection and identification into the individual and Places it on himself, on his own will and his own responsibility,

1 See “Genetische Psychologie,” II—“Verliebheit und Projektion.”

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without permitting the will justification in the projection or the rolling off of responsibility in the identification.

The greatest therapeutic difficulty, however, arises just in the separation experience itself which becomes the prototype of the whole will conflict if the patient applies to this leaving his material attempts at justification and his dynamic tendencies to denial. Here is necessary not merely psychological but human understanding, which must be converted spontaneously into technical skill, in order to be master of this concentration of the will-guilt conflict, in the forms and contents it takes on according to the sex role and individual development. Above all, the patient himself as 1 have already emphasized must be ripe for the separation even though he is unable to confess it to himself or the therapist. This reluctance expresses itself in the tendencies of the love claim and the counter-will so well motivated in the contents, which really try to deny the will to freedom and to pay off the guilt arising in consequence. The so-called end-setting, although it represents a giving in, an acquiescence to the denied will to freedom of the patient, inevitably brings with it all the reactions of the counter-will and the struggle to accept the own will which appears here under the guise of outer force, the therapist’s decision to stop. In spite of all the different forms and contents which this will conflict can take on in the terms described above, still in relation to its dynamics, actually only two ways of reaction are possible: either the individual accepts his own will to freedom, his growth toward independence and self-reliance, and in the situation turns it about as if to say, “Then at least I do it myself;” or he denies the separation or its meaning, reacting to it with earlier pangs of parting (dreams), not in the sense of a repetition compulsion, but with the tendency to enlarge the meaning of the present artistically because of guilt feeling; in reality, however, to minimize it in terms of the past (comfort mechanism). With the first reaction one must let the individual actually complete the separation himself even if it manifests itself predominantly in the forms of resistance. These can be overcome, not in terms of content, but dynamically and constructively in relation to the will conflict. In the second case one must bring out the emotional denial which is only another negative form of resistance, while one points out behind the

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traumatic contents of the past as presented, the present separation experience to which the patient is reacting with guilt attachment instead of with self emancipation.

In this retrieving of the actual by a past separation experience, it is important to distinguish between a parting which the individual works at himself as in giving up parents or others in authority and love objects, and a separation which came upon the individual traumatically, as abandonment, for which birth, weaning and other biological necessities may be used symbolically. With each of these two possibilities, one a being separated, the other a separating of one’s self, the attitude of will, and accordingly the guilt reaction, is different. The “being separated” is apprehended as compulsory and is responded to with counter-will, which can manifest itself not only as resistance, or protest, but also in the form of love fixation and gratitude. Separating oneself, as will expression, is apprehended as a freeing, a getting loose to which the individual reacts with guilt, but even so he can rationalize it ethically. Usually in this case the individual tries to transform the force of the separation into a wished for release, but also to motivate the will to parting forcibly, that is, through fate “I cannot help myself, it is to be.” In each of these two cases the attempt is to deny reality in the sense of will assertion, while the therapeutic experience, just the reverse, must aim at making real the unreality, and this is accomplished psychologically through the setting up of an obstacle to the patient’s will, represented in the counter-will of the therapist. This will obstacle can only have a therapeutic effect, however, if the reactions to it are correctly understood and constructively used. For what is made real here, is not merely the experience of parting and the situation in which it is manifested, but the individual himself, as a separate, different, independent being. All other attempts at making real as the patient himself strives to express them through alteration of his own situation, or through realization of the therapeutic situation, only lead away from the making real of himself as an individual, just as do all justification and Unburdening attempts in an unreal assistant ego. Only with the cutting off of all these possibilities does the own ego become real, that is, does the individual recognize and accept himself as independent of the other.

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To this making real of his own ego, the individual reacts in the actual separation experience with fear which is not an original biological reaction in the sense of the death fear, but on the contrary is life fear, that is, fear of realizing the own ego as an independent individuality. Accordingly fear as experienced in birth, is and remains the only real fear, that is, fear of one’s own living and experiencing. All other fear, whether it concerns death or castration anxiety, represents no biological problem in the narrower sense of the word, but a problem of human consciousness underlying all possibilities of interpretation and explanation. The consciousness problem lying at the root of separation, and the fear reaction following
it, is again a problem of human individualization. In the psychic separation experience as it is represented in the development of individuality through the giving up of outlived parts of one’s own past, we have to recognize an individualistic expression of the biological principle of growth. With human beings this whole biological problem of individuation depends psychically on another person, whom we then value and perceive psychologically as parents, child, beloved friend. These several persons represent then for the individual the great biological forces of nature, to which the ego binds itself emotionally and which then form the essence of the human and his fate. The psychic meaning of these individuals bound to us in feeling, comprehend in themselves, so to say, all biological, social and moral ties and this so much the more, the more individualistically, that is, however, the more independently, the development of the own ego takes place. In other words, these emotional ties which are so hard to loosen and can be loosened only in the separation experience, represent simultaneously the removal of guilt to the species, to society, and to one’s own ego.

In the separation experience itself then the individual reacts with a strengthening of the emotional binding to the one person now representing all other ties, but at the same time with a will to freedom which directs itself against the compulsion to dependence on any one individual. The will to freedom can only be admitted timidly and gradually because it is denied on the one hand because of the emotional tie, and inhibited by fear on the other. While the expression of will to independence and self-reliance is bound up with guilt and is accordingly denied, the fear

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serves as a motivation of this denial tendency by heightening the in order to make separation itself impossible. The fear, therefore, is not to be explained libidinally from the loss of the love fixation, or loss of the maternal; rather the love fixation itself is a reaction to the guilt which follows from the will to separation already perceived. This will to separation is in fact exactly as biological and human a principle of life as the will to union, only in consequence of the guilt associated with it, it can manifest itself much more seldom and less openly than the will to union, which removes the guilt. Here lies the whole problem of the neurosis and the basis of all therapeutic technique.

In the neurotic because of his strong individual development and the denial of the will lying at its root, attempts at separation usually result in a negative destructive way, and likewise the tendency to unite hypertrophies in a compensatory fashion as guilt feeling. Psychoanalysis without recognizing the will problem has taken guilt feeling for a reaction to the tendency to union, which manifests itself predominantly in biological sexual content. Freud, therefore, as we have pointed out repeatedly has always explained guilt as a reaction to the sexual will, while actually it is a reaction to the individual will, that is, the counter-will which is to be justified and removed by the physical and psychic union of love. Adler again has interpreted will not in the biological sense of sexuality but in the social sense of striving
for power, and corresponding to this social content, finds salvation in social feeling, not as Freud does, in sex feeling. Jung, who conceives of guilt more deeply than Freud and Adler, in cosmic terms, sees salvation cosmically also in the form of the collective unconscious, which is individual but at the same time includes the more than individual. No one of them, however, has recognized the individual will as such, and the individual guilt for it, which is neither biological, social, nor cosmic, although the individual can interpret it afterwards in one or another meaning.

From the individual will there follows of necessity the will to freedom, to separation, which one may not deny in terms of the neurotic ideology through love emotion, as the Freudian theory does, nor condemn it socially as the Adlerian pedagogy does, nor justify it collectively and morally as does the religiously oriented doctrine of Jung. As I said before the will to separation

represents exactly as much of a life principle as the will to union, but the first, in consequence of the attached guilt is denied, while the second presses into the foreground in the power and fullness of our sex and love life. Purely biologically apparently, separation is even the more primary, and probably also a stronger life principle for we find increase and propagation without union merely through separation just as there are animals who live neither in herds nor in families, or as animals even in the group usually remain much more isolated than humans. However that be, the will to union in men, as it expresses itself in social and national social feelings in general, or in family, friendship and love relations individually, seems to me to be compensatory guilt reaction to separation, which has found its strongest and most acute expression in individualistic will consciousness.

Now it is this will to separation with the understanding and constructive utilization of which the therapeutic experience is chiefly concerned. For here also the individual tries to deny it with the summoning of all the denial tendencies, whether they be manifestations of love or of guilt feeling or of both. In its psychological understanding and the emotional utilization of the will to separation, the work of constructive therapy reaches its peak, for it is here that the will guilt problem reveals itself in its primary form. The will to union pushes into the foreground here as elsewhere in life not only because union redeems guilt and removes it, but also because as self-willed, union is pleasurable, while separation, primarily perceived as forced upon one biologically, is always felt as compulsion, even if it is willed by the individual. The therapeutic experience must allow the individual for the first time to perceive such a necessary parting as self-willed and also to carry it through as a will victory, which ordinarily only the creative man is able to do. Then the patient will react neither with the uniting tendencies of love and guilt feeling, nor with the denial of the separation pain, which in reality he does not perceive and therefore can easily ascribe to the other. For he reacts as if he could not desert the therapist because the latter would suffer too much. Probably a bit of guilt reaction still inheres, as if the
patient would still say, “I cannot go because it hurts the other!” But he says also, “I go, although it hurts the other, as long as it does not hurt me.”

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This constructive freeing brings us back to the reality problem. In the therapeutic experience the will to separation which leads to the speedy close of the analysis appears quite spontaneously, if from the beginning one conceives it dynamically as an ethical will problem and not morally as a sexual guilt problem. The patient, who originally has fled into the unreal analytic situation from a painful reality, the cause of which lies in his conflicting inner life, in the separation experience perceives the therapeutic situation as too real; not in the sense of the transference love which actually makes it unreal, but emotionally real as awareness of his isolated ego, which confirms, wants this separation from the other. From this making real of his own ego, his individuality, he would gladly flee back to life reality, which not only affords and permits less hard and painful projections and justifications, denials and rationalizations, identifications and illusions than the therapeutic process, but also demands them of him. as they are necessary for living. Not from resistance to sexuality, even when interpreted as infantile (as Œdipus and castration complex) or as actual transference love, will the patient want to leave the therapeutic experience. He flees much more before his own inner truth, before his self-responsibility as a willing, responsible individual to the comforting ideologies and illusions, of which so-called reality consists. But one must not let this step back into life be made as flight from himself, nor seek to hinder it as resistance to therapy. For not only must the patient believe in his therapeutic experience, no matter what its ideology or interpretation, he must also believe in general and above all in himself as a self-reliant individual, different and differentiated from others. He has to face in this separation process the guilt which he cannot deny nor pay off, but can only bear and expiate as best he may in actual living.
"Schicksal, ich folge dir! Und wollt ich nicht, ich müsst es doch und unter Seufzen tun!"

"Fate, I follow you! And if I would not, yet must I though with sighs!"

—Nietzsche

The problem of separation and guilt in the last analysis has shown itself to be the internal conflict present in all of us between creature and creator, which manifests itself in the neurotic type as an ethical will-guilt problem. The analytic situation reveals to us what we find confirmed in common experience, that whenever it is a matter of a step toward independence and self-reliance, which the individual does not want to be responsible for himself, an “other” is made to play the part of fate. This is the role which the therapist plays also and one he cannot avoid, for when the patient decides to come for help he has reached a certain point in his will conflict where he definitely wants something, for the assertion of which he seeks the moral justification of the therapist. Consequently what he presents as the goal he wishes to attain through the therapy is, for the most part, not what he actually wants, or at least not exclusively, for he must still deny the will and try to justify it through the content of the therapeutic experience. He has, to a certain extent the will to self-determination without the capacity for it and therefore must motivate it in terms of fate by means of a self-created experience. The therapeutic factor therefore is the curative effect of seeking and creating for himself the object which not only grants the self-determination he wants, but forces it on him like fate. The constructive contribution of the therapist is the tracing back of these tendencies and motivations to the patient’s own will conflict, so that the therapist only represents a way around to

the ego, yes, the justifying and affirming part of the ego itself, which the individual tries to put outside of himself as the power of fate.

In the person of the therapeutic helper of every kind is personified, only in a more real way than in life, the so-called power of fate, the idea of which perhaps rests on the fact of our biological existence; at all events in its psychic-spiritual meaning it represents a projection phenomenon related to the idea of God, no matter in what form it appears, and is always utilized only to take over the responsibility for our
will, for whose autonomous self-determination there is perhaps no better proof than the enormous part which the fate idea plays in the history of mankind. In any kind of therapeutic experience it seems necessary that the individual project his fate-creating will upon the other, in order to unburden himself as creature, of the creative guilt. He must, as it were, undeify himself in order to humanize himself. In the constructive experience of parting, the will problem, divided as it is into two roles in the analytic situation, should be unified, since the individual is placed in a position to take over and affirm the creative role of the self and its fate-creating will. Even the neurosis is something self-created, an expression of will which would create its own downfall rather than confess its powerlessness. In this sense the neurosis is individual self-determination but it manifests itself in being fate, not in making independent. It is a self-creating of the individual, but in the compulsive form of fate, not in the freedom of creation. In it the individual is at once creator and creature, only the creative expression of will is a negative one, resting on the denial of the creator role.

In the therapeutic experience the individual is not only the creature who personifies his creator role in the other, but he becomes, in the course of the process, particularly in the separation experience, the creator who tries to exercise his creative role on the therapist instead of on himself. The therapist too must guard against trying to play fate or wanting to do the things to which the patient with his tendency to deification would so gladly seduce him and to which his position inclines anyway. On the other hand, the patient is easily ready to play fate with the therapist himself since he makes him his fate. All the different roles into which he transforms the therapist correspond really to such a playing fate, which betrays itself here clearly as the creative tendency of the will, making the other into a representative of a bit of his own past (or present). But this playing fate with the other becomes the creating of his own fate in the experience of separation, where he lifts the therapist to the role of creator, divine or parental, in order to free himself as creature from him. It is the same constructive manner of presentation by means of the past, that I have already described in the “Trauma of Birth” as a comfort mechanism and recognize here as will expression. The individual comforts himself by remembering already overcome separations instead of feeling the pain of the present, but he does this rightly, for the pain of parting is for the most part only guilt reaction to the constructive will to separation which creator and creature have in common, even though it is differently interpreted by both, by the creature as compelling fate, by the creator as free self-determination.

Now we can define the problem of separation and guilt which has unveiled itself to us as the problem of creator and creature, as the distinction between making fate and being fate (fated), or as self-determination and fate, a contrast in terms of which, the different aspects of the will conflict can be summed up. The past, likeness, force and guilt correspond to fate; while the present, difference, love...
and separation correspond to self-determination. The latter are will phenomena based on the freedom of the individual experience, the former are negative will phenomena based on the desired but denied dependence on other stronger powers than the individual ego. Making fate, like being fate, prove themselves to be, psychologically, will phenomena of positive and negative nature. They have the tendency to make others dependent on us and ourselves on others, and show themselves in the creative type and its negative counterpart the neurotic as manifestations of inner will-guilt conflict. While the creative man creates first of all himself, therefore in his creative will aims at independence, the neurotic destroys himself, therefore not only denies his creative will and represents himself as creature, but denies himself even as creature. This denial cannot be removed therapeutically as long as he only affirms himself as creature, to which the Œdipus ideology of the Freudian

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analysis leads him, but only when he can also affirm himself as creator. This is possible only in terms of the constructive release of the separation experience, in which the patient first wants to exercise his newly awakened creative will on the therapist before he applies it to himself and his own fate. One may not then interpret these expressions of creative self-will as resistance even if they manifest themselves in these terms, nor interpret the desire of the man to create himself as revolt against the father, and the same will reaction in the woman as “masculinity complex.”

The therapeutic experience is characterized by the fact that both patient and therapist are at once creator and creature. The patient may not be only creature, he must also become creator; while the therapist plays not only the creator role, but at the same time must serve the creative will of the patient as material. This happens automatically anyway and follows in the therapeutic experience just as unavoidably as in ordinary experience. Both the therapist and the patient have created something in common, whose sharing they must relinquish, perhaps not only from the ethical demands of the therapeutic situation itself, but from the ethical demand, speaking absolutely, which does not permit the individual to keep or possess that which is created by him whether it concerns parents and their child, or work in a spiritual-creative sense; over all, rules the ethical ideal, not a taboo which only symbolizes it, or real motives which only rationalize it, that the individual separate himself completely from the product and the product from him. However strong the tendency to maintain it as part of the ego, to the will something which belongs as much to the ego as the work to the creator, offers no more inducement and it turns to new conquests. This also describes the moment in the therapeutic experience when the time for separation has come, the critical moment between fate and self-determination.
Fate and self-determination correspond psychologically to two different attitude patterns of the individual to the will-guilt problem. Fate is causal force, self-determination is ethical freedom of will. The principle of causality applied to the psychic, leads necessarily to the acceptance of a force which Nietzsche has described in terms of the pleasure principle as “die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen” (the eternal recurrence of the same) and

Freud in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” as repetition compulsion. The only force which rules in psychic life is the force of will which is the psychic representative of causality. Yet the ethical manifestations of this will principle represent the opposite of causality and force, namely, freedom and self-determination. What repeats itself, or as Nietzsche says, what eternally recurs is only willing, whose freedom even the man on a definite level of denial interprets as fate, no matter whether it concerns a religious, fatalistic or scientific interpretation. Nearest to the psychological level, as I have shown elsewhere1 comes the heroic interpretation of the Greek legends of genius which make the individual responsible for his fate, that is, his willing. The heroic or creative type, it is true, also interprets freedom of will as fate, but as self chosen and thus transposes force into freedom, since he affirms will. The neurotic, destructive type, because of his denial tendency interprets freedom of will as the compulsion of fate and reacts to it with counter-will and guilt feeling.

In the therapeutic experience, where will denial is transformed into will affirmation, a so-called “fate chain” may appear in the patient’s recognition of his own will causality, which elsewhere he would interpret as the compulsion of fate and either personify it really in another person of stronger will or symbolize it as an unreal power. The reality problem thus proves to be dependent on the will, or rather on the individual’s attitude toward it. Where reality appears as fate, it is seen to have been created by the individual himself in the service of his will-guilt conflict. Not only is this fateful reality effective as external force which symbolizes the internal force of will, but as a creation, a product of the individual, it acts as a release. The so-called “reality” upon which most neurotics and theories of neuroses place all the blame for neurotic suffering, proves to be the greatest help in the struggle of the individual against his internal ethical will conflict, because it affords him unburdening and objectification, displacement and rationalization, personification and denial, even more than the night time dream, which actually throws the ego entirely on itself, and accordingly is either painful or in waking reveals all these illusory mechanisms as deceiving or disillusioning. Reality usually does not do this, but has an

1 See chapter “Creation and Guilt” in “Truth and Reality.”
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eminently therapeutic effect as long as the individual perceives it not in terms of the negative denial of will as compulsory fate, but creates and transforms it in the freedom and choice of will expression and at the same time by means of all the above-mentioned illusory mechanisms is in a position to interpret and to affirm as if it were that which we will.

All these mechanisms which I designate as illusory, we see denied in the neurosis; we may not call them “neurotic” on that account, however, as psychoanalysis inclines to do when it wants to educate the individual to the so-called adaptation to reality, instead of making possible to him its creative fashioning and acceptance in terms of will affirmation. The will accomplishment manifesting itself in creative phantasy is no substitute for real satisfaction, but something essentially different. Real satisfaction can never be substituted for in phantasy, just as phantasy wishes can never be satisfied by reality. Both spheres are and remain separated because in the one (phantasy) the individual always creates autocratically in terms of his own will, which, it is true, he can do in reality also under favorable conditions, but in this case the material is the other individual with a (counter) will of his own while in phantasy the ego itself affords both material and counter-will. Just as the illusory mechanisms do not make possible to us the adaptation to reality but its transformation and affirmation according to our will, so simultaneously they throw all difficulties and conflicts within, into the own ego, where they appear as will-guilt conflict. This inner conflict is therefore the necessary consequence of aggressive taking possession of the outer world, and represents an essential psychological antithesis. One cannot expect either from life or from a therapeutic release, that the individual remain free of both outer and inner conflict. It can only be a matter of a balance between the two, which, however, is not attained once and for all, but must be created anew and ever anew. This comes about through experience, but only when it is not interpreted as fate but is created in free self-determination.

Here we can define self-determination as a voluntary and conscious creating of one’s own fate. This means to have no fate in an external sense, but to accept and affirm oneself as fate and fate creating power. This inner fate includes self determination

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also, in the sense of the pleasurable will struggle with ourselves, the conflict which we affirm as long as we interpret it as consciously willed self creation, and not neurotically as the force of stronger supernatural forces or earthly authorities. Everything depends on how this unavoidable self creation of our own fate is perceived in our feeling and interpreted by our consciousness, and this again is determined by whether we have essentially an outer or inner ideal, in terms of which we want to create
ourselves and our fate. It is here that the interplay of will, feeling, and thinking is translated into action which forms and transforms the outside reality. The true self reveals itself in none of these spheres, however, but always only in the other self, that which we want to be, because we are not, in contrast to that which we have become and do not want to be. Accordingly therapy, which shifts to suit the momentary experience, cannot rest on the firm foundation of psychological truth. The manifest truth is the real of the moment, and as such constructive as long as it remains illusionistic, while the immediately latent represents the psychically true, which is always interpretative and as such inhibiting and destructive.

Here we have the contrast between fate and self-determination as the most general formulation of the conflict which I have described in “Truth and Reality” as the difference between knowledge and experience. The creative expression of the personality in real experience with all the deception of its emotional displacement and denial, is constructive. Self-knowledge (introspection) is and remains destructive with all its content of truth. We here strike the problem of the neuroses as a problem of consciousness. If, instead of seeking for the causes of the illness of the neurotic, we only ask ourselves about the causes of good health in other people, it is evident that it all rests on lack of understanding, misunderstanding, ignorance of their own psychology, in short on illusions. The knowledge of the average man about his own psychic processes and motivation proves to be so false that it works really only in its complete spuriousness, in an illusion troubled by no kind of knowing. Reality is always emotionally false exactly like the manifest dream content, but as this reveals, is equally constructive, that is, contains illusionistic elements and mechanisms which are necessary for real living. Therefore

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there can be neither a natural scientific nor an intellectual scientific psychology, but only a will and feeling psychology which works destructively in itself if it is not philosophically oriented, that is, aimed at epistemology and ethics. For the therapy follows from the fact that it can be grounded not on the psychological truth of the individual, but on his reality experience, on the dynamic expression of personality. Accordingly, the patient needs reality personified in the therapist, who represents the only therapeutic agent, namely the human counter-will, which by virtue of its own psychic truth can bring the neurotic sufferer back to real living. This experience expresses itself in all the reality illusions of projection and personification, until the patient through and in the leaving experience accomplishes the great sundering of ties, and separates himself as an individual from the other and all that he personifies. This is the really human step, away from all that binds, to the essential self of the individual while, all former ones in the neurotic were directed by a compensatory clinging to his bonds as guilt reaction to the will to freedom and independence.
This step from the fated to the self-determining attitude in the therapeutic experience does not work egocentrically or tend to alienate from reality, if the individual strives for the acceptance of himself as fate determining instead of an acceptance of reality as fate. The whole emphasis of experience is changed from the battle against a real fate which has created him, to the acceptance of his own willing individuality which not only creates its own reality, but also affirms that which is given, in terms of self-determination. While the average man perceives himself really and adapts reality to his ego, that is, makes it acceptable through all the previously mentioned illusions, the neurotic perceives himself as unreal and reality as unbearable, because with him the mechanisms of illusion are known and destroyed by self-consciousness. He can no longer deceive himself about himself and disillusions even his own ideal of personality. He perceives himself as bad, guilt laden, inferior, as a small, weak, helpless creature, which is the truth about mankind, as Oedipus also discovered in the crash of his heroic fate. All other is illusion, is deception, but necessary deception in order to be able to bear one’s self and thereby life. The neurotic type represents a declaration of bankruptcy in human self-knowledge, as he destroys not only the unreal will justification of the religious projection and the real justification attempts of earthly authority and love ideals, but also his own ethical ideal formation through his too strong guilt consciousness. We recognize in him the human type who in an attempt at ethical justification masks even the ideal formation of his own individual ego. The weak, dependent, evil ego recognizes itself in him as the helpless creature which must justify itself through the creator, no matter whether it relates to a cosmic creator like the occidental God, an individual creator like the father of a family or finally the self creating personality who interprets his own individual ego as ideal, and as such puts it in place of real and unreal symbols of authority.

The modern neurotic type has thus completed the human process of internalization which reaches its peak in psychological self-knowledge, but also is reduced to an absurdity. He needs no more knowing; only experience and the capacity for it may yet be able to save him. Therefore it is of no consequence whether we call his knowledge psychologically true or false. The essential fact is that it contains a self-interpretation which is opposed to experience. In this sense one cannot say that the neurotic interprets falsely and psychoanalysis correctly; they merely interpret differently, but the fact remains that both are forced to interpret. Also it makes no difference whether it is correctly or falsely motivated, since there is no general criterion but only the fact that in general, life must be interpreted and that the interpretation must be believed, that is, accepted as illusion.

The neurotic of today, however, already burdened with psychoanalytic knowledge, can no longer accept therapeutically even a natural science illusion, having already destroyed the religious and personal ones on which it rests, with the mounting consciousness of guilt. He is helped not by more knowing, but only
by willing, not by knowledge of his fate but by the living of his self-determination. This is no longer possible through the creation of new illusions, either real or spiritual, even if they appear in the guise of natural science ideology, in itself a continuation of disillusioning, or in the form of broader knowledge, but only in terms of the acceptance of the self, of the individuality as given, yes, as the only reality of which a doubt is not possible.

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Since the individual actually feels himself as real in the constructive separation experience, he trusts himself again to will without being obliged to justify this will in the other morally or to react with guilt to it. Yes, he can even give up having to justify his will ethically in his own ideal, if he accepts this ideal in a creative experience as his own real self. The average man always plays a role, always acts, but actually plays only himself, that is, must pretend that he plays, in order to justify his being; the neurotic, on the contrary, refuses this acting, this pretending, and yet is unable to be himself without will justification. With the impossibility of acting, this hypocritical rationalizing of the will falls away, but the neurotic is unable to put it through on his own responsibility. However, in dynamic therapy as he can no longer assign this justifying role to others, there remains to him only the solution of not pretending to play what he is, but really to be it; in other words, to accept himself as he is. Then self and ideal coincide, and are perceived as real, while the outer reality becomes material for the assertion of will and a therapeutic means of guilt unburdening. In both avenues of expression we find a new source of guilt to be sure, but this can never be overcome intellectually, as it is the consequence of will itself and can only be continuously expiated in creative experience, where it works as individual guilt, not as neurotic guilt consciousness.

In the therapy of the individual neurotic we deal therefore not with knowledge or ignorance, nor with the need for an “other” or “better” knowing, but with willing, to which knowing in the beginning serves as rationalization and only later opposes itself inhibitingly. The freedom of the will, to which the individual must attain, relates first of all to the self, the individuality; so to will this, as it is, forms the goal of constructive therapy while all forms of educational therapy wish to alter the individual m terms of a given ideology as he ought to be. From the latter viewpoint the individual must accept this ideology as authoritative, that is—believe; from the former, he must first believe in himself instead of being measured by the yardstick of any ideology in terms of which he perceives himself as bad and inferior. This feeling of rejection in relation to an unattainable ideal, designates the individual as neurotic, while the creative man who

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perceives the rejection of the contemporary ideology first in terms of people, affirms himself as an individual, as different, and then creates a new ideology for himself which, corresponding to the level of consciousness attained, always works constructively for a definite phase, whether it be in heroic, artistic, or philosophic terms. For all constructiveness is temporary and limited, yes, it consists just in working out and affirming the new aspect of consciousness as immediately manifested in the eternal will-guilt conflict. The earlier this new aspect can be recognized and the more intensively it can be affirmed, the more it can be utilized constructively. This is valid for the therapeutic situation as well as for experience in general, which it represents psychically.

In one important point, however, the therapeutic experience differs from real experience. The latter is essentially an outer, the therapeutic an inner experience which may be made external and concrete only far enough for the patient to recognize and accept it as his own self in the analytic reality created by him. In this sense the individual therapy of the neurosis is philosophical, which Freud will not admit because he thinks in the medical ideology in which he has grown up. But he himself has found that the neurosis presents not a medical but a moral problem and accordingly the therapy is not causal but constructive, that is, a process which enables the sufferer to reach a level of development which he cannot attain alone, whose necessity, however, is laid down in terms of continuing self-consciousness. The patient needs a world view and will always need it, because man always needs belief, and this so much more, the more increasing self-consciousness brings him to doubt. Psychotherapy does not need to be ashamed of its philosophic character, if only it is in a position to give to the sufferer the philosophy that he needs, namely, faith in himself.

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PART TWO:

THE THERAPIST AND THE NEUROTIC AS COMPLEMENTARY TYPES

“Es ist hiermit ebenso als mit dem ersten Gedanken des Kopemicus bewandt, der, nachdem es mit der Erklärung des Himmelsbewegungen nicht gut fortwollte wenn er annahm das ganze Sternenheer drehe sich um den Zuschauer, versuchte, ob es nicht besser gelingen möchte, wenn er den Zuschauer sich drehen und dagegen die Sterne in Ruhe liesz.”

“It is here as it was with the first thoughts of Copernicus, who when his explanation of the movements of the heavenly bodies did not work on the assumption that the whole galaxy of stars turned about the spectator, tried to see whether he would not succeed better if he allowed the spectators to turn and the stars to remain at rest.”

-Kant
If one considers psychological therapy from the standpoint of the total situation of the patient, both in its practical and in its ideological meaning, it is evident that the therapist is not to be compared to the physician who, on the basis of his skill and of confidence (transference) applies a method of healing. The therapist plays a role in the total situation created in the beginning of the treatment, which is not exhausted in the sum total of technique, even if one includes the so called “counter transference.” His role becomes intelligible only under the hypothesis already formulated in the first chapter of this volume which conceives of the human being as the remedy, not the wisdom comprehended in his technical skill. One recognizes at once, however, that this human remedy, although at bottom always the same, is nevertheless utilized differently by each patient, and accordingly works differently for different individuals. This fact contributes a positive constructive element which goes far beyond the comparison with the medical remedy in that the patient not only wishes to use the therapist as he is in himself but creates or re-creates him, that is, the total experience into that which he needs for his individual help. That something is exacted of the patient by the therapist other than he expects, is one of the oldest fundamental theses of psychoanalysis. However, that the therapist, whether he is conscious of it or not, must also give to the patient what the latter wills, seems to me to be just as true because otherwise the suffering person can never become well.

In the consequent battle of ideologies between the therapist and the patient which actually represents a will conflict, resistances are possible on both sides; they must appear on the part of the therapist just as unavoidably as on the side of the patient, as long as to the latter’s ideology of illness is opposed a definite ideology of cure. This unavoidable situation may still be utilized therapeutically if the tacit assumption does not persist that the therapist, on the basis of his knowledge (technical education) is in the right and that the patient must be wrong, of which his suffering is the only proof. Experience has taught, however, that as the therapist can only heal in his own way, the patient also can only become well in his own way; that is, whenever and however he wills, which moreover is already clear through his decision to take treatment and often enough also through his ending of it.

One must accordingly keep in mind the possibility that the therapeutic ideology of the therapist can itself be falsely oriented, whether it be in its totality, an expression of a definite therapist type who
employs a certain ideology for his own justification, or whether it be in relation to the particular neurotic case who uses his own dynamic of recovery. Information on this only an analysis of the therapist could give, which would bring into consideration the vocational psychology of the entire personality and not merely the libidinal aspects. I have attempted in the following chapters a description of the constructive therapist type, as he hides potentially in the patient also; that is, I have attempted to picture the therapist in relation to the neurotic type whose sleeping productive powers I have tried to reveal, since I have not measured him by the normal but have compared him with the creative person. I am conscious that there has resulted no exact representation but rather a portrait of the neurotic, for I believe that a conception of him which is merely true to reality can lead to no constructive therapy. Only insight into that which he is potentially, not the picture of what he should be normally, can form the foundation of a dynamic therapy. If the neurotic seems to be drawn too constructively, still this seems to me to be the only really therapeutic conception. In psychoanalysis the theory is oriented in terms of normal psychology, which lets the neurotic appear only destructively. If psychoanalysis has emphasized in the creative individual, the human, yes even the less than human instincts, I attempt to show in the neurotic the superhuman, divine spark.

Now the creative can never be purely individual; the individually constructive must at the same time be collective, or at least work collectively in order even to attain constructive meaning. Formerly religion was the collective binding force,

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ideational as well as emotional. Psychology now presumes to take over this function, but the attempt, as I have shown in my study “Seelenglaube und Psychologie” (1930) must come to grief against the fact that psychology represents a purely individualistic ideology, indeed the most individualistic ideology possible while every effective therapeutic ideology must be collective. Without a collective ideology not only is religion as cure for souls impossible, but the same is true of art, education and therapy. Not only is every kind of healing extra-individual or more correctly, super-individual, but also the purely psychological consideration or description of the individual can produce only a one-sided, distorted, neurotic picture of a human being. The concept of the neurotic has thus moved from the narrow medical sphere to the broader social sphere not only in Adler’s sense, for whom neurotic means merely unsocial, but in the dynamic sense in which neurotic means unconstructive and unproductive, that is, individualistic, without the collective compensation of productivity. While, practically speaking, both are necessary for a harmonious life, theoretically a more definite discrimination between the two spheres which have been mixed in different ways in the psychoanalytic schools, is necessary. Freud’s individual therapy rests on the foundation of a sociological psychology, Adler’s individual psychology leads to a social therapy and Jung, who holds a middle path in this matter has not laid the bridge from the socially collective to the individually productive which alone leads to constructive therapy because, fascinated
by the unknown and mystical, he could not press ahead to clear psychological concepts. Freud has tacitly brought sociological ideas into his psychology where they do not belong, as for example the super-ego which represents nothing other than the social self, from which pangs of conscience arise. The origin of this conscience is a psychological problem but Freud attempted to explain it sociologically, since he derived it from the outside influence of the father authority. The question as to why the human being is social seems to me to be a psychological problem as well, since it has to do in the last analysis with a feeling of belonging together, based on the fact that the human being is not only an individual but as such also part of a larger whole. The psychological paradox, that man in some form or

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other must and will give is soluble only in ethical terms, because we are not our own no matter whether we perceive the guilt religiously toward God, socially toward the father, or biologically toward the mother.

Theoretical psychology, however, must be treated as purely individualistic and more thoroughly than has yet been done, and must be purified of sociological and biological concepts which, it is true play a powerful role in human soul life but only as contentual ideologies of the collective type which provide material for the individual’s dynamism and lend it its constructiveness. These collective concepts might well be the content of psychology but not its object. Probably, however, they constitute the essential therapeutic agent just because they work as collective ideologies, constructively, while the individual psychology has in itself no therapeutic effect. If in this work dedicated to therapy, I introduce purely psychological concepts instead of the psychobiological and social psychological misconceptions of psychoanalysis, I do so in the interest of a sharper separation of these spheres, which seems to me scientifically necessary. Even if we know that factually the individual never appears pure but always mixed with the collective, and accordingly we can operate therapeutically only in harmony with the social, still I consider it a methodological error to give expression to this complex state of affairs, in misconceptions. Where Freud speaks statically of id, ego and super-ego, I speak dynamically of impulse (instinct), emotion and will, thereby distinguishing the biological elements contained in the id, and the social aspects assimilated into the super-ego as given collective ideologies from the individual dynamic which lends them momentarily their psychological meaning and their practical effectiveness.

To the creation of an effective therapy belongs a purely psychological understanding of the individual dynamic, as well as the knowledge of the actually effective collective ideologies which fulfill him and make him human. These collective ideologies are indeed variable but within a definite cultural level momentarily given, and belong accordingly more to the field of the critic of culture than to that of the psychotherapist. For him, the individual dynamic constant in human nature is of importance, certainly not per se, as purely psychological therapy confuses it,
but in its connection with the social factors given at the moment, with which, however, it dare not be mixed but only combined. In this sense the first half of Book Two contains a purely psychological presentation of the neurotic as a definite human type to which we all belong. The therapeutic aspects will be treated in the second part which considers the analytic situation as social in the sense of a supplementary reality in which the extreme neurotic type is opposed to the therapist type. This division of the material into a theoretical and a practical part is not only in the interest of a simpler presentation, but demonstrates at the same time methodologically my own separation of individual psychology from the essentially different therapeutic process since the one possesses preponderantly knowledge value and the other the value of experience.
If we now cast a glance upon the therapeutic development of psychoanalysis in recent years, it is evident that the technical advance is in no way comparable to the theoretical development which is almost equivalent to a revision of the original libido theory into ego psychology. The reason why the theoretical advance has not eventuated in therapeutic improvement lies, in my opinion, in the fact that even this progress was more apparent than real insofar as well known but previously neglected or libidinally interpreted facts were accepted in their simple commonsense meaning, without being worked over theoretically. Accordingly this last phase of psychoanalysis has not led to the creation of an authentic ego psychology, but consists much more in an application of the already deposed libido theory to the ego, based on the concept of narcissism and culminating in the superego. The little that therapy has taken on in recent years, beyond the original Freudian conception, is only an application of the super-ego theory to the technique, which because of the schematic character of the “Ego and the Id,” appears more speculative than practical.

During this period, independently of the analytic libido theory

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and its application to the ego psychology, I had already placed the ego of the patient, as will, in the center of the analytic situation and reduced the analyst with his “technique” to an instrument of healing, of which the patient only makes use in order to find a temporary release from his will guilt-conflict. In my method, therefore, the analyst not only plays the libidinal role assigned to him by Freud, or the not essentially different superego role which Freud has recently recognized, but all possible roles, roles which he cannot know at all in advance and from which he could not withdraw even if he could foresee them. This psychological appropriation of the analyst by the patient is as little a resistance as the differences in their respective ideologies. It is just as inevitable as it is necessary and therapeutic, if the therapist knows how to utilize it. The interpretation of this appropriation as a “repetition” in Freud’s
meaning, misses the mark therapeutically, for even if the patient repeats, which would only be a natural expression of himself, he does not do it, nay more, cannot do it without changing at the same time, and whether one emphasizes the repetition or the change has a determinative difference for the therapy. The assumption that neglects this alteration tendency in favor of the repetition compulsion also overlooks the fact that even mere repetition in relation to the analyst serves a therapeutic aim, which corresponds either to a will to punish (abreaction in the resistance) or to improvement (development in the repetition) but can be utilized constructively if the therapist is not blocked by a narcissistic or pessimistic ideology. Instead of taking over the modest role of catalyster in this experience of the patient, emphasis on the repetition tendency as an unsurmountable resistance has led Freud to the theoretical assumption of a genuine masochism as an expression of the “death instinct,” which seems to me only to cloak therapeutic helplessness. In other words, the Freudian concept of resistance, which as I see it is derived from the narcissistic placing of the analyst in the center, leads necessarily to a therapeutic pessimism, for, in terms of a theory oriented from the analyst, every reaction of the patient must be interpreted as resistance; the repetition coming from the id, seems to be a resistance to the new, while the new manifests itself as resistance against the analyst in his role as super-ego. Only if one permits

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the ego of the patient to have value as an independent power can one overcome this sterile concept of resistance, recognize even in repetition the constructive elements and prize the new as a voluntary expression of personality, even if it should contradict the ideology of the analyst.

In contrast to this ideological therapy, the therapeutic utilization of the analytic situation itself has led me to a dynamic therapy which in every single case, yes in every individual hour of the same case, is different, because it is derived momentarily from the play of forces given in the situation and immediately applied. My technique consists essentially in having no technique, but in utilizing as much as possible experience and understanding that are constantly converted into skill but never crystallized into technical rules which would be applicable ideologically. There is a technique only in an ideological therapy where technique is identical with theory and the chief task of the analyst is interpretation (ideological), not the bringing to pass and granting of experience. This method effaces also the sharp boundary between patient and therapist to the extent that the latter sinks to the level of assistant ego and no longer rules the scene as chief actor. It is not merely that the patient is ill and weak and the therapist the model of health and strength, but the patient has been and still is, even in the analysis, his own therapist, while the analyst can become a destructive hindrance to cure. If this occurs, not merely as incidental resistance, but threatens to establish itself as a situation, the therapist must possess the superior insight to let the patient go free, even if he is still not adjusted in terms of the analytic ideology in its role as a substitute for reality. For real psychotherapy is not concerned primarily with adaptation
to any kind of reality, but with the adjustment of the patient to himself, that is, with his acceptance of his own individuality or of that part of his personality which he has formerly denied.

Thus one explains the paradox, that analytic failures often have therapeutic consequences; yes, in a certain sense an essential result of the therapeutic endeavor must be destroyed, namely the analytic situation itself in order to assure the curative result. This part of the therapy which one could perhaps compare to the removal of a bandage, is all the more difficult in the psychic

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sphere because the patient must do it himself and thereby easily runs into danger, either of tearing open the old wound or of not being able to unloosen the bandage at all. How this chief difficulty of psychotherapy can be overcome dynamically, is to be presented later. At all events it is only possible when the therapist here too permits the patient, unhindered by ideology, to bear this most important experience in his own way, without wishing to prescribe for him a definite way of leaving. All that the therapist can do is to take over with understanding the role falling to his lot, and to make clear to the patient the universal meaning of this experience which comprehends in itself the whole man, yes, almost the whole of humanness. This explanation, however, can be given only in the individual terminology of the particular patient and not in a general ideology which cannot give him understanding, but at most, knowledge. Knowledge alone does not liberate but freeing through experience can bring the insight afterwards, although even this is not essential to the result.

In order to comprehend the deep seated difference between dynamic therapy and the ideological therapy of psychoanalysis, one needs only to remember the first principle of Freudian technique, which still lies at the basis of his therapy ideologically, namely, that knowledge is curative, that the making conscious of the unconscious cures the neurosis. Here is revealed the fundamental confusion of theory and therapy. Even if the conveying of analytic knowledge to the patient ensues gradually and not in a systematic way, yet his cure remains tied to the acceptance of the theory, the acquaintance with which appears to be identified with the healing factor although it is well known that analysts of other schools have also gained curative results with their theories. We are concerned here not with the correctness of a particular theory, but with the broader problem, whether any ideological therapy, which interprets the patient according to a certain scheme, is useful in general for the treatment of individual neuroses, or whether, for that purpose, a dynamic therapy is not needed which rests on no universal ideology, but takes the dynamics of each particular case for the basis of the therapeutic action. The nucleus of such a conception was given in the cathartic method of Breuer which Freud, it is true, did not abandon but neglected increasingly in favor of the ideological

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therapy. Dynamic therapy is distinguished from the cathartic through its constructiveness, aiming far beyond mere abreaction, and differs from the psychoanalytic in this, that it permits insight to follow from the experience but expects no alteration in it from previous knowledge. The concern is not at all general truth, but only the individually important.

In the search for a theoretical explanation good for all neuroses, one stumbles upon such universal phenomena as the relation to parents (Œdipus complex), the difference between the sexes (castration complex), or the birth trauma, common human experiences, the consideration of which would finally lead every general etiology of the neuroses to absurdity. Moreover in particular cases one cannot proceed from a universal psychological principle, however well founded, such as the statement that sexuality or the aggressive will to power is the motive force of human behavior. The truer, the more universally valid such a principle is, the less will it avail for the understanding of the neurotic, whose problem consists just in a special departure from the norm, therefore in his individually different attitude to these basic phenomena of human life. If Freud in the case of an ego conflict seeks after sexual roots, there is no reason why Adler should be wrong when he searches for the ego root in case of a sexual conflict; an equal right for which Jung on his side has already interceded, although he has not gone beyond the doctrines of types, corresponding to these two viewpoints. Moreover, there are just as many types, or if one prefers, mixtures of types, as there are individuals, and also in the cases of neurosis that one classifies under the same group, as for example hysteria or cornpulsion neurosis, the individual differences in the structure and motivation were even more striking to me and appear more meaningful than the apparent similarity of a ground structure with which, even if it existed one could do nothing therapeutically.

In dynamic therapy, which does not aim at knowledge but strives to help, the general psychological understanding of the therapist is applied to permit him to comprehend the individual characteristic of the case earlier and more sharply. Meaning is not determined by the therapist’s static ideology, but by the therapeutic necessity of the patient. What in one case is a resistance, in another spells progress; for example, what manifests itself as resistance to change, may have constructive value as acceptance of the own self, when it occurs with a patient of too lofty ideal formation, one who is never satisfied and must learn to accept himself.
Thus dynamic therapy aims only at an alteration of attitude, of valuation toward what is given individually, and not at an ego change in the sense of a general ideology or of the individual idealization tendency of the patient. It is concerned with making useful the constructive tendencies already present in latent form, through a change in emphasis. At bottom, it rests on the acceptance of the personality as a whole with its entire ambivalence. For the attempt at alteration of the individual who is never satisfied with himself is just what has driven him into the neurosis, which in itself signifies a much more revolutionary character change than any therapy could ever undertake. The conflict among opposing tendencies in the individual is not, as it at first appeared to be, the cause of the neurosis, but the very basis of life, and the neurosis is only the expression of dissatisfaction with this condition of life, in the last analysis, a refusal of life itself. Accordingly the therapeutic agent, the individual will, has not only to settle this or that particular problem but the life problem itself, which must be affirmed by the individual instead of being denied.

In terms of this ambivalent basic conflict which can be made bearable and in favorable cases even constructive, through a dynamic re-balancing, the side which has not been in evidence before, whatever it may be, is increasingly brought to view in the course of the treatment not merely through interpretation but above all by an adequate reaction. Accordingly content, whether it be the patient’s material or the interpretation of the therapist, plays a subordinate role in comparison to the dynamics, that is, to the constructive utilization of the expressions of will of the growing ego, manifesting itself particularly as resistance. In order to prevent misunderstandings, I wish to call attention to the fact that my theory of the birth trauma is applied not so much from the point of view of content, as has been concluded from my first presentation (1923) but dynamically, as a universal symbol of the ego’s discovery of itself and of its separation from the momentary assistant ego, originally the mother, now the therapist. However, in order to be able to understand the separation experience in its full meaning and utilize it dynamically, one must have already understood the role which the therapist plays as assistant ego throughout the process, and this again is possible only if the therapist orients himself to the experience of the patient in its entirety and does not, on the contrary, want to exemplify his own theory in the patient.

A further essential difference between dynamic and ideological therapy lies in the fact that it is in no way oriented historically, neither in the interpretation of the analytic material as a repetition of the past, nor in the over-valuation of knowledge as a means for the amelioration of the future. Not only is the psychoanalytic ideology based on the presupposition of the average man as the norm but it also takes the creation of an ideal for its goal. The length of the Freudian analysis is explained by these two aspects of the historical attitude; first, the ceaseless investigation of the past and second, the complete re-
establishment of the patient for the future, for all time. Both are not only unnecessary but also impossible, nay more, they are even anti-therapeutic because the problem is diverted from the present of the therapeutic situation, in which lie not only the difficulties of the patient but also all possibilities of healing. Nor is it intelligible why the neurotic who takes human problems harder than the average anyway should be protected by therapy from all future troubles. It is the idea of finishing the analysis in the sense of completion, which naturally can never be realized, that underlies such therapeutic ambition, and this again is only comprehensible as over-valuation of the analyst and his technical skill. Dynamic therapy is content to help the individual over a momentary or temporary blocking by releasing in him the impulse to free himself so that he may then continue on his own way. From this direct help in the present one may expect an improvement for the future, much more than from a final and complete analysis after which the individual, having once accepted the analytic ideology is no longer capable of adaptation. Certainly one must not overlook the fact that the patient himself may prefer ideological therapy because it is based less on self responsibility than the dynamic; in this sense, psychoanalysis, however much individual psychology it may bring out in treatment, is still not an individualized therapy, since it offers to the

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patient an ideology sanctioned by a certain group, through the acceptance of which he can feel himself a member of a definite communion.

The slight valuation which psychoanalysts of rigid observance put upon the so called “actual conflict” of the patient, seems to me to arise fundamentally from the fact that they do not know how to evaluate it; accordingly they analyze the past in order to assure the patient of a conflict-free life in the future. This, however, can take place only historically and ideologically, while in the present the dynamic alone is of value. To what misunderstandings my conception is exposed, where it cannot completely be silenced is shown by a polemically intended remark of Helene Deutsch in which she meets my reproach that psychoanalysis neglects the actual conflict in favor of the historical past, with this statement of Freud’s, “The actual conflict is only intelligible and soluble if one follows it back into the previous history of the patient.” One does not need to doubt this, but everything depends on how this going back takes place. Freud closed the statement just given with the words “and goes the way which his libido has gone in becoming sick.” Perhaps it is not enough, however, to follow the path of the libido in order to solve the actual conflict, an experience of failure which I know many analysts have had. On the other hand we all know numberless neurotic conflicts which have been solved without going back to the past, yes, without any therapeutic help, purely dynamically in the present situation. Perhaps this is even a fundamental life principle, the continuous dynamic solution of conflicts in the present. Be that as it may, the most serious criticism which I have made against psychoanalysis is this, that it interprets the actual analytic situation
historically as repetition of the past and does not understand how to evaluate it in its dynamic present meaning.

It has been said that my utilization of the present leads to the danger of suggestion, which is anathema to all analysts. Even this prejudice seems to me ideologically founded, for therapeutically I do not know what could be brought against suggestion provided it worked. If I could heal by means of suggestion, I should do it without being ashamed of it. However, if there exists any danger of suggestion in dynamic therapy it is rather the possibility that one might allow oneself to be

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influenced by the patient, instead of wanting to suggest something to him, since the patient develops his own ideology and unfolds his own dynamics, in this constructive acceptance of his positive ego. One does not escape suggestion, however, because one refrains from consciousness of it or denies it completely. However passive the analyst may keep himself otherwise, in the last analysis his interpretations are suggestions, for he suggests to the patient a definite ideology or attitude even if it be in a more refined way than is usual in ordinary suggestion therapy, which tries to work directly upon the will to health. How shall one avoid suggestion, however, since it is already given in the mere fact that a very busy analyst, who is consulted by a patient, decides to take him for treatment. Certainly this must increase powerfully in the patient the hope of cure. Finally, when the patient decides to come for treatment, he has already built up the will to become well to the point of action, and it is the first duty of a conscientious therapist to strengthen this will to health already present in the patient. Since this in itself is hard enough to do, it would be absurd to imagine one could use suggestion to persuade a neurotic without the desire for cure or the power for becoming well, that he is curable, or that he is already cured, if it were not true.

The psychoanalyst, however, seems to fear this impossibility, as I surmise, for the reason that there is danger that a result so obtained could not be lasting, which at bottom only says that the analyst himself possesses no satisfying or sure criterion for determination of “cure.” As I have shown elsewhere this is connected with his whole ideology, which trusts to the ego itself no autonomous expression of power, but interprets every positive movement as the mere wish of a shattered weakling. In other words, in the patient’s will to health is seen only a wish for cure, which one dare not take seriously because this taking seriously would be suggestion.¹ However there are negative suggestions

¹ The objection has been made that I am essentially saying nothing new because I simply use the word “will” in place of the Freudian “wish.” There is hardly an objection that would do Freud as well as myself greater injustice, Freud’s psychology is anything but a doctrine of will, which he not only does not recognize but actually denies since he conceives of the individual as ruled by instinctual life (the id) and repressed by the super-ego, a will-less plaything of two impersonal forces. On the contrary, I understand by will a
also which, perhaps, are even more dangerous, and it may be that the analytic wish ideology suggests a weakness to the patient which happily he may sometimes overcome by becoming well in his own way. This, however, I should count as a dynamic consequence, although it comes about exactly contrary to the will of the analyst, yes actually as a protest against it. Dynamic therapy strives on the other hand to promote the victory of the patient consciously instead of trying to thwart it, which cannot succeed in any case. The whole difference between the two kinds of therapy can be formulated most simply thus, that the dynamic method brings the patient to self-help, but helps to make this possible for him and also confirms it, while the analytic method forces him to the acceptance of help from another no matter whether this happens passively (ideologically) or actively (voluntarily).

The distinctly static condition of analytic therapy is evidenced by the fact that Freud in the last ten years has written no work on technique, despite his several important contributions to psychoanalytic theory. In addition to and along with the ego psychology which made Freud’s libidinal fear theory untenable, not only the life impulses symbolized by the id, but the death instinct instituted by Freud in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920) have taken on an ever greater importance, so that on the whole, the development of the last phase of the Freudian doctrine in contrast to the first, is characterized by the coming into the foreground of the negative, repressive factors, such as guilt feeling and self-punishment tendencies. The analytically postulated impregnability of the guilt feeling now forms for Freud the limit of therapeutic susceptibility in the negative ego, exactly as narcissism once did in the positive ego. From the beginning I have approached psychoanalysis and its object, human beings, not from the repressed neurotic but from the productive, creative type which led me naturally to consider ego psychology in its positive and constructive aspects, while

positive guiding organization and integration of self which utilizes creatively, as well as inhibits and controls the instinctual drives. The “wish” one could perhaps characterize as a faded, weakened impulse (not weak will) from which the will has withdrawn the energy necessary to achieve its goal and which must now be content with a mere longing for its fulfilment.
for the orthodox analysis, the ego had always a negative repressive character in contrast to libido, and this found its clearest expression in the concept of the super-ego. The Freudian ego psychology, paradoxical as it sounds, considers the ego hardly at all, sees in it only the stage on which the battle between id and super-ego takes place, and this super-ego itself, although comprehended as a psychic factor, is for Freud only an inner representative of the father complex, the castration fear. Accordingly, although in the newer analytic technique so much is done with the super-ego, it takes place for the most part in the form of personifications, because in the Freudian sense it is only a metaphorical expression for fear of the father (castration complex) and even if, like Adler, one includes in the super-ego the inner representatives of “painful reality,” still that which is peculiar to the individual as such, the real I or self with its own power, the will, is left out.

The Freudian conception of super-ego and its application to the technique, was the first concession of the analytic, realistic psychology, “Real Psychologie,” which was almost behavioristic, to the ego psychology standpoint, which does recognize autonomous forces in the individual himself. But even this acceptance of ego psychology turned out one-sidedly because of the libido theory. For the only forces to which Freud himself gives value in the ego are of a repressive nature, and ostensibly have been taken into the ego from the outside. As an essentially positive force in the individual, analysis permits only the libido to qualify, and this is placed in opposition to the ego. Without going into these difficult theoretical problems here I should like to recall only two essential principles of my own conception, which I have stood for from the beginning. Every impulse, as I see it, implies an inherent opposite impulse which does not function merely as a repressive or inhibiting force, but as impulse is also capable of positive expression. Thus, I have always seen the positive ego in the neurotic, while the Freudian theory on the contrary emphasizes the negative ego even in the average and the superior (artist). My conception assumes positive and negative forces in the ego itself, while the Freudian doctrine, even in the form of the super-ego, in the last analysis, has understood the inner repression only as a result of external prohibition in the broadest meaning of the word. Freud has made but one step beyond this and that a very important one in the assumption of a “death instinct” and in so doing has come into such dangerous nearness to a monism contradicting his earlier conception, that Bernfeld has found it necessary to free him from this suspicion.¹ This hypothesis, much discussed in analytic literature of the last few years, has culminated practically (therapeutically) in the question as to whether there are genuine masochistic tendencies of self-punishment and the like which lie beyond the pleasure principle, as manifestations of the death instinct, and accordingly analytically, in the sense of the libido (releasing) doctrine, would be beyond...
influencing; or whether we deal with aggressive tendencies turned inside against the own ego (sadism) which originally referred to other persons, but in consequence of outer or inner repression were unrealizable. This question not only theoretically interesting but practically important, now occupies a central point of discussion within the Freudian group and it has certainly not been benefited or clarified by Freud’s own changing position in relation to it. While in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” Freud postulated a death instinct inherent in the individual, which he understands as a special biological instance of the principle of inertia, later he identified this death impulse with the impulse to destructiveness, and in his still later work “Civilization and its Discontents,” (1930) he postulates a tendency toward aggression as a primary, independent instinctual predisposition in mankind which, however, he again conceives of as a descendant of and substitute for the death instinct. The assumption of this independent impulse to aggression gives Freud “a great theoretical facilitation” in the explanation of the increase of guilt feeling in blocked impulse satisfaction, a facilitation which Alexander in his interesting speculations on this theme seemed not yet to share.

The fault from which all these recent works of Freud and his school suffer is their too speculative character, by which I mean

1 “Der Entropiesatz und der Todestrieb” Imago XVI 2, 1930.

2 The question whether and under what conditions the death impulse can turn into an impulse to destroy, Westerman-Holstijn has discussed in “Tendenzen des Toten, Todestriebe und Triebe zum Töten,” Imago XVI 2, 1930.


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that they have grown out of theoretical presuppositions and viewpoints rather than from clinical or even common sense observation; at least they have in view the reconciliation and adaptation of the theory to the phenomena, rather than the understanding of the phenomena themselves, and so therapy no longer plays any role, at least in Freud’s work. If one had held to the phenomena, it would be impossible to understand how a discussion of the death impulse could neglect the universal and fundamental death fear to such an extent as is the case in psychoanalytic literature. For Freud himself fear of death has value as a derivative of fear of the super-ego, therefore, finally, as derived from the elaboration of the castration fear. Similarly anachronistic, is Freud’s newest discovery of the aggressive instinct which Adler twenty years ago was able to place in the center of his psychology of the neurotic. But it seems to me noteworthy not merely that Freud discovered the aggressive impulse so late, but also that in his lifelong analytic practice it came to him only by the circuitous route of a consideration of culture, and not through the individual himself. It is clear that this becomes intelligible only from the prejudice of an
already accepted theory of the neuroses, which could understand even the aggressive impulse only libidinally, as sadism. The one-sided emphasis of the libido theory itself seems to me explicable only from the denial of the negative disturbing aspects of individuality, which Freud recognizes relatively late as death impulse or as tendency to aggression. Freud’s theory has always been therapeutically oriented in this way, that he always considers psychologically correct that factor which momentarily has a more comforting or satisfying character; on the other hand his therapy has been ideologically oriented, an unwholesome mixture, which has been inherent in analysis from the beginning.

The authentic analysis of Freud has evolved from the fear problem, from pathological fear, therefore it is all the more striking that he has always avoided the topic of fear with a reference to the difficulty of the problem, until my birth trauma theory necessitated his coming to terms with this distasteful theme. I mean distasteful not only in the sense of the theoretical

1 Heminung, Symptom und Angst, 1926, but already in Das Ich und Das Es, 1923

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difficulties, but also in a personal sense, for the theme of fear seems so immediately connected with the concept of death that we avoid it, if possible, or where this is impossible, seek to fill it with another content. In this sense all fear theories seem to me to be only scientifically rationalized attempts to deny the fear of death, since various causal explanations are given for fear which all terminate with a conclusive primal cause and the means to set it aside. This was also the comforting therapeutic advantage of the Freudian fear theory. If fear arises from repressed libido, one can free libido and thus get rid of fear. Very soon not only was the insufficiency of this therapeutic ideology proved, but also the fact that fear often increases with the freeing of libido because the individual, as it were, can be frightened by his own libido. That the illusion could work so long is explained by the neurotic’s equally strong need of therapeutic comfort for his still more intense death fear, although it is just the neurotic type that is most afraid of fear from its own freed libido. And so it was in the sphere of a therapy for the neuroses where the Freudian ideology worked first, but also where it first failed.

Exactly as in the libido theory of fear, I see in Freud’s second tremendous effort to solve this problem for therapy, only another form of the denied death fear. In his work “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920), in contrast to his first ideology there is denied in the double concept death-fear, not the phenomenon of death but the phenomenon of fear; to this end, however, death is transformed from an unwished for necessity to a desired instinctual goal. Again the comfort-giving nature of this ideology could stand neither logic nor experience for long. I had the impression from the beginning that the observations which led Freud to the postulation of a death instinct, did not at all justify such a far reaching assumption, neither the analytic experience of the repetition compulsion, nor the persistence of guilt feeling, which in my opinion only cloak a technical helplessness. Even if there is a death instinct it is not
required on the grounds brought forward by Freud, much less proved, nor does Freud’s death instinct help us to understand hitherto unexplained psychic phenomena. Actually his innovation has not cleared the problem but confused it. If the death instinct has for Freud the meaning which

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the well intentioned critics like Alexander or Bernfeld find therein, then it helps us very little to the understanding of psychic phenomena, in discussing which Freud necessarily speaks of a sexual instinct and an instinct for destruction. If, however, the death instinct postulated by Freud is to be understood only as the expression of the physical principle of entropy, this most general law of nature, whereby matter strives for an ever more stable condition and finally for a state of complete rest, then this is much too far-fetched as an explanation of psychic phenomena to mean anything for individual psychology. Quite apart from the principal question of how far the physical laws of inanimate matter are applicable in psychology or even in biology, Westerman Holstijn, who once again brings up the question of psychic energy, does not get beyond the “tendency of intra-psychic energy to remain constant” already disclosed by Breuer (1893 in the “Studies in Hysteria”) but he emphasizes rightly that this is different from a tendency toward absolute rest. Much more the individual seems to prefer to absolute rest a certain condition of tension, perhaps because absolute rest could only be death. But even with the assumption that there is in nature such a striving after a condition of rest, and even if it manifested itself biologically as death impulse, still psychologically only the attitude of the individual toward this fact would be of interest.

Freud’s attitude toward this problem is therapeutic, not psychological, that is, he inclines to that interpretation which at the given moment is the more comfort giving. What in the beginning was the denial of death and the connecting of fear with libido as a means of cure, now becomes the denial of fear and the interpretation of death as wish (instinct). But even this ideology itself is so generally, one might almost say universally, maintained that it takes all terror from individual dying, since it presents it as an unmeaning special instance of the great cosmic passing away. Psychologically, however, we can establish in the individual only the fact of a fear of death, also under certain conditions a wish for it, whether this corresponds to the typical Psychic ambivalence, to a resistance to the death impulse, or to its acceptance, in other words to a negative or a positive manifestation of it we cannot decide. To this decision, the psychoanalytic authors referred to have come also; only I should like

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to go a step further beyond their discussion and maintain that such a decision is of no importance. For psychologically we never have to do with a principle so universal, and therapeutically we could use it at best only as an excuse for our powerlessness over nature. Freud’s sexual therapy of the neuroses was only effective ideologically—that is, as long as the theory of the neuroses could be explained sexually; the later recognition of the untenability of this theory was a great step forward psychologically, while it remained therapeutically unfruitful. Thus in the development of psychoanalysis we have the paradox that analytic knowledge has gradually undermined analytic therapy.
Cowards die many times before their deaths;
The valiant never taste of death but once.

— Shakespeare (Julius Caesar)

Having broached the metaphysical question as to whether there is a cosmic death instinct or not, we can now proceed from the indubitable psychological fact of the fear of death as it manifests itself in human consciousness. Regarding death fear in the actual meaning of the words, however, we can speak only in terms of the knowledge of death, that is, on a level of consciousness, which the infant at the time of the first development of fear certainly cannot yet have. On the other hand, we know that the child experiences his first feeling of fear in the act of birth, not fear of death however, but fear in the face of life. It seems, therefore, as if fear were bound up somehow with the purely biological life process and receives a certain content only with the knowledge of death. Whether this contentual tie up, which so frequently increases to a pathological fear of dying or being dead, represents the rationalization of another more fundamental fear we will discuss later in detail; at all events, this primary fear cannot be castration fear, for this also presupposes a certain development of consciousness which we could not assume for the infant. Moreover the point of view which I have maintained regarding the historical and genetic primacy of the birth fear as compared with castration fear, in spite of all the arguments of psychoanalysts to the contrary, seems undeniable. Since I was concerned first of all in the “Trauma of Birth (1923) with an explanation of the fears of the infant I did not evaluate the death fear sufficiently, as it belonged to a later level, although it can appear astonishingly early in childhood; on the other hand confess that at that time I had not advanced far enough beyond 119

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the birth symbolism, which here as elsewhere covered the death theme therapeutically. When for example, P. Schilder doubts the existence of a death instinct and asks “whether the impulse to death may not be a covering for erotic strivings, the wish for a rebirth”¹ it is certainly to the point in many cases, especially of neurosis or psychosis, but no argument against the death instinct, as little as are all the other erotic or masochistic disguises of it, which are covered by Freud’s assumption of the pleasure principle as a special case of death instinct. This disguise, moreover, Schopenhauer has already seen
clearly when he speaks in his “Metaphysics of Sex Love” of the pleasure primacy (Lustprämie) with which nature entices men to pay tribute in the sex act.

Responsibility for this erotic disguise of death seems to me to rest not only on the psychic tendency to denial of its terrors, but much more on the polar nature of the life process itself. For otherwise it would not be comprehensible why the death complex appears so much more clearly in religion, mythology and folklore than in the individual who apparently can bear the idea of death only collectively, just because this again promises therapeutic consolation. So, it happened that I myself brought out the death symbolism first in the “Myth of the Birth of the Hero” (1909) and still more clearly in the related “Lohengrinsage” (1911); also in my further “Mythologischen Beiträgen” (1912—1914) which appeared collected in 1919. I finally undertook a decided advance in this direction with the investigation of the problem of the “double” in folklore (1914), which I then continued in my book “Seelenglaube und Psychologie” (1930) even to the theme of religious belief in immortality and its scientific presentation in the modern doctrine of the psychic. In terms of individual psychology I have never lost sight of the problem of fear since the “Trauma of Birth,” although therapeutic interests forced me to build up my conception first in the direction of a constructive theory of will. This, however, had become clear to me, that we have before us in the individual neurotic, as it were, the opposite of collective belief in the soul and immortality ideology: that is, instead of the more or less naively expressed wish for eternal life, as it appears today in collective ideologies,

1 Psychiatrie auf psychoanalytischer Grundlage 1925 S. 12.

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we find an apparent desire to die, one might almost say a wish for eternal death. From the analysis of the role of the analyst in the therapeutic situation, there came to me finally a direct individual approach to the problem of death, and the idea that one could understand neurosis in general, including the therapy, only from this negative side of the soul life. In this sense the present presentation is the completion of my work on the belief in the soul, and as this finally leads to psychology, so the neurotic opposite of the belief in immortality, namely the death fear, leads to the need for therapy, as an individual doctrine of faith.

Freud has approached the problem of therapy from the forces of life (the libido) and has finally arrived at the death instinct, that is, at the death problem; for it hardly concerns an “instinct.”1 As I have already pointed out in the “Trauma of Birth,” it seems to me essential for the understanding of the neurotic to go at the human problem from the side of fear, not from the side of instinct; that is to consider the individual not therapeutically as an instinctive animal but psychologically as a suffering being. It soon becomes evident that, approached from the instinct side, a whole series of problems will be viewed falsely, or will be located incorrectly, which from the death side, are approachable. Again we
face the paradox of psychoanalysis, yes, of every ideology in general, which only happens to appear with peculiar clarity in the Freudian teaching today, namely, the therapeutic orientation in the broadest sense, which despite its scientific nature aims not at knowledge but at consolation, and always emphasizes in its facts just that side which affords help for human need. Freud’s emphasis on the instinctual was therapeutic in this human sense, but he used it theoretically for a specific etiology of the neuroses which it was intended not only to heal but at the same time to explain. His pragmatic presupposition was, as is also the case with other practical sciences, that what helps must also be true. So his teaching from the beginning was directed toward consolation in the sense of a therapeutic ideology, and even when he finally stumbled upon the inescapable death problem, he sought to give a new meaning to that also in harmony with the wish, since he spoke of death

1 Even analysts like Bernfeld and Westerman-Holstijn find the term “death instinct” inappropriate.

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instinct instead of death fear. The fear itself he had meantime disposed of elsewhere, where it was not so threatening, and was therapeutically more easily accessible. That the instinctual is repressed in the neurotic, certainly seems clear; equally that it is fear, from which the repression arises: since Freud however conceived of the instinct life sexually, he had the double therapeutic advantage on the one hand of having made the general fear into a special sexual fear (castration fear), and on the other of being able to cure this fear through the freeing of sexuality.

This therapeutic ideology rests on the presupposition that man is purely instinctual, and that fear is brought in from the outside (hence the concept of castration fear). It has for a second presupposition the displacement of general fear to a partial field, a therapeutic release with which we shall occupy ourselves in the next chapter. The discovery that the freeing or satisfaction of sexuality does not necessarily do away with fear but often even increases it, and the observation that the infant experiences fear at a time when there can be no question of outer threats of any kind, have made the theory of the sexual origin of fear, and its derivation from the outside, untenable. The individual comes to the world with fear and this inner fear exists independently of outside threats, whether of a sexual or other nature. It is only that it attaches itself easily to outer experiences of this kind but the individual makes use of them therapeutically since they objectify and make partial the general inner fear. Man suffers from a fundamental dualism, however one may formulate it, and not from a conflict created by forces in the environment which might be avoided by a “correct bringing up” or removed by later re-education (psychoanalysis).

The inner fear, which the child experiences in the birth process (or perhaps even brings with it?) has in it already both elements, fear of life and fear of death, since birth on the one hand means the end of life (former life) on the other carries also the fear of the new life. The stronger emphasis on the one or other
of these two fear components in the birth act itself still seems to me to contain the empirical meaning of the birth trauma for the later fate of the individual. Beyond that, however, for me, the birth trauma was also a symbol of the original suffering nature of man which according to the psychoanalytic conception had been caused in the first place by some guilt of the individual or the environment and could be corrected, therapeutically or prophylactically (educationally). Here it is again evident that one very soon strikes the boundary of the metaphysical in the discussion of these basic human problems no matter whether one takes it religiously or philosophically. This involves no danger, as long as one does not succumb to the attempt to justify the one viewpoint at the cost of the other. I believe that one can never understand the human being purely empirically, as psychoanalysis strives to do; on the other hand the purely metaphysical conception of man seems to me unsatisfactory also, as soon as it aims at knowledge and fails to consider the purely human.¹

Birth fear one can only designate as death fear metaphysically, since ideally one should separate it from the fear of empirical death, and find in it primarily that undifferentiated feeling of insecurity on the part of the individual, which might then better be called fear of life. The fact is just this, that there is in the individual a primal fear, which manifests itself now as fear of life, another time as fear of death. If birth fear, therefore, has nothing to do empirically with the fear of actual death, one must also test as to its empirical soundness the extreme metaphysical interpretation of Achelis. To call birth fear the first visible condensation of fear of death, that is, fear of the loss of individuality, seems to me open to attack on two grounds: first, the fear of loss of individuality seems to me to underlie fear of (empirical) death, second, I cannot see at all how birth can be viewed as loss or threat of loss of individuality, when it represents exactly the opposite; that would be possible only if one conceives of mother and child as one (which however Achelis does not mean) as I have done in the birth trauma theory, and then considers the loss of the mother in terms of an injury to the ego. In this case, however, fear is a reaction to the trauma

¹ Such, a dissatisfaction is presented in the profound book of Werner Achelis, Which only came to my attention when I was completing this book: “Principia mundi, Versuch einer Auslegung des Wesens der Welt.” The author who seeks to complete the empiricist Freud with the metaphysician Schopenhauer In a deeper sense, remains thereby as much guilty of empiricism as Freud of metaphysics, since he leaps far beyond the empirically comprehensible directly “to the metaphysical, instead of letting himself be led to the boundaries of both spheres.
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of separation as which I have comprehended it factually as birth, fear. Here lies also the connection made by the analysts, including Freud, between birth fear and castration fear, both of which, in this sense appear as reaction to the loss of an important part of the ego. Birth fear remains always more universal, cosmic as it were, loss of connection with a greater whole, in the last analysis with the “all”, while the castration fear is symbolic of the loss of an important part of the ego, which however is less than the whole, that is, is partial. The fear in birth, which we have designated as fear of life, seems to me actually the fear of having to live as an isolated individual, and not the reverse, the fear of the loss of individuality (death fear). That would mean, however, that primary fear corresponds to a fear of separation from the whole, therefore a fear of individuation, on account of which I should like to call it fear of life, although it may appear later as fear of the loss of this dearly bought individuality, as fear of death, of being dissolved again into the whole. Between these two fear possibilities, these poles of fear, the individual is thrown back and forth all his life, which accounts for the fact that we have not been able to trace fear back to a single root, or to overcome it therapeutically.

After this theoretical clarification of concepts I turn to clinical observation and should like first of all to establish the fact that the neurotic, to an even greater degree than the average, suffers from this double fear, yes, that the outbreak of the neurosis actually becomes explicable from the streaming together of these two sources of fear, which even in the “Trauma of Birth” I had designated as the fear both of going forward and of going backward. So there is already included in the fear problem itself a primary ambivalence which must be assumed, and not derived through the opposition of life and death instincts. We have almost come to the point of refusing to man as a suffering being a positive life instinct, and of looking upon that which apparently manifests itself as such as a mere not-wishing-to-die.¹ The opposite of the positive life instinct would be not the death instinct, but fear, whether it be of having to die or of wanting to die. At all events the neurotic gives the impression of a negative

¹ The Chicago biologist, Professor Hayes, allows dying to begin with birth.

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instinctual being who continuously strives to delay dying and to ward off death, but who by these efforts only hastens and strengthens the process of destruction because he is not able to overcome it creatively. On the other side the neurotic illness appears as a constant self-inhibiting of the life instinct, for any expression of which the individual seems to punish himself either before or afterwards. Both impressions are surely correct, corresponding to the ambivalent conflict of life fear and death fear; both, however, have been acquired relatively late.
Above all, it is strange that the punishment mechanism of the neurotic illness which seems so clear today had not drawn the attention of the analyst much earlier. However, as Freud had attacked the neuroses from the libido problem and not from the fear problem, it was natural first of all to emphasize the pleasure gain which the patient drew from his condition, the so-called reward of illness, and to consider the suffering bound up with it only as unavoidable evil. The therapy undertook, therefore, to bring him to the giving up of this pleasure gain through illness since it held out the prospect of a greater pleasure reward. Thus normal sexual satisfaction became avowedly or tacitly the goal of analytic therapy, a viewpoint which many analysts still hold as a standard. As Freud, however, learned to consider the punishment tendencies of the individual not only as hindrances to this goal, but also as the greatest resistances to the analytic process itself, he ascribed to them that genuine meaning, which found theoretical expression in the setting up of a death instinct. The works of Reik and Alexander which followed have pointed out a libidinal goal even in the self-punishment tendencies of the individual, and thus protected the Freudian theory of the neuroses from being stranded in the invincibility of the guilt feeling.

Before we take this leap into therapeutic ideology, however, we should keep in mind another type of experience which one cannot understand from the study of neurotics alone, but only if one approaches the problem from the development of the creative personality as I have attempted to do, especially in recent years. Thus, I have recognized not only the constructive meaning of resistances in the analysis but also the creative side of

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guilt feeling, and have attempted simultaneously to utilize these negative manifestations therapeutically. What expresses itself in the individual on the one side as driving force, does not always have to be and certainly not exclusively “instinct”, as little as resistances of different kinds must necessarily work only as hindrances. The self-punishment tendency which operates as inhibition (restraint) is not merely as Alexander has expressed it, a bribing of the super-ego in the interest of id satisfaction; on the contrary what manifests itself in this correct observation is a general life principle, on the basis of which “no creating is possible without destruction, and no destroying without some kind of new creation.”

When accordingly the neurotic must punish himself so much more severely and strikingly than the average man, this is not merely because he can only grant himself this or that pleasure satisfaction thus, but because he must bribe life itself, for which, according to Schopenhauer’s deep insight, we all pay with death.

The neurotic then is a man whom extreme fear keeps from accepting this payment as a basis of life, and who accordingly seeks in his own way to buy himself free from his guilt. He does this through a constant restriction of life (restraint through fear) ; that is, he refuses the loan (life) in order thus to escape the
payment of the debt (death). The more or less clear self-punishment tendency, which only represents one aspect of this picture, has not so much the intention of granting him life, as of escaping death, from which he seeks to buy himself free by daily partial self-destruction; applied to fear, guilt and inhibition symptomatology, this means that the neurotic gains from all the painful and tormenting self-punishments no positive pleasure, but the economic advantage of avoiding a still more painful punishment, namely fear of death. In this way the lengthening of punishment (drawing out) is at the same time a drawing out

1 As far as I know, Dr. Sabina Spielrein first demonstrated these thoughts analytically and applied them to the explanation of the fear inherent in the sexual instinct. “Die Destruktion als Ursache des Werdens” Jahrbuch, f, psa Forschungen Bd. IV 1912 S. 465 ff.

2 The ancient and universally distributed conception of death as punishment I have tried to explain in “Seelenglaube und Psychologie” from the human longing for immortality.

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of life, for as long as he punishes himself, feels pain as it were, he still lives. This neurotic attitude of the individual toward the problem of death, in the last analysis is comprehensible only from the will psychology, which shows that the human being seeks to subject death, this original symbol of the “must,” to his will, and, as it were, at his own instigation transforms the death punishment which is placed upon life into a lifelong punishment which he imposes upon himself. On the other hand the ancient idea of the sacrifice plays a part in this, the idea that one could escape the hardest punishment by voluntary assumption of lighter self-punishment. These basic remarks are only to characterize the general point of view under which I learned to understand the self-punishment tendency in man. Applied to the neurotic type, it results not only in a deepened understanding of the symptomatology in particular cases, but also of neurosis as a whole, showing it to be an individual attempt at healing, against the arch enemy of mankind, the death fear, which can no longer be cured by the collective method of earlier ages.

It would be alluring to build up a theory of the neuroses on the basis of the death fear and to show how the particular symptoms and not merely the neurosis as a whole can be understood in one way or another as an expression of it, but since we are concerned with the neurotic as a type, as he is opposed to the therapist type, the therapeutic aspects of this concept lie nearer than the theoretical. From the therapeutic standpoint, however, one gets the impression that the over-strong fear of the neurotic is only the necessary defense against an over-strong instinctual basis and a correspondingly strong will, which is prevented by fear from full expression in living, which would be death. For, in spite of the predominance of the death fear in the neurotic, he still stands nearer to the creative type than to the average man, on account of which also he can be understood only as a miscarried artist, not as an
incomplete or undeveloped normal type. In this sense the neurosis is a facing on the part of the individual of the metaphysical problems of human existence, only he faces them not in a constructive way as does the artist, philosopher or scientist but destructively. It is exactly on this account that we neurosis has taught us so much about the nature of man,

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because it represents the most inexorable form of self-knowledge and self-exposure than which nothing has less therapeutic value. With his therapeutic ideology the analyst protects not only the patient from the complete doubt as to the possibility of overcoming fear, but also himself from the destruction of his own illusions. Also the analyst like the artist can only overcome this fear creatively, as he is, in a certain sense, a new artist type, such as has not existed since the Greek period and has not been needed before since the Christian era. The type of artist who works in living human material, who seeks to create men not like the parents, physically, but spiritually, like God. How far this likeness to God corresponds to a creating of one’s self in another, I have worked out elsewhere.¹

In order to understand the creative and therewith also the neurotic expressions of this inhibiting, often destructive, life principle, we must first orient ourselves with regard to its normal forms of expression. The most important is sexuality, whose close relationship to the death principle is not only given biologically, but also holds psychologically. Not only in the act of birth but also in the sexual act itself the resemblance to death, yes, the nearness of death, is unmistakable. The sexual act has a different meaning certainly for the two sexes, a giving up (of an ego part) a surrender, yes, occasionally a complete loss of self; on the other hand it leads not only to new creation (in the child) but is at the same time perceived by the individual as the high point of the life principle, if the negative ego-destroying aspect does not win the upper hand. Viewed from the individual pleasure gratification which sex affords, it means biologically also a toll from life to death. Sexuality becomes thus the most current coin of this individual guilt to the race. This explains the attractive power which the so called perversions exercise on the individual, but also why these sexual practices which lack biological market value or lessen it, are tied up with biological guilt feeling. On the other hand, we have learned to understand that often enough guilt feelings coming from other sources are paid in sexual coin, as many a physical surrender, and even masturbation, proves. Of the latter one could say paradoxically that its shamefulness, actual

¹ See chapter on “Love and Force” in this book and also Genetische Psychologie II.

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or acquired, comes just from the fact of its harmlessness to the individual; one has not really paid and accordingly one feels so guilty.¹

Besides these biological connections between sexuality and death, there are psychological connections which are therapeutically more important. The retrieving of death fear through sexual fear represents an attempt to erotize the painful as it meets us grossly in masochism today. In this we have a use of sexuality characteristic of man alone, which is only comprehensible on the ground of will psychology. The individual will, as it were, seizes upon sexuality as a means to make suffering and pain, which in the last analysis are symbols of death, into a desired source of pleasure. It is the same ideology which creates from death fear a death instinct. At the basis of this apparently masochistic ideology there lies always the enormous strength of will of the personality, which is able by the erotization of pain to force the sexual instinct into the service of fear avoidance, and at the same time to strip the primal fear of its dangerous quality. Another means to the same end, which the individual employs in order to escape the fear of sexuality together with the compulsion to it, is love. We can only refer in this connection to one aspect of this perhaps most important of all human phenomena, the significance of which psychoanalysis missed in its identification of sexuality and love. There is just the contrast between love and sexuality that often enough causes love to resist sexuality or to fly before it, just as under certain conditions sexuality can be a flight from love. Naturally everything depends on how one defines or interprets love. In its erotic meaning, it includes at all events the concentration upon a single person, and represents therefore in this sense a turning away from the promiscuity natural to the sexual instinct, which is provided only for the maintenance of the species and not for the satisfaction of the individual. From this theoretical standpoint, which is also confirmed by practical observations, one can conceive of human love as a protection, so to speak, as an economic device, against

¹ The unavoidable nature of the masturbation conflict lies not in a false system of education, but corresponds as most conflicts do to a therapeutic attempt of the individual to overcome fear, which thereby is partially transformed into guilt (sin).

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the waste of the sexual instinct which could impoverish the individual, while he feels himself enriched by love. The much discussed promiscuity which may seem to the sexually repressed person like a symbol of freedom, proves from the viewpoint of the individual to be the greatest danger, which he seeks to escape ethically by a definite moral code, and practically through love. That thereby the individual only falls from the Scylla of sexual partial payment into the Charybdis of pledging his whole ego, is a problem which is to occupy us again elsewhere.
A further means for defending the ego against death fear, and one just as universal as love, is aggression. One does not need to assume an actual instinct of aggression as Freud does in order to justify this primary evil in man, by explaining it as a derivation of the death instinct, which only leads beyond this to speculations as to whether the original aggression turns toward the inside or the original death instinct to the outside. Here also a dynamic conception shows up a more immediate fact which one easily overlooks from the meta-psychological point of view. The death fear of the ego is lessened by the killing, the sacrifice, of the other; through the death of the other, one buys oneself free from the penalty of dying, of being killed. One recognizes at once that this “criminal” solution represents the opposite of the neurotic, for in both cases we are dealing with anticipation of death punishment, of dying; with the neurotic in the form of self-punishment, with criminals in the form of the punishment or killing of the other, which, however, is followed by the punishment of the ego through society (See my comment on the deeper meaning of the death punishment in Seelenglaube—S. 95). The neurotic is only a man who cannot allay his own death fear by killing the other, who, in other words, is not capable of aggressive protective behavior, although he experiences the impulse to it strongly enough. By this “killing” of the other for the protection of the self naturally I do not mean the legal concept of “self-defense” (legitimate), nor the biological concept of self-maintenance, but a purely psychic ideology, which rests upon the primitive feeling of the group (collectivity). According to this conception, which quite naturally values one life equally with the other without considering the individual as such, one death can also take the place of another. To the naïve consciousness of

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immortality, death must appear as punishment; later it became self-merited punishment which for the most part followed sexual transgression or more correctly the transgressing of sexuality, because just this in the last analysis leads to death; finally the individual preferred self-punishment coming from the idea of sin and again turning toward the outside, but as protection, not as aggression, will buy himself free from his own death through the death of another (sacrifice). The impulse to aggression therefore arises from within and has the tendency to transform one’s own suffering into the pain of the other, from whom the suffering ostensibly comes. The guilt feeling ensues then not as a reaction to the aggression, but corresponds to the death fear, not done away with by the projection but only transformed, and thus moralized. Besides, the guilt feeling is an expression of the identification which is implied in the sacrifice of the other in the place of the own ego. In this sense, guilt feeling and self-punishment appear in the neurotic also as expression of love for the other, for whom one then takes sin and punishment upon oneself instead of blaming him; for somewhere the bad, the arch evil must be placated either in the other or in the own self; a distinction which explains the sadistic or masochistic attitude toward life, and also the close connection of the two.
In this briefly sketched development of the idea of sin, the killing of the other appears as a developmental phase, that is, the sacrifice of a life to death with the neglect of the individual difference. However, this primitive form of the sacrifice which we call murder has undergone a development and therewith a refinement. There are various forms of murder as there are various forms of self-destruction, as for example, in the neurotic symptoms. Ibsen speaks of “soul murder”¹ and means by that a making use of, or exploitation of the other. The killing does not need to be actual, it can occur symbolically as for example in the withdrawal of love or in the desertion of a person; it can also ensue partially instead of totally, a slow murder, as it were, through constant tormenting. Always, however, it takes place as a self-protection against the own death fear, and not as an expression of a primary death wish. The death wish against loved

¹ This reminds one of Oscar Wilde’s saying, “The coward kills with kisses, the brave man with the sword.”

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persons shows itself frequently as the expression of strong attachment, which can be resolved only through death and not otherwise. Accordingly also in the treatment of many “depressives” the appearance of death wishes against others is not to be interpreted as infantile regression, but as a sign of the inner unburdening and strengthening of the ego.

For the problem of the overcoming of ego phases through the killing of the other I refer the reader to an earlier work (Genetische Psychologie), and here turn to a broader means of defense against death fear, which still falls under normal psychology although it is more closely related to the neurosis. This is the borderline case, where the individual neither punishes himself, like the neurotic, nor the other, like the criminal, but lets himself be punished by the other with certain limits. This function of external punishment as a means for inner unburdening is as it were the “pedagogical” agent in the therapeutic situation. With the very decision to accept treatment the patient takes a powerful forward step beyond his neurosis, since he makes the therapist the active agent for self-punishment, a role which the latter cannot avoid however much he may try to protect himself from it. When this punishing agent can also be loved, it represents a further step toward healing, for love presupposes the overcoming of fear. We will follow out these therapeutic meanings later and now turn again to normal punishment situations, which are only crystallized like a paradigm in the therapeutic situation. In every more intimate human relation, whether it be that between parents and child, teacher and pupils, master and subordinate, likewise in the relation of the sexes and particularly in marriage, the punishing element is set up in the other spontaneously and unavoidably, and this is what makes the relationship, as a rule, so hard to understand and often impossible to bear. Even in the child we deal always with a self-punishment displaced outward, which serves as a palliative for fear.
One might object that the conception of self-punishment as a reducer of fear is only another kind of interpretation of a fact which psychoanalysis interpreted libidinally, that is, as sanction for instinct satisfaction. Certainly this phenomenon also, like every other, has two aspects, but this is not only a question of theory, it means that every single individual can emphasize this or that aspect in his general attitude, that is, can interpret life positively or negatively. If one speaks of types, however, it seems to me certain that the neurotic is that type which aims primarily not at pleasure gain but at the reduction of fear, while the application of self-punishment in the service of instinct satisfaction, seems rather to correspond to the normal type (for example to work in order to be able to permit himself pleasure afterwards). That the reducing of fear then often leads to the expression of instinct is probably correct, but that must not be misunderstood to mean that punishment serves primarily for instinct freeing, for sanction, which always rests on the presupposition of an original repression of instinct from without. For besides the lightening of fear through punishment, the individual has yet another motive for instinct expression, which complicates still further a process already far from simple. In order to displace the punishing factor to the outside (to let himself be punished) the individual must feel himself guilty, and thus it comes to the paradoxical appearance of instinct expression with punishment as its goal, which analytically can be explained only from masochistic pleasure, which itself by no means represents an original phenomenon. The vicious circle is closed by the realization that the freeing of instinct from repressions causes fear because life and experience increase the fear of death; while, on the other side, renunciation of instinct increases guilt not because it represents repressed aggression which turns against the own ego (Freud) but because instinct renunciation is a renunciation of life, and therefore the individual feels himself guilty. The paradox that the lightening of fear (through punishment and instinct freeing) leads to fear, is explained as was mentioned in the beginning, from the double function of fear, which at one time is life fear, at another, death fear. From the life fear, a direct path leads to consciousness of guilt, or better, to conscience fear, which can be understood always as regret for the possibility of life that has been neglected, but its full expression, on the other hand, creates death fear.
XI

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There are people who appear to think only with the brain, or with whatever may be the specific thinking organ; while others think with all the body and all the soul, with the blood, with the marrow of the bones, with the heart, with the lungs, with the belly, with the life. —Unamuno

The two forms of fear which we have differentiated as life fear and death fear seem on closer examination to reduce themselves to a primal fear of the individual which only manifests itself differently in different situations. This ambivalent primal fear which expresses itself in the conflict between individuation and generation, is derived on the one side from the experience of the individual as a part of the whole, which is then separated from it and obliged to live alone (birth), on the other side, from the final necessity of giving up the hard won wholeness of individuality through total loss in death. This universal human primal fear which varies only in accordance with life age and difference of sex, seems to lead to two different life forms which are conditioned by the manner in which the individual can solve this part-whole problem.

Before we can characterize the different reaction forms of the neurotic and the creative types, we must first try to picture the biological development of the individual from birth, via childhood and puberty to maturity and from there downward through old age to death. In this sense, the trauma of birth, as I have already tried to point out in my book, shows itself to be the beginning of a developmental process which goes through various phases and ends only with the trauma of death. If there is a symbol for the condition of wholeness, of totality, it is doubtless

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the embryonic state, in which the individual feels himself an indivisible whole and yet is bound up inseparably with a greater whole. With birth, not only is this oneness with the mother violently dissolved but the child experiences a second trauma, which works just as seriously and much more lastingly, that is, the partialization to which it is forced through adaptation to the outer world. In the first developmental stages after birth, the child has lost not only the feeling of connection with the mother, but also the feeling of wholeness in himself. In relation to the outer world he becomes successively mouth, hand, eye, ear, legs and so forth and for a long time, in a certain sense all of his life, remains related to the world partially, until he can establish again in his ego feeling something similar to the
original totality. The fear of the child before reaching this ego development is, as is easily seen, a double one, although with stronger emphasis on the lost totality than on the possible loss of a wholeness not yet fully attained. The gradual development of wholeness in ego feeling is an individual substitute for the lost general totality, and protects the child from the primal fear, although he is now subject to the fear of loss of this individually acquired ego unity. With the knowledge of death, the fear is attached to this universal symbol of ego dissolution, but is more concretely bound by the constant threat to the total ego from the outer world, from life itself. For life demands continuous partialization, and the well-adjusted man must always be ready to live by a continuous partial paying off, without wanting to preserve or give out his whole ego undivided in every experience. This, however, is the endeavor of the above-average type, who often succeeds in carrying through his totality creatively, but also is frequently shattered neurotically in the attempt. This shattering can result chiefly in two ways; either one throws into every experience, however unimportant, the whole ego, from fear of losing it partially otherwise (life fear), or one keeps the whole ego apart from life in general (death fear), as neither the partialization nor the totalization is possible. The second type, which could be described analytically as narcissistic, has fear of losing itself partially as well as totally; the other “neurotic” type in the narrower sense (the hysterical) can give itself only wholly or not at all, but in every case has fear, in fact both life fear and death fear, that is, fear either of being wholly lost or particularly of not being able to live.

Fear, however, as I have already shown in the trauma of birth, is not only an inhibiting force but also a forward driving one. The neurotic, who through fear of losing his ego does not dare undertake life, can also be driven out of his ego-bound state only through fear. In this sense, the neurosis is at the same time a being held back and being driven forward, illness and healing process in one. The therapy has only to strengthen the healing tendency, and to weaken the illness tendency; it is rather a change of emphasis than an altering of the individual. The great alteration which is necessary for development, the neurosis itself has already initiated, only fear does not permit it to eventuate beyond a certain point. In the therapeutic displacement of emphasis from the death side to the life side, sex instinct and aggression play a major role, without, however, really representing the healing factor itself, any more than they were the cause of the neurotic repression, which lies in fear itself, the overcoming of which ensues only through a solving of the part-whole problem in the therapeutic experience.

We must now examine the meaning of the problem of ego wholeness in its relation to sexual development in general and to the two sexes in particular. In this consideration two points of view should be kept in mind: first, that the sex instinct in any case is easily perceived by the individual as an alien power, which falls into conflict with the rest of the personality (“Truth and Reality,” Chap. V);
second, that sexuality, as previously pointed out, is applied as common currency, in the normal paying off of the debt to death, plus the fact that the genital libido, according to its nature, represents a partial phenomenon, although in the sex act itself, as Freud showed, various partial drives or instincts find satisfaction. Now the genital is a part of the physical ego which, it is true, can symbolize the whole, the entire man biologically, but which, often enough, especially in the neurosis, appears isolated from the rest of the ego. This important fact, which may also manifest itself in the castration complex of analysis, not only lies at the bottom of well-known sexual disturbances such as impotence or frigidity, but forms also in other cases of neurosis one of the typical expressions of an attempt at partialization carried too far. This splitting off of the genital from the rest of the physical ego is only an expression of the denial of the sexual role, with the aim of escaping the payment to the mate, in other words, to death. On the other hand such a splitting off of the sexual ego from the rest of the personality can also lead to hyper-sexuality, since only sexuality is continuously given out (spent) while the rest of the personality is preserved.

Before we pursue this utilization of sexuality by the individual into its further fateful possibilities, we wish to show briefly wherein man and woman seem to differ essentially in this respect. The sexuality of the man, with its “penis psychology,” worked out by psychoanalysis, is in general much more partial, that of the woman, with the fundamental “child psychology” much more total. Hence we have the paradox that the genital level is partial with the man, with the woman, total; accordingly the man has the fear of losing the genital (part for whole), life fear, while the woman has just the reverse, a fear of disclosing the genital, that is of giving all (death fear). Accordingly also fear in regard to the sex act is different in the two sexes: the man with his partial genital libido inclines more to the death fear, that is, of losing himself completely, as he can only give himself partially. The woman shows more fear of life, that is, of giving herself away partially, as she can only do it wholly. While the level of genital libido with the man does not necessarily mean complete maturity, although he may be adjusted on that level, for the woman the complete reaching of the genital level as a rule means maturity also, because so much else in the emotional life is bound up with it. The development of the man beyond the genital level leads to totality in the love experience, which affects the whole ego but also easily becomes the occasion of neurotic conflicts, which on the contrary tend to take place in the woman if she does not come to the total experience, but is forced to give herself out partially. No matter how much the extreme types of men and women may differ in relation to sexuality, it is not the biological form of sexuality which creates the conflicts, but the attitude of the individual, the relation of his personality, to sexuality as such, which opposes itself to the ego as an alien force.
This dichotomy in the individual is found in its original form even on the most primitive level of propagation, which, as is well known, takes place by division. This original partialization which is continued in the division of the germ cells, represents a compromise between the continuous growth which would be synonymous with immortality, and the limits of ego maximation, which means death. Instead of dying in hypertrophic growth, the cell gives a part of itself away in order to maintain the other part. This self division leads finally to sexuality, since the part given away becomes always smaller in relation to the whole and the function is divided between the two sexes, of which the one, the woman, has preserved the original form of propagation through division, while the man only carries out this act symbolically in terms of the smallest part. This difference of the sexual role reveals itself in the total standard and life behavior of the two sexes, since the man maintains this partialization tendency necessary for practical life as an essential characteristic, while the woman inclines more to total surrender. Deviations from the masculine average, above or below, are to be ascribed accordingly to a strengthened tendency to totalization, while the adaptation difficulties of the woman appear with a predominance of the partialization.

Whether the sex instinct is actually built up from partial impulses, as Freud believed he saw analytically, or whether it has another genesis (see my article “Genesis of Genitality,” The Psychoanalytic Review 1925), in any case its development seems to me to be directed by the general tendency of the individual to find a middle way between partialization and totalization. From this point of view one sees clearly, especially in the disturbances of puberty, how the individual over-emphasizes single components, divides himself artificially, as it were, in order not to succumb to the totality of the sexual urge. Whether the component lifted out for perversion was already emphasized originally more than normally, or whether it assumes larger proportions and greater meaning through being split off from the

1 An interesting ethnological confirmation of my conception of the connection between death and sexuality, I find after writing this work in the explanation which Th. Preuss gives of initiation rites, which, according to him, aim at the postponement of death in spite of propagation.

rest of the personality, cannot always be determined. At all events there seem to be individuals who, instead of putting themselves together, divide themselves, as it were, in puberty, which a failure in ego formation can lead to psychosis in extreme cases. Puberty with its new demands and difficulties of adjustment seems to bring the individual once more face to face with the part-whole problem which it has already had to solve once in childhood. Perhaps every critical level of development makes necessary
a renewed settlement of this economic life principle. In puberty, where the restoration of the original wholeness has arrived in the ego development, the individual is faced anew with the problem of partialization, which seems necessary for the preservation of individuality, in opposition to the total claim of sexuality.

Now however, the generative aspect of sexuality comes to the individual’s aid by directing the ego to the sexual partner as the natural complement. In other words, the individual is offered the possibility of solving the partialization problem with the maintenance of the ego wholeness. The ego no longer needs to split itself up, but can perceive its wholeness as part of the other, a solution which comes nearest to the original relation to the mother, and accordingly is so blessed, that is, tends to free from fear. Why this solution, which is already preformed through the relation to other persons (parents, teachers, etc.) does not always succeed, or at least not permanently, depends, apart from the difficulties inherent in the problem itself, on another important factor which complicates the state of affairs extremely. This is the emotional life, the genetic understanding of which we can touch here only in relation to the problem confronting us. In contrast to sexuality, which works more freely than bindingly, because it attains totalization in the other without reducing its own totality, the emotional life has a clearly binding effect. Although there are partial feelings, it is true, still emotion according to its nature is a total phenomenon, in act an inner totalization of the ego, as love shows most clearly. Although it refers to the other and binds the ego to the “thou,” it seems also at the same time to be an ego protection against the partial or total loss of self in the other. For the emotion belongs to me, is always mine, makes me as it were independent of

the other, which explains the joy-giving quality often found in an unrequited love. Every emotion which is admitted in its totality manifests itself as love, yes, one might also identify love with totality, just as fear, and all negative emotions, are one with partiality. The well-known incapacity for love of the neurotic is explained by the fact that he never lets his emotion become whole or come up wholly, so that it can only express itself partially, i.e. negatively as guilt feeling. However, as I have already shown, with the emotional life there enters, as a powerful factor, the time element, so that totality in this case also means permanence. The incapacity of the neurotic to bear the tension of the emotional life, either as total or as permanent, leads to the fact that he must always generate his emotions partially and afresh, which is just what causes their manifestation as guilt feeling. To bear the same feeling totally and permanently would mean to feel love. How this quantitative alteration of the emotion is to be reached therapeutically, we will try to present in a later chapter.

The temporal aspect, so meaningful in the emotional life, makes us aware of one of the grounds on which the idea of the whole can be imbued with fear. The total is actually at the same time final, and
finality in the last analysis means death. Again this is shown in the fact that the neurotic with all his symptoms, which are partial, like the splitting off of sexuality, seeks to avoid totality, the total surrender to life or to a person, by offering a part as substitute for the whole. The miscarriage of this solution, which apparently succeeds with the average, comes about thus, that with the neurotic, the part is not a substitute for the whole but always the whole itself, because with him the partial always assumes the dimensions of the whole, and therewith of finality. With him, accordingly, it is always a matter of life and death, an avoidance of life that leads him to the threshold of death and a fear of death that keeps him from life.

1 Gen. Psychol. II “Fühlen und Verleugnen,” Modern Education, Chapter III.

2 The neurotic irresolution and indecisiveness in the beginning or ending of life acts is an expression of death fear, because every decision and every end has final meaning for the neurotic, also wherever it has to do with momentous resolutions and purposive closings as for example in the psychoanalytic cure. His real element therefore is conflict, where at all events he avoids finality.

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In this sense the neurotic is a “totalist” that is, an individual who can carry out every act of living only totally, while life demands constant capacity for partialization. In the case of the normal who must settle the same life problem, partial acts seem somehow to sum up to a whole, which naturally does not have the significance of one single act, as with the neurotic. On the side of libido, this totality has been described as “narcissism,” but it seems as if this concentration on the own ego were only a defense mechanism against the partial giving up of the self, cement, as it were, that holds the parts of the ego together so firmly that they cannot be given out separately. However, as life constantly demands partial reactions, the over-strong tendency to totalization leads necessarily to inner division as an attempt at adaptation, which perhaps explains also Janet’s concept of the dissociation of the neurotic. This inner split of the neurotic, which, in contrast to the outer partialization of the normal, manifests itself as conflict, is always an avoidance of complete surrender, a wanting to give and still not being able to, a gesture of giving without the real act. All neurotic symptomatology is just such an unfortunate part for whole solution, which distinguishes itself from normal partialization in this, that every part again becomes symbol of the whole and accordingly cannot be given. This throws an important light also on the difference between neurotic symbolism and that which has collective value, since the latter actually uses a characteristic part as representative of the whole, while for the neurotic, everything assumes symbolic, that is total, meaning. Collective symbolism, as it reveals itself in art and religion, works therapeutically because it actually gives something, is a partial sacrifice, while neurotic symbolism is a mere gesture with which the individual seeks to withdraw from actual giving.
Before we turn again from these general viewpoints to the analytic ideology, we must refer to a paradox of essential significance, knowledge of which may protect us also from the mixing of theory and therapy. While experience always takes place only partially (in particular) because total experience would be final, that is death-bringing, the understanding of a person’s never partial but always possible only as a whole. Accordingly therefore psychoanalytic psychology can explain only particular human reactions, but never can understand the total personality, the whole man. Rightly, for example, does Driesch place the concepts of “wholeness” and its corresponding causality in the center of his vitalistic conception, likewise the idea of development from it, that is the personal development of mental faculties in relation to human beings. Ernst Schneider in a work “Über Identifizierung” (Imago XII, 1926) has made an attempt to organize some empirical results of analytic research with the help of Driesch’s concept. He conceives of identification as an attempt to be rid of fear which has ensued through differentiation. Identification thus shows itself to be a means to integration, an attempt again to arrive at a whole. Identification, is therefore in the last analysis wholeness-identification, in which Schneider, however, differentiates a polarity, since he distinguishes “the striving to give back the differentiated part again to the whole” as regressive identification, from the “tendency to add to the part so that it grows into the whole,” progressive identification. As the basis of all traumata he conceives the “absence of wholeness” which thereby is intensively experienced, and he brings out as peculiarly meaningful differentiations the “trauma of birth” and the “trauma of consciousness.” Identification appears thus as the normal opposite to the inner split, which we have characterized before as the neurotic attempt at fear defense; it is differentiated from a split in that it seeks to take the absent wholeness from without into the ego, instead of wanting to maintain it by internal division. On the other hand, identification also has the tendency to make the ego independent of the outer world, and accordingly often has the significance of killing the other, incorporating him, in order to escape one’s own dying (from differentiation).

It would be enticing to examine from this standpoint the problem of character which recently has again moved to the center of psychological discussion. The two fundamental views which here also are irreconcilably opposed, according to the

1 See the brief resumé of Driesch’s doctrine in his “Metaphysik der Natur,” 1927 S. 92.

2 The same thought, that identification proceeds from the ego and not from the id, that is, that it has fear-controlling not libido-freeing as its aim, S. Bernfeld used later as foundation for his study “Über Faszination,” Imago XIV, 1928.
distinguished presentation of Fr. Seifert\(^1\) have come somewhat closer through the analytic concept of identification to the naturalistic conception which considers character as given by nature; the idealistic view on the contrary looks upon it as a free personal act of reason. This latter conception has found its clearest expression in Schiller, influenced by Kant’s autonomic psychology, which defined man in the idealistic sense “as a being who himself is the cause and indeed the absolute final cause of his status, who can alter himself on grounds which he takes from himself.” To this certainly one-sided spiritualization of the individual, may be contrasted roughly not only the naturalism which looks upon character as given, but also Freud’s conception, which looks upon it as the precipitate of identifications, chiefly with the parents. In contrast to that, I have again emphasized the individual factor, which, through the given and through that which has been appropriated by identification, finally makes something of its own, and in truth so much more, the stronger the personality, or whatever forms its nucleus. In a similar sense Seifert also defines characterology as the striving of psychology after the whole man, with the rejection of the subject-object contrast as an anthropological basis. Character is the complete person existing in individual coinage without the elimination or degradation of any essential side of his existence. No matter how one may ally oneself on the matter of a scientific definition of the concept of character, psychologically it always means wholeness or at least the striving of the individual after unity and, however far given partial impulse dispositions or acquired identifications are applied to character formation in terms of psychoanalysis, the latter itself, is only one of the most essential manifestations of individual striving for wholeness.\(^2\)

The only question is, in how far does the individual succeed in this totalization in character formation or even elsewhere, that is, what differentiating forces oppose it, or can bring it to partial

\(^1\) Charakterologie, 1929.

\(^2\) Also it again becomes clear here why psychoanalysis has busied itself so little with the character problem, while it discusses the various ego parts in unwearying variation and permutation. That this super-ego and sub-ego psychology may itself be an intellectualistic derivation of the partialization tendency, can perhaps be demonstrated from the original dualistic soul concept of the primitives.

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decomposition. Statically one can certainly distinguish as does E. Jaensch\(^1\) two fundamental forms of human existence, the integrated and the disintegrated type, which compares in some ways, although
not wholly, with the total and the partial type. But even with characterologic disintegration, as which one can view the neurosis, one cannot dispense with the dynamic conception, leading beyond the mechanistic one of psychoanalysis. Nearest to the dynamic viewpoint comes the “romantic” conception of Goethe, whose organic-rhythmic “primary phenomenon” of arsis and thesis (rising and sinking) permits character to be understood as proportional forces (balancing forces). According to Seifert, whom we follow in this, this polarity principle is possible in characterology only beyond all causality.

This brings us back to Freudian therapy, yes, to the basic problem of the whole psychoanalytic ideology. When the reproach was made against Freudian analysis in the beginning, that it was not constructive and accordingly should be integrated by a synthesis, Freud answered that the synthesis would make itself. He must probably have made this observation through his patients, and it is correct too, insofar as otherwise they would have been wholly analyzed (dissected) and would have remained so. In other words, he must have glimpsed the working of the tendency to wholeness in the individual, but he has described it only as resistance to his analytic work. With the same right as Freud in regard to synthesis, one could also say of analysis, it does itself, and the synthesis would be more important for the patients. Actually, many a neurotic comes to the treatment already too much in pieces to bear a further analysis, while with others one has the impression that their too complete wholeness must yield before they can integrate themselves constructively.

A discussion of analytic versus synthetic therapy is just as unfruitful, however, as a discussion of active versus passive technique, since there can be no generally valid rule, which would be applicable to every type in every case. Only if one sets out less to find a general technique than to solve the individual problem of the patient, will one recognize how the part-whole conflict is to be solved in every particular situation, that is, at what

1 Grundformen menschlichen Seins, 1930.

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moment, or in what case, analysis or synthesis, activity or passivity, is necessary. Finally, Freudian technique whether one wants it to be so or not, also combines active and passive, analytic and synthetic elements. To this synthetic aspect belong first of all the restoration of psychic connections through associated remembering and correct placing of affects, the two factors which played the main role in the original cathartic experiment of Breuer. Freud was impelled further and further from this into the analytic through interest in research, which then took effect in his therapy as an overbalance on the side of partialization. Again, the mixing of theory and technique is shown, since natural science with its interest in the single problem has always a partial ideology as its pre-supposition, while all therapy (including religion, art and philosophy) must be totalistic to work at all. Here again we stumble upon a profound point in which the psychology of the therapist type is of meaning for the neurotic type. If a
therapist like Freud, and the analysts identified with him, are of the scientific partialization type, then they will never really understand the totalistic neurotic type which approximates the creative artist, and will never be able to help him constructively. They can, it is true, help him unwittingly if it concerns an extreme totalistic individual who needs just this partialization which the analytic type with his scientific ideology can give, provided this influence, which cannot be counted on anyway, is not paralyzed by the personality type of the particular analyst concerned. In this sense, Freud’s passivity was an instinctive protection against this personal influence, although it was maintained in the interest of uninfluenced investigation of the patient and not from therapeutic considerations, that is, from an understanding of the role falling to the analyst. With other analysts, this scientifically justified reserve has become a technical gesture which must be kept up for the justification of endlessly drawn out analyses.

Technically a resistance of the patient during treatment, always according to his type or the momentary localization of his tear (life or death fear), can be directed against an attempt at Partialization through the analyst, or also against a compulsion to totalization. In the first case the patient will either resist the analytic partialization through total exclusion (narcissistic cutting off), or he will react with life fear; in the second case, he will seek to avoid a synthetic compulsion to totalization as it ensues through the increase of transference emotion, with a symptomatic partial payment. On this account the reappearance or first appearance of symptoms in analysis cannot be met effectively through their historic-genetic tracing back. Their appearance must first of all be understood from the dynamics of the therapeutic situation itself, which then also throws a light upon their general meaning in the total economy of the personality. In general, the first part of the analysis should develop in terms of the (narcissistic) total resistance to the therapeutic partial invasion (attack), while the second may be characterized in terms of the part holding its own against the totalistic emotional binding, through the appearance of partial resistances (transitory symptoms). According to my experience, one is usually able through a dynamic influencing of the patient to avoid extreme resistances of the one or the other kind, and therewith to obtain a quicker and at the same time a better therapeutic effect.

The widely differing capacities of individuals for the solution of the whole-part conflict, determine also their differences in relation to reality in general as well as to their fellow men. The so-called “adaptation to reality” which the neurotic apparently envies the average man, corresponds to a re-orientation of the individual as a part in a whole, whether it be biologically in the family, socially in the professional group or nation (race) or ideologically in religion or a similar collectivity (science, art, etc.). The neurotic type, quite the reverse, makes the reality surrounding him a part of his ego, which explains his painful relation to it. For all outside processes, however un-meaningful they may be in themselves, finally concern him,
are alterations of himself which he perceives painfully. However, this apparent egocentricity originally is just a defense mechanism against the danger of reality, as is normal adaptation, for both strive at bottom after unity, only the adapted type does it by accepting itself as part of the whole (of a whole), the neurotic type by always remaining the whole and accepting reality only as part, that is, of itself. As the neurotic does not succeed, he is never able to feel himself as whole, and so perceives not only the chasm between

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himself and the world as unbridgeable, but also the division in himself as a constant hindrance to organizing himself as an entity of the world. However, neither is the inner division the cause of his estrangement from the world, nor his alienation from reality the cause of the inner division; both are consequences of his attempt at solution of the problem of individuation, which he can accept only in the total fashion determined by his fear.

The separation of the neurotic from reality is therefore only a seeming one; he is bound up in a kind of magic unity with the wholeness of life around him much more than the adjusted type who can be satisfied with the role of a part within the whole. The neurotic type has taken into himself potentially the whole of reality, on account of which on occasion he can also put it outside of himself in a creative way. But this very creativity which looks like a finding the way back to reality (Freud), remains for the productive type itself always a barrier between himself and the world, for the complete work of art represents the total personality as well as the total reality, which means at bottom that it is still the inner personal wholeness and not the outer, actual totality. This act of putting out, which the artist perceives rightly, not only as a birth but also as a dying, the neurotic can bring to pass in no way. He only takes in, he gives nothing out. He seeks to complete his ego constantly at the cost of others without paying for it. But he perceives the guilt as a double one; on one side, that of the constant taking without giving back again, which on the other side lets his debt to life grow constantly. And however hard he tries, always, as long as he maintains the inner division, a part must remain unsatisfied, and this must necessarily produce guilt, because in holding back the ego (self maintenance) he must blame himself for missing life (conscience fear), and when he lets it go, he becomes guilty for losing life (death fear).

According to whether the one or the other side of this basic life conflict is more or less over-emphasized one can distinguish two neurotic types or classes, which correspond to a shattering on the one or the other difficulty in finding a solution. One meets here either a partial symptomatology or a total illness, and within each of these two groups again a division, but by no means rigid, into physical and psychic phenomena (symptoms). While in a
number of cases the individual succeeds in localizing the fear by means of particular neurotic symptoms, which correspond to partialization of the ego, in other cases it seems to seize the whole ego. With this latter type, whose classic form is represented in depression, a character trait of the neurosis comes clearly to view, which in other cases we can only infer theoretically; namely the individual has not so much fear of dying or the wish for it, rather he is dead, it is true not biologically, but insofar as his relation to the world and to positive living is concerned. It has to do with a kind of death simulation reflex, a biological defense mechanism which Kretschmer\(^1\) has drawn upon for comparison with certain hysterical phenomena. What disturbs the functioning of this mechanism in humans is the tormenting consciousness that the individual will not let himself forget that he still lives, although he has the feeling of being dead. Actually, these cases of neurosis correspond to a condition of being buried alive, just as other cases correspond to a constant partial self-murder. The loss of consciousness with certain catatonic and epileptic attacks, other observers have already interpreted as death symbols (for example August Hoch, “Benign Stupors” 1921).

At the other end of the line stands that kind of neurosis which represents a pure consciousness phenomenon, namely compulsive thinking, in which the rest of the personality can usually remain capable of functioning. This is a successful partial solution not only in the sense of social functioning, but also from the standpoint of the suffering person, who therewith escapes more severe injuries, that is, the total fear development. In this as also in the case of the hysterical partial solution which produces a single symptom or a definite phobia, the most important thing for the individual himself is not the capacity to function which remains, but the part split off in the symptom, for from the individual standpoint, the symptom represents the life maintaining principle, through which the ego is to be conserved. Accordingly the resistance against the giving up of the symptom, which would have as a consequence a general release of fear. The split off part of the ego represents at the same time a secret compartment,

\(^1\) The motor attack is related to the preformation of the “storm of activity,” the syncope to that of the death-simulating reflex in the animal kingdom,” Über Hysterie”—1923.

in which the life reserve for the dark hour is stored, and fear watches over it that these savings be not given up. Probably every man has in his ego such a secret chamber (by which is meant here not any kind
of psychic localization as perhaps the unconscious) which he keeps for himself and cuts off from living
until perhaps one day it is spent in the celebration of a great experience. For the neurotic it remains
inaccessible, if it cannot be made mobile in the therapeutic experience, in which, however, there is also
the danger that he may give up completely in this one experience his whole life capital. The typical
neurosis, however, presents the individual who has killed a part of his ego in order to protect it from
being lived out, and in so doing has made himself incapable of living. The hysterical type represents
the death symptoms carried out in the own ego, the compulsion neurotic type represents the fear of death
projected upon the other. “If I do not do this or that then this or that one will die,” is not the expression
of repressed death wishes with simultaneous self-punishment from guilt feeling, even where it may
appear so; this is ultimately only a defense against the death fear through the killing (sacrifice) of the
other. The compulsive condition in the last analysis always implies “If I do anything at all, that is if I live,
then a misfortune occurs, that is, I will die.” Accordingly, life is restricted in order to keep off death, but
this repression of life is again only death, which the extreme compulsion type also acts out in his self-
seclusion, exactly as does the hysterical in his attacks.

From this conception of the neuroses as a self-restriction of the life function in the interest of protecting
from death (fear avoidance), we learn to understand the essence of normal repression as a self-
protection, which, however, works like a two-edged sword. While we protect ourselves through all
possible social precepts, moralistic restrictions, and ethical ideals, from a too intensive or too quick living
out or living up, we feel ourselves guilty on account of the unused life, the unlived in us. However, if we
step over these repressions set up for self-protection, then follow repentance and conscience fear,
which are expressions of threat by death, which is brought nearer by experiencing. This double
repression mechanism creates the appearance of self-punishment, but is just as much self-protection.
All moral fear,

including conscience fear which proceeds from the super ego, is accordingly fear of life and serves as
protection from it, while all outer restrictions, like law and moral conventions, represent only
objectifications of this inner barrier, which, when projected outside, unburden rather than hinder the
individual. In other words, the conventions in the broadest sense of the word prescribe for the individual
an average partialization and dosage of his experience, which has proved itself through generations, and
has found its precipitate in certain laws, customs and moral precepts.¹ The average man is glad to find
such a scheme of which he can make use, while the total human type has difficulties fitting into this
partial living. He must accordingly either establish his own partial repression inside (symptom), or take
flight to a total repression which approximates death. In no case, however, is the fear which the
neurotic shows the consequence of his inner repression, but rather the cause of it, although the
neurotic repression, which always goes too far, is total, and again releases fear. This, however, is the fear of not being able to live, while the fear leading to repression is the fear of having to die.

1 During the writing of this work, an article by R. de Saussure comes to my attention, which proposes to bring to account the new orientation of Psa in terms of ego psychology through the fact that one assumes a “repression instinct.” Revue Française de Psa. Tome 1930.
The psychoanalytic conception of the neuroses and of illness in general in the broader sense, leads necessarily to a new conception of the idea of illness, which one might best designate perhaps as a philosophy of suffering. From our earlier deductions on life and death fear, we obtain first of all a basis for understanding suffering which extends beyond the rational notion of self-punishment into psychobiology. Illness, at least that designated as neurotic, proves to be a means of partial payment to death, an attempt to escape a complete through a partial killing off, that is, to avoid death fear. That this attempt of the individual to deceive life, ends with the deception of the self in regard to life, is just what constitutes the neurotic quality of this type of illness. It is evident that in the neurosis the human being misuses one of nature’s predestined ways in self-willed over-valuation of self, and thereby divests it of its biological value. The human arch evils which Buddha designates as age, illness and death, cannot be accepted by the self-conscious individual as a natural consequence of the life process. Since ageing and dying resist every influence, man picks out illness as the evil to be attacked in order to test out on it his power over nature. However, a deepened understanding of human psychic life teaches us that illness is not only biologically necessary, but as a partial dying, is even wholesome, since it releases new capacities for living and also serves psychologically as a kind of payment, an unburdening from guilt feeling, through the release from fear.

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The psychology of the neuroses in the narrower sense brings up the broader problem, whether and to what extent the human being can himself produce illness, or even develop a given germ for that purpose. It seems probable that this might happen when his fear of life or his guilt to life from continuous refusal to live, becomes so great that he can balance it only with a temporary or lasting illness. The neurotic type therefore lives negatively, as it were, since he pays not with life but with death; seeks to buy himself free by an apparent partial killing (illness) without gaining anything thereby. This cannot be explained on the basis of unlucky-person psychology, on the contrary the neurotic will
accept nothing, not even good luck, because he is unwilling to give, in fact cannot give anything. It seems therefore, that in neurotic illness we are dealing with an attempt on the part of man to force nature, that is, an attempt against himself as a part of nature. Although this situation now seems clear, still it is not evident who, or better said, what the source of compulsion actually is, and what end this whole process is intended to serve. In the study of the neuroses, it has gradually become clear to me that Freudian psychoanalysis, although it had recognized this paradox could not understand it fully because it had left out an essential factor in psychic life, namely, the individual will. Accordingly, in its conception of the neuroses Freudian psychoanalysis remains fast in self-punishment, a concept based on the idea of punishment from the outside and imbued with its moralistic flavor. Just so, the part that exercises this self-punishment, Freud’s super-ego, is itself only an inner representative of outer sources of force (father, society) which once have punished or potentially could punish. In contradistinction to this viewpoint, I assumed even in my first book, Der Künstler (1905), a capacity for inhibition inherent in instinctual life itself, almost an inhibition instinct which I was not able to distinguish as will until later1 after I had recognized its positive side as the organ of integration of the impulsive self and its constructive capacity for ruling, developing and changing, not only the surrounding world but the

1 This conception derived from my analytic work I have since found confirmed by Klages who, although too one-sided, understands the will as an inhibiting organ; see the summarized presentation by Ludwig Klages “Persönlichkeit” Das Weltbild Bd. 11 Potsdam 1927.

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self. To show how the individual will forms itself in relation to the outer influences of authority and reality, that is strengthens itself on them or breaks, is a matter for a genetic psychology. In the developed individual we find the will already present as an autonomous power capable of effecting positive changes, although often enough it manifests itself negatively. Schopenhauer was probably the first to recognize clearly that man can transform will to not-willing, a discovery which certainly loses much of its paradox if one has learned to understand that the will of the individual is originally a “not wanting,” not only in relation to outer force, but also with regard to inner compulsion. We now return to the concept of illness, which remains incomprehensible without the will psychology. It is clear that the negative nature of the will, the not-wanting, makes it possible to resist illness, as in fact folk consciousness itself so richly testifies. The new element in our conception however is this, that positive will can take illness as something willed or at least affirm it, or use it, and further as creative will even be able to overcome it constructively. The greatest witness for this process as well as the source of the first psychological insight into its significance is Nietzsche, who as is well known, not only affirmed his illness, yes, actually glorified it, but who discovered through his own experience that becoming well is of more value than being well, because it is more constructive, yes, in a certain sense is creative. He says “I took myself in hand, I myself made myself sound again.” The prerequisite for this process is that one be
sound at bottom. A typically morbid being cannot become healthy, still less make himself so, while for a typically healthy person, on the contrary, illness can even be a powerful stimulant to continued living. Nietzsche, however, has not only experienced in himself what we see in so many artists, namely that any kind of illness can lead to creative overcompensation in work⁴ but he seems also to have suspected the deeper problem, that both illness and work are the expression of a creative will in the individual. Be that as it may, at all events, the will psychology which I have developed from the study of the neuroses has led

A similar conception lies at the basis of Alfred Adler’s doctrine of the tendency to over-compensation for inferior organs and Wilhelm Ostwald’s idea of a biological tendency to “over-healing.”

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me to believe that in certain situations of illness the individual strives for a re-creation of self, which perhaps many times gives the appearance of self-healing, but does not have this for its aim. Even Nietzsche after his self-healing became not healthy but productive, that is, was able to transfer the creative urge from his body to the personality, as is manifested spiritually in his work. With this deviation we leave the productive personality in order to turn again to the neurotic, in whom the creative tendency instead of expressing itself objectively, remains exclusively confined to the ego itself.

The neurotic is a person who expresses his creative will exclusively within his own ego, both physical and psychic, which shows that he cannot really accept the self as given. Accordingly, we see his discontent with himself, with his ego as it is, and his compulsion to remodel it in terms of his own will. It makes little difference whether he has an ideal image of himself in mind or not, for always he is concerned more with the expression of his will, and less with the attainment of a definite goal, in any case, probably beyond reach. Consequently, also he does not really want to become healed or well, because that itself would mean attainment of a goal which he would probably like to attain if it were not a goal. For the goal is an end and the end is death for the neurotic, even though he be the end of a therapeutic treatment with health as its aim. But the neurosis is more than the manifestation of the individual creative will exercised upon ego, it presupposes also the expression of the destructive will upon that part of the self which has been overcome. In other words, it is a willed attempt at remodeling on the part of the individual who wants to create himself in the exact image of his own ideal. The neurotic illness shows this melting up process (Peer Gynt’s melting pot) in statu nascendi, in which the old has been dissolved in part and the new is not yet crystallized out. Why is it that so many men apparently remain hopelessly caught in this process of remodeling the given self into a willed ego, and often enough cannot be freed from it by any therapy?
This question can be answered only by a consideration of the several aspects of this complicated problem. First of all, it seems to me we must remember that, in spite of the constantly increasing number of neurotics, the majority of men do somehow complete the task of self-formation and self-creation; on the other hand, that the increase of neuroses is connected with the increase of self-consciousness, and also with mounting guilt and fear, for the control of which the individual is thrown more and more upon himself as the collective therapies fail. Another reflection leads more deeply into psychology and ties up with our conclusions on life fear. It is not merely that the dissatisfaction with the given self which characterizes modern men is the result of too highly aimed ideals, but the inability to accept self is itself a consequence of fear, which causes the individual to flee before life, whether it be into an ideal formation which artistic unreality represents objectively, or whether it be a symptom formation as neurotic unreality represents it subjectively. One finds as a rule various mixtures of these two flight mechanisms in one and the same individual. The conception just presented presupposes two facts: the broadening of self-consciousness, which, especially in the psychological era in which we live, needs no further explanation and the increase of the emotions of guilt and fear which shows itself as a specific increase of neurosis. Both are clearly connected with increasing individualization which throws the individual evermore upon himself, a condition which the ego strives for basically in any case. The dark side of this individual self-mastery is the increased self-responsibility which manifests itself as guilt feeling and leads to mounting fear.

Again, we come upon the basic part-whole conflict, for the fear which appears in consequence of individualization, is the fear of being alone, of loneliness, the loss of the feeling of kinship with others, finally with the ALL. Here psychotherapy enters as a binding function, not only in its effort to bind the isolated neurotic to society, but even in its method, which offers to the patient in the person of the analyst, the “thou” from whom he had estranged himself in self-willed independence. That this “thou” then so easily becomes the “all” for the patient is now clearly comprehensible and constitutes the most difficult aspect of the treatment of the neurotic type, which is formed on the all or none psychology so that either aspect has for him a death meaning, that is, tends to unleash fear. Since we are saving the analysis of this therapeutic process and the role of the therapist therein for the next chapter, we turn again to the discussion of
the concept of illness. There is no doubt that in the illness resulting from the attempt at re-creation of the given self into a willed ego, the moment at which the individual looks to a therapist indicates an important turning point. This is characterized by the fact that it means on the one hand a step toward bettering the situation, on the other hand also, the climax of the neurotic process. For this turning for help to a stranger is a gesture with double significance; it indicates not only a hopeful inclination to give up self-will, but for the self-ruling individual also a confession of defeat. There are mingled in this initial situation, as I have pointed out elsewhere, stubborn tendencies together with yielding, surrender together with domination. In psychoanalytic terminology, the patient comes with resistances, but I do not believe that in every case these resistances must be removed, overcome or broken down in order to get results. This view could arise only on the basis of a psychoanalysis centered in the therapist, which could recognize in the defense against alien help only the “resistance,” and not the self-healing tendencies also contained therein.

The neurotic illness, as I understand it, includes from the beginning self-creation, no less than self-destruction, and I believe that a dynamic therapy should bring these constructive forces in the individual into play instead of forcing him to accept alien help, which naturally includes alien values and evaluations. In other words, I try to bring to fruition the auto-therapeutic forces in the neurotic, which hide behind the so-called resistances, and often can only manifest themselves negatively. The auto-therapeutic function of the neurosis, which has been revealed to me from the constructive understanding of the idea of resistance, expresses itself not only in the general attitude of the patient to life, to analysis and to himself, but also in the particular symptom formation and symptom transformation as it ensues, not only in the course of the illness, but also of the healing process. I have never yet seen a neurotic who has not used his symptoms, earlier or later and more or less consciously, in terms of self therapy as a proof or test of power. In other words, he produces the symptom or in chronic cases uses it, in order to see whether he has already overcome it or can still do so. He does the same then with the treatment itself, not only after it has won a definite

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therapy, since by means of it he can, as it were, apply his creative impulse according to his own will upon the process, the therapeutic task instead of on himself. In this endeavor dynamic therapy supports him, otherwise he directs his neurotic destructiveness against the process as representing his own ego. In this case he destroys, in place of himself, the therapeutic work representing it, especially if it is the work of the therapist. If he has enough creative energy left over he will produce (which often occurs as an after result of an ideological therapy) a physical illness at the ending of the analysis, of which he then cures himself by his own strength. Many times, this happens even in the course of an analysis.
ideologically conducted, and it looks as if with the removal of psychic inhibitions, the physical restriction had become no longer necessary. However, it is at least just as much an expression of voluntary creative energy, which the ideological analysis hinders in its activity, and which accordingly can only manifest itself as resistance. On the other hand, in this re-creative process which the illness represents, the destructive impulse also has a proportional share, so that the outcome of such an illness can be negative even so. It seems that here also Nietzsche was right when he said that he who is sound at the core, with whom, therefore, the creative drive is at bottom stronger in spite of all illness, yes, in spite of all cures, finally goes forth well and strengthened from all experiences of death, if only he wants to live; while the basically sick, in whom the inhibitive impulse is predominant, never becomes healthy as long as he does not overcome life fear.

This evaluation of illness as an expression of the individual creative force leads to a wholly different conception of the neurotic, yes, almost to an apology for the neurotic type who not only unites in himself potentially the possibilities of destructiveness as well as of creativeness, but also demonstrates them factually. The neurotic, although he is not successful in displacing these two basic tendencies ideologically from his own ego to objective work, nevertheless corresponds much more to a miscarried artist (productive person) than to an average man who has not achieved normal development. The attitude of scorn which the therapist type has for the neurotic, in spite of all his understanding, arises in the last analysis from the fact that he

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sees in him his own destructive self, just as the patient seeks to find in the therapist his own creative ego, by means of identification. In this sense therapist and neurotic form two complementary types, whereby the therapist uses the patient in psychic terms exactly as the patient uses the therapist. The misunderstanding of this situation has led to the misunderstanding already pointed out, that psychoanalytic theory, which represents a psychology of the therapist type, was maintained as a psychology of the neurotic while it is really only his therapy; in other words, that while psychoanalytic theory is therapeutically oriented, the therapy is ideological. The recognition of this fact leads necessarily to my conception that the healing factor of psychotherapy consists not in psychological self-knowledge and its ideological formulation, but in the therapist type itself, whom the neurotic seeks and wants to use as the ideal completion of his own ego.

In order to be able to use this therapy of complementary types dynamically, it is necessary to understand the psychic play of forces which underlies it. We have seen how, to the original biological duality of impulse (instinct) and fear in human beings, is added the psychological factor par excellence of the individual will, which can manifest itself partly negatively as inhibition (control) and partly positively as creative energy. However, this creative drive, which we also saw at work in the process of illness, is
not sexuality as psychoanalysis assumed, but an actually anti-sexual tendency in men which we have characterized as a voluntary control of the instinctive life. Precisely formulated I understand by the creative drive, the impulse life put at the service of the individual will, and this naturally in-- eludes sexuality. When psychoanalysis speaks of the sublimation of the sex instinct, by which is meant its diversion from the purely biological function and its direction to higher goals, the question as to what diverts and what directs, is avoided by the reference to repression. Repression, however, is a negative factor which perhaps can divert but never direct. Also, the further

See “Truth and Reality.” In a notable book, which has come to my attention in working out this chapter, I found a similar comprehension of the transference relation which the author, Schulte-Vaarting, tried to explain socio-biologically by leaping over all psychological factors. “Neubegründung der Psychoanalyse” Berlin, 1930.

social question remains open, what originally leads to repression itself. This question, as is well known, was answered with the reference to outer deprivation, which also means only a negative restriction, while I represent the conception that at least from a certain point of individual development on, voluntary control takes the place of repression and autonomous use of the sexual impulse in the service of this will, effects the sublimation.

We have therefore to reckon in the growing individual with the triad, impulse, fear and will. The dynamic relation of these factors determines the present attitude, or, after the attainment of some kind of balance, the actual type. However unsatisfactory it may be to put these dynamic processes into typical formulae, still it remains the only way to approximate clarity in this complicated matter. If we compare the neurotic type with the productive, then it is clear that with the former the impulse life is repressed too far. According to whether this neurotic impulse repression ensues by means of fear or the will, we have the picture of fear neurosis (hysteria) or compulsion neurosis, the typical illness in the sphere of will. In the productive, on the contrary, the will is dominant, with a far reaching control but no repression of the impulse life, which is thus freed for a creative social use that tends to ameliorate fear. The impulse life is relatively unpressed in the so-called “psychopathic” type, to which also the criminal belongs. With this type the will affirms the impulse life instead of controlling it; that is, in spite of the opposite appearance, we deal with weak-willed human beings, who are subject to their instinctual impulses, while, quite the reverse, the neurotic, contrary to the common conception, represents the strong-willed type, but he can exercise his will only on his own ego and, on the whole, repressively. Quite schematically one could perhaps formulate it thus that with the neurotic, fear has the upper hand, with the psychopath, the impulses, and with the productive, the will, although in actuality these extreme types always appear mixed for the most part, and also do not remain constant dynamically. On the other hand, it seems clear that a complete love life of which no one of the three named types is
capable, unites all three factors in an harmonious way. The impulse life is satisfied in sex, the individual will fulfills itself in the choice and creative transforming of the mate, while fear

is overcome by the love surrender. Moreover, guilt feeling is produced in as slight a degree as possible because the different parts of the personality, the impulse ego, the will ego and the fear ego, work with, instead of against, one another, and because biological guilt to the partner, as well as the social guilt to the fellow man, is paid off through voluntary, yes, joyful giving.

With the three types described above guilt feeling is as unavoidable as the heat produced by friction in machinery. With the neurotic, guilt feeling is restrictive of action and serves like fear as protection against it; with the psychopaths (criminals) guilt feeling as a rule follows the impulsive behavior as repentance; with the productive, guilt feeling usually accompanies creation, upon which it can exercise a repressive as well as a furthering effect. (See the chapter on creative guilt feeling in “Truth and Reality.”) The productive pays, however, not only to life, to mankind with his work, but also to death with neurotic suffering of a physical or psychic nature, and on the contrary many a product is the payment to life of a type basically neurotic. Accordingly it is possible to differentiate two fundamental types of artist, as there are also two great groups of neurotics, sometimes called the Dionysian and the Apollonic, and again the romantic and the classic.¹ In terms of our dynamic viewpoint, the one should be nearer to the psychopathic impulse type, the other to the compulsion neurotic will type; the one creates more from exhaustion and in compensation, the other more from vigor through sublimation. The work of the one is whole (total) in every single expression, the work of the other even in its totality is partial; the one lives itself out positively in work, while the other pays with work; not to society, for both do this, but to life from which the one type seeks to buy itself free through voluntary creating, while for the other type, work is the expression of life itself. Here again the predominance of life fear or death fear within the play of forces of impulse and will, differentiates this or that kind of creative type (artist, philosopher, etc.) and also the differing productivity within the same type. This is valid, as we have seen, for neurotic production also,

¹ Recently E. Von Sydow has designated these polar opposites from the standpoint of aesthetics as “love-rulled” and “love-ruling” art, “Primitive Kunst und Psychoanalyse” 1921.
which in the striving to lessen or avoid fear has to choose between total giving up or partial giving off, and must find both unsatisfying. Illness can be both, no matter whether it is more concerned with a protection against living (repression) or with a paying off to death. There are men who spend themselves in illness, as well as individuals for whom being sick corresponds to a saving of life strength. In general a psychoneurosis will always carry rather the character of parsimonious sickness, that is of repression of life, while the physical illness corresponds to a payment to death. In both cases however, the actual soul life of feeling and willing is exploded either in physical symptoms or in cerebration.

As I have shown elsewhere, emotion arises from impulse damned within, in which the will bringing about this inhibition seems itself softened (Modern Education 1929). In this sense, every emotion is a mixed feeling of aggressive and subversive tendencies in which the first predominate in the affect, the latter in the emotion. The aggressive character of the emotional life, its longing for expression, comes from the damned instinctual impulse; the yielding, releasing character of the emotional life from the softening of the will. The hysterical physical symptom has the yielding character, compulsive thinking (or acting) is impulsive and aggressive. This is connected with our earlier formulation, according to which the phenomena of hysterical illness are death symptoms represented in the ego, while apprehensions and wishes of the compulsion neurotic, on the contrary, correspond to the death fear projected upon the other. The compulsion neurotic represents exactly the will type, who has the tendency to kill the other in order to live, while the hysteric must die (kill himself) in order to live at all. In both types, however, illness (neurosis) corresponds to a denial of emotion, that is, emotion is either dissipated into impulsive action, or inhibited by will, or is hindered from expression by fear. For the expression of emotion tends always to totality, which means a giving up of self or losing of self, in the last analysis, death. He who does not perceive emotional expression as renunciation, that

1 Translator’s note: In Genetische Psychologie II, Rank defines affects as the alienating, painful feelings, such as jealousy, anger, hate, etc., while he uses the term emotion for the uniting, binding feelings.

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well as a cathartic function. The hysterical type represents all of his emotions, not only the sexual ones, with his body, as for example psychic suffering as physical pain, aversion as nausea, and so forth, while the compulsion neurotic emotionalizes his thinking. Psychoanalysis in both these cases has spoken of a sexualizing of the bodily functions, or of thinking, which is by no means the same thing. This viewpoint arises from the fact that for Freud the emotional life develops from the sexual sphere, therefore his sexualization in reality means emotionalization. Freud could not study the rich scale of the emotional life by means of the neurotic, since the latter suffers from impoverishment of emotion, actually from parsimony. For emotion pushes finally to surrender, at all events to giving out (expression) no matter what specific emotion is involved, and the neurotic exercises emotional restraint on the same grounds on which he inhibits every other expression of life, because one can lose one’s self, renounce one’s self in emotional expression, whether it be of the yielding or aggressive kind. The therapeutic relationship with its action-restricting and emotion-forming situations is accordingly in essence a learning to feel, a process in which the individual learns to develop emotion, but also must learn to recognize the emotion arising in himself, that is, must accept and bear it without letting it out in any way other than by thinking and speaking. Once the damming up in emotion is achieved, that is, once the individual can let emotion arise and keep it, then the first step toward the unification of the ego has been taken, a unity which was broken up by the fear of total loss. In place of instinctual drive and repressive will which are in conflict in neurotics and balance each other dynamically, emotion enters, which not only represents both spheres but also binds them, in a word, represents the total personality on the last level of its evolution.
THE ROLE OF THE THERAPIST IN THE THERAPEUTIC SITUATION

“Das Geeinte eu entzweien, das Entziceite zu etnigen ist das Leben der Natur.”

“To divide the united, to unite the divided is the life of nature.” _ Goethe

The concept of neurotic illness just presented necessitates a discussion of the therapeutic agent, which we shall begin with a description of the role of the therapist. In the first place, it is important to emphasize that this conception of the neurosis does not lead directly to therapy, for knowledge does not lead to therapy anyway and is certainly not the therapeutic agent for the patient. Our knowledge of the neurotic type, as we have presented it, has been won therapeutically, not from the analysis of the patient alone, but also from the understanding of the therapeutic situation and especially of the role played by the therapist. Therefore we are not concerned to give a description of a “technique” which does not exist in the dynamic therapy of the neurotic. Every technique must necessarily be oriented from the standpoint of the therapist, and must contain definite directions as to what to do or to leave undone. Dynamic therapy on the contrary is oriented in the patient, and indeed essentially in the particular individual as such. On the other hand, one can and must know in general what the patient does, that is, what he must do and what he should avoid. The following description in algebraic formulae, of the dynamics operative in the analytic situation, is only understandable if one presupposes the knowledge of the therapeutic agent won from the practice of psychotherapy which we have presented in the preceding chapters. This knowledge is not therapeutically used, however, but serves to light up the understanding of what goes on in the therapeutic

process in its constructive and destructive aspects. The role of the therapist is given through the patient, who functions as author; the task of the therapist is rather that of producer, who has to see to it that the performance runs successfully and undisturbed, and who must be always ready to take over any role that is demanded.

Already this comparison points to the multiplicity of roles falling to the therapist in the course of a treatment which are inherent in the case itself. Regardless of whether the patient gives to the therapist the role of a parent or spouse, of a brother, sister or friend, of a superior or inferior, temporarily or persistently, the therapist must penetrate beyond the concrete content to the ego of the patient and its
division, if he is to understand and utilize the dynamics therapeutically. For the patient assigns to the therapist alternately the roles of a partial ego, whether it be now the impulsive ego, now the willing ego, or again the restraining fear ego, and of these selves the life relationships of the moment (parents, spouses, etc.) are only symbolic representatives. In other words, the first therapeutic effect, which as a rule appears soon after the beginning of the treatment, is a projective unburdening from the conflict of the inner ego split, which is displaced outside and made concrete. In contradistinction to the usual life projection upon parents, spouses, etc., the therapist takes over the role of an assistant ego on the basis of his attitude, whether he is conscious of it or not. The patient will probably first assign to the therapist the ego part felt as most disturbing, but in consequence he will soon seem to fight against the therapist in this very role.

With the successful objectification of a part of his ego, there takes place at the same time a decisive alteration which, as one sees here, is not brought out by any kind of treatment, but by the situation itself which makes possible for the patient this new ego division. (The so-called “character analyses” of which a few advanced Freidians speak and in which a character alteration is striven for, is, therefore, at bottom the process of alteration introduced by the patient himself through his neurosis, which we have characterized as voluntary re-creation of the own self.) The neurotic defends himself against having the therapist want to change him, and this with right if it implies an alteration in terms of a predetermined schema, but he alters himself continuously and his regressive tendencies only prove how strongly he struggles against it, because change means development and development means life, which finally leads to death. In the dynamic therapy, which is based on the understanding of the role of the therapist, the patient is forced to change just through the fact that the therapist accepts the ego role assigned to him temporarily, and with the objectification of a part of the ego, a new dynamic situation arises inside, which in its turn effects another economic division of energy.

That this first unburdening can as yet work no healing is clear. First, it is not lasting and leads accordingly to new unburdening projections; secondly, the situation itself must be given up sometime and with it the assistant ego; and thirdly, even with its continuance it would be only a partial living in which the patient would lead, as it were, a parasitical life. The therapy ought to bring him finally to an emotional ego totality, on the basis of which he can at last express himself emotionally and thus buy himself free. Here it becomes comprehensible that the emotional life actually represents a kind of conventional means of payment like our paper money, which is taken for actual money only in trade, that is, in mutual exchange. Emotion is never a real loss but only a fictitious one; no actual giving is involved as it remains fundamentally always mine and as a rule only finds expression when it is answered by the
other, that is, is given back. Moreover, emotion, even when it is of the yielding kind, is always only an apparent giving, for it remains either entirely in the ego or is immediately restored to it. Therefore, usually only that is given and only so much as one is sure to get back from the other. In other words, there is in the individual the tendency to the maintenance of a certain feeling quantum, by means of which the ego compensates momentary losses, that is, can avoid or lessen fear reactions. This explains many a riddle of the emotional life; for example, why the individual can feel guilty because of his feeling for another; because it is just feeling and not more, that is, is not actual giving but only a gesture which simulates giving in order to free the individual of his guilt.

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which it really only increases. Accordingly one often finds very egoistical persons like the neurotic, capable of strong emotional perceptions with complete inability to express emotion.

The patient in the therapeutic situation develops intense emotions, which he, as a rule, keeps to himself, although he could express them. He receives from the therapist, it is true, no expressions of emotion but he does get help, for which he must pay in some form. His giving back, however, takes place in the purely egoistic form of the development of an emotion for the therapist, which he keeps for himself and which accordingly makes him all the more guilty. At the same time there goes on the process described by psychoanalysis as libidinal, which in dynamic terms, consists of the fact that the neurotic who has never learned to use the conventional feeling payment, with every giving out, however slight, drags in his whole gold treasure in order to pay in actual currency. He must first learn to make good with the expression of his emotions, be it only a symbolic (verbal) expression as a potentate repays the services done for him, through insignia. What we have here described in allegory, amounts dynamically to the conflict already spoken of between partial and total. The neurotic in giving, at least chiefly in giving, can only be total, and is not able to operate with the emotional surrender which represents only a symbolic part for whole. The normal gives emotions in smaller doses in order to be able to keep everything else, that is, the whole self for himself, while the neurotic thereby incurs the danger of making the emotion total and losing himself entirely in it.

As a powerful means of expression for this partial giving, verbalization of emotion is to be noted here. The first improvement in the treatment which we have ascribed to the ego unburdening, is usually explained as the effect of the “confession,” for the psychological understanding of which much is still lacking.¹ What we can contribute to it here is based on a recently published ethnological study of the confessional and touches its first magic stage with the primitives.² The primitive is naively convinced of his continuing existence and ascribes illness and


death to the mysterious effect of harmful matter penetrating him from without; his therapy consists therefore in putting this matter outside again and thereby making it harmless. This may be accomplished either through blood-letting, as for example in many South American peoples, or through the taking in of an emetic, as with various North American Indian tribes. More symbolically it may be effected by the removal of pieces of clothing as parts of the self or by washing; finally, the well-known drawing out of the alien body causing the illness, through the medicine man can have an astonishingly suggestive healing power. This giving up of ego or physical parts in place of the whole ego (dying) which I should like to conceive as a sacrifice in the sense of partial buying off, led finally in the penance of the church during the middle ages to lighter and more difficult works of mortification (killing off). There is also the fact that the magical confession used since earliest times, in order to banish the illness with magic words, means just such a giving out of the poison matter from the inside. For, say the Kagaba, “to confess means nothing other than to know what is within” (l.c. 38). Therefore, the verbal formulation of illness is a rejection of the illness in words, in which the idea of sin, which seemed to be absent from the original illness magic, is already presupposed. In the beginning illness and death are caused from outside, without personal guilt, by the evil of others. The unavoidability of these occurrences seems to have led to the comprehension of the guilt as individual and it was then defined as doing wrong (sin) most frequently as sexual wrong doing, because in sexuality as a potential death, the body is weakened. ¹

At any rate these reflections show that verbalization, which constitutes the only emotional expression in the therapeutic situation, is not only a symbolic substitute for action or emotion but also actually represents a rejection (putting out) of parts of the ego. The same thing can be seen in the symptoms substituted for feeling or speech, as for example vomiting which corresponds to a partial giving (or giving back). In the therapeutic process, however, the poisonous stuff of sins separated out from the ego is put over on the therapist who, as a matter of fact,

¹ For the causal derivation of death as punishment for sins, see my discussion in “Seelenglaube und Psychologie” (1930, S 109).
in the consciousness of many a patient retains the role of a scapegoat. Psychologically speaking he becomes in the course of the treatment a dumping ground on which the patient deposits his old neurotic ego and in successful cases finally leaves it behind him. For in the meantime the patient has undertaken the revaluation of his whole attitude to life, which is accomplished with the recall and partial reproduction of the past. In order to be able to accept this self, which he earlier rejected, he must recreate the past symbolizing or representing this self, in terms of the new strengthened ego. Compared with the historical truth, one can designate this description of his past as “falsification of history” but in this sense almost all historical writing is not only viewed in the light of the present but also proves its actual worth there. Therapeutically, however, this falsification of the past is necessary in order that the individual may form a new ideology from his new interpretation of his life. The search for actual truth in relation to the past, or even to the present, which is very dubious in the psychic sphere in general because there are no historical documents except memory, is therapeutically unnecessary. The individual often lives better with his conception of things, than in the knowledge of the actual fact, perhaps is able to live only with his own conception of things. Finally it is only the inner past that determines the present ego, and this can be revealed from the actual events only by understanding the individual’s attitude toward them.

What has been said is valid also for the patient’s therapeutic experience which, in the course of its development, becomes past in the sense just given. In the ideologic therapy, the analyst is inclined to measure the condition of the patient, his progress or the task still to be done by what has come out in the analysis, while dynamic therapy judges the therapeutic situation at the moment according to what it means to the patient in general and at the present moment in particular; in other words, by what he makes of it, what kind of history formation he has undertaken to create, what role he has assigned to himself and what to the therapist. I do not think, however, that it is always necessary or curative to destroy this illusion of the patient with reference to the difficulties of reality as he assumes them, or to show him how he also seeks to falsify the analytic experience post festum. For reality is at bottom not arranged differently, but there collective or at least socially recognized illusions function in place of the individual illusions appearing in the therapy. What the patient first of all can and must learn is to live at all and this seems to me possible only with illusions. Analysis prefers to use the term sublimation, but can only mean illusion, for the one is based on the other, is at bottom the same. The concept of sublimation includes the denial of something else, which, indeed may be more primitive but perhaps stands closer to life, is more real, and so stamps sublimation as a self-deception after the principle of the sour grapes. It seems to me, however, that no man and no
type of man can live, or wishes to live, on the primitive plane and that it finally comes to the question on what level of illusion one lives. I am not referring to the so-called natural man who, however primitive he may be from a certain viewpoint, still lives in far greater measure than we on a super-real level, into which his magic world view lifts him. It would lead too far here and remains therefore to be dealt with elsewhere, to discuss the different levels of illusion which cultivated times and peoples up to our modern civilization have held in readiness for the different types and classes; we refer in general to religion, art, play and certain professional ideologies, which not only lift man out of his everydayness, but out of himself, not because he needs recreation, diversion, distraction, something higher, but because he could not exist at all on the plane of his own primitive self.

The neurosis represents a peculiarly gross, because self-determined, form of this lifting out of man from the biological plane of life, since it isolates the individual and accordingly makes the play of illusion neurotic or unreal, while the ideologically founded levels of illusion just mentioned, place the individual in a larger or smaller group and thus preserve a more or less real connection, even if they are not actual (as for example religion in ritual). The therapeutic situation offers the neurotic a plane of illusion\(^1\) on which he not only can live as

\(^1\) By “illusion” Rank does not mean falsity or self-deception. He refers rather to a level of play, which permits us to make reality our own, a creativity of everyday living, as it were, not for a moment misunderstood or confused with the reality of the “not-self.”

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long as he has it, but on which he can learn how to live on a plane of illusion, which is necessary in the society in which he exists. However, in order to be able to accept for himself any of the conventionally sanctioned illusions, through which it loses for him the character of illusion, he must first create in himself the presupposition required for it. This consists of finding an inner level of illusion of his own on which all experiencing as it were plays itself out potentially, like the shadows in Plato’s cave without actually occurring. This inner illusional level of our modern human type is the emotional life itself, which permits an inner experiencing without outward living, but when it comes to the expression of emotion, as a rule it is confined to one of the socially provided planes. Emotions, therefore, as the neurotic shows, can simulate living, without the individual’s becoming conscious of their illusional aspect; the neurotic longs for a normal emotional life as his ideal, without knowing that the normal person uses his emotions much more as protection from actual experience than as means thereto.

If the inner emotional plane is the stage on which the therapeutic relationship essentially plays itself out, we can understand the meaning which the dream life could gain therein. All dreams here would be at once a dream within a dream, as it were a double refraction of life on the emotional level, for the therapeutic situation itself corresponds to life lifted to an illusory play level, which the dream represents
over again symbolically. Accordingly the dream during the therapy can represent either the situation as such, or the emotional self of the dreamer, or life, as represented here on a make-believe playground. For in spite of all difficulties and conflicts, the therapeutic experience is not “earnest as life,” and possesses if not the alleged gaiety of art, its existence as appearance. The neurotic, who has taken everything too earnestly, too totally, learns to play here on a plane of illusion, that is, to work with substitute forces and substitute goals, thereby learning above all to play a role instead of being engaged at every moment with the whole self, which in ordinary everyday living is not suitable either, yes, perhaps not possible at all. The artistic life plan created through the therapeutic relationship is only gradually and not ever essentially differentiated from the illusory life plan, on which we all live.

has progressed so far that the individual can react to ordinary stimuli suitably. In fact, the inner differentiation even longs for outside stimuli in order to win the desired wholeness through the inclusion of reality, instead of wanting to maintain it through its exclusion. The individual then no longer seeks to assimilate the world to his ego but to make his ego, at least potentially, as manifold as reality, since he is in position to react suitably to its stimuli. The best proof is in the end phase of the therapeutic process where the assistant ego, the role of the therapist hitherto, becomes a real ego, that is, when the loss of the therapist is no longer perceived painfully as ego loss, but can be accepted as the breaking in of reality to the ego life. This giving up of the assistant-ego with simultaneous acceptance of reality, appears to me as the most important problem of therapy, for the solution of which careful preparation must be made in advance and carried on throughout. For this purpose and not for an enforced “cure” of the patient, which of course is impossible, the setting of a limit for ending the experience is necessary. From what has been said before, it is evident that when the moment for ending comes, the time which one allows for the solution of the task of adaptation just mentioned is not reckoned on the basis of a rule, but decided according to the individual case. More important than that, however, is the fact that one knows what is going on in this end phase, what forces come into play, and which factors are therapeutically important.

Our previous presentation now gives us the advantage of being able to answer these questions in a systematic way, which perhaps is not wholly suited to the dynamic nature of the theme, but at all events might bring some clarity into its complexity. First of all, in this end phase the patient will have to come to a basic understanding with the problem of the whole-part reaction, and attempt the overcoming of fear in the way he finds most possible. Although this will be decided individually in every case, still there are certain typical reactions of which we wish to mention those corresponding to the two main neurotic types. We are concerned essentially with a description of what the patient experiences in the end phase, the “how” is left as it were to his individual taste. In the simplest formulation derived from my experience, the end phase of the therapeutic process in which the
therapist has come through and beyond his role of assistant ego into his real meaning, can be represented as a battle for life heightened to the utmost between two individuals, one of whom must die that the other may live. Before we go into a psychological explanation of this formulation, it is important to anticipate what the task of the therapist must be in this battle of life and death, and to see wherein lie the dangers of his failing in his task. There can be no doubt that in this duel the patient must remain victor if he is to feel himself healed, that is, capable of living, and the danger of the therapist lies in the fact that he himself instinctively wants to be victorious, that is, to live and not be killed. However the therapist may disguise his self-maintenance tendency intellectually, or justify it therapeutically, he will be caught by it unless he recognizes it in himself and is able to restrain it in the interest of therapy.

In this dilemma he can succeed only through his intellectual and emotional superiority not only over the patient but over the situation itself, which is equivalent to a superiority over life itself, such as not many human beings, and still fewer therapists, possess. For to this superiority belongs far more than the belief that the patient does not struggle personally against the therapist but against a father, mother, or some other image; in other words, that the situation is not a real, but an unreal one. At the very least one needs to know that the patient in this battle for life and death fights out the conflict between his own destructive and constructive tendencies, and that he must kill the destructive ego finally in the therapist, who during the process has symbolized the constructive ego which now the patient takes into himself.

A peculiar difficulty arises for the therapist in relation to the correct understanding and handling of this situation, from the fact that he himself represents the creative type who does not want the other to create, much less to destroy, him. There occurs accordingly in the last phase, a complete reversal of roles, since the patient has to take over the active, creative function hitherto assigned to the therapist while the latter becomes the symbol of the destructive neurotic ego, which must be destroyed. This tendency of the patient is naturally to be understood only in terms of a total reaction, with whose destruction he easily falls from the all into the nothing ideology, and instead of the other, kills himself, remains neurotic. The tendency to self-destruction with the simultaneous incapacity for aggressive self-protection, we have already recognized as the negative life attitude of the neurotic. His
restoration to health consists essentially in the freeing of the creative powers, which must first be released in the therapeutic process in an aggressive way before they can be applied to the constructive governing of life. If there is still doubt up to this point that the whole illness and healing process plays itself out in life and death symbols, there can be no doubt in the end phase, so openly does the symbolism enter into dreams and also into other reactions of the moment. The clearer it becomes, however, the more danger there is for the therapist type to react to it with his healthy instincts, that is, in an unfavorable way for the patient.

In the analytic ideology, these crass reactions of the patient are usually stamped as infantilism of a sadistic or masochistic nature, and make a prolongation of the treatment appear necessary. Whether this end conflict is represented in unequivocal symbols of life (sexuality) and death (self-murder, murder) or in the specific symbols of health (life) and illness (dying), in every case both tendencies are always mobilized so that one of the roles of the divided self falls to the therapist. But it seems just as hard for him to detach the patient from a false role as to take over the correct one himself. There remains always the question which self the patient leaves behind in the therapist, and in the situation which he abandons, and which self he takes with him into life, the sound creative self, or the sick neurotic self, after he has once partialized his total self into these two fundamental egos. But even if the patient succeeds in leaving his neurotic ego behind, and in destroying it by going away, yet as a rule he will be able to do this only with guilt feeling, otherwise he would be no neurotic type and would not come for treatment at all. This guilt feeling, one can explain to him as following necessarily from the situation, and so make it more bearable than if one seeks to explain it ideologically from infantile sins, and denies or

1 This unburdening upon the outside hinders the destructive powers from carrying out the killing inside, as the best known expression of which I should here like to mention violent repression, or better, denial; but also the normal forgetting corresponds to a dying, as denial to a killing, “He is dead for me.”

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misunderstands its actual source. In no case will one be able to do away with human guilt feeling, as little as with the neurotic character, but it makes a great difference whether the patient has fear and guilt reactions without visible reason, or whether he experiences guilt feeling as the result of exercising his own will. In the first case the individual feels doubly guilty, that is, he has guilt feelings because of the unmotivated guilt, in the second case the guilt feeling forms a valuable index to show the individual an attitude adapted to his goal.

The neurotic guilt we have described before as a moralized fear inhibition against growth, which in truth necessarily brings death with it. If the individual gives in to this death fear rationalized as guilt feeling, then he falls into the Charybdis of guilt consciousness against himself, which springs from life fear. This
shows itself, however, not only as the most fundamental life problem in general, but also as the essential problem of all psycho-therapy, since the guilt feeling arising from the individual himself as also from earlier bearers of it, is projected upon the therapist, and it is from a deepened understanding of this unavoidable guilt projection of the individual, that its fundamental meaning in human psychic life becomes evident. For the individual just on the grounds of his individuation, cannot suffer this most natural of all life processes, growth, simply because the acceptance of his independent existence necessarily bound up with it, strives against it. In order to maintain ourselves, and still more in order to grow, we must continuously take in nourishment, that is, alien life, whether of a physical or spiritual nature, and we must be able to compensate for this in particular partial acts. Since the neurotic with his total attitude is incapable of this partialization, he therefore refuses to accept anything which may often appear symptomatically as a rejection of nourishment. In the therapy the acceptance of the nourishing material (mother situation) has fewer difficulties than the giving up of this one-sided situation, to which one has abandoned himself in order to take, and which demands no return. The better the Patient has adapted himself to this therapeutic situation therefore, the harder will be for him the final breaking off, as with him any separation of mine from thine can only succeed with difficulty. He tries then either to leave there all that he has received

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or to offer all that he has (himself) as return for what he has received. Neither is a constructive solution because it substitutes for the actual problem of independent growth, the ethical fictitious problem of taking and giving, because the first would be final but the second is partial.

The freeing from this guilt involvement cannot result through bringing up infantile repressions and fixations, because one would come undeniably upon parental influence and from there through generative morals to the original sin, in which, however, we have already recognized the problem of individuation. The solution accordingly is possible only dynamically in and from the therapeutic situation, and indeed only on the ethical plane of the will-guilt problem, which presents itself in the individual as the fundamental life problem of growth and death. As guilt feeling arises on the one hand from the inhibiting death fear which does not let the individual grow and become independent, on the other hand from duty to the own ego, to which one owes the possibility of life and free development, so must the solution touch both aspects of the guilt problem in the same way. This is only possible if the therapeutic experience affords to the individual a potential living out of the hitherto suppressed or denied side of his personality, no matter whether this is the impulse ego or the will ego. Through this emotional realizing of the hitherto denied ego parts, the individual is in a position to compare, and on the ground of this comparison to choose, although naturally this is not a conscious choice. While this therapeutic release of the hitherto blocked portions of the ego is used by the patient as protection against real experience, it has at the same time the value of a developmental level which no longer
needs to be merely potential. For, insofar as the guilt feeling arises from self-reproach due to the repression of one side of life, the emotional experience of this repressed or denied side in the therapeutic situation relieves it, while the opposite source of guilt feeling arising from the fear of release and of actual experience, is transformed into self-responsibility by the choice now open to the individual.

Now one sees that all "technique" is nothing further, and can be nothing more than a skillful balancing of the therapeutic level of illusion with the actual life plane, but also that in every case

the fundamental evil is and remains fear, which is first of all to be freed from all its disguises and rationalizations and brought back to the fundamental life and death fear polarity. The next therapeutic step is the overcoming of this fear through total surrender of the self to the therapeutic experience, with simultaneous emotional differentiation of the ego, which thus becomes capable of partial experience on a plane of illusion. The last step finally is the freeing of the acting creative self in the end phase whereby in place of the therapist who is to be given up, reality is taken for assistant ego, not a static reality as the original neurotic totality attitude demanded, but a reality changing with every experience, to which the individual becomes equal through the inner differentiation. The greatest danger of failure in therapy lies in the fact that the patient wants to end the process either totally as he began it and therewith be quit of his guilt to life and himself in this potential experience, or he seeks to buy himself free with a too small partial payment in the therapeutic situation, from it and from life. In both cases the ensuing guilt feeling because it is guilt against life, remains neurotic while in case of a successful freeing of the creative self, guilt enters unavoidably, it is true, but does not remain unconquerable.
XIV

THE END PHASE AND THE THERAPEUTIC AGENT

“Death and birth resemble each other, say the Rabbis. Suppose a child in its mother’s womb to know that after a lapse of time it will leave the place it occupies. That would seem to it the most grievous thing that could happen. It is so comfortable in the element that surrounds it and protects it against outside influences. However, the time of separation approaches, with terror it sees the protecting envelopes torn asunder and it believes the hour of death has arrived. But the moment of leaving its little world marks the beginning of a nobler, more beautiful, more perfect life which lasts until a voice again sounds in its ear proclaiming: Thou must leave earth as thou didst leave thy mother’s womb, and stripping off this earthly vesture, thou must once more die, once more begin life.” - (Extract from the Talmud)

—Arsene Darmesteter

The giving up of the therapeutic relationship signifies for the patient separation from an ego part whose characterization as assistant ego makes intelligible its expression in birth symbolism, as separation from the mother. The separation symbols observed by Freud, which he explained not dynamically as reactions to parting, but historically as the effects of a complex, are better understood under the general viewpoint of ego division. First, as far as castration is concerned, the separation reaction of the man observed by Freud as typical, signifies a real ego part, not a biological part like the mother, nor a psychological one like the assistant ego, and accordingly is still to be considered as “neurotic” because it works itself out negatively on the self. Likewise, the typical feminine reaction to separation, which Freud has described as the wish to present a child to the own father, must be designated as neurotic, because it does not go beyond the infantile guilt level of sexuality. The ending reaction as representing the patient’s own birth, described by me as valid for both sexes equally, is not only more universal, but also has constructive elements which are lacking in the reactions described by Freud. Naturally this difference in observation cannot be explained from a difference of material, but only from a difference in technique. The assumption seems justified that apart from the possibility of a different kind of interpretation, it was probably my technical use of end-setting which brought out the birth reaction in my patients.

Again we meet with the difference between the ideologic and dynamic therapy. End-setting was originally a purely therapeutic measure for shortening the duration of treatment, with a simultaneous
forcing of constructive tendencies in the individual. The castration or child symbolism in separation are results of an ideologic therapy, no matter whether these symbols were used frequently by the patient during the analysis, or whether his ending reaction was interpreted thus in terms of the theory. The latter must probably always have been the case, for otherwise Freud would have been able to interpret even the castration complex at the end also as a wish to leave something there, to buy himself free with a part in order to keep the rest, which the feminine wish to give a child clearly expresses. On the other side, the child is also something which the woman receives from the man, takes with her, a symbol of union, and so both symbolisms seem possible only in the final phase of an analysis which has not succeeded in going beyond the guilt feeling of the patient and his tendency to buy himself free of it. If one interprets these ego reactions libidinally as Freud has done, I cannot see how such a therapy can be constructive, unless it be that the patient himself has enough strong positive tendencies to work himself out of this dilemma.

Birth symbolism, as it was apparently provoked by my setting of an ending, meant a long step ahead, at least in the field of dynamic therapy, although in the meantime my first rough conception of it has been essentially refined, and has become therapeutically more effective. From one aspect, however, birth symbolism from the beginning was distinguished therapeutically from the ideological interpretation of the end reaction, through my acceptance of separation as constructive, since the split off ego part, whether designated as mother or assistant ego, becomes the outer world. The distinction from actual birth, as I should now like to formulate it, lies in the fact that dynamic therapy transforms the always total embryonal self, as the neurotic presents it, into a more highly differentiated ego, which reacts to the birth trauma constructively and not like the infant, with helplessness. This constructive reaction is due to the fact that the separation is no longer perceived as ego loss, but is utilized for ego enrichment, since the individual can react on the higher emotional level of ego development, instead of with his total self; at the same time the capacity for the emotional bearing of the trauma, of which the infant is incapable, makes possible an inner completion that compensates for the separation loss. This solution is possible, however, only when the guilt feeling is not ideologically inhibited but has become creatively effective, otherwise, in leaving, all the oral, anal and genital partial reactions appear, which as symptoms of a still hovering guilt feeling aim at paying off and buying free. Just as neurotic is the other extreme also, that is, the completely total reaction of the individual who feels himself entirely lost at the separation. In other words, the patient must have learned in the course of the therapeutic process that living is partial, just as dying is; that not all experiencing at every moment is necessarily final, but can be comprehended as an episode.
A second aspect which distinguishes the end reaction from the birth situation, is the fact that the patient has learned to understand in dynamic therapy, that the giving up has to do only with the loss of his old neurotic ego with which he has identified the therapeutic process in the course of the treatment. Naturally this can only succeed if the therapist has carried through his role as assistant ego consistently, so that he represents not only the ideal, active creative ego of the patient, the will to health, but also has let himself become the representative of the neurotic tendencies, which the patient leaves behind on his way to health. As the therapist to a certain degree always symbolizes both aspects of the individual, the positive and the negative, it is obvious that it is possible for the patient at the conclusion of the treatment, to leave behind the real ego instead of the false one, kill it, as it were, and go away with the old neurotic self.

This problem of the self, divided between two persons, one the therapist, who should become objective reality, the other, the own ego which should become inner reality, that is, capable of living, represents the climax of therapeutic action. The understanding of this seems to me the presupposition of every real result. With the neurotic, the old self, that is an earlier phase, not only of development but of the whole personality, continues to live actually. This “fixation” however, is not libidinal but fear-conditioned, and tries to deny life, that is growing, maturing in order to avoid death. There are various ways in which the individual seeks to be rid of this old double of his present self. The defense against the old self described as neurotic consists of a repression or denial of it, which, psychologically, approximates a killing, that is, a making non-existent. In the case of a particularly strong-willed person, this struggle with the old ego, which does not want to die and at the same time keeps the present self from life, may even lead to attempts at actual killing appearing as suicidal tendencies. For I can conceive of actual self-murder only as an indication, however momentary, of strength of will. Experience also seems to show that it is rather the strong-willed who tend to suicide, yes also to neurosis, since only those with strong conflicts are capable of a real neurosis. At all events we make this assumption tacitly when we are willing to exert ourselves therapeutically. The little that I have seen of cases of suicidal tendencies during treatment, has made me certain that psychologically it concerns a stage in the struggle between the two sides of the personality where it is not merely that one side of the ego has won the upper hand over the other, but that the one side wants to kill the other, will rid himself of it completely.¹ Whether it has to do with the “old” self which stands in the way of the new development, or with the “bad” self, which is condemned by the moralistic ego, depends

¹ See “Der Doppelgänger” (1914) for my contribution on this subject.
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on the individual case. In any event, the knowledge that suicidal tendencies in the end phase of analysis, even when expressed as threat, can have a constructive meaning, is therapeutically vital. We may be sure it is always an act of will directed against the own person and on that account more destructive, but it can be constructively applied, if it can be turned against the neurotic ego projected upon the analyst. Such would-be suicides are not actually dangerous provided one does not misunderstand them entirely, for as long as the individual must still punish himself neurotically there will be no suicide, because life provides harsher punishments. Only when the person wants to live, that is, has strength and courage for it and yet cannot, is he strong enough to kill the sound self that will die rather than accept a living death. Naturally the patient with suicidal threat can also show that the therapist cannot heal him, but even so he wants to prove that he can do it himself, therefore he may at the end, as we have already pointed out, leave the sound self there and take the sick self away, that is, psychologically speaking, kill himself instead of the other, which, in terms of a destructive tendency directed against the own person, is actually self-murder, not merely an attempt at suicide.

When the old ego lives on neurotically in the present, we have an inhibition of development through life fear, indicating the incapacity of the individual to allow even a lived out part of himself to die. This often gives the impression of self-punishment, as for example in the well-known painful dreams, in which the successful individual puts himself back in an unpleasant past situation not because the situation is painful but because it is past, that is, brings back to the dreamer an earlier period of life. Like Polycrates, the ego sacrifices success in order to avoid the evil of death, or at least to put it off. There are cases in which one finds such a developmental inhibition through life fear with comparatively little conflict, although they do show symptoms. The conflict ridden neurotic type, on the contrary, is already in a struggle with the old self, from whom he seeks to free himself in a radical way. The typical neurotic crisis, as has been already indicated, seems to break out at a certain age when the life fear which has restricted the ego development, meets with the death fear as it increases with growth and maturity. The individual then feels himself driven forward by regret for wasted life and the desire still to retrieve it. But this forward driving fear is now death fear, the fear of dying without having lived, which, even so, is always held in check by fear of life. We have already shown how the therapeutic situation enters into this dilemma helpfully, since it creates for the patient a “play-level” which is differentiated from reality not sharply, but gradually, and on which he learns to live partially as he begins to experience emotional

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differentiation. The emotional experience provides the inner balance which he requires, but it is just as important to make accessible to him in place of fear, will and impulse as driving power, not the instinctive life to which psychoanalysis would like to bring him back but, I repeat, the will. Of the instinctive life he is afraid because he cannot govern it as he wishes. So the education for willing (not to be confused with the education of the will as the task of pedagogy) is the essential therapeutic agent. This willing, however, has not only impulsive but also inhibiting significance. It works itself out constructively, not only in the governing of reality, but also in the organization of the impulse life. This will awakening or will affirmation in the patient makes it superfluous for him to project his impulsive or inhibiting ego upon the therapist or his own family, since the will represents the only unifying force in the individual. On this account the neurotic, governed by impulses and restrained by fear, is always divided, always in conflict, the one ego against the other with all guidance lacking. It is true that creativity causes conflicts too, but only to create implies that at least part of the time one puts all the forces together and organizes them. The will conflict from which the neurotic suffers at bottom, seems to me now to be the most important problem of the end phase, where it manifests itself in its full strength and presents itself in its full meaning. When the patient in the first phase of creativeness has projected upon the therapist his positive willing, it is to be counted as success, if in the end phases he takes over this role himself, and now sees in the therapist the essential hindrance to his freedom of will and expression. The inner will conflict Manifests itself here even more clearly than in the course of the treatment as an external conflict between dependence on the

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therapist and the wish for independence, in which the tendency to independence brings out will reactions, the need for dependence, guilt reactions. This strife between emotions, which always includes the problem of healing, must as a rule be reduced to the internal will-guilt conflict which the dependence conflict only represents externally, and which the patient’s doubt regarding his cure only symbolizes. For no matter whether symptoms appear again or not, the patient always finds himself in doubt in the end phase as to whether or not he is healed, a doubt which in truth the Freudian analyst as a rule shares with him and tends to solve by prolonging the treatment. For the patient, the question whether or not he is healed is for the most part a rationalization of the dependence-independence conflict, behind which is hidden again the will-guilt problem. One of my patients solved this problem with a chance visit sometime after the ending of the treatment, when he remarked that he assumed that he had not been analyzed at all, for otherwise he would always have had to ask whether or not he had been cured.

If the question of his cure becomes for the patient a symbol of his will conflict, the therapist ought to know, and share his knowledge with the patient, that there is no criterion for “cure” in psychotherapy, yes, perhaps no “cure” in the medical sense in terms of the removal of a disturbing cause. What is given,
however, in dynamic therapy, is a criterion for the ending of the treatment, whose timely and correct conclusion is the most essential therapeutic instrument. For the really therapeutic agent is the freeing of the creative tendency in the individual, and allowing its utilization in the creating, transforming and endless destroying of the therapeutic relationship, which represents the self, and finally even more the sick (neurotic) part of the ego. This is only possible, however, if from the beginning the rite of the active creative ego is relinquished to, shared with, or permitted the patient so that at the end he cannot react in any other way than the right one. In what special form he does it, that is, what individual content and dynamics he utilizes, is of subordinate importance compared to the right general attitude. The self creating of his role is a truly therapeutic experience, as every experience is creative, but the patient can never foresee this because he has been incapable of experiencing; besides

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most patients come with the more or less clear idea of releasing an earlier, unhappy experience of life, which ideological therapy as a rule also has in view. Dynamic therapy gives them a new experience instead of releasing the old, and insofar as the latter is ultimately “released” therapeutically, it is because the new experience makes it possible. In general the therapist should guard himself against the ideology of “wishing to release,” for nothing can be released once and for all, least of all the therapeutic process, especially if it is a dynamic one. Like birth, it represents much more the beginning of something new than the end of the old, and can also be borne thus by the individual much better because it is not final.

End setting, therefore, has not the purpose of completing the therapeutic experience, but of furthering and intensifying it. The question which is often put as to how one can tell when the time has come for the ending of the treatment, is answered in dynamic therapy. The difficulty and lack of success reported by psychoanalysts who have tried it, is explained by the fact that the dynamics of end setting has no connection with ideologic therapy, which always judges quantitatively according to amount of material already produced, and cannot make the dynamic play of forces a criterion independent of any content. Often the patient can decide just as well, many times even better than the analyst, at least according to his feelings, and so from a certain moment on he will betray more or less clearly his wish for self-dependence. This moment cannot be recognized by the ideological therapy of psychoanalysis, still less utilized, on grounds which I have already formulated but on account of its importance I will recapitulate briefly. The chief reason is this, that the strengthening and invigorating of the ego in the patient, which can express itself negatively just as well as positively, is interpreted ideologically either as “resistance” or as mere “wish” to which no real strength is to be accredited. Dynamically, however, both resistance and wish are comprehended as will expressions of the strengthened ego, and accordingly can be utilized constructively. The revolt against the analysis on the part of the patient, can only be interpreted as
resistance under the tacit assumption that the individual protests against the analyst or the ideology (authority) he represents, a

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conception which is implied by the analytic interpretation of resistance as resistance to the father. If one knows, however, that the patient is struggling in this way for his inner freedom, resistance against the on-going of the analysis at a certain moment becomes the first and most important criterion of recovery. The patient has then received enough strength from the therapist to attack him, a paradoxical but not so unusual situation, like the typical test of strength of the hero who often even as a child is able to kill his begetter.

In dynamic therapy the end setting thus wins its original form and meaning as a provocation of the constructive tendency of the patient to independence, but from the very beginning he is encouraged to this self creative attitude. Thereby at best one avoids a misuse of the therapeutic situation, which the patient many times wishes to withdraw from, especially if it puts too great claims upon him emotionally. Also in this case one must not blindly condemn the resistance, but rather weigh it to see whether the individual who is under the compulsion of ideological therapy, is not perhaps right to withdraw from an ideal of adaptation for which he was not made. In other words, it is a question whether the individual does not instinctively know better than anyone the limits of his ability to adapt and do, and whether one should not prize, in the resistance to going farther analytically, the act of will as such, instead of condemning it because it is directed against further treatment. That on which the will of the patient is strengthened, however, is not the symbolic aspect of the analytic situation, but the real side, which becomes more and more evident in the end phase. Genetically also the will is a product of reality, a result of the operation of the outer world upon the individual, and on that account strengthened will and the will expression of the patient are the essential criteria of his attitude toward reality, as is the development and differentiation of the emotional life in relation to the inner self. By means of the will one can become independent of reality and mankind, but the impulse life is directed to the outer world for its satisfaction, and also the super-ego manifests itself as moral dependence or domination in relation to the other. The independence of the patient, which actually means only the necessary sound self responsibility, is prepared

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for constantly in the course of the treatment and not developed in the end phase only. Nevertheless, there must be an end phase and not a gradual expiring or a sudden breaking off, and this end phase must be constructively utilized in order to guarantee the therapeutic result.

Once in a discussion I gave the spontaneous definition of end setting as a “last hour” prolonged. At that time I meant the last hour of treatment, in which so much that is unresolved seems to offer itself if one has had no foresight in regard to its release at the proper time. In the light of my present conception, this “last hour” contains a deeper meaning, as the patient actually reacts in case of an ending not prepared for, as if his last hour had come. In a prolonged end situation he learns not only to die gradually, which we have recognized as a fundamental life principle, but he also learns gradually to live and represents then, at the actual leaving, the surviving and not the dead part. To achieve both these essential changes of attitude it is necessary to treat the therapeutic situation itself dynamically, and to control it like a medicament. Accordingly, I make use of various means in the final situation in order to meet the inner dynamic of the patient, which already functions freely, sometimes too intensively, by a dynamic of the external situation which corresponds better to reality. According to the type of person and the situation, through postponing, leaving out, lengthening or shortening of the regular treatment hour, as well as through other alterations of the customary therapeutic situation, I bring an outer dynamic to bear upon the inner conflict which perhaps may irritate the patient, but is still perceived by him as an unburdening of his ambivalence and is utilized in terms of adaptation to reality. By this means, first of all a field is opened for the positive and negative will reactions where the patient can operate without causing damage. These will expressions are necessary, not only to air the heightened conflicts, but to leave a freer path to the emotional development which is required to work through the separation trauma.

Since the patient’s neurosis actually represents an extreme judgment, a condemnation of himself and his own will, it is one-sidedness and not ambivalence that characterizes the neurotic, a one-sidedness which perhaps represents a violent solution of the ambivalent conflict by the condemnation of one side. Dynamic therapy through revaluing this condemned side, reinstates the ambivalence and enables the patient with the help of the therapeutic situation to balance the two conflicting tendencies on two different life planes. These two planes speaking psychologically, are the emotional plane which we discussed in the preceding chapter, and the will plane which we have just discussed. While the emotional plane represents a purely inner experience, the will has pre-eminently a relation to reality. In the dream, which represents an inner will experience, both are united, although in the course of treatment, dream life develops always more and more from the feeling sphere over into the sphere of will. In reality, emotion means dependence, will,
independence; psychologically it seems to be just the reverse, since emotion makes one independent of the other, at all events it has this tendency, while will needs reality for its fulfilment, otherwise it turns neurotically upon the own ego where it is unable to work itself out creatively. The therapeutic situation offers to the patient that plane of which he is momentarily in need for a balance; that it can do this is essentially to the credit of the patient who automatically uses it for that purpose, and of the therapist, who does not hinder him in it. Also, the end situation, if it is constructively led up to and handled, affords in spite of the separation conflict, this function of balancing, although it now concerns a wholly different division of forces. The therapeutic situation itself is made ambivalent, the assistant ego as it were becomes impossible to leave, and the patient brings his whole will into play to win his independence. At the same time his emotion makes him dependent and only the inherent ambivalence of this dilemma shows him the way out, since the will for independence seeks for occupation in reality, while emotion lends to the individual the self-assurance of inner independence.

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"Die Auszendinge sind dazu da, dass man sie benutzt, um durch sie das Leben zu gewinnen, nicht, dass man das Leben benutzt, um die Auszendinge zu gewinnen."

"External objects are there that one may use them, in order through them to win life, not that one uses life to win external objects."

—Spring and Autumn of Lü Buwei [291 BC-235 BC]. Translated by R. WILHELM

The authentic meaning of the therapeutic process, as we have seen, comes to expression only in the end phase when the therapist by setting an ending and by the change of attitude bound up with it, is transformed from assistant ego to assistant reality. Reality in spite of all difficulties and pain, is not just the enemy of the individual, as it might seem from the neurotic viewpoint, but also a great help to the ego. While the average human being has to learn to use reality therapeutically, something which the neurotic can attain only in the therapeutic relationship, this could never happen unless the possibility had been given originally in reality itself. It is not unsatisfying reality, but a willful turning away from this natural therapy as given, that characterizes the neurosis. The neurotic has a bad relation to reality not because reality is bad, but because he wants to create it instead of using it. He attempts the same thing with himself also, by trying to re-create himself instead of accepting and making use of the self that has been given to him. One might oppose to this optimistic conception of a reality, which when correctly utilized represents a helping curative factor, the fact that the human being apparently must always imagine or create a second “better” world, in order to be able to live in and with reality as given. But that seems to me less explicable on the basis of need for a better world because of unsatisfying reality than from the necessity of having a second world by means of which we can carry out the fundamental ambivalence of the inner life. Certainly, this second world is self-created, but that does not imply that it is better as compared with the first, only that it is different in relation to our momentary necessity and desires. To express it simply, we would not exchange the other world for this, but we need both in order to be able to live at all. Our “better” world is not a substitute for this reality, but its completion in terms of human ambivalence.
I refrain from following out this viewpoint historically and culturally, as we must confine ourselves to the present civilization which has produced the neurotic type. This much may be said in characterization, that the primitive differs from modern culture in the “other sidedness” of the second world, which with the oncoming of civilization becomes ever more “this sided.” The increasing domination of natural forces and the development of technical method has enabled man to realize the second, self-created world in ever greater measure. Modern man has realized these two worlds in terms of his vocational or professional as against his private life; two spheres which could only be separated with the increasing development of the individual and his personal freedom on the one hand, and complex organization of society on the other. Most neurotics come to the therapist with two overt problems, a personal and a social (vocational) problem. Freud considers the personal problem of the patient’s love and sex life to be the most important, and it does, indeed press into the foreground, because the individual on the one hand feels himself more responsible for his private situation, and on the other also hopes in this area to be able to do something for the relief of his misery. Adler, on the contrary, considers the social problem, that is, the general attitude of the individual to his fellow beings, as more important, and this is justified insofar as it includes the love relation. Jung, who seeks to introduce a middle standpoint in the therapy of the neuroses, actually distinguishes cases which must be approached from the Freudian and others which must be approached from the Adlerian viewpoint.

If one has in mind from the beginning an harmonious balancing

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of the two spheres, it becomes less important from which side than in what way one attacks the situation; at best it should be from both sides simultaneously and equally, which in any event always gives the most favorable prognosis. For in these cases, the individual himself is already prepared for the equalization which should take place during the treatment. Certainly, everything will remain centered in the personal side, not in terms of psychoanalytic ideology but in the sense of individual psychology. For the chief therapeutic task is and remains, as has already been pointed out repeatedly, not the adaptation of libido to reality, but the acceptance of the self with its individual ego and its volitional and emotional autonomy. Reality, however, is therapeutically necessary to this inner stabilization, therefore not an unavoidable evil, which one must accept because there is nothing else to do. For if we had not reality to project upon we should not only be shut off from the most pleasurable experiences, but what is far more important, we should all have to create within ourselves the denials, limitations and hindrances which we need for balance.

In this last sentence it is easy to recognize a description of the neurotic type, who must erect within himself all the limits which he avoids externally. The outer world thus proves to be the second, complementary world of which we have spoken before, and man with his inner life the only actually
experienced reality, which needs the outer world and its human representatives in order to be able to exist harmoniously. The two worlds in which civilized man lives therefore, are not a real one and an unreal one which serves for recreation (as art, and sports), they are both equally real or equally unreal, according to how one lives them. What we seek in the outer world depends on what we have found in the inner, but there are certain things which one finds more easily or exclusively within and others which one finds without. One must at all events know how to seek and to choose, in a word, to balance, which presupposes the capacity for partialization. If an individual has too much inner freedom and independence, which is not so rare as one might believe, he will not only accept dependence and compulsion externally out actually be obliged to seek them in order to be able to live harmoniously. If, for example, an individual is very free in his

professional life, then he may be inclined to bind himself strongly in his love life, but will in turn fight against these chains without getting free because this complete freedom would be for him still more unbearable. The individual seems to tend automatically to such equalizing corrections which somehow for the majority brings about a balance. Why in spite of this there are relatively many persons, the neurotics, who do not succeed, is explained by the totalization tendency already spoken of and the corresponding human ideal of unity, which has found social expression in the concept of character.

Our striving for totality, at the bottom of which lies the fear of loss of ego, makes it difficult to bear a life on two different planes, necessary as it still seems to be. Character as an expression of this striving for totality serves to justify this fear. We ought to wish to remain the same individual in all life situations, accordingly we perceive as painful every change of attitude, instead of not noticing it at all because it is constantly taking place. Fear seems to be erected here as a dividing line between the ego and the world, and vanishes only when both have become one, as parts of a greater whole. Death fear is therefore utilized as a justification for ego maintenance, it demands egoism, a cutting off from the world, which then manifests itself as life fear. Again, we see the individual hemmed in between these two poles of fear; if he will live totally, he has death fear, the fear of losing himself, if he cannot live partially he has life fear which is maintained as a constant factor through the dualism of the ambivalent split. The solution is to be found only in reality, not in a reality opposed to the ego, but in a world of which the ego is a part, and which on the other side forms a part of the ego. From such considerations and the experiences underlying them it is evident that the therapy of the neurotic can be no purely psychic affair. Psychotherapy can only bring him to the point where he himself can utilize reality therapeutically, not because he must but because he wants it for harmonious balancing. Therefore, most psychotherapeutic or psychoanalytic aspirations for an inner freedom from complexes, and an outer capacity for adaptation on the part of the patient must fall away to give place to the goal of dynamic therapy, which leads the patient over the primitive phase in which he needs an assistant
ego and the contrasting phase of inner independence in the emotional life, to the development of the will, which is able to make use of reality with all its advantages and disadvantages in the service of the ego. The much discussed acceptance of reality is in actuality never a passive taking over of the given, but an active appropriation of it for individual ends. In peculiarly favorable cases this voluntary adaptation may lead to transformation or new creation of reality, but usually in the case of a well-adapted individual there is merely a utilization of the given reality, which works therapeutically, since it becomes one with the ego.

Having arrived at this ideal formulation, we must still keep before us the difficulties of its realization in therapy in order to get a correct picture of the problem as a whole. I have seen neuroses, or better said phenomena which appear to be neurotic, which I should like to designate rather as sound reactions to an unsound situation than as symptoms of illness. Yes, one can perhaps, even as Freud has implied in his “Civilization and its Discontents,” view the neurosis in general as a last reaction of the healthy instincts against an overpowering civilization. Certainly, Nietzsche’s question to alienists whether there are not also neuroses of health (1886) is so intended. In such “false” situations against which the individual defends himself with right, we are concerned for the most part with those realities which, whether created or provoked, are at least suffered by us until they finally become unbearable or are outgrown. The freeing from such situations as a rule is accompanied by reactions which, in terms of the earlier attitude of the ego, or compared with the one usually held, impress one as “neurotic.” Here the individual must alter more in his reality than in himself, in order to set up the lost equilibrium or create a new one. These situations demand more individual, but also more creative, reactions toward reality than the typical neurotic possesses, who does not know how to begin anything.

At all events the use or alteration of reality must come about individually, and is certainly determined for different types. It is important to remember that in the last analysis the neurotic remains as to type that which he was before the treatment, just as the psychopathic and also the creative type will always maintain their essential quality. If one conceives of the neurotic as a type, with psychological significance in itself, and not as a person deviating from a social norm, then one can see that there exists
a place for this type socially, yes, a real need, otherwise he would perhaps not have come into existence in our civilization at all. If the fundamental life fear of the individual leads, figuratively speaking, to the end that he has no other choice than to be slain or to slay, the question is who are the sacrifices that must constantly fall in this way? I think it is the type which we today designate as neurotic which the New Testament characterizes as “Christian” and which Nietzsche in the ideology of earlier times has described as the slave type. These humans who constantly kill themselves, perhaps to escape being sacrificed, need not at all events not be killed any more in order to be utilized as fertilizers of civilization (Kulturdünger, an expression used by Freud who applied it in another connection). In offering themselves up as it were in a Christian sense, they make it not too hard for the others who slay, the lordly natures, the men of will. In view of the difficulties of the therapy one must ask whether it is not a vain therapeutic ambition to want to transform this sacrificial type into god-men, and even if this were successful, where shall be forthcoming the necessary hecatombs for the creative type.

However that be, in the therapeutic situation we have to do with these two contrasting types and their mutual dependence. Often the therapy only strengthens the neurotic character of the patient, which is also a way to “healing,” because then the individual at least can seek and find a place suited to him in society instead of tormenting himself with the effort to change himself into the other type. On the other hand, he may drag about with him the assistant ego of the therapist, and so give the appearance of strength which he does not have and perhaps never can possess. This transformation, caught half-way as it were, of the weak dependent type into a strong and independent one, is a not unusual result of psychoanalytic treatment. In any case it is less desirable than the strengthening of the patient in his neurosis in a way which is not equivalent to illness but rather a constructive adaptation, yes, perhaps, the secret ideal of the much-prized adaptation to reality which breeds patient docile

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Philistines. The fact that the neurotic cannot adjust himself, speaks just as much in his favor as against him. With the treatment is installed a provisory assistant ego, and a provisory assistant reality, in which it is shown whether the patient will remain neurotically dependent on the assistant ego or whether he can use the situation constructively as assistant reality. Both are possible and good outcomes if the patient carries it through consistently to the end. Even in the first case, the patient may become socially valuable and personally satisfied and happy as a life-long dependent. However, before the analyst has found out which solution is more favorable for his patient, or which is possible at all, it may be too late, and a half-baked product such as we have just described may be the result.

This is probably the place to consider besides the general type, the problem and the therapeutic possibilities of man and woman. The man as a rule has divided his ambivalent conflict between vocation and love life, while the woman shows more clearly the purely human conflict between her biological
role and her individuality. In the last analysis that is also the primary conflict of the man, whose
individuality expresses itself in the calling (in work). The modern woman is caught like the man in the
same conflict, and one will probably not go far wrong if one finds in this basis of the masculine neurosis,
one of the causes of increased nervousness in women also. However that may be, therapeutically one
dare not overlook the fact that analysis in treating the woman essentially as an individual, at the same
time brings to view her “masculinity complex” or at least its temporary increase. At all events it seems to
me a mistake to deduce a “masculinity complex” from the masculine reactions of the woman in analysis,
for not to be treated as sex object is for many women equivalent to masculinity, apart from the
identification undoubtedly existing with the male analysts who are in the majority. In every case,
however, the masculine reactions in the analysis have other than purely historical meaning. We know
that the biological terms, masculine and feminine, are used almost universally for activity and passivity,
also very frequently for the contrast between intellect and emotion, even by individuals who know
better. I have often found in analyses of women, that masculinity comes to light just at that point where

the patient is about to accept her original self, her feminine role. The masculinity appears then not only
as a compensatory reaction against the feminine self, but also because the patient now projects upon
the therapist her will as such, which has been actively awakened by the dynamic therapy, in order to be
able to accept passivity (femininity). It has to do therefore not with a masculinity complex, nor with
identification with the male analyst, but the reverse, with a splitting off of the masculine activity in the
analyst for the purpose of accepting the feminine role. The typical difference in the reaction of the man
and the woman to the separation I have already treated thoroughly elsewhere. The man is inclined to
react destructively, the woman conservingly, due to the fact that the man is in general more willful
(destructive and creative) in his adjustment, the woman more emotional (preserving). This difference of
attitude shows itself here as a special case of the previously mentioned dualistic typology of dependent
and independent characters, although according to our earlier deductions, the matter is not so simple as
to justify a generalization that emotion makes for dependence and will for independence. I mean only to
make this one point, that one type cannot take the opposite type for an ideal, but as long as we must
have ideals, only the extreme of one’s own type is suitable. The inner ambivalence seems to permit this
only in the rarest cases and under peculiarly favorable conditions. Normally this ambitendency finds its
solution with the help of reality, which permits us to realize the contrary type slumbering in us in the
other, in favorable cases in the other sex. This is the love reaction which seems to be the prototype for
every human relation, since it includes in it besides the sexual completion all other complementary
possibilities also emotional and impulsive, active and passive, moral, psychological and
characterological.
Various types of persons may be differentiated in their social relationships according to the complementary use of the other person. The neurotic type stands in a more negative but in a certain sense a greater dependence upon his fellows than other types, but his dependence is more moral than libidinal in nature, more total than partial, and has more of will than of feeling. Therefore the neurotic can change or give up the assistant ego only with great difficulty, because he loses therewith not only an object but the moral support which he seeks and finds in the complementary type. The finding of the correctly adapted partner is most important for everyone because, going far beyond the sexual satisfaction, it balances the relation to reality. Certainly a too successful balance in this field may disturb the relation to the rest of the world and is then perceived by the individual as inhibitory. The poets have rightly symbolized by death all-absorbing love, as the complete loss of individuality. The much misused slogan of the modern man that marriage destroys love, loses much of its value through the consideration that perhaps this is the goal of marriage, not of necessity to destroy love, but to moderate it so that it is possible to live with it, since pure love kills the individual as a social being because it means a total giving up of the individuality. The pleasurable aspect of this condition does not as a rule seem strong enough to overcome the fear and so we see the individual, with peculiar clarity in the creative artist, flee complete love as passionately as he seeks it.

We must here consider, besides the general typology of the neurotic, the productive, and the average, the different attitudes of man and woman to the partner and to the rest of the world. In general the man seems more inclined to make of the woman an ideological symbol, while the tendency of the woman is to take the man rather as real completion; in other words, the man projects himself, the woman identifies more with the other. In general the relation of the woman to life is more concrete, that of the man more abstract, although he has apparently to struggle with hard reality, while she is protected from it in her home. But in our civilization this hard reality is for the man, on the whole, an ideological world of abstraction, while children and the home continue to represent very concrete tasks and at the same time have preserved a bit of the primal reality. For the average man, as a rule, the wife and family mean the only reality that has remained to him, and perhaps that is one of the reasons why he bears it so ill and wants to withdraw into ideological illusions. On the other hand the man fears much more the object loss (of the woman) while she, as Freud says, also fears the loss of love. For she has other realities, which bind her
to the world, before all the child, while the man retreats ever more into an abstract sphere and finally holds on to the woman as the only reality. It may perhaps flatter the chosen woman, may even be an inner need, to be lifted by the man from her own real sphere into his ideal one, but at bottom she will still want to be loved not as his symbol but as herself, that is to say, as woman. The question is how far a true love without idealization and ego assimilation is possible, or may even be wished for. Certainly it is not the goal of the woman to be desired only as a woman, that is, merely for the sake of her sexuality. Often enough one finds that love must justify sexuality, and is set up in consequence of a physical relation. However that may be, the difficulties and conflicts in modern love life are in great part to be traced to the increasing likeness between the sexes, which seems to be a consequence of increasing individualization. Instead of seeking or finding the complementary type, human beings today seek to find preferably the same or similar type, and sexuality remains the only difference, the object of conflict or avoidance. A deeper study of the love life makes it clear also that human beings depend more on the one who rules them than on the one who loves them. Love, where it exists in such cases, is then taken only as proof that this ruling will not be too severe or earnest, that one will be punished just enough to spare self-punishment, but that this punishment will be no death punishment. Another more social form of paying off is work, however satisfying or creative it may be. Work to which so many men allude when they speak of painful reality, is not only frequently a source of positive satisfaction but in every case lightens the inner punishment tendency. This important viewpoint has only recently found entrance into psychoanalysis, which has given very little value to the work life of the sick as a therapeutic factor, although it would have played an important part with the numerous patients who were or who became analysts. The chief ground for this neglect seems to me not so much in the libidinal orientation of analysis as in its purely psychological orientation. (Detailed treatment of this point will be found in the chapter on vocation of my book on Modern Education). The human being is not only an individual but also a social being and both sides are important, at least therapeutically. The psychoanalytic goal of the purely psychic achievement of balance of the individual, is an ideal which is not only beyond reach, but is misleading. The social factors, however much they may encroach upon the individual, are still finally the only therapeutically effective ones, that is, those which help the individual to objectify his inner conflicts and his original ambivalence. For this one needs persons and situations which lie outside of the self. The problem of the neurotic type is that he cannot make use of these situations because he does not understand how to divide, to balance, to partialize, but must totalize or negate every single situation, every relation, even every action.
If one approaches life so totally that one wants to receive everything from one person or situation, one must to that extent become disillusioned, just as one has to deny, if one will take nothing at all from the outside and must find and do everything in oneself. One must be able to take and give different things on different sides, that is, to bear dependence, which, however, is no longer perceived as such when one feels oneself as part, not as an undivided and indivisible whole. The being able to divide oneself is an art which must be learned, otherwise it leads to swinging from one attitude to another, which, while it can be productive, always remains painful. On the other hand, there is the danger of mixing or interchanging the two sides into which one has already divided one’s self. I have seen cases in which the individual wanted to do that in his private life, in other words, to treat men as ideologies. The so-called professional men who never fall from their social role, are actually strong egos who have barricaded themselves behind the calling, and then interpret the world in terms of this professional ego. There are also types who with all freedom and lightness in living never reveal the real self, even to themselves. Also, it is true in therapy that the therapist learns to know the patient only from one side, and that certainly is not always the best. There are people who always hide a part of their ego, in order to keep the best for themselves. One could characterize the neurosis as secretiveness with regard to the self, and the necessary modification of this attitude in the therapeutic relationship would explain in part the therapeutic effect. On the other hand, the therapeutic process with all honesty still offers rich opportunity for hide and seek.

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since the secret self projects itself upon the therapist and must be read off from there.

The human being has an inherent aversion to playing two roles, while at bottom he is so dualistically conditioned that he cannot live with one only. Ideological therapy with its psychic balancing strengthens this idea of unity of the individual, instead of, figuratively speaking, putting him on two legs. Vocation and private life, work and leisure, complement one another anyway, indeed actually force the modern man to a change of roles. That sounds banal enough but seems to me worth emphasizing, in view of the analytic concentration upon psychological details which perhaps have laboratory interest, but certainly no therapeutic value. For the only therapy is real life. The patient must learn to live, to live with his split, his conflict, his ambivalence, which no therapy can take away, for if it could, it would take with it the actual spring of life. The more truly the ambivalence is accepted the more life and possibilities of life will the human being have and be able to use. If he only understands how to live in harmony with the inevitable, that is, with the inevitable in himself, not outside, then he will also be able to accept reality as it is. This is no fatalistic and passive acceptance, but rather an active constructive utilization. Finally, therefore, everything depends on the attitude of the particular individual to the given factors, including primarily himself. In the last analysis therapy can only strive for a new attitude toward the self, a new valuation of it in relation to the past, and a new balancing in relation to and by means of, present reality.
TRUTH AND REALITY

The central statement of Rank’s ideas

BY

OTTO RANK

Translation from the German,
with a Preface and Introduction,

by

JESSIE TAFT

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

Truth and Reality is the third volume of Rank's “Grundzüge einer genetischen Psychologie auf Grund der Psychoanalyse der Ichstruktur” (Outlines of a Genetic Psychology on the basis of the Psychoanalysis of the Ego Structure). The first volume, published in 1927, is concerned with the biological development of the ego, including the genesis of genitality, the origin of guilt feeling, and the genesis of the object relation, and discusses the psychic mechanisms such as projection, identification, and denial, an important concept which Rank introduces as more basic than repression. It has never been published in English but was delivered in lecture form under the auspices of the New York School of Social Work in 1926, before it appeared in German.

Volume Two, “Gestaltung und Ausdruck der Persönlichkeit” (The Development of Personality), published in 1928, goes beyond the biological level to the essentially human development of man as an emotional, social and ethical being. It contains discussions of character formation as contrasted with something we call personality, the development of the emotional life, education, social adaptation, creativity, and the helping function. Like the first volume, this book also was presented first in the United States as a lecture course for the New York School of Social Work and for the Pennsylvania School of Social Work in 1927, although it has not appeared in an English translation.

“Truth and Reality,” the third volume, like the other two, was offered first in English in lecture form, in this case for the Pennsylvania School of Social Work alone, just before its publication in German in 1929. While it forms the conclusion of the two volumes just described, it presents in clear, integrated form an original point of view representing Rank's unique contribution to psychology and philosophy, which had not come through into full consciousness until this final book was written. Although “The Trauma of Birth,” published in German in 1924, marks the beginning of Rank's development beyond Freudian psychoanalysis, the first two volumes of "Genetische Psychologie,” while they differ radically from the orthodox psychoanalytic approach, are not yet clearly differentiated from Freudian psychology. Before the third volume was written Rank had found the key to his own theoretical organization in a sudden realization of the role of the will in the analytic situation.

Under the illumination of that discovery he wrote simultaneously the second volume of his "Technik der Psychoanalyse" showing the relation of will to the therapeutic process and repudiating completely the Freudian psychoanalytic method, and this third volume of "Genetische Psychologie," "Truth and Reality," in which he develops the psychological and philosophic implications underlying his new vision of the therapeutic process.

In "Truth and Reality" Rank offers not one more psychology of the individual in the interest of
therapy, but a philosophy of man's willing, an historical sketch of the evolution of will itself with its inexhaustible creativity, its dynamic of projection and denial and its ever increasing burden of fear and guilt.

J.T.
Philadelphia
December 1935

1 This volume appears as Part One of “Will Therapy.”
Jesus. I am come to bear witness unto the truth.

Pilate: What is truth?

**THE BIRTH OF INDIVIDUALITY**

“The most important event in the life of a man is the moment when he becomes conscious of his own ego.” —Tolstoi

The lines of thought comprehended in this book constitute a preliminary statement of the final working out of a concept of the psychic which I had anticipated in the work of my youth “Der Künstler”1 (1905) almost a quarter of a century ago. The consequent building up and shaping of this early conception led me gradually to a “genetic” and “constructive” psychology which, on the basis of practical analytic experiences, has finally crystallized into a will psychology. This approach threw such meaningful light upon the psychological foundation of epistemology and ethics that it led me ultimately to a philosophy of the psychic which I now attempt to outline in the following chapters. The practical, therapeutic aspect of the will psychology I developed in the second part of my “Technique of Psychoanalysis” which was published simultaneously.3

While at first I was completely under the influence of Freudian realism and tried to express my conception of the creative man, the artist, in the biological-mechanistic terms of Freud’s natural


2 Translator’s Note: The German word “seelisch” has no exact equivalent in English. I have used “psychic” in lieu of something better, but it does not carry satisfactorily the reference to the concept of the soul in primitive cultures to which Rank relates modern psychology in his book “Seelenglaube und Psychologie.”

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science ideology, on the basis of my own experience, I have since been enabled to formulate these common human problems in a common human language as well. “The Trauma of Birth,” a book written in 1923, marks the decisive turning point in this development. There I compared to the creative drive of the individual as treated in “Der Künstler,” the creation of the individual himself, not merely physically, but also psychically in the sense of the “rebirth experience,” which I understood psychologically as the actual creative act of the human being. For in this act the psychic ego is born out of the biological corporeal ego and the human being becomes at once creator and creature or actually moves from creature to creator, in the ideal case, creator of himself, his own personality.

This conception of the birth of individuality from the self as a consequent psychological carrying out of the original trauma of birth from the mother, leads also to another kind of methodology of treatment and presentation. While in “The Trauma of Birth” I proceeded from a concrete experience in the analytic situation and its new interpretation, and as in “Der Künstler” strove to broaden it into the universally human and cultural, my present conception just reversed is based on the universally human—yes, if you will, on the cosmic idea of soul, and seeks to assemble all its expressions in the focal point of the separate individuality. It has to do neither with a leading back of the general, the supra-individual, to the concrete and personal, nor with a wishing to explain the one from the other. Although this may often be the appearance, yes, at times may even underlie it, yet this is not the object of this presentation which rather sets for itself the goal of viewing the two worlds of macrocosm and microcosm as parallel, and only as far as possible, pointing out their inter-dependence and their reactions upon one another. In this attempt, excursions into the history of culture are naturally unavoidable, in order at least to note the great counterpart of the individual in a few of its typical forms.


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The main task, however, as indicated in “Genetische Psychologie” continues to be the presentation of the chief actor and at the same time chief onlooker, the individual ego, in this, his dual role. This involves not only the duality of actor and self-observer, but has yet another meaning, in that, for civilized man, the milieu is no longer the natural reality, the opposing force of an external world, but an artistic reality, created by himself which we, in its outer as in its inner aspects, designate as civilization. In this sense civilized man, even if he fights the outside
world, is no longer opposed to a natural enemy but at bottom to himself, to his own creation, as he finds himself mirrored, particularly in manners and customs, morality and conventions, social and cultural institutions. The phenomenon thus described is of fundamental meaning for the understanding of the human being’s relation to the outer world as well as to his fellow man. For while Freud’s reality psychology emphasized essentially the influence of outer factors, of the milieu, upon the development of the individual and the formation of his character, even in “Der Künstler” I opposed to this biological principle, the spiritual principle which alone is meaningful in the development of the essentially human. This is based essentially on the conception that the inner world, taken in from the outside by means of identification has become in the course of time an independent power, which in its turn by way of projection, so influences and seeks to alter the external, that its correspondence to the inner is even more close. This relation to outer reality I designate as creation in contrast to adaptation, and comprehend as will phenomena. The indication of its psychological determinants and dynamic factors in terms of this will psychology, forms the main content of the following chapters.

This conception of the influencing and transforming of the milieu by the individual allows for the inclusion of the creative, the artist type, for whom there is no place in Freud’s world picture where all individual expressions are explained as reactions to social influences or as biological instincts and therewith are reduced to something outside the individual. For with Freud the individual in the nucleus of his being (the so-called “id”) is subject to the great natural laws, under the guise of the “repetition compulsion,” while personality consists of the layers of identifications which form the basis of the parental super-ego. This perhaps may account for the great mass, the average, although even here it can be true only roughly, but it can never explain the creative type nor the so-called “neurotic,” who represents the artist’s miscarried counterpart. In this cursory survey I should like to characterize the creative type, in a preliminary way only, in this regard, that he is able, in a way soon to be described more closely, to create voluntarily from the impulsive elements and moreover to develop his standards beyond the identifications of the super-ego morality to an ideal formation which consciously guides and rules this creative will in terms of the personality. The essential point in this process is the fact that he evolves his ego ideal from himself, not merely on the ground of given but also of self-chosen factors which he strives after consciously.

As a result the ego, instead of being caught between the two powerful forces of fate, the inner id and the externally derived super-ego, develops and expresses itself creatively. The Freudian ego driven by the libidinal id and restrained by parental morality, becomes almost a nonentity, a helpless tool for which there remains no autonomous function, certainly not willing whether this be creative or only a simple goal conscious striving. In my view the ego is much more than a mere show place for the standing conflict between two great forces. Not only is the individual
ego naturally the carrier of higher goals, even when they are built on external identifications, it is also the temporal representative of the cosmic primal force no matter whether one calls it sexuality, libido, or id. The ego accordingly is strong just in the degree to which it is the representative of this primal force and the strength of this force represented in the individual we call the will. This will becomes creative, when it carries itself on through the ego into the super-ego and there leads to ideal formations of its own, which, if you will, in the last analysis arise from the id, at all events not from without. On this account, the creative man of every type has a much stronger ego than the average man, as we see not only in genius but also in the neurotic, whose convulsed hypertrophied ego is just what creates the neurosis, psychologically a creative achievement just as much as any other. The creative type, whose denial we see in the inferior neurotic is

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therefore not only characterized by a stronger impulse life, but also by a wholly special utilization of it, the most important aspect of which I consider the ideal formation from the own self (i.e. on the basis of the own impulsive make-up) whose “negative” we have to recognize in the neurotic symptom formation. However, while the neurotic so strengthens his repressions against his stronger than average impulsive self, that they finally make him completely incapable of willing and acting, in the creative man there occurs a qualitatively different impulse displacement, which manifests itself psychologically as ideal formation with simultaneous expression in conscious creative activity of will. Such a conception makes creative power and creative accomplishment comprehensible for the first time, rather than the insipid and impotent concept of sublimation, which prolongs a shadowy existence in psychoanalysis. From this viewpoint one could say that with human beings sometimes even impulsive expressions are only a weaker, less satisfactory substitute for that which the creative power of will would like. Therefore, as it were, not only the phantasy-produced substitute for unattained reality, but even the reality which is attainable, is only a weaker substitute for the inexhaustible willing.

The psychological understanding of the creative type and of its miscarriage in the neurotic, teaches us therefore to value the ego, not only as a wrestling ground of (id) impulses and (superego) repressions, but also as conscious bearer of a striving force, that is, as the autonomous representative of the will and ethical obligation in terms of a self-constituted ideal. Freud’s original wish fulfilment theory lay much nearer to this recognition than his later doctrine of instincts, which actually only represented a biologizing of the unconscious wishes. We easily recognize in the Freudian wish the old will of the academic psychologists, although in the romantic guise of natural philosophy, while the wish, as I first explained it in “Der Künstler,” actually corresponds to an impulse tendency which later was ascribed to the supra-individual id. But the conscious wish fulfilment tendency of the ego, for the designation of which the suitable word “will” exists, extends (as Freud himself finally had to perceive in “The Ego and Id”) much further than he was willing to admit, while the instinctual impulse tendency in men is less
extensive than he originally thought, since it is repressed by the powerful super-ego factors for Freud and, for me, in addition, is molded by the self-created ideal formation. Also this fact appears clearly in the dream phenomenon in which Freud has seen the wish fulfillment tendency, since the conscious wishes of the day are often strong enough to put through their fulfillment in dreams while the ostensibly stronger unconscious wishes (the impulse drives) are almost regularly blocked by the ethical repressions, still watchful even in sleep (Freud’s censor). All these facts and considerations would have been able to save psychoanalysis from an over-valuation of the power of the unconscious impulsive life in men, and from the under-valuation of his conscious willing ego, if a kind of psychic compulsion, which reaches far beyond the personal psychology of its creator, had not, of necessity, blocked it. Before we seek the source and nature of this compulsion, I should like to justify here briefly by way of introduction what causes me to speak of a compulsion. The whole of psychoanalysis in its theoretical and practical aspects is actually an unparalleled glorification of consciousness and its power as I have already observed in “Der Künstler,” while Freud himself designates his theory as a psychology of the unconscious and as such wishes it to be understood. It certainly is that, too, but the more it became a doctrine of the unconscious, the less it remained psychology. As a theory of the unconscious it became a biological foundation of psychology as which I also tried to present it in “Der Künstler.” In its mechanisms of super-ego formation it gives on the other hand a foundation of characterology. The actual field of psychology, the conscious ego, with its willing, its sense of duty, and its feeling, psychoanalysis has treated very like a step-child because it has placed the ego almost entirely under the guardianship of extra-individual factors, of the id and the super-ego, at least as far as theory is concerned. In practice, however, psychoanalysis represents, as has already been said, a glorification of the power of consciousness; in its therapeutic meaning, according to which neurosis is cured by making conscious the unconscious motive underlying it, in its cultural significance as a tremendous broadening of consciousness in the development of humanity, as I represented it in “Der Künstler,” and finally in its scientific meaning, as the recognition and knowledge of a part of the unconscious in nature.

Before we can investigate how such a contradiction could arise between theory formation, the facts on which it rests, and the conclusions to which it leads, we must review the factors which, according to our viewpoint, psychoanalysis has undervalued. At first we said it was the significance of the inner, independently of the outer factors, then the significance of the creative will, and finally the meaning of a conscious sense of duty. We recognize now that these factors
belong together intimately and condition one another, yes, in a certain sense, represent one and the same thing. We started from the “inner” which originally was an “outer,” but became inner, and as its representative we accept the super-ego in the Freudian sense, that is, as far as it is built up on identifications. If we add to this “outer” also the id which is in a certain sense supra-individual because generic, that which Jung designates in the racial sense as collective unconscious, there remains left over as the actual own “inner” of the individual, his ego, which we have distinguished as bearer of the creative will, or generally speaking, of the conscious personality. If we have once acknowledged its power—and psychoanalysis, as already said, had recognized but denied it—there appear as a result further interesting perspectives which the old academic psychology in spite of its recognition of the meaning of conscious willing, could not let itself dream of because it lacked the dynamic viewpoint which psychoanalysis, it is true, conceived purely on the level of biological instinct while we approach it rather from the basis of the individual creative.

First of all, there is the possibility of the creative reaction of this strengthened willing ego upon the overcome instinctual id; on the other hand, there follows therefrom the already noted influencing of the super-ego formation through the self-constructed ideal. The first effect leads us into the most important but also the darkest field of all psychology, namely, the emotional life, while the effect of the willing ego, on the other side, comprehends all actual sublimation phenomena, therefore the spiritual, in the broadest sense. In a word we encounter here for the first time the actual ground of psychology, the realm of willing and ethics in the purely psychic, not in the biological or moral sense, therefore not in terms of any supra-individual force, but of freedom as Kant understood it metaphysically, that is, beyond external influences. Psychoanalysis has scarcely approached the problem of the emotional life because the “unconscious” feelings which it accepted corresponding to the “unconscious” wishes were not so easily reducible to instinctive life as the latter. In want of a better explanation, one could perhaps allow the assumption to serve that the affects correspond to such unconscious feelings but the whole sphere of human emotions, important as they are, with their finely graded scale is as undeniably a phenomenon of consciousness, as the whole man himself. One can better accept from this standpoint the Freudian explanation of consciousness as a “sense organ for the perception of psychic qualities” in the genetic sense. Probably consciousness even earlier was entirely a sense organ for the perception of external qualities (sensation psychology) which it still is today also; later was added the function of the perception of inner qualities and a further developmental level of consciousness was that of an independent and spontaneous organ for partial ruling of the outer as of the inner world. Finally, consciousness became an instrument of observation and knowledge of itself (self-consciousness) and as such again it has reached in psychoanalysis and the will psychology which I built further upon it, a peak of development and self-knowledge. The individual ego frees itself therefore always more and more with the weapon of increased power of consciousness, not only from the rule of environmental natural forces, but also from the biological reproduction compulsion of the
overcome id; it influences thereby also more and more positively the super-ego development in terms of the self-constructed ideal formation and finally in a creative sense the outer world, whose transformation through men on its side again reacts upon the ego and its inner development.

Thus we are finally led back again from the problem of will to the problem of consciousness and this all the more, the more psychological we remain. For however fundamental and important the will—whatever one may understand by that—for all stimulation of the individual to acting, feeling and thinking,

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finally we can only comprehend all these phenomena in and through consciousness. In this deeper sense psychology can of necessity be nothing other than a psychology of consciousness; yes, even more, a psychology of consciousness in its various aspects and phases of development. We shall examine later this relativity, not only of all conscious human knowledge, but of all phenomena of consciousness itself. First of all we face the whole problem of psychology, namely, that we become aware of the actual driving factors in our psychic life always only through the medium of consciousness, but that this consciousness itself is nothing firm, constant, or unalterable. There results from this situation a series of difficulties without knowledge of which every psychology is impossible, since the understanding of these contradictions forms the very warp and woof of psychology as such. These difficulties are: first, that we, as said, are aware of the will phenomena only through the medium of consciousness; second, that this conscious self offers us no fixed standpoint for observation of these phenomena, but itself ceaselessly alters, displaces and broadens them. This leads to the third and perhaps most important point, namely, that we can observe these fluctuating phenomena of consciousness itself only through a kind of super-consciousness which we call self-consciousness.

The difficulties are complicated still more seriously when we take into consideration the fact that consciousness itself and its development are determined essentially by will phenomena or at least are influenced in far reaching fashion. We can hardly do justice to this highly complicated state of affairs when we say that a constant interpretation and reinterpretation takes place from both sides. Consciousness is constantly interpreted by will and the various levels of will, yes, consciousness originally is itself probably a will phenomenon; that is, consciousness was an instrument for the fulfilment of will before it advanced to the will controlling power of self-consciousness and finally of analytic hyperconsciousness, which on its side again interprets will and will phenomena continuously in order to make it useful for its momentary interests. If we actually want to pursue psychology we must protect ourselves from extending further this constantly reciprocal process of interpretation by any kind of theory formation. Theory formation of every kind is then only
an attempt to oppose to the manifold spontaneous attempts at interpretation by will and consciousness a single interpretation as constant, lasting, true. This, however, on the basis of the considerations just presented, is exactly anti-psychological, since the essence of psychic processes consists in change and in the variability of the possibilities of interpretation. The compulsion to theory formation corresponds then to a longing after a firm hold, after something constant, at rest, in the flight of psychic events. Is there perhaps some way out, which might free us from this external compulsion to interpretation or at least let us rest a moment beyond it? Certainly it is not the way of historical or genetic analysis. For aside from the fact that even the final elements to which we can arrive by this path still represent phenomena of interpretation, it is also unavoidable that on the uninterrupted analytic path to these elements we should fall upon the interpretation compulsion of consciousness and of the will also. There remains therewith psychologically no other recourse than just the recognition of this condition and perhaps also an attempt to understand why it must be so. This would be the purely psychological problem, beyond which there begins again the kind of interpretation which we designate as knowledge in the broadest sense of the word. This knowledge, however, is not an interpretative understanding, but an immediate experiencing, therefore a form of the creative, perhaps the highest form of which man is capable, certainly the most dangerous form, because it can finally lead to pain, if it opposes itself to living inhibitingly, instead of confirming it pleasurably. We shall treat in the following chapters this contrast between knowing and experiencing which culminates finally in the problem of “truth or reality” in order eventually to recognize in the opposition of the most longed for psychic states of happiness and salvation, the double role of consciousness or of conscious knowing, as the source of all pleasure but also of all suffering.

Here I should like to go further by way of introduction as far as the location of the problem itself is concerned, and estimate the value of knowledge for the understanding of our own soul life. We sought before for a way out from the contradictory interpretative compulsion, in which will excites consciousness and consciousness excites will. It is that kind of knowledge which one can best designate as philosophic because at least its tendency is directed not upon this or that content but upon the existence of the phenomena themselves. The philosopher creates, as little as the artist or the religious believer, merely from his own personality. What manifests itself in all of them, although in different form, is at once something supra-individual, natural, cosmic, which accordingly and to this extent also has value somehow for all humanity. At all events here we run against the problem of form, which is just the essential thing psychologically. But in the creative individual, in genius, there is manifested, becomes more or less conscious, not only a bit of the primal, but just as much the individual, the personal. How far and to what extent the knowledge is universally valid depends entirely on the relation of these two elements in this
mixture and their effect on each other. At all events, the individual is liable to the danger, or at least the attempt, of again interpreting the universal which becomes conscious of itself in him in terms of his individual personal development, that is, speaking psychologically, of representing it as an expression of his will and not of a supra-individual force (compulsion). This is the psychology of the world view which in contrast to theory building, as we have previously characterized it, as flight from the interpretative doubt, represents an immediate creative experience not only of the individual himself, but of the cosmos manifested in him.

Again here, on the highest peak of the human elevation of consciousness and its creative expression, we run upon the same basic conflict of will and compulsion which goes through the whole development of man and the process of becoming conscious. In the creative individual this conflict is manifest only at times, and we can best describe it thus, that nature becomes even more conscious of herself in a man who at the same time with the increasing knowledge of himself which we designate as individualization, tries always to free himself further from the primitive. It has to do, therefore, with a conflictual separation of the individual from the mass, undertaken and continued at every step of development into the new, and this I should like to designate as the never completed birth of individuality. For the whole consequence of evolution from blind impulse through conscious

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will to self-conscious knowledge, seems still somehow to correspond to a continued result of births, rebirths and new births, which reach from the birth of the child from the mother, beyond the birth of the individual from the mass, to the birth of the creative work from the individual and finally to the birth of knowledge from the work. In this sense, the contrast of will and consciousness as we have recognized it as the psychological problem par excellence somehow corresponds to the biological contrast of procreation and birth. At all events we find in all these phenomena, even at the highest spiritual peak, the struggle and pain of birth, the separation out of the universal, with the pleasure and bliss of procreation, the creation of an own individual cosmos, whether it be now physically our own child, creatively our own work or spiritually our own self. At bottom it is and remains our own act of will, which we oppose to the outer force of reality as the inner pressure after truth.
II

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“Man is fearful of things which cannot hurt him and he knows it; and he longs for things which can be of no good to him and he knows it; but in truth it is something in man himself of which he is afraid and it is something in man himself for which he longs.” —Rabbi Nachman

My re-introduction of the will concept into psychology solves a succession of problems in such a simple and satisfying way that it may seem to some a deus ex machina. But I know too well that I have not brought it in as such; on the contrary that I have busied myself long and intensively in the attempt to solve certain problems which psychoanalysis had brought up anew without coming to a satisfactory solution. Only after a struggle against prejudices of every kind did the acceptance of will as a psychological factor of the first rank seem unavoidable but soon also became a matter of course, so much a matter of course that I had to say to myself that only a tremendous resistance could have hindered the complete recognition and evaluation of will as a great psychic power.

Thus the problem soon presented itself to me as a universal one, going far beyond the critique of psychoanalysis. Why must will be denied if it actually plays so great a role in reality, or to formulate it in anticipation, why is the will valued as bad, evil, reprehensible, unwelcome, when it is the power which consciously and positively, yes even creatively, forms both the self and the environment? If one puts the problem thus, then one sees at the same time that this apparently necessary contradiction is not only the basic problem of all psychology, but lies at the root of all religious dogma as well as of all philosophic speculation. In a word, not only all religion and philosophy are avowedly moralistic but psychology was also and must continue to be, as long as it cannot place itself beyond this will problem and thus be able to solve it. Religion and philosophy are, as we know, highly valued because of their moralistic tendencies and their ethical content while it is the pride of psychologists to deny this weakness in their science. Certainly psychology should not be moralistic, but it was necessarily so as long and as far as it busied itself with the content of soul life which is saturated and pierced through and through with moralistic principles. To an unusual degree this is true for therapeutically oriented psychoanalysis and that constitutes in my mind its greatest advantage as an educational method. As psychology it has been obliged in its theory formation to justify this moral-pedagogic character in part and in part to deny it. However anti-moralistic psychoanalysis may seem, at bottom for Freud, will — or whatever he understands by that term — is exactly as “bad” as for the Old Testament man or the Buddhist or the Christian, exactly as reprehensible as it still is for Schopenhauer or other philosophers who played reason against it.

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The problem therefore is not peculiarly psychoanalytic, not even purely psychological, but cultural and human. Its solution depends upon one single point. The conception of will as evil, its condemnation or justification, is the basic psychological fact which we must understand and explain instead of criticizing it or taking it as presupposition or finally as a primary phenomenon as psychoanalysis has done in the concept of guilt. That is the point at which real psychology begins. That psychoanalysis could not go on beyond this point is understandable from its nature as a therapeutic method. Psychoanalysis began as therapy, its knowledge comes from that source and psychotherapy according to its nature must be oriented morally or at least normatively. Whether it has to do with the medical concept of normality or with the social concept of adaptation, therapy can never be without prejudice for it sets out from the standpoint that something should be otherwise than it is, no matter how one may formulate it. Psychology, on the contrary, should describe what it is, how it is, and, where possible, explain why it must be so. These two diametrically opposed principles, Janus-headed psychoanalysis has necessarily mixed up and the lack of

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insight into this condition as well as a later denial has finally led to such confusion that now therapy is psychologically oriented and theory moralistically so instead of the reverse.

A closer interpretation of this paradoxical state of affairs will best lead into the understanding of the will problem underlying it. The psychoanalytic patient seemed in the beginning to suffer from repression of impulse, from inhibitions; evidently because he denied impulse as bad, as unethical. One can quite well imagine therapy resulting when an authority (doctor or priest) or a loving person permits the individual this impulse satisfaction; in other words says to him, “It is not bad as you assert, but good (necessary, beautiful, etc.).” This kind of therapy has always existed and still does today, in religion, in art, and in love. Also psychoanalysis began with it and essentially has always remained with it. First it operated directly, as Freud encouraged his patients to a normal sexual relation, that is, psychologically speaking, permitted it. But even in all the complicated outgrowths of psychoanalytic therapy and theory this one justification tendency still remains the actually effective therapeutic agent. Only now they say, “your evil wishes”—as prototypes of which Òedipus and castration wishes, the worst that man can wish, are brought forth—“are not evil, or at least you are not responsible for them for they are universal.” That is not only correct but is often therapeutically effective especially with trusting natures, not in the ironical but in the psychological sense of the word, with men who always seek some kind of excuse for their willing and find it now in the id instead of in God. But as men have seen through the so-called priestly deception, which actually is a self-deception, so they finally see through every kind of therapeutic self-deception and it is just that from which they suffer, just that which forms the very root of the neurosis. When I say “see through,” I do not mean necessarily consciously, but guilt feeling, which humanity perceives always and ever increasingly in spite of this apparent absence of responsibility, is the best proof of what this kind of therapy denies today, in a certain sense has always denied, and to that extent has worked only
this form of consolation works, partly because of their universality, partly because in them man accuses himself of this evil will that he would like to deny. In ritual, in artistic satisfaction, in teaching, man is unburdened and comforted through the others, the priests, the artists, the wise. But in the content of these therapeutic systems, accusation and punishment dominate as religious humility, resignation, as tragic guilt and sin, and as justification in terms of the ethical reaction formation. In a word, in all these projections of the great will conflict, man confesses in one or another way that he is himself sinful, guilty, bad. Exactly the same process of justification and self-accusation we see unroll itself in psychoanalysis only here it appears in the therapeutic and psychological terminology of our natural science age, although it seems unavoidable to bring in the contentually richer ideas and symbols of earlier systems. In its technique, psychoanalysis is exactly as much a matter of consolation and justification as therapy must be according to its nature. That is, it quiets man concerning his badness, since it says to him that all others are thus also and that it lies grounded in human nature. Therefore psychoanalysis in the content of its system, of its theory, must count exactly as all the former justification attempts of humanity. In psychoanalytic theory, instinct is evil, bad, reprehensible; the individual is small and insignificant, a play-ball of the id and the super-ego; guilt feeling is and remains a final insoluble fact.

Hence it comes about that psychoanalytic theory represents the necessary opposite to the therapy, as the religious system or church dogma represents the necessary opposite to ritualistic practice, the ritual of atonement. It is a completion just as the creative work of the individual represents a completion and not merely an expression of actual experience. It follows that psychoanalysis cannot be an independent unprejudiced psychology but must be the necessary balance to its therapeutic practice, often enough its willing servant.

It is still psychology, even so, but it becomes the psychology of the therapist, who needs such a theory for the justification of his practice and simultaneously for the denial of his moral-pedagogical attitude. In this sense, however, this very attitude itself again becomes the object of psychology which asks further
why every kind of therapist needs a justification at all and why just this one? The objection that psychoanalytic theory is founded on the experiences of the practice of therapy and that just this constitutes its value, especially its scientific value is not entirely sound. Psychoanalytic theory is founded on one single experience, the fact of the analytic situation, which however is an essentially therapeutic one, that is, rests on the relation of the patient to the doctor. As the patient represents the object, could one expect to obtain even in the summation of his various experiences, a universal human psychology? It would represent only the psychology of a part of humanity, let us say even of the majority, namely those in need of help. The psychology of the helper, of the therapist, would remain and this side of human nature is at least just as important.

My contention goes far beyond this conclusion in maintaining that psychoanalysis betrays much more of the psychology of the therapist, of the helper, of the active willing person, only it represents it as the psychology of the patient, the seeker for help, the willness. This is not to deny the psychological value of psychoanalysis in which as I believe, we can study the fundamental problems of human soul life as never before and nowhere else, only we must first agree on certain basic questions upon whose clarification our fruitful utilization of psychoanalysis depends. In a word, the psychology of the normal man, the average type given us by psychoanalysis is in reality the psychology of the creative man, not only of Freud, as Michaelis has shown beautifully in the single case, but of the type. It unveils to us the psychology of the strong man of will, who while almost God himself and creator of men in his practice, in his theory must deny his godlikeness with all its characteristics and represent himself as a small, weak, helpless creature, a person actually seeking help and comfort.

Although enough human tragedy lies in this apparently unavoidable fate of the creative type, the denial continued into the work, the philosophy, darkens its noble aspect. For the work born out of this superhuman internal struggle to represent an

much more a psychologist than he. Certainly his freedom from office and calling which he had to buy so dearly had much to do with it. In no case, however, was he a therapist who needed a psychological justification, no, not even a patient, a seeker for help, in spite of all his illnesses. He was himself, which is the first requirement for a psychologist, and therefore he was also the first and only one who could affirm the evil will, who even glorified it. That was his psychological product for which he paid not with system building and scientific rationalization, but with personal suffering, with his own experience.

Nietzsche’s contribution, therefore, based on Schopenhauer’s important discovery of will, is the separation of the will from the guilt problem (the moral). He has not completely solved the problem, could not solve it, because for its solution the analytic experience was necessary. By which I mean not so much the experiences of the analyst through the patient, but also and much more the experience of humanity with psychoanalysis. As Nietzsche’s will affirmation represents a reaction to the will denial of the Schopenhauerian system, so Freud’s theory is again to be understood as a throwback from Nietzsche’s attitude to an

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almost Schopenhauerian pessimism and nihilism. I do not doubt that my will psychology which has arisen from personal experiences, represents in its turn a reaction against Freud’s “making evil” of the will; I shall show further that the whole history of mankind in the individual himself and in the race represents just such a sequence of will action and reaction, of affirmation and denial. I shall then show also that in the historical developmental process of this will conflict, as in its individual manifestations we have to do not merely with a repetition in the sense of the Freudian fatalism but that a continuous evolution can be traced in terms of the broadening of consciousness and the development of self-consciousness. For as little as Freud’s theory is a “repetition” of the closely related one of Schopenhauer, so little has my will psychology to do with Nietzsche’s “will to power,” with which Nietzsche has again finally smuggled evaluation into psychology. With this comparison I mean only to point to a common psychological aspect of experience, which necessarily conditions these reactions, and which we intend to make the object of our investigation.

The will in itself is not as “evil” as the Jew-hating Schopenhauer believes along with the Old Testament, nor as “good” as the sick Nietzsche would like to see it in his glorification. It exists as a psychological fact and is the real problem of psychology, first as to its origin, how it has evolved in man, and second why we must condemn it as “bad” or justify it as “good,” instead of recognizing and affirming it as necessary. The epistemological question, whence it comes, what it means psychologically, will throw a light upon the ethical question of condemnation or justification in the answering of which, however, we must guard against bringing in moralistic evaluations before we have recognized their psychological source. Which is to say also that we must guard against bringing therapeutic viewpoints into psychology with Freud, or pedagogical aims with Adler, or ethical values with Jung, for at bottom they all involve one and the same cardinal error. That the will must be justified in therapy, we already know, yes, even the patient
is caught in the denial of it, that is in guilt feeling, and his seeking for help is just an expression of this will conflict. That the will in pedagogy

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is reprehensible, goes without saying, for pedagogy is obviously a breaking of the will as ethics is a will limitation and therapy will justification.

If I said we must guard ourselves against bringing in therapeutic elements, that is, moral evaluations into psychology, then I must elucidate this further before I go into a sketch of a philosophy of the psychic (seelisch). Although my will psychology has resulted not wholly from analytic experience, but also represents the result of my philosophic, pedagogic, religious and cultural studies, still I will not deny that it was essentially analytic practice that crystallized for me all of these various materials, differing in kind and value, into a psychological experience. I must present these analytic experiences elsewhere not only from lack of space but also on objective grounds in order to exclude as much as possible a mixture of the two viewpoints since they correspond to two different world views. But this external separation would not necessarily guarantee an inner separation if I had not at the same time in my analytic work struggled through to a technique which tries to avoid the therapeutic in the moral pedagogical sense. What, you will probably ask, is this new method and what does it aim at if not re-education since any cure for mental suffering is excluded anyway?1 To say it in one word, the aim is self-development; that is, the person is to develop himself into that which he is and not as in education and even in analytic therapy to be made into a good citizen, who accepts the general ideals without contradiction and has no will of his own. This, as Keyserling 2 recently noted pertinently, is the confessed purpose of Adler’s leveling pedagogical cure and as Prinzhorn 3 has seen, the unconfessed but clear purpose of Freudian psychoanalysis which purports to be revolutionary but is really conservative. If one understood the will psychology only a little, one must at least know that this conservatism is the best method of breeding revolutionary, willful men who for the most part are driven into

1 See the observations on “Leiden und Helfen” in Part II of my “Genetische Psychologie”

2 “Vom falschen Gemeinschaftsideal” (Der Weg zur Vollendung, 14 Heft, 1927).


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the neurosis by the oppressive majority when they want to express their wills. No, the man who suffers from pedagogical, social and ethical repression of will, must again learn to will, and not
to force on him an alien will is on the other hand the best protection against excesses of will which for the most part only represent reactions. In my view the patient should make himself what he is, should will it and do it himself, without force or justification and without need to shift the responsibility for it. How I present the method leading to this end and utilize it practically, I will discuss elsewhere. Here it has this value only; to show how and in how far I can apply my practical experiences to the founding of my will psychology justifiably because as a matter of fact they are not therapeutic in the moralistic pedagogical sense but are constructive. Otherwise I should not have succeeded at all in understanding what a tremendous role will psychology plays in general. In the Freudian analysis the patient is measured by a minimum scale, as it were, as perhaps the weak-sighted by the ophthalmologist in order to be brought up to normal vision. This minimum scale consists of the primitive fear pictures of the OEdipus and castration complexes together with all related sadistic, cannibalistic and narcissistic tendencies. Measured by thes the modern civilized man certainly feels himself better than the more evil primitive, at all events not worse, and thus we get the basis for the therapeutic justification. Please do not misunderstand me. I am not making fun of this, any more than of the necessary profession of the ophthalmologist or the normal vision of my chauffeur. But if, for example, a weak visioned painter can create better pictures when he works without glasses, it would be folly to educate him to the wearing of spectacles because he then would see the same as his neighbor the banker. It is just as foolish to educate a man who is inhibited in his self-development by the norm of the OEdipus complex, which he seeks to escape. By this holding up of a mythological decalogue as a confessional mirror one can probably work therapeutically, but one must know what one does, not for the sake of a fanatical sense of honor, but in order to be able to succeed in actuality. However, one must also be ready to admit that the morality lying at the bottom of this therapy is the Jewish-Christian morality which it seeks to conserve, while that part of

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humanity which has already outgrown it includes the main body of neurotics, whom one can scarcely hope to cure with the morality from which as a matter of fact they suffer. That, however, is the therapeutic significance of the OEdipus complex; a kind of mythologizing of the fourth commandment, which perhaps still lingers in the Greek OEdipus story but, as I shall show, is certainly not its meaning.

Psychologically the OEdipus complex as I have already indicated in my “Genetische Psychologie” has no other significance than that of a great—even if not the first—will conflict between the growing individual and the counter will of a thousand year old moral code, represented in the parents. Against this itself, nothing is to be said; it must probably have its value as it has so long preserved itself and thereby apparently mankind. The child must subject himself to it, not in order that he should let his father live and not marry his mother, but that he should not believe in general that he can do what he wishes, that he should not even trust himself to will. Also on another ground than that of the dominance of the strongest must one render acknowledgment to this Old Testament moral code against which perhaps at bottom all hatred of Jews is directed. Apparently we have to thank the reaction against it for all great revolutionaries
of spirit and deed, who have displaced the old. For on this powerful imprint of centuries the counter will strengthens itself, trains itself, must first of all seek the most different by-paths and disguises, in order finally to prevail, and when it has reached this goal, deny itself in guilt feeling.

Here only a constructive therapy, which must not even be an individual therapy, can take hold helpfully. I do not mean constructive in the sense of a medically oriented normal therapy as it is handled in the analytic situation by Freud, who interprets as resistance the counter will of the patient awakened by the authoritative pressure of the therapist. Here lies the moralistic pitfall into which the analyst falls hopelessly when he steps in as therapist of society and not of the individual. For against this parent-like representative of the social will is aroused the self will of the weakest patient although it is interpreted by the Freudian therapist as resistance on the basis of his own will and in terms of his own social and moral ideals; that is, as

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something which must be overcome or even broken instead of being furthered and developed. Without the understanding and courage of a constructive therapy, individual therapy degenerates into a mass education which is based on the traditional world view and the Jewish-Christian morality. We shall see elsewhere in how far a freeing of will in education, as it is already utilized today in the program of modern pedagogy, works and is justified psychologically. At all events, to correct always seems easier to me than to prevent or to educate, particularly because there is a natural tendency to self-healing, yes, even to over-healing (in Ostwald’s sense), while the tendency to self-education if it exists, at all events is much harder to awaken and to develop, as it presupposes on the part of the individual the acceptance of his own will. This tendency, the constructive technique which I have evolved in individual cases, tries to build up into a principle of individualization, the presentation of which I must postpone to a later time after the fundamental psychological problem of will and force is known and recognized in its universal meaning.
III

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“As the fish does not live outside of the dark abyss, so man should never strive for knowledge regarding his own essence.”

—Lao-Tse

Since we have come back to our original point of departure, the overcoming of external force through the inner freedom of will, we have now to indicate in a general way how we conceive the outline of a philosophy of the psychic after this neo-Copernican reversal to conscious will as the central point of psychology, if not of world history. Consciousness, as an instrument of knowledge turned toward the inside seeks truth, that is, inner actuality in contrast to the outer truth of the senses, the so-called “reality.” Instinct lifted into the ego sphere by consciousness is the power of will, and at the same time a tamed, directed, controlled instinct, which manifests itself freely within the individual personality, that is, creatively. Indeed it is as free toward the outer as toward the inner. But only the inner effects interest us here, first upon the id, the instinct life itself, and next upon the higher super-ego aspects and ideal formations of the self. Just as the creative will represents the conscious expression of instinct, in a banal sense the act, so emotion represents the conscious awareness of instinct, that is, the emotional tone is an index of the “what” of the will. In both cases, however, it is consciousness which lends to the phenomenon its authentic psychological significance.

The influence of the power of consciousness on the ego-ideal formation has a double effect in the ethical sphere likewise, an active and passive one, corresponding to the act of will and the emotional perception in the purely psychic sphere; active in the creative expression of the momentary ego ideal as it manifests itself in work; passive in the formation of definite ethical, aesthetic, and logical norms for doing and making, without whose concurrence no kind of action is possible. Nay more, these norms modify still further the content of the original pure instinctual drives, which were already modified by consciousness and indeed go beyond content into form, since they prescribe the only possible form in which this particular individual can realize and objectify the content of the momentary instinctual drive. In a word, in the perceptual sphere of emotional life the ego modifies the instincts (lifted into the sphere of will by being made conscious) into definite interests or desires whose carrying over into deed or work again depends on the spiritual forms, if you will, the psychological categories, created from the individual’s ego-ideal formation. This is the schema of a constructive will psychology, in the center of which we again place the conscious ego, with its old rights and newly won prerogatives.
From this constructive psychology it is only a step to a widely comprehensive point of view which I designate as a philosophy of the psychic because it includes not only the psychological problem of “Will and Force” but also the epistemological problem of “Truth and Reality,” the ethical problem of “Creation and Guilt” and finally, the religious problem of “Happiness and Salvation.” And I believe it is impossible to handle or to understand any one without the others. For at the moment when we perceive the mechanism of the instinctive drive set in motion, molded into ethical willing by the conscious ego (and this has been abstracted from a wealth of observation and experience), a reaction results with hitherto incomprehensible inexactability, a reaction which psychoanalysis has designated as guilt feeling. This guilt feeling in spite of all the efforts of psychoanalysis remains not only an unsolved riddle, but in my opinion has led the whole of psychology astray, including psychoanalysis. For this guilt feeling which seems to enter so inevitably into the functioning of the psychic mechanism like the friction in the operation of a machine, leads to the rationalization of our motives, to the interpretation of our emotions, to the falsifying of truth, and to the doubting of the justification of our will. However, as soon as we restore to the will its psychological rights, the whole of psychology becomes of necessity a psychology of consciousness,

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which it is anyway according to its nature, and the “psychology of the unconscious” unveils itself to us as one of the numerous attempts of mankind to deny the will in order to evade the conscious responsibility following of necessity therefrom. The unavoidable guilt feeling shows the failure of this attempt, is as it were the “neurotic” throw-back of the denied responsibility. This enthroning of the conscious will upon its natural rights is no backward step from psychoanalytic knowledge, but a necessary step forward and beyond it to include the psychological understanding of the psychoanalytic world view itself.

Freud’s presentation of the “Ego and the Id” presents a developmental level of our mental life as it may have existed once and perhaps in the child’s development it returns to that level to a certain degree, where the ego, as it were, shyly lifts its head out of the id, perhaps even then against it, and comes upon the moralistic super-ego factors as they are represented by the parent authorities externally. But from this birth hour of the ego from the womb of the id to the self-conscious pride—yes, analytic super-pride—of the achieved ego consciousness is a long and highly complicated path which Freud does not follow through, and has not even seen, as he still insists on understanding the modern individual from the earlier level. The conscious ego of the individual since the time of the setting up of father rule, although this still exists formally, has itself become a proud tyrant, who, like Napoleon is not satisfied with the position of a leading general or first consul, nor even with the role of an emperor among kings, but would become ruler of the whole world kingdom. Herein lies the unavoidable tragedy of the ego I and from this springs its guilt also. Speaking purely psychologically, as we presented it in our schema of a constructive psychology, the ego had gradually become the conscious interpreter and executor of the impulsive self and as long as it was or could be only that, it found no hindrance in the ethical norms of the ideal ego. Man was one with himself as he had been one with nature before the
development of the conscious ego. The inner tragedy, which we designate as conflict, and the guilt necessarily inhering in it, appear only when to the purely interpretative “I will” (which I must do anyway) is added the “It is not so” which denies the necessity.

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This goes along with an alteration of consciousness as well as the power of will. Consciousness, which primarily had been only an expression and tool of the will, soon becomes a self-dependent power, which can not only support and strengthen the will by rationalization, but also is able to repress it through denial. On the other hand, the will which up to then had been only executive now becomes creative, but at first only negatively so, that is, in the form of a denial. The next step serves to justify and maintain this denial and leads to the positive creation of that which should be, that is, to that which is as the ego wills it in terms of its own ideal formation. Psychologically speaking, this means, as the ego wants the id. I believe, however, that this ego-ideal formation not only works transformingly upon the id, but is itself the consequence of an id already influenced by the will.

Perhaps these last statements of process may seem to many a mere playing with words, an accusation to which most philosophic discussions as well as psychological formulations are easily open. Language, which is the only material of psychological research and philosophic presentation, is rightly famed for a sheer uncreative psychological profundity. Certainly it seems to me that verbal expression itself represents a psychological formulation if not actually an interpretation. Instead of turning to a “philosophy of grammar” to which Freud’s opposition of “I and it” would indeed give occasion, we will illustrate the thoughts we have just formulated in psychological terminology with the plastic picture speech of mythical religious symbolism. The nucleus of all mythical religious tradition is the nobility and tragic fall of the hero who comes to grief through his own presumption and the guilt arising therefrom. That is the myth of humanity, ever recurring in the various levels of development involving man in his two aspects as a willing and a self-conscious individual. The hero myth shows man more as willing, the religious myth shows him more as an ethical individual. In relation to the portentous advance of the power of consciousness, the biblical myth of the fall has presented the human tragedy in its noblest form. Man, who advances like God in his omniscience, falls away from nature through consciousness, becomes unfortunate in that he loses his naive unity with the unconscious, with nature. Here we see for the first time in

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our presentation, but by no means for the first time in the history of mankind, unconsciousness, oneness with nature, identified with the wholesome, the good, and consciousness with fate.1 Psychoanalysis notoriously preaches just the opposite, but only in its therapy, while theoretically
it must enthrone the unconscious in order to unburden consciousness.

Without going into the broader meaning of the myth of the fall at this point, I should like to illustrate its difference from the hero myth as classic Greece represents it. There man, the hero, appears as creator, as actor, and his likeness to God comes to expression in his deeds, as for example with Prometheus, who, like the Gods, presumes to create men. The biblical myth on the contrary represents this Godlikeness, not on the creative level, but on the level of consciousness, that is, it consists in knowing, in self-consciousness. The contrast between these two myths, the religious and the heroic, signifies not only a contrast between different races, times, and developmental levels, but between two world views, or better said, between two great principles, which we here seek to comprehend as experience and knowledge, living and knowing. The hero myth represents experience (living), the deed, the will, which consciousness could only restrict, as we find it expressed in the ΟEdipus story 2 but the hero comes to grief and must come to grief in the fact that he cannot know beforehand and does not even want to know so that he can act. The religious myth represents "knowing," the knowledge of God, that is, self-knowledge, and here man suffers again in that, knowledge about himself interferes with naive action, restrains him and torments without affording him the satisfaction and liberation which the deed grants. He cannot accomplish through action anymore because he thinks, because he knows too much. Now man longs for naive unconsciousness as the source of happiness, and curses the knowledge bought so dearly. In the heroic myth the moral runs that with a little insight into pride of will, the fall could have been avoided, which is not correct, but at all events it

1 See in this connection the literary remains of Alfred Seidel who committed suicide, published by Prinzhorn under this title, “Bewusstsein als Verhängnis,” Bonn 1927.

2 See also “Will Therapy,” Book I, chap. v.

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represents knowledge as the source of salvation and the strong active will as fate.

Here is shown again the fact that there is no criterion for what is good or bad, as there is no absolute criterion for true or false, since it is one thing at one time, and another at another. The psychological problem which has been raised by this way of understanding myths is in my opinion the basic problem of all psychology which I should like to formulate thus: Why must we always designate one side as bad or false and the other as good or right? This primary psychological problem cannot be answered by saying that we do it because it has been learned from our parents and they again from their parents and so on, back to the original pair. That is the explanation which the Bible gives and Freud also in his primal horde hypothesis. Our individualistic ethics is explicable psychologically but not historically. It is not a cumulative phenomenon of morals piled one upon the other for centuries, nor could it be propagated through centuries if something in the individual himself did not correspond to it, which all great minds have recognized and Kant has presented so admirably. At all events, we can expect to find the answer only in the individual himself and not in the race or its history. This basic problem
appears also in all mythology and religion that undertake to explain how evil, sin, guilt came into the world, that is, psychologically speaking, why we must form these ideas. Both mythology and religion answer the question finally by saying that the conscious will, human willing in contrast to natural being, is the root of the arch evil which we designate psychologically as guilt feeling. In the oriental religious systems it is known as evil, in the Jewish as sin, in the Christian as guilt. This transformation is related to the development of conscious willing just outlined whose first externalization we recognized as a denial, a negation. On account of its negative origin the will is always evil as, for example, with Schopenhauer who harks back to the corresponding oriental teachings. The idea of sin as the biblical presentation teaches, is related to the next developmental level where will, consciously defiant, is affirmed, that is, where knowledge thereof already introduces pride. Finally the Christian idea of guilt under whose domination we

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still live just as under that of the Jewish idea of sin, is the reaction to the positively creative will tendencies of man, to his presumption in wanting to be not only omniscient like God, but to be God himself, a creator.

Here one might be tempted to think of Freud’s “father complex” and to derive this creative will from the Œdipus complex. This, however, would be to leave the actually creative unexplained, a lack of psychoanalytic comprehension which Freud himself has seen and admitted. For Freud, that which we call “will” originates, as it were, in the father identification, in the wish to be in the father’s place. But this conception itself in my opinion is nothing other than a denial of the own will, which is ascribed to the father (identification) or to God. For Adler again, the will, crudely put, is not father identification, but father protest, the wanting to be otherwise, which again is only a method of interpretation—even if a correct one. Actually the will is both, or rather neither. It is indeed positive and negative, will and counter-will, in the same individual at the same time, as I have already expressed it, principally in “Der Künstler.” The will, in a certain stage of development is projected upon the father, is objectified in him, because the father represents a strong will, because he in actuality represents a symbol of the will or resistance to it. The real problem lies in man himself, beyond identification, beyond the biological, and guilt feeling comes not primarily because one wants to put himself in the father’s place which one ought not to do, but because in developing, one must become father, creator, and will not. The authentic psychological problem, therefore, lies in this, whence the “ought not” on the one side, and the “will not” on the other.

Just as the father is not the prototype of will but only its symbolic representative—and not the first even then—so God too is not simply a deified father as Freud will have it, but an ideal created in man’s image, in a word, a projection of the consciously willing ego. This religious justification turns out much more nobly just because the actual father, who is only a weak representative of the will is thereby ignored, and does not disturb the nobility of the ego projection. The father, therefore, is only a first modest personification of conscious will which soon is not satisfied with this real representative but symbolizes its next
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great developmental step in the creative, all powerful and all-knowing God. In the religious myths, the creative will appears personified in God, and man already feels himself guilty when he assumes himself to be like God, that is, ascribes this will to himself. In the heroic myths on the contrary, man appears as himself creative and guilt for his suffering and fall is ascribed to God, that is, to his own will. Both are only extreme reaction phenomena of man wavering between his Godlikeness and his nothingness, whose will is awakened to knowledge of its power and whose consciousness is aroused to terror before it. The heroic myth strives to justify this creative will through glorifying its deeds, while religion reminds man that he himself is but a creature dependent on cosmic forces. So the creative will automatically brings the guilt reaction with it, as the self reducing depression follows the manic elation. In a word, will and guilt are the two complementary sides of one and the same phenomenon, which Schopenhauer, resting on the Hindu teachings, has perceived and comprehended most deeply of all moderns. A philosophy of will accordingly must either be deeply pessimistic if it emphasizes the guilt side, or extremely optimistic like Nietzsche if it affirms its creative power.

In psychoanalysis we find both aspects but not harmoniously united, rather they stand side by side as one of the numerous unreconciled contradictions. As therapy, analysis is optimistic, believes as it were in the good in men and in some kind of capacity for and possibility of salvation. In theory it is pessimistic; man has no will and no creative power, is driven by the id and repressed by the super-ego authorities, is unfree and still guilty. Here lies before us so transparent a contradiction that one can only wonder how it was possible and must again recognize therein a psychological problem so fundamental that it leads far beyond a critique of psychoanalysis. Free will belongs to the idea of guilt or sin as inevitably as day to night, and even if there were none of the numerous proofs for the inner freedom of the conscious will, the fact of human consciousness of guilt alone would be sufficient to prove the freedom of will as we understand it psychologically beyond a doubt. We say man reacts as if he were guilty, but if he reacts so it is because he is guilty psychologically, feels himself responsible, consequently no psychoanalysis in the world can relieve him of this guilt feeling by any reference to complexes however archaic. Therefore one should not only permit the individual to will but actually guide him to willing in order at least to justify constructively the guilt feeling which he can by no means escape. I do not mean by rationalizations, religious, pedagogic or therapeutic, but through his own creative action, through the deed itself.
At this point we can formulate whence the guilt feeling arises and what it means. We have contrasted will and consciousness previously and have seen that now the one, now the other is interpreted as “bad” or “false,” according to whether the experience side or the knowledge side is emphasized, and depending upon the momentary overweighting of the one sphere by the other. In the conscious perception of will phenomena the knowledge side is emphasized; in the immediate content of willing, it is the experience side. Only when the moral evaluation “bad,” which restrains the individual in the experience of childhood, is transferred from the content of willing to the will itself, does the ethical conflict within the individual arise out of the external will conflict and this, through the denial of the own will, finally leads to consciousness of guilt. However, guilt is also determined on the will side and this double source makes it a strong invincible power. For against this supremacy of consciousness which sets up for the individual himself the ethical norms of right and wrong (not the moral ones of good and bad) the will reacts with a condemnation of consciousness, which it perceives as restriction, and this is the state of affairs which we describe as consciousness of guilt. In this sense guilt consciousness is simply a consequence of consciousness, or more correctly, it is the self-consciousness of the individual as of one willing consciously. As the Fall presents it—knowing is sin, knowledge creates guilt. Consciousness, which restrains the will through its ethical norms, is perceived by the latter to be just as bad as the individual’s own will is seen to be by consciousness. Guilt consciousness is therefore actually a consequence of increased self-consciousness; yes at bottom is just this in its most fateful working out as conscience. We cannot occupy ourselves here with the different possibilities and forms of the restriction of consciousness upon the one side and the repression of will upon the other, although this makes

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comprehensible the different forms and degrees of the so-called neurotic reactions.1 It is important here to recognize that the neurotic type represents not a form of illness but the most individualistic beings of our age in whom awareness of the concepts, badness, sin, guilt, has finally developed into tormenting self-consciousness of this relationship.

The neurotic type of our age, whom we meet in places other than the consulting room of the neurologist and the treatment room of the analyst, is therefore only the further development of that negative human type which has existed as long as the will has existed in our mental lives, and shows one side of this conflict in extreme form. It is the man in whom is manifested a will as strong as that of the creative man of action, only in the neurotic patient this will expresses itself in its original negative character, as counter-will, and at the same time is perceived through the medium of conscious knowledge as consciousness of guilt. The so-called neurotics, therefore, do not represent a class of sick people, upon the cure of whom society must concentrate; they represent rather the extreme outgrowth of the modern type of man, whose cure both individually and socially is possible only in one and the same way—no matter whether this ensues in the form of an individual therapy, a general educational reform or finally on the ground of a world view, the basis of which is formed by knowledge of the state of affairs just described. At all events, for individual as for social therapy, a world view is indispensable and the more one strives against
this presupposition the less prospect one has of finding a solid basis for educational reforms or therapeutic results. Yes, one is surprised how this comes to pass of itself if one does not set out to want to make the person other than he is, but permits him to be what he is, without his needing to feel guilty or inferior on account of it. The neurotic type, which we all represent to a certain extent, suffers from the fact that he cannot accept himself, cannot endure himself and will have it otherwise. The therapy accordingly cannot be corrective but only affirmative; it must transform him from a negative person of suffering and guilt to a positive man of will and action, which he was in the beginning even if his soul life has

1 See also in this connection the chapter “Likeness and Difference” in Book I of “Will Therapy.”

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become ever more complicated and painful with the increase of consciousness.

We are, therefore, human beings, who through consciousness, through too much self-knowledge are restricted or hindered in living, a type which Shakespeare pictured psychologically in such a masterly fashion in Hamlet, who in our age for the first time has found complete recognition. We must not forget, however, that knowledge also has a creative side, as for example, Shakespeare himself shows in the creation of the Hamlet figure. Evidently he himself represented the Hamlet type, which did not hinder him, unlike his hero, from using his conflict creatively instead of perceiving it merely as a restriction. Knowing, therefore, when it works creatively, can be a substitute for living, yes itself a form of experiencing. It becomes then an inner victory of will if one may speak thus, instead of an outer, but it is a victory of will which the individual must pay for in every case with some kind of deficit. The active hero who represents the conscious power of will can act because he knows only his will, not its origin and motives; he comes to grief just in this, that he cannot foresee the consequences of his act. The passive man of suffering cannot act because his self-consciousness restricts his will which manifests itself as guilt feeling in the face of the deed. The spiritually creative type which I have characterized as “artist,” lives in constant conflict between these two extreme possibilities. The artist solves it for himself and others since he transposes the will affirmation creatively into knowledge, that is, expresses his will spiritually and changes the unavoidable guilt feeling into ethical ideal formation, which spurs him on and qualifies him for ever higher performance in terms of self-development.
IX

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“Nur der Irrtum ist das Leben, Und das Wissen ist der Tod.”

“Only in Error is there Life; Knowledge is Death.”

—Schiller

In the previous chapters we have elaborated the contrast between knowing and experiencing in terms of the development of consciousness from a tool of will and an instrument of will affirmation, to the tormenting self-consciousness of the modern individual. Knowledge in the sense of self knowledge leads finally to constant awareness of itself, and since it is always present in immediate experience too, disturbs it grievously if it does not block it completely. To this development of consciousness into the neurotic self restriction of living there corresponds the general evolution of the neurosis from a basic will problem to a problem of consciousness. If in the first place, the will was bad and its denial to blame for all suffering, now conscious knowledge about ourselves and our problems, in other words the insight into this denial process, constitutes the evil, the sin, or the guilt.

The problem of consciousness has yet another aspect which is opposed to this termination in tormenting self-consciousness and this is consciousness as a source of pleasure. Consciousness originally as a tool of the will and an instrument for its accomplishment or for justification is a source of pleasure just as is the carrying out of will itself. Yes, the consciousness which confirms will and approves of its accomplishment is the very source of pleasure. In this psychological sense, pleasure and displeasure are actually only two opposite conscious aspects of will phenomena. The putting over of will in living plus the consciousness of it in experience is the mechanism of the pleasure feeling which we call happiness. It is at once a double, really a redoubled enjoyment, first in the act of will itself and again in the reflecting mirror of consciousness which says “yes” once more to the will achievement. Only when consciousness is placed in the service of the counter-will and manifests itself as a tendency to repression or denial, do we feel unpleasantness and experience in the summation of painful feeling and the simultaneous consciousness thereof, the sense of pain contrasted with pleasure which also represents a reflection phenomenon of consciousness. Both reactions relate to the present attitude of consciousness, to the will expression revealed in experience. Knowledge, on the contrary, is more an historical process, which follows experience and feeling, although it is often very immediate. Knowledge separates consciousness from experiencing, or rather is itself a consequence of this separation and has the tendency to preserve
the pleasurable, to remember it and to deny and forget the painful.

Why this never quite succeeds is not only the problem of the neurosis, but of all human suffering. In other words, how does it happen that consciousness turns from an organ for pleasure in the service of will fulfilment into an organ of pain in consequence of will denial. I believe this comes about because consciousness from the beginning has a negative character, just as will originally is negative, denying. The negative side of consciousness, however, is its connection with reality, just as the will also emerges as counter-will on the reality of the strange will. Consciousness originally by means of the sense organs is the mediator of reality, of the real world, and as such has the capacity to cause pain, like reality. It opposes the will accordingly as reality does (for example in morals) because originally and even further it is the psychic representative, not only of will, but also of reality. In other words, consciousness is intensified reality which we perceive with pain as long as and insofar as the will is not able to put it into its service, to overcome it, which it strives to do with outside reality also. In this sense all is real that opposes itself to our will as invincible resistance, whether it be outer reality or the inner reality of consciousness.

In order to come from this reality side to the inner truth side of consciousness, we must take a further step in the building up of the will psychology and approach the difficult sphere of the

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emotional life. For the area in which all these will and consciousness phenomena take place perceived in sense terms as pleasure and pain, or spiritually as happiness and sorrow, is the emotional sphere standing equally close to will and consciousness where all these activities come together and flow into one another. The emotional life represents accordingly the strongest inner force. It is even stronger than the sexual instinct which is always capable of being controlled and satisfied somehow. Not so the emotional life, which is uncontrollable and insatiable, yes, whose very essence consists of its inability to be controlled or satisfied.

If we consider first the relation of the emotional life to the sphere of will, we find that it is a two-fold one. All that we designate as emotion in the narrower sense of the word, love, gratitude, longing, tenderness, is finally only the breaking, or rather the softening of the will. It is not that we subject our own will to the will of the other by means of emotion, but rather our own softened will is the emotion itself, a kind of self subjection, in the face of our pride. The defense against this yielding of self-will we perceive as shame, the affirmation of it as love, and the denial as hate, a kind of hardening of the will. Here we touch upon the second side of the relation of will to the emotional life, namely, the affects. For what I call affect is a kind of warding off of emotion, actually an attempt to guide it back into the sphere of will as psychic action, while emotion is passive. Scorn, anger, hate are affirmations, exaggerations of the negative will which sets itself against the rising softening influence of emotion by diverting it into the sphere of will as a defense. On the other hand, the affirmation of emotion through the will, or better said, its release into emotion, leads not to subjection to the other, but to that which we call surrender, a
kind of beneficent release of will.

We must postpone a discussion of the relation of the emotional life to the sexual life which is so often emphasized but has never been understood, to the chapter on “Happiness and Redemption” in order to turn now to the relation of the emotional sphere to consciousness. Of the affirmation of will-hardening manifested in the affect, there is only this to be said, that it momentarily overpowers consciousness in order afterwards to force it to justify the affect expression. Where this does not succeed, the originally denied emotion appears afterwards in the reaction of repentance, which often leads to the complete breaking of will. The influence of emotion as a will phenomenon upon the sphere of consciousness shows itself where will denies the emotional yielding, without increasing it to full denial in an affect. This partial denial is certainly not without influence upon the emotional sphere itself, where it manifests itself as the transformation of positive emotion (love) into guilt feeling, thus again proving guilt to be the result of miscarried denial. The influence upon consciousness is a manifold, to a large extent a grave one, which affects not only all of our behavior but also our thinking and so leads us back to the theme “Truth and Reality.”

The original nature of denial is seen in the attempt to oppose to a painful reality, the power of the individual will. Soon, however, the denial mechanism is turned entirely inward where it expresses itself in the emotional sphere as affect and in the sphere of consciousness as repression. This leads secondarily then to all the thought processes which we know as distortion, rationalization, justification and doubt. Repression as I have already shown before is denial continued in conscious thought and appears when the individual becomes aware of emotional denial and wants to repress the associated memory content in order to be free of the feeling (which however has its origin in the sphere of will not consciousness). This repression can fail of its purpose or succeed only partially and then doubt sets in, which brings into question the reality of what has been thought, that is, the truth, since it can neither repress it consciously, nor deny it emotionally. Doubt, therefore, is originally intended to shake truth, it is the intellectual struggle for truth, for certainty. This, however, is nothing other than the old battle lifted from the sphere of will and emotion into the sphere of consciousness and is conducted with the same inevitability and stubbornness as the original will conflict itself. Accordingly no argument avails against doubt because truth is what it avoids, just as no arguments convince the counter-will, of which doubt is only the intellectual manifestation.

If doubt represents the conscious counter-will, truth represents the will intellectually. Crudely put, one might say: “What I will

1 See the chapter “Verleugnung und Realitätsanpassung” in “Genetische Psychologie” Part I.
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is true, that is, what I make truth,” or to be banal, “what I want to believe.” Also here again the problem is not one of content, namely to decide what the truth is, but rather what truth is and this setting of the problem contains the solution in itself just as the laconic answer of Pilate to the announcement of Jesus that he had come to bring the truth. Truth, however, is not only a subjective concept and accordingly a psychological problem, but it is an emotion like its opposite doubt, which has long been recognized as such. Both have nothing to do with reality except that both stand in opposition to it. Truth is what I believe or affirm, doubt is denial, or rejection. But the reality which penetrates consciousness through our sense organs can influence us only by way of the emotional life and becomes either truth or falsehood accordingly; that is, is stamped as psychic reality or unreality. In the interaction of will and consciousness as it manifests itself in the emotional life we find a continuous influencing of one sphere by the other. Even the purely sensory consciousness is not merely receptive, but is guided and restricted by will. I see or hear what I want to, not what is. What is can only be learned by overcoming the tendency to deny all that I do not want to see or hear or perceive. Still more clearly is intellect influenced by will, for logical, causally directed thinking, going beyond the effort to shut out the painful is the positive, active expression of the will to control reality. The third level of creative consciousness or phantasy, is the most positive expression of the counter-will, which not only says “I will not perceive what is,” but “I will that it is otherwise, i.e. just as I want it. And this, only this is truth.” Truth therefore is the conscious concomitant, yes, the affirmation of the constructive or creative completion of will on the intellectual level, just as we understand the perception of pleasure as the emotional affirmation of will expression. Accordingly truth brings intellectual pleasure as doubt brings intellectual pain. Truth as positive emotional experience means “it is good, that I will is right, is pleasurable.” It is, therefore, willing itself the affirmation of which creates intellectual pleasure. That we do not know truth in its psychological nature but set it up as it were outside of every psychology, yes, as the criterion of psychology itself, as again related to its content. If we did not do that, this last intellectual way to justify will, the will to truth as a

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drive to knowledge which shall make an end of doubt would also be denied us. Once more we cannot enjoy completely the pleasure of truth seeking because it is an expression of our own will which even here on the level of knowledge and self-knowledge needs the content of a general truth equally valid for all, in order to deny its own truth, its own individuality. And here, in my opinion, we hit upon the most paradoxical phenomenon of the human soul, the understanding of which I consider the most important result of my relativity theory of knowledge. It concerns the law of continuous development of our general psychological knowledge. This results not as one might think pedagogically, by the handing over and broadening of the already known, whereby he who follows knows more or sees better. No, it is not only that he knows more, he knows differently because he himself is different. And this “being different” is related to the continuous development of self-consciousness, which alters the whole individuality because it determines it. This knowing differently about ourselves, about our own psychic processes is in this sense only a
new interpretation of ourselves, with which and in which we free ourselves from the old, the bygone, the past, and above all from our own past. Creative individuals, in their advancing knowledge, represent therefore only the increased self-knowledge of mounting self-consciousness which manifests itself in them. Only in this sense can their truth also serve as the truth and not in relation to any extra-psychological content of the truth-emotion which transforms the positive affirmation of willing into conviction.

With this separation of the content of truth from the feeling of trueness, there is revealed to us the problem of truth and reality in its complete practical meaning, as well as in its psychological and epistemological aspect. The only “trueness” in terms of actual psychic reality is found in emotion, not in thinking, which at best denies or rationalizes truth, and not necessarily in action unless it follows from feeling and is in harmony with it. This, however, is seldom the case because the will for the most part does not permit it but preserves for itself the supremacy over the sphere of action. Then, however, action ensues either on the basis of conscious thought guided by will or is the expression of an affect and is, therefore, not emotionally true in either case. For the most part it stands thus, that the denial tendency arising

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from the negative origin of will and ruling our entire spiritual life in the sphere of thought and action, particularly as far as it concerns our relations to other people, manifests itself as self-deception concerning its own emotions, but really is the truth. The paradox therein is this, that exactly what we pretend consciously to be the truth, this it actually is psychically. It is only that we attach to emotion, as it were, this intellectual denial in order not to admit it to ourselves and the other. Again the will—in its negative form—presses in past emotion and must deny even while it sanctions it. This is the psychological side of the situation. In relation to practical action, to behavior, the result is that we pride ourselves on playing a role when it has to do with true emotional reaction. We actually play, then, what we are in truth, but perceive it as untrue, as false, because again we cannot accept ourselves without rationalization. Just so, in the exaggeration of an action or reaction, the more genuine it is, the more we perceive it as voluntary exaggeration. (I play the injured role, means, I am injured.)

The understanding of this relation between truth and reality is not only highly important psychologically as it reveals to us the psychic truth-status of lying, pretension, dramatization, but also practically for judging the actions resulting therefrom. This explains why we rightly judge a man by his actions and these again according to their manifest appearance, as not only the laity but also justice and education do. For the psychic motivation, upon which one finally stumbles with careful analysis, may be psychically true but it is not actually like the act itself whose psychological understanding always includes its interpretation in terms of the will-guilt problem. Accordingly, therefore, the so-called Freudian slip is psychologically truer than the correct behavior which always rests on a denial of what we really want to do and which usually comes through only in blunders where at the same time it is made ineffective, as also in the dream through the sleeper’s incapacity for action. Here also light falls upon the peculiar phenomenon of
the intentional blunder, in whose mechanism the emotionally true intention again betrays itself. In this sense the majority of our actions as we have previously described in conscious acting, pretending, falsehood, are really would-be slips.

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From this results not only a new comprehension of human behavior, but also an understanding of it, a view of life that is therapeutic in an anti-analytic sense. It is to the effect that our seeking the truth in human motives for acting and thinking is destructive. With the truth, one cannot live. To be able to live one needs illusions, not only outer illusions such as art, religion, philosophy, science and love afford, but inner illusions which first condition the outer. The more a man can take reality as truth, appearance as essence, the sounder, the better adjusted, the happier will he be. At the moment when we begin to search after truth we destroy reality and our relation to it. Be it that we find in the beloved person in truth a substitute for the mother, or for another person, or for ourselves. Be it that, just reversed, we establish through analysis that we really love the hated person, but must displace this love upon another person, because our proud will does not permit that we confess this to ourselves. In a word, the displacements are the real. Reality unveils itself to analysis always as something displaced, psychologically untrue. This is a cognitive fact but no life principle. It is not at all a matter of putting an end to these displacements because it is impossible as the analytic situation teaches us best of all, where the patient only continues this displacement process further, in denying the actual feeling relation to the analyst, and displacing it upon other persons or situations. This displacement, if it succeeds, we regard and rightly so as healing, for this constantly effective process of self-deceiving, pretending and blundering, is no psychopathological mechanism, but the essence of reality, the—as it were—continuous blunder. This is also the authentic wisdom of the Greek Œdipus myth, whose hero would live happily in his displaced world of appearance if he were not driven by his intellectual pride, the will to truth, to expose his reality as lies, as appearance, as falsehood. He carries out his will pleasurably in the search for truth, in the overcoming of obstacles, but suffers in the content of what he finds, which brings to consciousness the denied emotions (in the case of Œdipus, for his parents).

From this conception there results a paradoxical but deep insight into the essence of the neurosis. If man is the more normal, healthy and happy, the more he can accept the appearance of

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reality as truth, that is, the more successfully he can repress, displace, deny, rationalize, dramatize himself and deceive others, then it follows that the suffering of the neurotic comes not from a painful reality but from painful truth which only secondarily makes reality unbearable. Spiritually the neurotic has been long since where psychoanalysis wants to bring him without being able to, namely at the point of seeing through the deception of the world of sense, the
falsity of reality. He suffers, not from all the pathological mechanisms which are psychically necessary for living and wholesome but in the refusal of these mechanisms which is just what robs him of the illusions important for living. The neurotic, as distinguished from the creative man of will whom the hero Ædipus represents on the intellectual level, is not the voluntary happy seeker of truth, but the forced, unhappy finder of it. He seeks, moreover, no general objective truth, and finds his own subjective truth, which runs like this—“I am so little and bad and weak and worthless that I cannot deceive myself about myself, cannot accept myself as a worthwhile individual.”

While the average well-adjusted man can make the reality that is generally accepted as truth into his own truth, the creative searcher after truth seeks and finds his own truth which he then wants to make general—that is, real. He creates his reality, as it were, from his truth. The neurotic, on the other hand, finds his subjective truth but cannot accept it as such and destroys therewith the given reality, that is, the pleasurable relation to it, as he is neither in position to make it his truth nor to translate his truth into reality. The difference lies again in the attitude or rather in the kind of consciousness, in its relation to will. The average man has reality consciousness more strongly developed, the creative type will consciousness, the neurotic individual self-consciousness. Reality consciousness comes from adaptation of will, the creative phantasy consciousness from will affirmation, the neurotic self-consciousness from will denial. The will itself is justified in the first case, generally and socially; in the second case, individually and ethically; in the third case it is denied.

The differing quality of conscious attitude to the will problem which decides the predominance of pleasure or pain, of destruction or construction, depends essentially upon the

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fundamental significance of the content problem. Reality consciousness is predominantly oriented from the standpoint of content; its truth is, as already said, the actual, and is therefore exclusively content. The creative consciousness is also contentual but in distinction employs predominantly subjective material, phantasies of every kind, which in the last analysis represent will phenomena. The neurotic self-consciousness, on the contrary, busies itself in an introspective way, which we can only designate as psychological, with the psychic processes themselves, and they consequently represent his predominant content. Certainly the neurotic also has real content and phantasy content, of the first too little, of the latter too much, but the essential thing in his form of consciousness is still the introspective self-consciousness of the psychic processes as such. Also in this sense and on this account, the neurotic is much nearer to actual truth psychologically than the others and it is just that from which he suffers.

Psychoanalytic therapy then works therapeutically for the neurotic in that it offers him new contents for the justification of his will in the form of scientific “truth.” It works therefore on the basis of illusion exactly like religion, art, philosophy and love, the great spontaneous psychotherapies of man, as I called them in “Der Künstler.” On the other hand, the
psychotherapy which lets the individual first of all accept himself and through that learn to accept reality, must also, according to its nature, use illusions not truth in the psychological sense because it is that from which the neurotic suffers. In this sense, psychoanalysis too is therapeutic but only so long or with those individuals who are still capable of this degree of illusion and with a class of neurotics whom we see today, this is often no longer possible. The insoluble conflict in which psychoanalysis itself is caught arises because it wants to be theory and therapy at the same time and this is just as irreconcilable as truth with reality. As psychological theory it seeks truth, that is, insight into psychic processes themselves and this works destructively, as neurotic self-consciousness shows only too clearly. As therapy it must offer the patient contentual consolations and justifications which again cannot be psychologically true, or, as far as they are true, cannot work therapeutically.

This brings us back again to the part played by the will

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problem in the neurosis. This disintegrating destructive character of self-consciousness arises in the last analysis from the original negative character of will which works itself out, not only toward the outside as resistance, but also toward the inside as counter-will. The destructive element enters first through denial, negation, and finally relates to our emotions, that is, to ourselves. Here the psychology of the neuroses branches off and can be comprehended only as the opposite of the psychology of the creative individual who confirms his will and himself but not in terms of the psychology of the average man. The fundamental methodological error of Freudian psychology is that it is oriented therapeutically on the psychology of the normal man and knows the creative only in its negative expression as neurosis. The Freudian psychology pictures the man as he would be if he were normal, healthy, but the mistake lies in this that the neurotic individual cannot be made normal and healthy in this way, but only through the positive, creative affirmation of will, which the moralistic pedagogical therapist wants to translate into normal adaptation. The neurotic loses out, however, because of the relation to reality, because he knows too much truth about himself, no matter whether this manifests itself as guilt consciousness, inferiority feeling, or incapacity for love. It is at bottom always only incapacity for illusion, but an incapacity for illusion which concerns the sphere of will in the same way as it does the sphere of consciousness both of which the creative type affirms, while the normal man does not perceive them at all as separated forces which oppose one another. The neurotic not only turns his consciousness as a self-tormenting introspection toward the inside but he also turns his will as counter-will inside instead of putting it outside like the constructive man of action. With him it is not only denial of painful reality or rather of painful emotion which makes reality resistant to him, but it is the denial of feeling in general through the will which finally excuses the denying factor itself, i.e. the counter-will, on moral grounds, or rationalizes it ethically and accordingly either suffers from guilt feeling or from the breaking of the will, or both. He must then explain, motivate, understand, rationalize, justify each of his acts of will, whether positive or negative, instead of simply affirming them, which makes homo sapiens into that
thought specialist among living beings, whose extreme developmental type we have before us in the classic form of the neurosis of our time, the compulsion neurosis.

On the other side, this tendency to deny will expressions and the need to justify the denial has led to all the creations of genius, as we know them from the religious formation of heroes to philosophic ethics. These universal justification therapies fail before the all destroying self-consciousness which is no longer capable of illusions and unspARINGLY exposes even the last great attempt of this kind, psychoanalysis, as it has all earlier ones because it seeks to give at one and the same time comforting contents which no longer delude and psychological truth which does not comfort. Therefore not only must every effective therapy be purely subjective, because of the difference of individualities and the corresponding neurotic types, it must also be relative because we all represent this neurotic type of intensified self-consciousness whose destruction of reality, of truth, of illusion and of itself, we are only now experiencing in its full strength. We find ourselves in a transition period in which we still seek mightily for new illusions without being able to utilize them therapeutically just as we struggle violently for truth about ourselves which makes us ever more unhappy. Psychoanalysis, as I have said, gives both. This was its strength and becomes more and more its weakness, the more it is dragged into this irresistible knowledge process of hyperconsciousness.

This process has now reached a point in the sphere of consciousness which the neurotic type shows equally clearly. Parallel with the denial of feeling, as we have just described it, there goes also the denial of consciousness and indeed to the degree that the awareness of inner truth approaches something we do not want to see because it is painful and destructive. The stronger denial tendency of the neurotic therefore is also a defense mechanism against this domination by self-consciousness which must know the truth without the individual’s wanting it. The neurotic type of our day, therefore, must rather learn not to see the inner truth about himself, not to have to see it, as his self-consciousness represents only a manifestation of the negative will. When he can again will positively and translate this into action or creative achievement, then his self-consciousness does not need to torment itself with the question why it cannot will or to create his thinking in justification of this will.

Here also a positive basis of his will to truth becomes apparent. Truth is to free from doubt, from the insecurity of our whole system of thought which is built up on interpretative negativism, as represented in the endless rationalizations of our will and consciousness motives. Here again truth as inner emotional experience opposes the uncertainty of reality and the thought processes corresponding to it. In the inner awareness of our true feelings the neurotic self-consciousness manifests itself in its most tormenting form, in the objectified content of truth we have found the
last greatest comfort of illusion, of which the self-conscious type of our age is still capable. Its positive affirmation corresponds to a pleasurable act of will; its subjective perception which is related to the emotional life, is painful, sorrowful; its constructive transformation into a general truth, although actually representing an illusion, is creative.

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“This above all: to thine own self be true.”

—Shakespeare

We return now to the presentation of the inner will conflict, particularly as it is manifested in its effect on the ethical ideal formation. In the analytic situation we see and feel the will of the patient as “resistance” to our will, just as the child breaks his will on the will of the parents and at the same time strengthens it. But the analysis of the adult gives us this advantage, that we can throw this resistance back upon the individual himself, provided we work constructively; that is, we can show the patient that he actually suffers from a purely inner conflict between will and consciousness, but analysis enables him to project it as an outward one. Now the form and manner in which this inner conflict appears and what effects it produces within and without, constitute the actual subject matter of the will psychology, which is to be independent of moral, pedagogic and social viewpoints. The latter we must examine in their turn in judging those situations where we are concerned with the collision of one will with another or with the will of the group. Just now we have to do rather with individual consciousness and particularly with that aspect of it which expresses itself positively and constructively as ideal formation.

As we are interested here only in the positive, constructive, creative side of the conflict, and indeed only with a specific form of it, it is necessary to remind ourselves that we must ascribe even to the positive will a negative origin with whose genesis we have busied ourselves elsewhere. Long since, especially in the first part of “Genetische Psychologie,” I have pointed out the significance of the mechanism of denial for all thinking and acting. In this denial there is evidenced as I would like to emphasize now,
confusing than clarifying, especially as the ego plays a relatively slight role with Freud despite its unconscious elements because it is ruled by the two great powers, the id and the super-ego, which represents the moral code. I have no occasion to go back to this terminology here, because I would like to describe the phenomena just as they present themselves to me, except to make clear where and in how far my conception differs from the former one. I see and understand the two opposing powers in the individual as the same forces that are experienced as a conflict of wills in the clash of two individuals, namely, will forces. The one force is that which we experience in impact with the outside world, namely, our conscious will. But what is the other inner force against which it strives, or rather, which strives against it, for this seems to me to be the real situation. One might say that this is sexuality, as Freud originally assumed, provided one understands it not only in a broader but in the broadest sense of the word. Accordingly we say in biological terms the generic in contrast to the individual in which case the question remains open as to whether or not one should include the collective racial which in Jung’s meaning is a social-ethical concept. At all events we need no external sexual prohibition, no castration trauma, as our daily experience with children shows, to explain the struggle of the individual ego, the conscious will, against sexuality, against generic compulsion. The parents or others in authority

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may represent to the child powerful wills but one can oppose them openly or secretly, one can finally overcome them, perhaps can even free oneself from them or escape them. Sexuality, however, as it awakens in the individual about the time of puberty is an incomparably stronger power than all the external authorities put together. Were it not so, the world would have died out long since.

This generic sexual compulsion which, as sexual attraction, is the root of the Freudian Œdipus complex, when it is actually completely aroused, naturally goes beyond parental boundaries because generally it goes beyond all bounds. It is so strong and dominates the individual so extremely that soon he begins to defend himself against its domination, just because it is a domination, something that interferes dictatorially with his own will as individual, appearing as a new, alien and more powerful counter-will just as the ego is strengthened by puberty. The reason the individual defends himself so strongly against it is because the biological sex drive would force him again under the rule of a strange will, of the sexual will of the “other,” while the ego has only just begun at this time to breathe a little freely out from under the pressure of strange authoritative wills. Accordingly he flees of necessity to a mechanism for the satisfaction of urgent sexuality that enables him to maintain the newly won autonomy at least a little while without subjecting himself to an alien sexual will. I speak of the typical masturbation conflict of this and also of later years which represents nothing but the powerful expression of the conflict between the individual will and generic will manifesting itself here as sex drive. This struggle always ends with the victory of the individual. Although he must often pay too dearly for it, nevertheless an ego victory it is, since the very appearance of masturbation registers a successful attempt to put the sexual instinct under the control of the individual will.
These individuals even when they present themselves as weak willed, falling into vice without resistance, are at bottom people of unusually strong wills who have merely concentrated their wills for the moment in the one direction. They often succeed in becoming master of the sexual urge to such an extent that they can suppress it through conscious effort of will, and can also arouse and satisfy it; that is, when the individual wills it and not when sexuality wills it. Only, as Adler believes, they must continue to prove this will power of theirs and that gives the appearance of not being able to get free of the sex drive. This appearance is correct too, insofar as it is based on a denial of will power which we could here bring into the universal formula: I do not want to will at all, but I must. In contrast to Adler, however, I do not believe that the individual must continuously prove his own strength of will because he feels inferior, and therefore is really weak. I believe much more that he could never prove his strength if he were not actually strong, if he did not have just that powerful a will. Here again the problem is why the individual cannot accept his own will, cannot admit it or affirm it, but is compelled to reject and deny it, in other words, to replace it with a “must.” But just this denial tendency brings with it secondarily the guilt and inferiority feeling which really says, “I ought not to have such a strong will, or in general any will at all.” In this sense, the powerful compulsion of the biological sexual urge is raised to a representative of the will, whose individual freedom is then justified by the generic compulsion. Herein lies the psychological motive for the tie-up of the conscious individual will with the generic sex drive, as significant as it is fateful, also the origin of the sexual guilt feeling since the guilt for willing falls into the sexual sphere by displacement and at the same time is denied and justified.

The explanations that psychoanalysis and also the Adlerian doctrine give for these phenomena of guilt and inferiority seem, to me unsatisfactory because they do not meet the real problem at all, that is, the denial of will from which secondarily follow guilt and inferiority. The explanation given formerly is that the will of the child has been so broken by the authority of parents, that it can no longer trust itself to will, in a word, experiences anxiety which was added to it from the outside. Not only does every educational experiment contradict this, but also experiences in the psychology of the neuroses and creative personalities testify that the fact is other and deeper. Our conflicts in general go back to much deeper causes than external social restrictions even if we conceive them psychologically with Freud as internal super-ego formation or with Adler as inner inferiority feeling, springing from the externally inferior status of the child. Probably in the beginning we were bound to our milieu, which, however, we are able to outgrow, and just so to a great extent we have remained bound by nature in our sexual life. But what characterizes man or
is made to by himself, perhaps unfortunately, is just the fact that his conscious will increases to a power equal to the outer environmental influences and the inner instinctual claims, and this we must take into account in order to understand the individual in all his reactions. Our will is not only able to suppress the sex urge, but is just as able to arouse it through conscious effort, to increase it and to satisfy it. Perhaps our will is able to do this because it, itself, is a descendant, a representative of the biological will-to-live become conscious, creating itself in self maintenance and reproduction, which in the last analysis is nothing more than supra-individual self maintenance.\(^1\) When this tendency to perpetual self maintenance of the species carries over to the individual, there results the powerful will whose manifestations bring with them guilt reactions because they strive for an enrichment of the individual, biologically at the cost of the species, ethically at the expense of the fellow man.

This brings us to the fundamental thought of my whole viewpoint which I have already expressed in principle in “Der Künstler,” namely, that instinct and inhibition, will and counter-will do not correspond to any original dualism, but in the last analysis always represent a kind of inner self limitation of one’s own power and, therefore, since everything has its roots within, the outer reflects more than it creates the inner. This conception as was emphasized likewise in “Der Künstler,” relates in particular to all kinds of sexual conflicts which arise not through any kind of outer prohibition but through inner inhibition of the own will by the counter-will. It explains also the resistance which Freud’s sexual theory has met and necessarily must meet since it is an expression of the same conflict, the understanding of which leads us out of all the futile discussions which psychoanalysis has occasioned. Freud said: “Sexuality is the strongest;

\(^1\) See on this point and the following, the beginning of the first chapter in “Der Künstler”—as well as the material on the development of the individual in the introductory chapter of “Genetische Psychologie,” Part II, Page 14.

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the answer was—“No, the will can control it to a great degree.” And both sides were right. But each emphasized only one side, instead of recognizing the relationship between them and understanding the conflict in its essential meaning. Freud has gradually yielded and in his castration and super-ego theory recognizes the power of the factors which inhibit sexuality. But they are for him external anxiety factors and remain so even later, when he internalizes them in the super-ego, although they establish themselves as the court of morals which evokes the uncontrollable guilt reactions. But guilt feeling is something other than internalized anxiety, as it is more than fear of itself, of the claim of instinct, just as the ethical judgments are something more than introjected parental authority.

In order to understand what they are and how they arise, we turn back to the struggle of ego will against race will represented in sexuality, which actually represents a struggle of the child against any pressure that continues within him. In the so-called latency period as Freud has it (between early childhood and puberty) the ego of the individual, his own will, is strengthened
and has turned, for the most part in revolutionary reactions, against the parents and other authorities that it has not chosen itself. In the struggle against sexuality which breaks in at that point, the ego, as it were, calls to its aid the earlier contested parental inhibitions and takes them as allies against the more powerful sex drive. This introduction of the will motive makes the mysterious process of the introjection of parental authority comprehensible psychologically for the first time. Hitherto it had to be forced upon the child from the outside and this force must obviously be maintained because the child opposes the acceptance with his will, his counter-will. Moreover the child has no occasion to make of these actual outer restrictions an inner censor, and even if it had reasons, its counter-will would resist the acceptance of force. The child obeys because it wins love, avoids punishment and lessens its own inner control. But it does not do these things of its own free will; on the contrary, prohibition strengthens the impulse, as we know, just as permission lessens the desire. In puberty, however, where the individual is awakened on the one side to autonomy of will and on the other defends himself against the pressure of the racial sex urge, he has

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a strong will motive for making his own these early parental prohibitions and all that he has learned to know meantime in moralistic inhibitions, in order to use them in his encounter with sexuality. Here the individual forms his own super-ego because he needs these moral norms for his own will victory over the sex impulse. Again it is a victory which many a time is bought at too dear a price and must be paid for by a lifelong dependency on this moral code.

The constructive formation and creative development from what Freud calls super-ego to what I call ideal-formation from the self is a highly complex process which is accomplished in the typical forms of the will conflict and under its pressure. It consists first in the fact that the individual who earlier made his own only externally, limitations accepted of necessity, now affirms them in the service of his own will interests. This affirmation of a condition already established earlier under pressure, is a very important factor psychologically, yes, is the essential psychological factor; for the fate of the individual depends on the attitude he takes to the given factors, whether these happen to be a part of environment, or the sexual constitution itself. This “I will, because I must,” is, as is easily seen, the positive opposite of the denying attitude which we formulated in the sentence, “I do not will at all, but I obey a force!” The whole difference lies in the fact that this force as external cannot be borne and causes the will to react negatively as denial. But if this outer force becomes inner, then there arise two possibilities, the one of which leads to neurotic reactions, the other to ethical standards. If the force although inner is still perceived as force, the will conflict manifests itself, as already pointed out, in guilt feeling, which, as it were, represents an inner ethical compulsion resisting the individual’s will just like an alien counter-will. But if the own will says “Yes” to this force, this internal “must,” then the inner force becomes inner freedom in that will and counter-will both affirm the same willing.

The process just described goes beyond the mere affirmation of force, either outer or inner, to its constructive evaluation, that is, positively as ethics in ideal-formation and not merely
normatively and regulatively. Therefore the individual only takes over the overcode for a protection, as it were,

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under the first violence of the sexual impulse. Soon, however, the proud will stir again and strives to win the battle alone without the help of authoritative morality. Here then begins the ethical ideal-formation in the self although the individual may turn to external models, ideal figures from life or history. But these ideals he chooses in terms of his own individuality which, as we know, has nothing to do with infantile authorities, least of all the parents. It does not matter whether the individual succeeds wholly in freeing himself from the traditional moral concepts; probably he never does, especially not as long as he must live with other individuals who more or less depend on this traditional morality. It is important, however, that for everything creative, regardless of how it manifests itself, even in the neurosis, we can thank this striving of the individual, of his individual will to free himself from the traditional moral code and to build his own ethical ideals from himself, ideals which are not only normative for his own personality, but also include the assurance of creative activity of any kind and the possibility of happiness. For this whole process of inner ideal formation which begins with the setting up of one’s own moral norms inside is a mighty and important attempt to transform compulsion into freedom.

The broader fate of the individual depends essentially on the success with which this attempt is undertaken, how it is carried through and conducted further, also how far it goes in a particular case and where and how it ends.

Certainly it is no planned and straightforward way, but a continuous struggle against outer forces and a constant conflict with inner ones, in which the individual must live through for himself all stages of his evolution. That cannot be avoided and should not be, for just this living through and fighting through constitute the valuable, the constructive, the creative which does not inhibit the will but strengthens and develops it. The first step in the freeing process is that the individual now wills what he was earlier compelled to, what externally or internally he was forced to do, and the normal, average man perhaps never gets beyond this level which guarantees a relatively harmonious working together of will and counter-will. It corresponds to a willed

1 Certainly not with the parents of the hero, the man of strong will, as I explained in the “Myth of the Birth of the Hero.”

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acceptance of the external compulsion of authority, the moral code and the inner compulsion of the sexual instinct. Accordingly it permits fewer possibilities of conflict but also fewer creative possibilities of any kind. The human being to a large extent is one with himself and with the surrounding world and feels himself to be a part of it. He has the consciousness of individuality
but at the same time also the feeling of likeness, of unity, which makes the relation to the outer world pleasant.

The next stage is characterized by the feeling of division in the personality, through the disunity of will and counter-will, which means a struggle (moral) against the compulsion of the outer world as well as an inner conflict between the two wills. The constructive person goes beyond the mere moralistic and instinctual affirmation of the obligatory in his own ideal formation which itself having become a new goal-seeking power can work thereafter constructively or inhibitingly. On this level there are possibilities of neurotic or creative development not present on the first level. And again it depends on what position the will takes toward the moral and ethical standards originally called in by it or self-created, after they have once been called into life, or have even achieved power. So the will is always compelled to take attitudes anew; first to the given, then to the self-created, and finally even to the willed. And this taking an attitude can always turn out to be negative or positive, negative even when it concerns something originally self-willed or self-created. This negative attitude in turn can always have one of two results; either it leads to improvement, to a higher level, to a new creativity as with the productive, or it creates itself in self-criticism, guilt and inferiority feeling, in short, under the neurotic inhibition of will.

The third and highest level of development is characterized by a unified working together of the three fully developed powers, the will, the counter-will and the ideal formation born from the conflict between them which itself has become a goal-setting, goal-seeking, force. Here the human being, the genius, is again at one with himself; what he does, he does fully and completely in harmony with all his powers and his ideals. He knows no hesitation, and no doubt as does the conflicted man of the second level, even though the latter be productive. He is a man of will

and deed in accord with himself, although as distinguished from the type of realistic man he is not in accord with the world, because too different from others. I do not mean that the conflicts of this type would be more of an external nature, played out more in the battle with the hostile environment; I merely wish to emphasize here the creative side of their being, which just through its unlikeness to reality gives to genius its peculiar greatness. This type in its ideal formation, in its continuous rebuilding or building anew, has created an autonomous inner world so different and so much its own, that it no longer represents merely a substitute for external reality (original morality) but is something for which reality can offer in every case only a feeble substitute so that the individual must seek satisfaction and release in the creation and projection of a world of his own. In a word, with this type, from all the accepted, the obligatory, from all the wished for, and the willed, from all the aspirations and the commandments is formed neither a compromise, nor merely a summation but a newly created whole, the strong personality with its autonomous will, which represents the highest creation of the integration of will and spirit.
The first level corresponds to the type of duty-conscious, the second to the type of guilt-conscious and the third level finally to the type of self-conscious individual. We see at once that in these three types, which represent a line of development, the relation to reality and to the fellow man is different. The first level is oriented to the external world, corresponds to the adaptation of the ego to it; in this the individual takes over the social and sexual ideals of the majority for his own, and this is not only a passive identification but an effort of will which certainly ends in a submission of will. On the third ethical level there are no longer the external demands or norms, but the own inner ideals, which were not only created by the individual out of himself but which the self also willingly affirms as its own commandments. The second neurotic level represents the failure in going from the first to the third stage; the individual perceives the external commands and norms as compulsion which he must continually oppose, but cannot affirm the ideals which correspond to his own self. Therefore he has guilt feeling toward society (or the various representatives of it) and consciousness of guilt toward himself.

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In other words, the first type accepts reality with its demands and so adjusts his own individuality that he perceives and can accept himself as part of reality. He removes the painful feeling of difference since he feels himself one with reality. The third type, on the contrary, accepts himself and his inner ideal formation and seeks accordingly to adjust the environment and the fellow man to himself. This can take place violently as with thoughtless men of action or by way of a reformative ideology, whether it be educational or therapeutic, in the scientific or religious sense of the word. It can, however, also be creative and reaches then its highest level when the individual creates from himself and his own idealized will power, a world for himself, as the artist or the philosopher does, without wanting to force it on others. Certainly this peculiarly creative type also strives for recognition but it cannot, as with the therapeutic reformative personality, be through force or violence, but rather must be the expression of a spontaneous movement of the individual who finds in the creator something related to himself. This creative type finds recognition in himself as he also finds in himself motivation and its approbation.

The first adapted type, therefore, needs the external compulsion, the second neurotic type defends itself against every kind of external or internal compulsion, the third creative type has overcome compulsion through freedom. The first type is dependent on reality, the second defends itself against the compulsion of reality, the third creates for itself against the compulsion a reality of its own which makes it independent, but at the same time enables it to live in reality without falling into conflict with it. The second neurotic type is the most interesting psychologically, because it shows that the whole problem at bottom turns on the acceptance of the own individuality on which the attitude toward reality primarily depends. For the neurotic shatters not only on the incapacity to bear external pressure, but he suffers just as much, yes, even more, from the inability to subject himself to any pressure whether it be inside or out, even the pressure of his own ideal formation. The essential therapeutic problem is not, therefore, to adjust him to reality, to teach him to bear external pressure, but to adjust him to himself, that is,
to enable him to bear and to accept himself instead of

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constantly defending himself against himself. If one attains this therapeutic goal, that the individual accepts himself, that is psychologically speaking, that he affirms instead of denies his will, there follows thereupon spontaneously without further effort the necessary adaptation to reality. This, however, cannot form an equally valid scheme for all men, regardless of whether one defines it with the concept of the Œdipus complex like Freud, or again as social feeling like Adler, or as a collective union like Jung. Adaptation ensues with each individual in a different, even in an individual way, from the three possibilities we have described as types. Psychologically speaking, adaptation on the basis of self-acceptance may be an acceptance of external norms which finally represents a justification of will, but at least a generally recognized one, or the self-acceptance enables the individual to continue his development on the basis of his own ideal formation and its essential difference. In each case, however, the neurotic self-denial as it follows from the denial of will must first be overcome constructively in a therapeutic experience.

How this happens I am describing simultaneously in another book.1 Here I would only like to point out how, as a matter of fact, the various reactions of the individual only correspond to various attitudes to the same fundamental problem. The average man adapted to reality finds the justification of his individual will in the similarly adjusted wills of the majority, but accepts therewith also the universal attempts at justification and unburdening, as society itself apparently uses them in its moral norms and religious projections. The neurotic who in consequence of his stronger individualization feels himself so very different from others, can accept neither the general norms nor the justifications, but neither can he accept his own because they would be an expression of his own will, which he would therewith have to accept. The creative type, on the other hand, accepts as we have said, himself and his ideal, that is, his own individual will, at all events in higher degree than any other type. Certainly he also needs all kinds of external justifications but these work destructively only in the field of intellectual production, like philosophy and science, where they lead to theoretical denial of


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will and justifications which appear under the guise of truth.

This leads us back from the problem of will to the problem of consciousness and conscious knowledge. Where ideal formation works constructively and creatively, it is on the basis of acceptance of the self, of the individual will, which is justified in its own ideal, that is ethically,
not morally in terms of the average ideal as with the adapted type. In other words, in its own ideal the originally denied will of the individual manifests itself as ethically justified. The neurotic suffers not only from the fact that he cannot accomplish this, but also from insight regarding it which, according to the degree of insight, manifests itself as consciousness of guilt or inferiority feeling. He rejects the self because in him the self is expressed on the whole negatively as counter-will and accordingly cannot justify itself ethically, that is, cannot reform and revalue itself in terms of an ideal formation. Accordingly he strives only this far, to be himself (as so many neurotics express it) instead of striving to live in accordance with his own ideal. Therefore while the ideal of the average is to be as the others are, the ideal of the neurotic is to be himself, that is, what he himself is and not as others want him to be. The ideal of the creative personality finally is an actual ideal, which leads him to become that which he himself would like to be.

In the sphere of consciousness we see these various levels of development toward ideal formation comprehended in three formulae which correspond to three different ages, world views and human types. The first is the Apollonian, know thyself; the second the Dionysian, be thyself; the third the Critique of Reason, “determine thyself from thyself” (Kant). The first rests on likeness to others and leads in the sense of the Greek mentality to the acceptance of the universal ideal; it contains implicitly the morality, consciously worked out by Socrates, which still lies at the basis of psychoanalytic therapy: know thyself, in order to improve thyself (in the terms of universal norms). It is therefore not knowledge for the sake of the self, but knowledge for the goal of adaptation. The second principle in contrast to the first repudiates likeness and the improvement based on it, as it demands the acceptance of what one is anyway. In contrast to the principle of the Delphic Apollo, I have designated it as Dionysian because, in contrast to adaptation, it leads to ecstatic-orgiastic destruction, as not only Greek mythology but also Ibsen shows in Peer Gynt, who on the basis of the same principle landed in a mad house. The true self, if it is unchained in Dionysian fashion, is not only anti-social, but also unethical and therefore the human being goes to pieces on it. In this sense the longing of the neurotic to be himself is a form of the affirmation of his neurosis, perhaps the only form in which he can affirm himself. He is, as it were, already himself, at any rate far more than the others and has only a step to take in order to become wholly himself, that is, insane. Here comes in the Kantian “Determine thyself from thyself” in the sense of a true self knowledge and simultaneously an actual self creation as the first constructive placing of the problem. Herein lies Kant’s historical significance as epistemologist and ethicist. He is indebted to us for the psychology but also a part of his greatness lies therein, for the avoidance of psychologizing has protected him from falling into all the denials, rationalizations and interpretations which form the contents of most psychological theories including the Freudian.

An epistemological psychology without flaw, that is, neither moral nor religious as the Freudian system still is, must start at the point where Kant placed the problem. How can the individual
determine himself from himself, or better, why does he do this with such difficulty? Here we strike the will-guilt problem, the knowledge of which remains the indisputable psychological contribution of Schopenhauer. But he has denied the will, while Nietzsche sought to deny the guilt feeling. Freud, finally has seen the guilt problem, as the neurotic presented it to him it is true, but he has tried to solve it by leading it back to a definite content of willing, namely the sexual, while the other analytic schools (Jung, Adler, etc.) differentiate themselves in this, that they have put another content in place of the sexual, and so have hidden the purely psychological will problem itself. The Freudian content disguises itself under the occidental religious morality from which we still suffer and in its failure to solve his individual problem, the modern man has finally shattered in terms of the neurosis.
VI

CREATION AND GUILT

"Fate sends individuality back to its limitations and destroys it if it transcends them."

—Hegel

We have traced the evolution of the will conflict in the individual from the negative externalization of will, which leads to denial and guilt consciousness to the positive creative power of will, which not only affirms the obligatory instead of denying it, but leads beyond it to a constructive “ought.” This “ought” as we have pictured it in the ideal formation of the individual, if the will is able to affirm itself and its own activity on this ethical level, can finally lead to creativity that alters, reforms and builds anew the outer and inner environment as the individual wills it. From the purely psychological act of willing, we have arrived at the moralistic problem of content, that is, what the individual does will or ought to will. The will projection itself, as reaction to an outer or inner counter-will, is independent of the content of the willed. It is related to the “musts” and the “won’ts” as such and accordingly, can have to do even with something that the individual himself has wanted, but does not any more when it is forced on him by a strange will or merely offered, that is, permitted. Apparently it is generally the content itself, a definite content, which the originally denying force of will transforms into a positive, constructive, and finally a creative one with which not only the content of willing in the sense of the own ethical ideal is justified, but also the individual will as such. Whence comes the content of willing and what does it contain? Just as willing itself arises as an inner, primarily negative opposing force against a compulsion, so the content of willing arises primarily from rejection; we want what we cannot have, that which is denied us. If this first level of willing is determined more negatively from without, so the next level is equally influenced from without, but in terms of desire which already contains a definite willing. We want at that level what others have or want, and this manifests itself as envy or competition in terms of the desire for possessions. But a truly positive willing is arrived at only when we have made this willing our own, that is, have given up comparisons and no longer measure our individual willing by external obstacles or models, but by our own ethical ideal formation. In other words, the will becomes positive, constructive in the ethical justification of the ideal formation and eventually creative from the purely inner will conflict which ensues between the content of our willing and the self ideal of the “ought.” If even in this stage the will remains too dependent on outer likeness and justifications in relation to other individuals, there result the feelings of inferiority or guilt which we have comprehended as the neurotic opposite for creative affirmation of will on the ethical level. Before we can understand this in its own terms as the proper subject of this chapter we must first review again the neurotic development.
We must remember that the deeply rooted psychological turning from the affirmation of willing to the denial of the will is closely tied up with the problem of content. All external restrictions and refusals meet the individual in childhood (and also later in life) not as a universal prohibition against willing in general, but as prohibition against willing some definite thing at a certain moment, and are therefore determined in terms of content and eventually also in terms of time. The individual himself, on the contrary, very early connects these particular prohibitions with willing as such. Here it seems to me, as we have noted before, lie the roots of the most important difference and the deepest misunderstanding between the grown-up and the child. In this sense one could say that the child is more ethical than the grown-up average man who is able to think in moralistic concepts only, that is, in terms of content, while for the more impulsive child every restriction, refusal, or prohibition affects the whole of willing, the will as such, and on that account, as we see, is taken so tragically. Briefly put, the momentary content has only symbolic meaning originally, but gradually because of the individual’s tendencies to justification, takes on an ever more

1 See “Will Therapy,” Book I, chap. v.

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“real” meaning, while the universal impulse life, which is always the essential, is made ever more abstract. Thus the child deceives the adults about willing itself in terms of their own ideology by means of a “good” acceptable content. And equally in the same way, or much more, the adult deceives himself later about the evil of willing itself by means of a content approved by his own ideal or by that of his fellow men. As long as we must justify the evil of willing in terms of its content, so long we feel ourselves morally answerable to others and are accordingly dependent on their praise and blame all the more, the more we are slaves to this deception and self-deception. In the degree, however, that we become conscious of the will itself in its original form of counter-will, as the source of our conflicts with the external world and ourselves, to the same degree do we feel the responsibility with which our own ethical consciousness has to say “Yes” or “No” to our individual willing. And only in this sense can we understand what we now wish to handle as creation but also only in this ethical sense can we comprehend the guilt indissolubly bound up with it not as guilt feeling toward others (in the moralistic sense), also not as consciousness of guilt toward itself (in the neurotic sense), but as guilt in itself, in the ethical sense.

Since we conceive of the creative urge as the expression of will by which willing itself is justified ethically and its content morally, that is, through others, the genesis of the guilt inherent in the creative is to be understood in the following way. The individual seeks to justify his willing in the manner described above, through its “good” content, hence the will branded as bad through the moralistic critique of the content attaches itself to the bad, illicit contents, which are identified from then on with the forbidden will itself. This expresses itself in the child in so-called “being bad,” in the adult in the phantasies or day dreams which according to Freud form not only the preliminary step to the neurotic symptoms, but also to creative activity, with both, only insofar and because they represent the aforesaid acts of will which embrace various and, for
the most part, forbidden contents. Whether they manifest themselves neurotically or creatively
does not depend on content which can be the same in both cases, and is also not to be explained
in the Freudian sense by repression, no, not even by the quality and degree of the

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repression, but seems to me determined only by the relation of the will to the content of willing.
In other words, if the good contents of willing are shown and expressed because they imply a
moral recognition of will, but the bad are hidden and kept secret because they contain moral
condemnation of willing, then their final fate and that of the individual depends on the relation to
the will itself, independent of all contents. If the will itself, as pointed out before, is identified
with the evil contents and remains so, then these phantasies with the forbidden will content
remain secret, that is, the will itself remains evil, condemned, forbidden, in a word, negative
counter-will which leads then to repression, denial and rationalization. On the contrary, if the
will itself is originally very strong in the individual (as counter-will) then the good contents are
not sufficient for the justification of the badness of the will and the individual affirms the
forbidden contents also, that is, the bad will itself which they represent. The phantasies are then
released from the sphere of mental will expression into the sphere of action, that is, they are no
longer kept secret as forbidden, but are transformed into deed as will expression which in this
sense is creative. It is not only affirmation of the content stigmatized as evil, but of the individual
will which it represents.

The morally proscribed contents themselves are associated originally with the bodily functions.
The child must learn to eat and to control the excretory functions, when the adults wish, not
when he wishes. His counter-will in relation to this is commonly designated as “bad” and
“hateful,” but this means restricted and eventually punished. Very soon also the physical
expressions of sexuality are drawn in and then become the most important contents of willing,
perhaps just because these expressions are so violently put under and forbidden. With regard to
the overwhelming part that the psychic plays in our love life, which we will discuss later, the
moral prohibition of the physical expression of sex in childhood, has perhaps the biologically
valuable effect of strengthening the physical side in its later reaction so that it can stand against
the psychic in general. Possibly we have here the ground for that separation of sensuality and
tenderness which Freud has described as characteristic of the neurotic, but which I would
characterize rather as the attitude

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of the average, at all events, as more wholesome than the indissoluble union of sensuality with
the spiritual which seeks in love the individual justification of sexuality. Again we see here the
separation of will from content lying at the root of these phenomena. The tender expressions of
love toward certain persons are permitted to the child, are good; the purely physical element of
the will is evil, bad.

We said before that the child with the evil forbidden content turns to wish, to phantasy. It seems
wholly in accord with my conception that the phantasies of men (of the child as of the adult)
relate not so much to the satisfaction of actually forbidden bad contents as to the carrying
through of will in itself. To speak bromidically, they are overwhelmingly egoistic even when
their content is on a sexual theme. They show the ego of the individual putting through his own
will successfully, victoriously against all obstacles. The development into the productive, the
creative, represents only a step further in this direction, namely the lifting out of these
expressions of will, from the sphere of thought to action. The phantasies are objectified in work,
and thus the forbidden content is accomplished somehow, but in the last analysis it is the will
expression afforded by creativity, the putting out, the affirmation, that constitutes the satisfying,
many times rewarding factor.

Herein lies the essential difference between the average man who keeps the phantasies secret
from others, the neurotic who keeps them secret from himself (represses them), and the creative
type who affirms them for himself and reveals them to the world, yes, is compelled to do just
that. This difference is explained by the different attitudes of the individual to will itself on the
one side and to its contents, good or bad, on the other, and this also creates the guilt problem in
its various forms. The average man who hides from others the content of the phantasies as an
expression of evil will, has guilt feeling (toward the others) ; the individual who hides them from
himself, that is represses them, tries to deny thereby not so much the evil contents as the evil will
they represent, has consciousness of guilt (toward himself). Finally the individual who maintains
the phantasies and therewith affirms his individual will so that he can transform it into

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positive action has guilt, makes himself guilty by the individual nature of his doing. Actually
guilt arises toward others to whom he opposes himself through his individualization, but also
there is guilt toward himself which persists in the justification of this individual will expression.
The creative type must constantly make good his continuous will expression and will
accomplishment and he pays for this guilt toward others and himself with work which he gives to
the others and which justifies him to himself. Therefore he is productive, he accomplishes
something because he has real guilt to pay for, not imaginary guilt like the neurotic, who only
behaves as if he were guilty but whose consciousness of guilt is only an expression of his will
denial, not of creative accomplishment of will which makes one truly guilty.

We notice here that creation and guilt in the ethical sphere present the same contrast as truth and
reality in the sphere of knowledge, and that they belong together just as indissolubly. The
individually created, the work, is to be generally recognized like truth, and guilt opposes itself to
this inhibitingly but also stimulatingly as inner reality, which is continuously overcome by new
and ever more lofty feats of will. Accordingly we have to do here with guilt-laden creation and
with creative guilt, which in contrast to the more than individual guilt consciousness of the neurotic type, has something specifically personal, individual. What we have here is just the activity of the creative type, not a sublimation of sex instinct, but, on the contrary, the expression of individual will which is almost to be called anti-sexual. For the authentic creative force proceeds always only from the inner will conflict, as we have described it before, that is, beyond the conflict between ego and sexuality, which the will wages on that level, and with the weapons belonging to that level. It may well be the biologically basic instinct that, in the last analysis, is used as I have already shown in “Der Künstler,” but it is used. For it creates in the service of the will to its own downfall and what it helps to create is essentially different from itself, in the ideal case, far surpasses it. This is the mighty wrestling between nature and spirit, force and will, which Freud sought to describe with the educational concept of sublimation without recognizing the fundamental difference that lies between

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reproduction and production, begetting and creating, tool and master, creature and creator.

We recognize therefore in the creative impulse not only the highest form of the will affirmation of the individual, but also the most mighty will conquest, that of the individual will over the will of the species represented by sexuality. A similar victory of the individual will over generic will, as I show elsewhere, is represented in the individual love claim, whose psychological meaning lies in the fact that the individual can and will accept his generic role only if this is possible in an individual personal way, in the love experience. This represents, as it were, the creativity of the average type who demands a definite individuality for himself and if necessary also creates it, an individuality that sanctions and so justifies and saves his individual will. The creative type on the contrary does not content himself with the creation of an individual. Instead he creates a whole world in his own image, and then needs the whole world to say “yes” to his creation, that is, to find it good and thus justify it.

In this sense, to create means to make the inner into outer, spiritual truth into reality, the ego into the world. Biological creating also represents an ego extension in the child, as the love creation represents a confirmation of ego in the “other,” but above all the spiritual psychic creation is a creation by itself in the work, the ego is opposed to the world and rules it thus in terms of its will. This manifestation of the ego will in the creation of the work is therefore not a substitute for sexuality and love, but rather both of them are attempts to occupy the creative drive really, attempts which with the creative type always result unsatisfyingly because they always represent forms of expression of the individual creative urge limited by alien counter-wills and accordingly insufficient. Moreover, creativity is not something which happens but once, it is the constant continuing expression of the individual will accomplishment, by means of which the individual seeks to overcome self-creatively the biological compulsion of the sexual instinct and the psychological compulsion to emotional surrender.

1 See the corresponding conclusions in Chapter V of “Will Therapy.”
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This conception of the creative will as a victory of the individual over the biological sexual instinct explains the guilt which the development and affirmation of the creative personality necessarily produces. It is this going beyond the limits set by nature as manifested in the will accomplishment to which the ego reacts with guilt. Only this guilt reaction makes completely intelligible the projection of the God idea by means of which the individual again subjects himself to a higher power. For the primitives who spiritualized the world, this was nature itself, for heroic man triumphing over nature it was the creative God made by himself, therefore his own will at once glorified, denied and justified, and finally for the man of our western culture, it is the really fateful powers of parental authority and love choice, to which he wishes to submit voluntarily, that is, ethically.

This entire conflict complex we find represented on a grand scale in the myth of the fall of man, which presents the level of knowledge on which consciousness wants to control and rule sexuality, that is, to use it for its own pleasure and satisfaction. The hero Adam is not punished because he exults in his Godlike knowledge, but because he wants to use it to force the sex instinct into the service of his individual will. It is not the father complex that can give us understanding here, as little as can the contrasting Greek figure Prometheus. It is just the reverse. The utilization of the sexual instinct in the service of the individual will on the basis of knowledge of good and evil, that is, the affirmation of the evil willing, brings suffering and punishment. The punishment consists in the loss of paradisical naïveté, of oneness with nature and her laws, and the recently won order among them. Adam is punished for not wanting to become a father and the punishment is the obligation to become one, that is, subordination under the compulsion of the biological sexual drive, in spite of knowledge of the moral problem which has branded the pleasure will as evil, and the attempt to overcome this morality through will affirmation.

The hero becomes thus the psychological representative of the creative man whose negative opposite we see before us in the neurotic type. The hero does not disown the parents in the sense of the Œdipus complex, that is, because he wants to put himself in the father’s place, but because he is the earthly representative of God, that is, of the creative will. Accordingly he has no children (which he would have to in the role of father) but expresses himself and his individual will in works, in heroic deeds. He knows no gratitude (toward parents) and no guilt feeling (toward others), but he has guilt which
derives from creating. Not that the fact that he wants to become the father or to be God gives him
guilt consciousness, but that he is God, that he occupies himself creatively, makes him guilty and
this guilt can only be atoned for through further performance and finally through death. I believe
moreover that the idea of hero formation, as explained in the material presented in the “Myth of
the Birth of the Hero” was strongly influenced by the discovery of the man’s share in
procreation. At all events the conscious comprehension of the male process of procreation seems
to signify a revolutionary turning point in the history of mankind.

A whole area of will and guilt psychology as the present day neurotic still shows, seems to me to
be grounded in the fact that man on the one hand could feel himself as a creator who creates
human beings (Prometheus), on the other hand could control this biological procreative act
consciously and thus utilize sexuality for mere pleasure gain (Adam’s knowledge?). Moreover,
the discovery of this connection gave the first real basis for the social and psychological father
concept, against whose recognition the individual defends himself even in the myth of the hero
with the denial of the father and the emphasis on the maternal role. Here is to be found perhaps a
powerful motive for the fact that God representing the individual ego-will took on fatherly
features at a certain period. The autonomous heroic individual could not endure and use the
biological dependence on an earthly progenitor and ascribed it all the more readily to the already
installed creator God who received in this way paternal features, which give psychological
expression to the hero’s self creation.

Moreover the first intimation of the individual love problem betrays itself here in the creation of
the woman from the man and in his own image. Here the woman is a product of the creative
man, who ascribes to himself this divine creative power and divine knowledge—like the Greek
Prometheus. We recognize therein the first faint beginnings of that magnificent process of
rivaling the Gods which we have understood psychologically as

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the gradual acknowledgment of the conscious individual will in the human being. It appears in a
glorious fashion in Greek culture with the heroes rebelling against the Gods, and reaches the
peak of its development in Christianity with the humanizing of God and the deifying of man. If
man had first to manifest his own creative will in the formation of God, but at the same time had
to justify it, so in the heroic period, at the other extreme, he fell into the deification of himself, of
his own individual will in order finally to deify and worship in the individual love experience,
the other individual who represents the creation and redemption of his own individual will.
Christianity as the religion of love and guilt unites all the conflicting elements of this will-guilt
problem in itself. It shows us in the humanizing of God, the continuation of “heaven” on earth. It
is still in the form of universal brotherhood as it also led away from individualism, for it created
a mass hero of such great sweep that every man could feel himself redeemed in and through him.

Our whole spiritual development is thus represented by the three levels, the Jewish, the Greek
and the Christian, which represent not only historical phases, but also psychological types, ways
of reacting and attitudes even of modern men. They correspond to the different attempts to solve the will-guilt problem, the real, the ideal and the spiritual. The biblical Jews were a rough, warlike nation of herdsmen who needed and created a strong willed, confident god of battle as an ego ideal. If one understands “Jahwe” as the personification of the hard and tenacious individual will of the wild herdman constantly fighting against enemies, then one recognizes in the Bible the first noble attempt of a victorious people arrived at stability and prosperity to dethrone their old god of war and to perceive themselves in his strong will. But after that, all that is accomplished and attained is ascribed to a creative God who earlier had only been a destructive one, and to whom the chosen people which feels itself as completely heroic, voluntarily submits. Thus the warlike Jewish people first sought their leader, embodied in the hero Moses, in a strong willed God, as later they sought in him the justification for all the horrors and conquests of war.

Also the Greeks originally had to fight hard for their existence and the few fertile spots open to them as the Iliad shows. Their

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reaction to final victory and prosperity was no late justification through the creation of an individual God, but an increase in the affirmation of individual self-feeling as we understand it in the myths of the heroes. No longer do the gods cause and guide war and the battles of heroes, but world happenings are influenced by the super-human passions, the strong wills of the heroes, who perish through their own passions, therefore of their own will. Only much later there enters here as reaction to this creative arrogance the hybrid, the creeping poison of consciousness of guilt, which we see the tragic poets transfer to the heroes themselves instead of ascribing it to the gods. In this sense Greek civilization actually represents the birth of individuality in human history. Man himself takes the place of God in the form of the self-ruling creative hero, a God whose first twilight appears here in his passive role of spectator. Accordingly also we have the excessive guilt feeling of the Greeks as it manifests itself particularly in tragedy as a reaction to the heroic phase. In the Greek tragic poet the hero, as it were, makes himself fully responsible for himself and pays, atones, with death.

Here lies their difference from the Jewish nation, which could keep and preserve the fruits of victory because they put the responsibility for it back on God. The Greek who recognized and acknowledged deed and guilt equally as an expression of his individual will came to grief in the tragic recognition of the will problem and self responsibility while the Jew converted the evil, destroying, recognition “therapeutically” into the moral compulsion of good and evil and made it concrete in a meaningful will prohibition, the decalogue, which protected him from stepping over the boundaries set for the individual will. Christianity, as an immediate reaction to Roman tyranny, representing paternal authority, presents in the symbolism of the rebellious son, the passive hero, who conquers, not by means of will assertion but by means of will submission, conquers spiritually even though corporeally, physically, he fails. Therewith the struggle is lifted from the sphere of the real to the unreal, while Greek culture had lifted it from the moral to the ethical. At the same time, in Christianity God is brought from the unreal sphere to the real, just
as with the Greek heroes, only still further humanized, as it were, made into a universal hero. In this sense Christianity is a

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reaction to and attempt at healing from the danger of individualism, as it had culminated in terms of will in the Roman autocratic system of father rule. If, therefore, the creative God was the strongest expression of the individual ego will, so the mild, forgiving God of the Christian faith is the strongest expression of the self depreciatory ego which presents itself in terms of the Roman ideology as son, that is, as creature and not as creator. Therewith at the same time, it tries to reprimand the father as creator and lifts the mother principle to a spiritual significance which it had not had formerly. Here the realization of the will principle as we see it in the Roman father rule begins to oppose the realization of the maternal love principle, which reaches its height in the individual love claim and love creation of the modern irreligious man.

Thus the hero formation emphasizes the divine in man, affirms, glorifies the individual creative power of will while religion formation seeks to deny it and shows man again as the creature who humbly subjects himself to the higher racial will. In this sense the Jews represent the religious; the Greeks the heroic; and Christianity the human solution of the will-guilt problem. The first is moralistic, the second ethical, the third spiritual. This is associated with the transformation of the guilt problem which again is dependent on the level of consciousness. With the Jews, God represents the will and the individual the guilt; with the Greeks the individual hero represents will and guilt; in Christianity God represents guilt and the individual subjects his will to the God conquered and overcome by himself. In the same degree that we see the will in the individual develop and then break, we can substantiate an analogous displacement and denial in the sphere of consciousness; with the Jews recognition of the moralistic solution as the saving of the individual; with the Greeks recognition of the ethical problem as the fall of the individual; in Christianity the recognition of the human problem as the abrogation of the individual, as release from the compulsion of the will and the torment of the conscious responsibility as creator. Accordingly Christianity puts the emotional experience of love in the center and brings the female principle again into a position of honor, in its symbolic meaning; the Greek puts the creative principle first, which leads to guilt, and therewith brings

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forward the individual artist, while the Jews represent the will principle and therewith paternal compulsion. Accordingly, force, freedom and love represent different reactions (by Jews, Greeks and Christians) to the will-guilt problem. Thus each of these culture groups represents a certain level of development of the will-guilt problem as it manifests itself in the individual also; the Jew, the conscious recognition of the paternal compulsion principle of morality; the Greek, the
creative recognition of the heroic principle of freedom; the Christian, the recognition of suffering, of the maternal love principle.

With this advance from divine projection to human justification of the individual will, the part of consciousness, especially in the developing recognition of self-consciousness, is of decisive importance. The first level, the projection of deity, presents as yet no conscious creating, rather an attempt to transfer the will expression represented in the wish phantasy in a magic form and way, to a personified ego whose will and counter-will correspond to the own will. In the active hero, who converts his conscious will into the deed, we glimpse the first recognition of the individual forming and reforming reality in accordance with his personal desires, who, however, like Œdipus, is destroyed as soon as he perceives his little human truth. Through increasing self-consciousness, therefore, the whole mechanism of will projection with simultaneous denial of willing, like will expression with simultaneous denial of knowledge, is dethroned, humanized, removed from God to man, from heaven to earth. It continues, however, on the earth, and in truth, in the love experience, and in the love relation, which again in the last analysis only represents an attempt to put the responsibility for our will and counter-will upon another, whom we make into a divinity and against whose will we revolt at the same time if it does not resemble our own and bow to it. Here, in the love relationship, in the recreation of the other after our own image, we again come up against the real counter-will of the other which we have evaded in such a cunning fashion in the creation of a God, for the divine will represented our own will and at the same time justified it.

Only in our occidental culture has God become creative, not merely conserving like the ancient Godheads who were themselves creatures, like their creators of that period, the ancients. This creative God, as the occidental systems of religion have evolved him, is not any longer mere projection but is himself a creative expression of the individual will, not just a father who does not create but only begets. This creative, omnipotent, omniscient God is the first great manifestation of the individual will, at the same time its denial and justification in the supraindividual world will, nature. The creation of God ensues cosmically, not in imitation of the dependence on parents which corresponds to a much later interpretation on a certain level of family organization. On the other hand, the primitive God who existed before the creative one was dangerous and destroying, a manifestation of the evil counter-will which, in the later systems, was ascribed to a negative deity, as we know it from Ahriman to the Christian “devil.” Against this original, destructive, hostile God, who is still preserved in the creator Jahwe, were gradually called upon for help, protective deities, who bore the maternal character, as for example, the Egyptian and even Athena in the Homeric world picture. The image of the creative God, as the highest developmental level of this ethical process, proceeds then from an overcoming of the evil counter-will to its affirmation in creative willing, but carries in addition the maternal conservative characteristics of preserving and protecting that which he creates. Only later and under the influence of our present and still persistent family and social organization and
in the service of its maintenance does God take on strong paternal characteristics, which correspond more to the external counter-will of the stronger than to the individual creative will. In this father God, who actually corresponds to a reduced, degenerate God of will, the individual grown equally proud in the spheres of will and consciousness, sets upon earth a strong real counter-will, which shall again keep within bounds the individual who demands for himself the divine power of will.

Perhaps the predominance of the father principle itself whose culmination in the Roman state was broken by Christianity, is to be understood psychologically just from the fact that the “father” represents the strong willed man who dares to ascribe to himself the divine prerogative and whose domination is accepted not only on the basis of force, but equally from the necessity of placing other earthly bounds to the all-powerful will of

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the ego which is always being put further back into the individual. It would be the psychological opposite of our conception of love as a humanizing of the self deifying tendency, since the father principle in its proper and psychological manifestations would correspond to a humanization of the negative side of will, of the counter-will. Be that as it may, at all events, for us the opposition of the mother and father principle as it has come to expression recently in the contrast of Bachhofen’s world view to that of Haller1 and in the various psychoanalytic interpretations, corresponds to the opposition between natural right and forced right, in other words between love and force, or psychologically speaking, between the positive will (mother) and counter-will (father). In other words, the father represents, as I have said before, only a symbol of the own actually inhibited will, but not the creative power of will as it is presented in the occidental God, creator of heaven and earth. Freud takes part in this denying rationalizing attempt of guilt conscious humanity in his theory, where, as it were, the individual will hides itself behind the father principle; hides in a double sense, quite as in the creation of God, for the father symbolizes the own will but the individual hypocritically denies his own will which he ascribes to the father in order to be able to subordinate himself to it. In this humble subordination of the weak helpless creature to the parental will, psychoanalysis is religious, in its actual domination of consciousness it is presumptuously heroic. That means that the analyst must pay for his likeness to God in knowledge and in creation (re-creation) of men, since he must represent the individual as such, including himself, as an unfree, powerless creature who, a pawn of his unconscious wishes and evil impulses, has lapsed into guilt.

This is not intended to be an attempt to present a psychoanalysis of Freud as, for example, Michaelis has recently undertaken, but it is a psychology of the creative man who must always be denying his godlike power of will in order to unburden himself of the creative guilt. Again we see how the special and the individual can only be understood on the grounds of the universal not the reverse. Just as the father concept in the social sense only

1 Bachhofen: Selbstdiographie und Antrittsrede über das Naturrecht. Edited and introduced by Alfred Bäumler, Halle 1927.
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represents the earthly personification of the own consciousness of will, so also the Œdipus complex is only a special instance of cosmic fate in which man wants to free himself from dependence on natural forces, and yet cannot deny his littleness and helplessness in the face of the universe. But the Œdipus complex is also a special case in another sense. For the child of our modern social organization, probably the parents represent the first will forces, as it were, his world, his cosmos, and this remains the incontestable psychological meaning of the parent relation. Very soon, however, the child grows beyond these family symbols of the will conflict to the perception of his own inner will conflict which soon goes beyond the external one in intensity and meaning. For the primitive man, on the other hand, nature itself which we now rule with our wills to a large extent, was the threatening external will power against which he found himself helpless and which he learned to fight and to rule with his will. Here is the place to seek the origin of all threatening and terrifying Gods and spirits who show their evil influence even deep within the Greek heroic world and against which they called upon maternal protective deities for aid. These, however, had a far more cosmic than feminine significance, that is, they called to their aid the conserving and preserving powers of nature against the evil destructive natural forces. For regardless of what one calls the cosmic preserving principle, the biologically dependent child of man understands it through the image of the mother while the father as symbol of will power not only emerges much later, but also belongs to a wholly different psychological plane, namely the sphere of conscious will.

Accordingly the evolution of the God concept moves from the personification of natural forces threatening the helpless and defenseless individual to the conserving maternal principle, under whose protection the individual first arrives at the strengthening and unfolding of his own will. The self representation of the same we see in the creative God, who represents the omnipotence of conscious will much more than the domination of the father whose biological procreative rule and whose social ascendancy lie as far from childish thinking as from primitive. The next and psychologically most interesting developmental level is characterized by the guilt concept attached to the creative God idea,

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which was lacking on the earlier level, because fear was then the driving force. The creative God corresponds to one side of the self representation of the conscious will power of the individual, but is at the same time an attempt at its denial and the throwing off of responsibility, and leads accordingly to creative guilt, which belongs to the will expression as such, manifested in the creation of God himself. We get here, from the understanding of the creation of the creative God, a glimpse into the psychology of a creator, of the occidental individual and his guilt problem.
ensuing from the individual will. This understanding continues into the further development of
the modern individual and his relation to the God concept, which concerns chiefly the guilt
problem from which we suffer, henceforth individually with a growing conscious knowledge of
this whole connection, so that no general salvation but only the individual happiness of each
separate person seems the solution.

The psychic process of dissolution in which we now find ourselves and as the extensive neurotic
type represents it, concerns not only the knowledge of the God creation as a projection and
justification of the individual will, but extends to the real representatives of this will conflict, the
moralistic parent authorities in the social sphere and the releasing love objects in the sexual. We
see here again how progress in knowledge hinders experiencing, in other words, how self-
consciousness inhibits will projection, for the creation of the creative God was not only a
manifestation and an expression of the creative individual will, but made possible to the
individual at the same time in its justification tendency, creative action on earth. In truth it all
happened in the service of religion, to the glory of God, but at least it did happen. All the creative
powers of the individual, both of an artistic and productive kind could unfold under the justifying
symbol of the creative God. This holds for the culture of the middle ages through the church
more than for the ancients, where the hero was still the representative of divine will power on
earth. With the general humanizing of God, as Christianity initiated it, the hero, the creative man,
becomes as it were a universal type, whose development culminates in the modern individualized
man, when actually each separate person is himself a God, a personality stamped with a strong
will. Now, instead of its leading to

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heightened creative will activity, as one might expect, we see this strong individualistic will in
the neurotic type directed as counter-will against itself and the fellow man and thus denying in
itself both itself and its own creative power.

The basis for this is easy to see in the light of what we have just said. With the knowledge and
the perception of the divine power of creation as his own individual power of will, the individual
must also take over the responsibility for it himself, and this leads necessarily to the ethical guilt
concept, which relates to willing itself and not like the moralistic guilt feeling, to any particular
content of will. The conscious knowledge of divine creativity leads therefore beyond an heroic
phase in which the individual voluntarily takes upon himself and affirms will and responsibility,
to a new erection of the rule of God on earth, as we recognized it in the love principle on the one
side and in the father principle on the other. Both correspond to current attempts to solve the will
conflict in reality, after its magnificent unreal solution in the God concept had been destroyed by
the knowing power of consciousness and the disintegrating force of self-consciousness. But this
twilight of the Gods now approaching its end is accompanied by a still more fatal and tragic
process, which one might designate as the disenthroning of the individual himself, the result of
which we have before us in the neurotic type with its guilt and inferiority feelings.
For the earthly attempts at justification of the individual will also are shattered by the power of the counter-will only to end finally in a kind of psychological “twilight of the ego,” with a tormenting hopelessness of the individual thrown upon his own resources. The basis for this, as has already been pointed out, is that something is lacking in all real attempts at solution of this will conflict which the unreal God creation, whose very faults actually made solution possible, did not have. It is this, the fact that the earthly representatives of the individual ego themselves have an own will and a counter-will against which our own constantly strike. The father or the parental authority represents not only a symbol of the child’s own will, but also—and probably equally early and strongly—a strange counter-will, which disturbs and restrains its own. In the love relation, which, as already noted, represents entirely individual creative activity, yes

exactly the creative activity of the individual as such, he runs against the same counter-will which wants to occupy itself creatively on him. This makes the conflicts of the modern man so difficult and deep because the inner will conflict cannot become released really through an external agent, but apparently is only to be temporarily and partially unburdened in the more suitable manner of unreal projection.

The neurotic human type of our time has therefore not only exploded the God illusion itself, but perceives the real substitute for it as we have recognized it in the parental authority and love objects to be unsatisfying for solving or even lessening the inner will conflict heightened through knowledge and intensified by self-consciousness. Knowledge, which we have understood as an intellectual will experience in terms of spiritual truth, leads therefore to taking the Gods from heaven and to the humanizing of the omnipotent creative will. The tormenting self-consciousness which again leads to the denial of the individual will thus affirmed, comes into the picture first when the will conflict is thrown back from the real personifications of it as we recognized them in the parent authorities and love objects, through the counter-will, upon the individual himself and this leads to the recognition of his own inner conflicts. However, this throwing back does not ensue as we consciously strive for it in the therapeutic experience, in a constructive fashion so that the individual can accept himself as conflicted, instead the actual conflict only shows the individual that he cannot find salvation from the evil will in the “other” either. The therapeutic value of the analytic situation as such lies in the fact that it affords the individual an unreal solution of his will conflict corresponding to the creation of God from the own will, but at the same time lets him experience in the actual emotional relation to the analyst and understand in this connection the real earthly parallel.

The therapeutic experience is thus only to be understood from the creative experience because it is itself a creative experience and in truth a very special form of it which we describe more fully and make intelligible elsewhere.1 Just as for the individual neurotic the therapeutic experience represents the last deliverance from the two-fold conflict of the negative denial of will and

1 See the chapter “Love and Force” in Book I of “Will Therapy.”
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destructive self-consciousness, so the creative type as such is the last salvation of human kind from the same inevitable neurotic conflict which we all work against. The creative man saves himself first of all from the neurotic chaos of will denial and self-consciousness since he affirms himself and his own creative will, which at once protects him in the growing advance of consciousness from falling into the inhibiting self-consciousness. He keeps for himself the capacity to manifest himself and his individual will creatively instead of denying and reacting to it with guilt consciousness. He expresses himself instead of knowing himself consciously, wills instead of knowing or knows that he wills and what he wills and lives it. His guilt consists in the fact of his release from common pressure, whether it be biological or moral, in his isolation, which however he can affirm creatively instead of having to deny it neurotically. His creativity cancels his guilt while the neurotic willing makes the individual guilt-conscious with its denial. Since he transforms the neurotic self-consciousness arising from the hypertrophied compulsive thinking into creative living again, that is, into individual will affirmation, he does isolate himself it is true, as an individual from his contemporaries who suffer from consciousness, but unites them again with positive natural forces, thus revealing at once the grandeur and strength of man.

The creative man is thus first of all his own therapist as which I have already conceived him in “Der Künstler,” but at the same time a therapist for other sufferers. Only he solves his individual will conflict in a universal form which does not satisfy the hyper-individualized type of our time. This type needs and desires no longer a common savior, but an individual one; he comes to the therapist, however, as soon as and because he has broken down in the individual therapy which the love experience affords. In analysis he tries again the unreal and real methods of salvation which no longer work for him because for his heightened and hypertrophied self-consciousness there is only one savior—and that is himself! In this sense the therapeutic experience, as I pointed out before, is to be understood only from the creative. For in the first place the therapist is a creator, and in truth almost a creative God, and not made so first by the patient. For he creates men in the Promethean sense, men who like himself have

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the creative will, but must deny it instead of being able to affirm it. And this is the second reason why the therapeutic experience is only to be understood from the creative. For the patient is also a creator, but a miscarried negative one and his powerful identification with the therapist arises from this, that at bottom he is the same and would like to possess creative power positively also. This therapeutic creation of men, which the patient on that account presents as a rebirth experience, cannot ensue on the basis of a general norm or a common ideal for which the neurotic type is just as unsuited as is the creative, and he cannot be educated to it either. The only
therapeutic possibility with our modern individual neurotic type is to permit him to develop and accept his own individuality, in other words, to allow the individual to mold himself into that which he is, that is, to affirm his own will and therewith his individuality. This can happen, however, only in an individual personal experience of therapy, where again we meet the guilt bound up with creation, the release of which presents the greatest difficulty for this individual type of therapy.

Since we are keeping these problems for presentation in “Will Therapy,” we turn in conclusion to one more universal viewpoint which is important not only for individual therapy, but also for the universal therapy of the creative type. We spoke of different phases and levels of the formation of religion and the creation of God, which certainly have a history, whose interesting evolution and many aspects we have no intention of giving here. These historical allusions are only a convenient help in the presentation of these complicated processes in the individual and serve merely to illustrate the point of view, which seems to me essential to the understanding of the individual structure and its reactions. We spoke of a period of evil deities, of protective gods, of will gods, of father gods, of the deifying of love and finally of self deification in the heroic man as well as of his negative, the self condemnation of the hyperconscious neurotic hemmed in by guilt feeling. All these and yet other phases, developmental levels and reactions we find to vary in the single individual himself at different periods of his development. I do not believe, however, that we are able to understand the historical development in the past through projecting backwards or drawing conclusions a

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posteriori from the individual. Rather it would perhaps he possible that the past, if we should understand it from its own time, might light up many an individual of the present who seems to be going through similar phases, not only in terms of an ontogenetic repetition of the phylogenetic as it lies at the basis of the Jungian concept of the “collective” unconscious, but from his own will conflict, which, in contact with the outer reality of his fellow men and with the inner reality of his own consciousness and development manifests itself in similar fashion. We are concerned therefore with parallel phenomena as the ancient world picture conceived it in the opposition of microcosm and macrocosm, not with causal connections as they underlie the concept of phylogenesis, whether one undertakes to explain the past from the individual or vice versa wants to understand the individual from the past. For the guilt is no accumulated guilt, neither historical nor individual and all attempts thus to explain it represent a misuse of the natural science principle of causality in the service of will justification. Guilt arises in and from the individual and must continue to produce evil if the individual uses it for the justification of his evil will, when it appears as neurotic guilt consciousness and not as creative guilt which can be atoned for through new creation.
VII

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“I drink not from mere joy in wine nor to scoff at faith—no, only to forget myself for a moment, that only do I want of intoxication, that alone.”

—Omar Khayyam

At this point we leave the historical and typological methods of comparison which forced themselves upon us as parallel phenomena in considering creation as a continuous ongoing and developing life process, and return to those spiritual states which always emerge in the individual as reactions to the will-guilt conflict as we have described it, and influence and determine its manifestations decisively. The longing for happiness and redemption dwelling in all of us can only be expressed as a momentary present life value for the individual and can only be understood from that viewpoint. Accordingly we see the need for happiness and redemption in humankind becoming always more individualized. Upon the religious justification and the heroic ethical solution of the will-guilt problem, there follows the effort to find individual redemption in the emotional love experience, which gives this developmental phase value not only historically, but also individually for the particular person with whom it characterizes childhood, puberty and maturity. We need for the understanding of these parallel phenomena no phylogenetic causality, but only the will causality of the individual from which the same reactions always follow with psychological necessity. In the course and progress of the latter we have discovered, in addition to the principle of will causality, another principle derived from it which has helped determine the gradual transformation of the concepts of happiness and redemption decisively. This is the “Realisierungsprinzip”¹ which in distinction from the “reality principle”

¹ This term has no suitable equivalent in English. It means a making real, a literal “realizing” in contradistinction to the static “reality principle.”

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of Freud has a dynamic significance inasmuch as it views reality, not as something given once and for all to which the individual adapts himself more or less, but as something which has come into being, yes, is continuously becoming.

We have illustrated this principle of the gradual and continuously changing realization of the unreal and the reverse process of making the real unreal which parallels it, in the evolution of the idea of God. This develops in humanity and in the individual from the projection of the most real principle of all, namely, the will, in the unreal concept of God, to the real personification of the counter-will in the father principle, and of positive willing in the love principle. Our scientifically oriented era, however, has driven this “Realisierungsprinzip” still further toward its denial in the moralistic parent ideology, and the ethical love ideology since it would make the spiritual itself real, a last despairing attempt which we see culminate in the psychoanalytic world
view. At the same time we see the neurotic type of our time suffering from the loss of all illusions, breaking away from the psychoanalytic therapy which makes the will concrete and justifies the guilt really, and striving after new spiritual experiences, as indicated in parallel attempts toward a new orientation of psychology in terms of total personality and total experience. This reaction of the spiritual against the psychological seems to me to correspond to a reaction against the whole scientific ideology to whose practical consequences and activities man reacts on the one side with guilt, as to all of his will consequences, while on the other he flees to spiritual reality, that is, to emotional experience in order to find there salvation from will as well as from consciousness.

Whatever the need for happiness and salvation may have meant to the men of an earlier age, for the hyperconscious, will-restricted neurotic type of today they represent the attempts to get free of the conscious will-ego temporarily or permanently, in a word, they strive for an abrogation of the individualism from whose isolating consequences we suffer. As always, the man of earlier times sought to win happiness and salvation or to imagine it, while for us, after the failure of the common attempts to make real or unreal as they lie before us in religion and science, there remains only the individual solution carried out in the love experience, whose failure has led finally to the most individualistic form of therapy. Already the hypertrophied self-consciousness of the neurotic type begins to recognize this latest illusion of an individual therapy as affording neither happiness nor salvation. This recognition, however, like all psychological knowledge, is no creative one in terms of a pleasurable will affirmation but a painful becoming conscious, a disillusioning awareness of all these connections which we do not will to know for the sake of knowledge, but which we have to know because no other course remains open to us. In order to comprehend this process of decay in all illusions, the unreal as well as the real, in its full bearing, and to understand the inherent need of modern man for redemption, we must examine it, especially in the three aspects which it offers us today, namely, its relation to sexuality, to the emotional life, and to the consciousness of the individual.

In relation to sexuality, we find that the modern man no longer understands and experiences the sexual purely biologically, but as we have explained, uses it morally as the essential content of the will and guilt problem, which inevitably contributes to the formation of the neurotic conflict. From this it follows that he has also attached the need for happiness and redemption to the sexual content, insofar as it is to free him from the compulsion of the moralistic. In other words, having utilized sexuality psychologically, he now wants to use it spiritually. Originally sexuality had as little to do with morality as with redemption, but its original biological meaning does not explain its modern role and function. In its psychological meaning as will accomplishment, which it represents for both sexes, sexuality can probably afford happiness, insofar as happiness is perception of pleasure, that is, a brief consciousness of will accomplishment itself. However it can afford no salvation that aims at the dissolution of, or escape from individuality, from the conscious self, because it is sex that emphasizes difference in the highest degree and accordingly
can only be pleasurable, that is, affording happiness, when the individual, man or woman, is able to affirm his individuality and its will. This the neurotic is not able to do and accordingly sexuality affords him not even the happiness of a brief self forgetting but only increases his awareness of difference, that is, increases his guilt consciousness. Sexuality tends to make possible

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for him a flight from consciousness instead of enjoyment of the will achievement in consciousness, which constitutes the essence of pleasure. Sexuality with this opposition of sex and will becomes the symbol of inner conflict instead of release therefrom. For him this real solution with the freedom of will in the love choice and its justification through the “other” becomes the compulsion of racial will which the “other” represents for the individual will, and to which, accordingly, the counter-will reacts negatively.

The erotic emotional experience lifts these difficulties found in the physical sex relation to a certain level in the releasing happiness of love but shatters on other grounds in the final solution of the conflict as well as in the redemption of the individual from it. In the emotional experience the individual yields primarily through his own emotion, so that the giving up to the other is no subjection of the will actually, but only the consequence of his own voluntary softening of the will. The emotional experience represents therefore a kind of attempt at self redemption which actually aims at independence of the other will and object and also strives not for the other’s subjection, but its own subjection. This giving in of will holds for both sexes, exactly as the physical sex act means for both sexes will accomplishment. The conflict re-enters in the emotional sphere when the will opposes the yielding to the other, so that the individual who finds salvation in his own emotional yielding finally strives after redemption from this individual emotional compulsion as he formerly strove after release from the racial sex compulsion in the emotional love experience.

Here again we see that the need of man for happiness and redemption not only changes with different historical and individual developmental phases but that, exactly as does the spiritual content of truth, it varies in terms of the momentary will and guilt picture. From what serves today as a means to salvation, the individual at once, or tomorrow, wants to be saved as soon as this form of salvation becomes compulsory. This situation is most highly complicated in the sphere of consciousness in which, finally, all these conflicts manifest themselves. If consciousness in its original function as the instrument of will affirms the latter’s achievement, then it mediates the sensation of

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pleasure, but the pleasure experience then struggles after rescue from the quality of consciousness, begrudging its momentariness, and seeks to make happiness a salvation. This pleasure, which in Nietzsche’s meaning wants eternity, as it struggles loose from time conditioned consciousness becomes pain when consciousness does not affirm the will but denies it and so leads to guilt consciousness instead of consciousness of pleasure. The longing for redemption, then, has to do with guilt consciousness as a tormenting form of self-consciousness which originally mediates pleasure through affirmation of the will.

We find ourselves through this discussion in the midst of the whole problem of redemption which, depending on circumstances, is connected with will or consciousness, pleasure or guilt. We notice here also that happiness and redemption, at least as we understand them in the modern individual, actually represent opposites and not merely different degrees of a longing directed toward the dissolution of individuality. For the achievement of happiness represents a peak of individualism and its pleasurable will affirmation through personal consciousness while the longing for salvation, on the contrary, strives after the abrogation of individuality, for likeness, unity, oneness with the all. Accordingly happiness is only to be attained in the will accomplishment, salvation only in the abrogation of will through emotion. But this giving up of will, although it is also pleasurable, is only achieved through guilt feeling from which state redemption is then sought in turn. In this sense, the feeling of happiness releases only temporarily from will compulsion, while what we seek is the actual lasting release from tormenting guilt consciousness. Here we come upon the time element whose quantitative aspect is not only determining for the feeling of happiness and redemption, but in general represents the central factor of consciousness itself and therewith of spiritual life as such. For all our spiritual tendencies, from whatever standpoint one may view them, can be understood finally like life itself, temporally. With all so-called psychic mechanisms, we have to do ultimately with the shortening or prolonging of psychic states; to shorten to the point of nothingness, as, for example, denial does, or to prolong to infinity as in the belief in immortality. The situation, however, is not so simple as that we merely want to prolong

pleasurable conditions and shorten unpleasurable ones; we here strike the paradox that the individual wants to prolong the pleasure whose essence lies just in its temporal limitation, which must miscarry in the same way as the shortening of pain, whose essence lies in the prolongation of any psychic state, even one that is pleasurable in the beginning. For pleasure is a certain brevity of consciousness, pain a lengthening of consciousness, at least on the level of neurotic self-consciousness, where consciousness disturbs experience in the form of self-consciousness and guilt consciousness and accordingly the individual wants to be saved from it.

Therefore from the standpoint of the psychology of emotions, consciousness shows itself as a time problem in the sense that time represents the form of consciousness and by means of this time factor makes the different contents pleasurable or painful. Will as the constant driving force strives accordingly to prolong its pleasurably perceived affirmation through consciousness, to
make the feeling of happiness lasting, that is, redeeming. Insofar as this prolongation succeeds, it is perceived as painful because compulsory and thus the individual wants again to get free of the spirits which he himself has called up. Thus sex pleasure which does away with the inner will conflict pleasurably through realization, is intended to be made lasting through the love emotion; this emotional dependence, however, is perceived as compulsory and the individual strives for release through conscious effort of will which leads to guilt feeling, and from which again salvation is sought in the sphere of unconsciousness. Here belong all ideas of salvation with eternal duration from the Buddhistic Nirvana to the Christian immortality, which, however, only strive after a redemption from tormenting self-consciousness and have as little to do with actual biological death as Freud’s “death instinct.” For the painful reality from which the individual wants to get free is his own consciousness in the form of self-consciousness and release is sought in the overcoming of the temporal form of consciousness, that is, in permanence or eternity symbols, for which procreation and death as contents given in the biological process have always been preferred.

Man felt himself immortal as long as he knew nothing of time, as long as he had no time consciousness. This is the meaning of

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the myth of the fall which represents symbolically this human destiny generally as the guilt of knowledge while the Greek myth attaches the transition from the immortal God to mortal man in almost psychological formulation to the breaking in of time consciousness. Uranos, the eternal God of heaven, is emasculated by Kronos, a symbol of time and temporal duration which from that point on had dominion over the world and men. If Freud had named the basal complex here after the hero instead of the content, he would have recognized in the “Kronos complex” what is perhaps the most important and powerful complex for the modern man. With him the time problem as a psychological determinant enters into human consciousness and its development. The eternal biological principle of procreation which the myth represents cosmically in the love union of heaven with earth, breaks through in human self-consciousness in the form of time consciousness. From then on human ideas of salvation take on the character of eternity which culminates in the blessed life of the Christian kingdom of heaven. The psychological recognition of the time problem as the form of human consciousness, therefore, leads away from the brief instinct satisfaction of happiness, to the eternal lasting peace of blessedness, that is, to redemption. Human ideas of redemption have a development and a history and this history, as always, has been interpreted and misinterpreted as long as men, in ignorance of the will-guilt problem lying at their roots, played the one of the two factors against the other instead of recognizing them in their essential relationship and interaction. Redemption, according to the constellation of this conflict can relate now to will, another time to guilt, and finally also to consciousness. In relation to the time problem, however, will, guilt and consciousness maintain themselves differently, for the will, however one comprehends or interprets it, remains a constantly operating force, while consciousness above all is a quality, a state, and as such is passive and temporary, yes momentary. The feeling of pain, which manifests itself psychically as
guilt feeling, arises from the attempts to unite these two incommensurable powers. In order to understand all the possibilities arising here in their historical development as well as individually, we must insert again a bit of will psychology and trace the opposing effect of the three factors, will, consciousness,

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and guilt feeling upon one another. The problem is considerably complicated, but is for the first time psychologically interesting through the fact that the will in the different levels of development through which it goes from the negative to the positive and creative, reacts upon the individual himself, upon what he has overcome and become.

In the relation of will to consciousness there is a naïve phase of development in which the two are one, as once probably the conscious individual will was one with the biological life impulse which it only represented and affirmed. The first developmental phase of the individual will, as it manifests itself in counter-will, corresponds to a “not willing,” because one must; the second phase, that of positive will expression, corresponds to a “willing” what one must; the third creative phase, to a willing of that which one wants. The first phase corresponds to consciousness that one wills (against the compulsion of the other will); the second phase to a contentual knowing of that which one wills (because one must); the third creative phase binds the ego consciousness to the first with the positive will expression of the second, but corresponds in content not to a “must,” but to a “self-willed.” On the first level, we perceive guilt feeling as a consequence of counter-will; on the second level we have guilt consciousness because we deny the own will, since we interpret willing as compulsion, we will, either not knowing what we will (content repression or rationalization) or that we will at all (dynamic denial). The third level, finally, creates guilt through conscious affirmation and expression of the own will and its personal content.

Thus consciousness and guilt which originally cooperate in the service of the negative will expression and the creative will achievement, finally place themselves inhibitingly in the way of will itself, yes call a halt to human will as such in neurotic guilt consciousness. All man’s longing for happiness and redemption corresponds then to a spontaneous therapeutic attempt either to unite harmoniously once more this insoluble opposition of will and consciousness that manifests itself as consciousness of guilt or to separate them entirely. Both must miscarry. In the harmonious union, in the working together of will with consciousness which affirms the will, we sense, it is true, the feeling of happiness, but this can only be brief in duration and its

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lengthening can never be attained in continuous consciousness, therefore redemption is sought in
unconsciousness, which involves a separation of the feeling of happiness from the temporal form of consciousness. Accordingly we have ever after the tendency to make-eternal which manifests itself in the different spheres of will, consciousness and guilt, whether we would immortalize pleasure in emotion, self-consciousness in truth or the ego in creative work. All these self perpetuation tendencies correspond to the positive beneficent spontaneous therapies as we trace them in religious and love emotions on the one hand, in creative knowledge and artistic creation on the other. They do not all lead to redemption, however, because they always depend on the affirmation of consciousness and accordingly are limited temporally.

The actual redemption ideas which aim at eternal duration and a deliverance from consciousness can only be understood through guilt feeling, to the overcoming of which belongs release from will just as much as release from consciousness because it is just from the opposing reactions of these two that the tormenting self-consciousness arises. The effect of guilt feeling on the conscious will extends from will restraint in the ethical sense beyond the crippling of will of the neurotic to the denial of will as Schopenhauer above all others has described it in all its appearances, including the destruction of will in self murder. Both exhaustively and magnificently the same philosopher has handled the eternal longing of man for salvation from this tormenting will. But Schopenhauer has been driven by emphasis on the guilt problem into pessimism, like Freud who finally followed him in this, so that there is no redemption except that of eternal nirvana, which Freud interpreted biologically as death instinct. This solution of the will problem to which Schopenhauer as we know was led by the Hindu religious philosophy, corresponded to the Hindu soul, which in the Buddhistic doctrine constituted the highest deification of human consciousness, and its ideal of redemption accordingly pictures a release from an overcoming by consciousness through the all-powerful will. Schopenhauer, from the emphasis on guilt feeling, to which the Hindus give expression in the doctrine of transmigration of souls, has carried over his longing for salvation from consciousness to the will. Freud finally valued consciousness at first as a releasing source of healing against the sexual will in order finally to strike against guilt feeling as the insuperable obstacle. Nietzsche, who sought neither philosophic truth nor therapeutic illusions, but presented himself creatively, had the advantage of finding in the affirming will expression of self creation, the only redemption from will. For the neurotic human type, however, who suffers from consciousness and guilt feeling, salvation is to be found only in will denial as he can no longer find it in the temporary abrogation of consciousness in ecstatic states (and such is the creative act of will also). With him then the desire for redemption relates to the will to live in Schopenhauer’s sense, to the instinct for life in Freud’s meaning, speaking psychologically, to the will itself, but only because he cannot get free from the knowledge of it and the guilt consciousness following therefrom.

This leads then to the real task of individual psychotherapy, whose chief difficulty for me—like that of education—seems to lie in this, that both parties with their different psychologies have
correspondingly different goals. On the level of individual therapy this opposition is shown in
the fact that therapist and patient have a different salvation ideology. The therapist, as the strong
will type who wants to create man in his own image, like the educator, sees salvation in getting
loose, in the freeing from the compulsion of the evil will, whose self creative affirmation he
denies at the same time in the therapeutic ideology of helping; the guilt springing therefrom he
tries to dissipate through release from willing. The neurotic patient, on the contrary, who already
suffers from will denial which he can no longer idealize through any illusion seeks not release
from will but from consciousness which torments him in the form of guilt consciousness. He no
longer wants to know, to know otherwise or better, but not to know at all, much more needs to be
brought through emotional experience to positive will expression and affirmation, while the
therapist just the reverse seeks the release from creative will in conscious knowledge. Since I
reserve for another connection the further presentation and development of this

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contrast in the psychology of the helper and the patient, so important for the therapy and theory
of the neuroses,1 I now turn again to the universal spontaneous therapies as they lie before us in
the happiness and redemption ideologies of humanity. For the same contrast in the psychology of
both happiness and redemption-seeking individuals as we discover it in the artificial therapeutic
situation, is maintained in the universal therapeutic power which the sexual and love life of men
has become in the course of evolution. Here both sexes enjoy the beneficent feeling of will
accomplishment, corresponding to the individual and sexual personality, but they find also
release from individual consciousness in the temporary ecstatic self-forgetting of sensuous
delirium and emotional yielding, and finally free themselves from guilt through the creation of
the child as a generic function which is then transformed into an individual creation in bringing it
up.

This blessedness through harmonious working together of all three spheres is found, however,
only in the ideal love experience, which is not only limited in time as is all experience of
happiness, but for the most part only endures for a brief period, as it shatters in the conflict of the
two individual wills. As happiness means the consciousness of will attainment, it is not only
brief in accordance with its own nature, but also is bound to reality, that is, to the overcoming of
an external obstacle, a resistance, while redemption seeks a purely inner state of equal
importance, which shall make the ego independent of the outer world. With the attempt of the
individual to make the short-lived condition of happiness lasting, that is “saving,” the pleasure
quality is not only withdrawn from it as already pointed out, but the external resistance belonging
to it is made permanent. In the individual love experience, which owes its possibility only to a
favorable conjunction of the most diverse factors, the difficulty just pointed out manifests itself
in this way, that the strange will finally becomes an external representative of the own counter-
will instead of leading to an inner dissipation of it. In other words, the inner dualism showing
itself as opposition between the racial sexual instinct and the conscious individual will, finds in
the duality of the sexes only an external symbol—not the reverse.

1 See “Will Therapy,” Book II.
That is to say, the dualism of the self-conscious individual no longer rests on the developmental level of bisexuality lying behind it for aeons, which would let us sleep peacefully if we had not developed in ourselves as consequence of the will-guilt conflict, the will to conquer the other and the longing for will subjection in emotional yielding, which we then interpret from within the will psychology in terms of sexual ideology as masculine and feminine.

The shattering of the human longing for happiness and redemption even in its highest individualistic form, in the love experience, leads finally to a form of salvation characteristic of the modern man, which I would like to designate quite generally as “therapeutic.” Therewith it becomes clear that this salvation tendency concerns guilt consciousness, for the making happy of the other releases from guilt and thus makes the individual himself happy. This therapeutic redemption ideology characterizes not only the love life of our time which itself is only an expression of it, but alone makes intelligible the meaning of individual psychotherapy of our present cultural life. For on the one side we see the particular person in search of salvation shatter on this individualized Christian sacrifice ideology; while on the other hand the modern type of psychotherapist who gradually succeeds the priest, has to thank the same ideology of redemption-of-the-other for his origin and steady growth. And while we previously found in the difference of the redemption ideologies of patient and therapist, a difficulty for successful treatment, here the fundamental likeness of their psychic structure, however positively and negatively expressed, proves to be a hindrance.

The neurotic type suffers in this, that he seeks to realize his longing for salvation only in the beatification of the other, for that is the form adequate to the modern man, in which the individual seeks release from his guilt; just so, however, it is the right form for the psychotherapist to seek his release from will in helping, in sacrifice for the other. However, the gratification which both strive for cannot be won in this way, but only through positive will accomplishment, while salvation is attainable in general only independently of the object. This mixture of

1 Compare the introductory conclusions of Book I in “Will Therapy.”

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happiness and salvation-need, as it manifests itself clearly only in the therapeutic situation, is the characteristic mark of modern type who was described as neurotic. As he negates happiness, which the individual will affirmation is, in consequence of ethical will denial, he must upset the individual love therapy of which he is still capable only in terms of the just described salvation ideology of sacrifice for the other. In other words, he seeks to transform the possibility of
happiness which lies in will achievement in opposition to the other, into a moralistic justification of will through the other, on the basis of which alone he could (for the first time) accept happiness. Thus the love relation with the modern neurotic type has become a moralistic, yes, if you will, a religious problem, at least in the psychological sense of the word, as he can no longer experience directly and immediately the possibility of happiness which lies in the love experience because of ethical will conflict, but must transform it into an individual release from moralistic compulsion. The love emotion of the modern neurotic is not a powerful will affirmation which leads to a feeling of happiness, but a therapeutic attempt at saving from the compulsion of the will-guilt conflict with the help of the other who as a rule is himself no therapist and hopes for the same release.

After the shattering of the universal redemption therapies, as they appear notably in religion with all its ramifications in art, philosophy and science, individual salvation for which the modern type strives, is to be found only in individual happiness, but this cannot be accepted because of the ethical guilt conflict of the individual. Love, whose failure as individual redemption therapy is now evident, was the last attempt to transform the individual possibility of happiness with the other into an individual salvation through the other. While happiness can only be found individually and then also means individual redemption, in its essence redemption is only to be found universally because it comes to a climax just in the abrogation of individuality. If individuation has advanced so far that the individual can no longer find salvation in the universal through the universal ideologies, but must seek them individually, then there remains no other possibility of salvation except the release from individual self-consciousness in death. This destructive form of

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salvation as it is manifested in the growing tendency to suicide of the modern individual, represents indeed the greatest victory of the individual will over the life impulse and all ethical inhibitions, but no longer works therapeutically, not even when, as in psychoanalytic theory, it is presented in the scientific garb of a death instinct. For with men even the biological factors are placed in large measure under the control of will and thus certainly are also exposed to the danger of manifesting themselves destructively because of the guilt problem. We know just from psychoanalytic experiences that men can sicken and die when they will it, that, however, just as often in a miraculous fashion they can escape death—if they will it. It is just this conflict of the individual will with the biological compulsive forces that constitutes the essentially human problem, in its creative as in its destructive manifestations.

If the will is affirmed and not negated or denied, there results the life instinct, and happiness, like salvation, is found in life and experience, in the creation and acceptance of both without having to ask how, whither, what and why. Questions which originate from the division of will into guilt consciousness and self-consciousness cannot be answered through any psychological or philosophic theory for the answer is the more disillusioning, the more correct it is. For happiness can only be found in reality, not in truth, and redemption never in reality and from reality, but
only in itself and from itself.
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